{ "id": 9187920, "name": "PATRICIA S. LOMBARDI, Plaintiff v. DONALD C. LOMBARDI, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Lombardi v. Lombardi", "decision_date": "2003-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA02-474", "first_page": "540", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 N.C. App. 540" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "241 N.J. Super. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 350146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/241/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 A.2d 1091", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 N.J. Super. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 900161 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/178/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.J. Super. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 752001 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" }, { "page": "649" }, { "page": "603-04" }, { "page": "649" }, { "page": "604" }, { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/287/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.J. Super. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 340324 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "1012" }, { "page": "1096" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/316/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 A.2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.J. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 341849 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/88/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.J. Stat. Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798444 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9248714 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0074-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 12335, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.21537819386381213 }, "sha256": "2e52c0b4af0258663bf6fc4f580d12b00c485cfead1b597a45807c103c92f104", "simhash": "1:4bbd47e78248f2f0", "word_count": 2023 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:20.581695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "PATRICIA S. LOMBARDI, Plaintiff v. DONALD C. LOMBARDI, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nPlaintiff Patricia S. Lombardi and defendant Donald C. Lombardi were divorced in New Jersey in 1984. As part of the divorce, the New Jersey court ordered that defendant pay a fixed sum per week for the support of the parties\u2019 daughter, who is mentally retarded. Plaintiff later moved to North Carolina, and defendant registered the child support order here and requested that his child support obligations be terminated under North Carolina law. The trial court agreed, finding that North Carolina did not require defendant to continue to support his daughter. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff and defendant were married in July 1963 and divorced by judgment of divorce filed in April 1984 in New Jersey. The parties have a daughter Corinne, born May 1964, who is mentally retarded. The judgment of divorce required defendant to pay $50 per week for Corinne\u2019s support.\nBy order of the New Jersey superior court dated May 2, 1988, the court found that Corinne was unable to be employed full time and therefore was deemed unemancipated. Defendant was ordered to continue to pay $50 per week as support. On June 2, 1998, the New Jersey court increased defendant\u2019s support obligation to $150 per week. The court again indicated in its order that Corinne was une-mancipated. Defendant filed a request for reconsideration, which the court denied in July 1998.\nAfter entry of the 1998 order, plaintiff moved from New Jersey to North Carolina. Defendant moved from New Jersey to Maryland. On September 25, 2001,' defendant filed in North Carolina a notice of registration of foreign support order with the New Jersey court\u2019s orders attached. He also filed a motion in the district court to terminate his child support obligation. At the hearing on January 25, 2002, the court terminated defendant\u2019s child support obligation because it found that Corinne was no longer eligible for child support under North Carolina law.\nPlaintiff appeals.\nANALYSIS\nA.\nBefore us is a child support order, originally entered by a New Jersey court pursuant to that state\u2019s law. Currently, none of the parties live in New Jersey; plaintiff and Corinne live in North Carolina, and defendant lives in Maryland. Defendant has registered the support order in North Carolina and is attempting to modify it in a North Carolina court. Accordingly, we must decide whether the district court in North Carolina properly modified the order issued in New Jersey to comply with North Carolina law.\nThe Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (\u201cUIFSA\u201d), codified as Chapter 52C of the North Carolina General Statutes, sets out procedures for the interstate establishment, enforcement, and modification of child and spousal support obligations. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-1-103 official commentary (2001); Butler v. Butler, 152 N.C. App. 74, 78, 566 S.E.2d 707, 709 (2002). UIFSA governs the proceedings involving any foreign support order registered in North Carolina after January 1, 1996, UIFSA\u2019s effective date. Welsherv. Rager, 127 N.C. App. 521, 527, 491 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1997)..\nOnce a foreign child support order has been registered in North Carolina, it can be modified by a North Carolina court only if the issuing state has lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-2-205 and official commentary (2001). For that to occur, (1) neither the parties nor the child may still reside in the issuing state; (2) the party seeking modification must be a nonresident of North Carolina; and (3) the respondent must be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the North Carolina court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 52C-2-205, 6-611. As indicated above, all three elements are met here, which means that New Jersey, the issuing tribunal, has lost its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its support order.\nOnce North Carolina has obtained modification jurisdiction, our courts must apply the law of the forum \u2014 with one exception. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-611(c), a \u201ctribunal of this State may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state.\u201d In other words, subsection (c) prevents the modification of any final, nonmodifiable aspect of the original order. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-611(c) official commentary (2001).\nHere, the only aspect of the New Jersey order that plaintiff claims to be final and nonmodifiable is the New Jersey court\u2019s determination that Corinne was unemancipated. Under North Carolina law, in the absence of an agreement otherwise, a parent is no longer required to pay for child support for a dependent child, regardless of disability, once that child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from secondary school or until the age of 20 if still enrolled in secondary school or its equivalent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c).\nNew Jersey law, to the contrary, sets no fixed age at which the obligation to pay child support terminates. Rather, the demonstrable needs of the child, not the child\u2019s age, determine the duty of support. N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 2A34-23 (indicating that support is based on the court\u2019s determination of what the \u201ccircumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just\u201d). New Jersey recognizes that the age of majority is eighteen years. N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 9:17B-3. However, the child\u2019s reaching that age has no bearing on the duration of or limitation to parents\u2019 obligations to support a child. Duration is a question of fact that hinges on the court\u2019s determination of whether or not the child is emancipated. \u201cWhether a child is emancipated at age 18, with the correlative termination of the right to parental support, depends upon the facts of each case.\u201d Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038 (1982).\nWe do not believe that the New Jersey court\u2019s determination that Corinne was unemancipated is a final, nonmodifiable term of the order. Our careful review of New Jersey case law reveals that New Jersey courts do not regard a finding of emancipation as permanent and instead view it as a fact-specific inquiry dependent upon the \u201cintricacies and various operative facts of each matter.\u201d Monmouth County Div. of Social Servs. v. C.R., 316 N.J. Super. 600, 616, 720 A.2d 1004, 1012 (1998). For example, in Bishop v. Bishop, the New Jersey court engaged in a detailed inquiry before concluding that the child, a twenty-year-old cadet enrolled at the United States Military Academy at West Point, was emancipated. 287 N.J. Super. 593, 604, 671 A.2d 644, 649 (1995). The court found that the cadet, as an active-duty member of the United States Army, owed his allegiance to the president of the United States as commander of chief of the military, not to his parents. Id. at 603-04, 671 A.2d at 649. The government, not the parents, provided for all the cadet\u2019s educational needs and virtually all his material requirements, such as food, housing, and medical care. Id. In sum, because the mother \u201crelinquished any remaining control and responsibility over her son,\u201d by virtue of the son\u2019s enrollment at West Point, the father was held to be relieved from his support obligations for the child. Id. at 604, 671 A.2d at 649.\nIn fact, New Jersey courts have specifically held that emancipation is not an immutable concept. In Sakovits v. Sakovits, 178 N.J. Super. 623, 429 A.2d 1091 (1981), the court explained that \u201c[w]hen a declaration of emancipation is entered, all a judge has before him are the facts as they exist at that time.\u201d Id. at 631, 720 A.2d at 1096. Accordingly, the court held that even though a child may have been declared emancipated at one time, circumstances may change, such that a previously emancipated child is no longer emancipated and the parents in a given case may be required to contribute to the college education of the child. Id.; see also Balding v. Balding, 241 N.J. Super. 414, 418, 575 A.2d 66, 68 (1990).\nIn sum, we conclude that since the New Jersey court\u2019s finding that Corinne was unemancipated is not a final, nonmodifiable part of the order, its determination that defendant owes support is also modifiable. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-611, the North Carolina court can modify the support order to comply with North Carolina law such that defendant is no longer required to pay for Corinne\u2019s support. Further, \u201c[o]n issuance of an order modifying a child support order issued in another state, a tribunal of this State becomes the tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-611(d).\nB.\nPlaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order. We disagree.\nAs set forth above, under UIFSA, the North Carolina court can modify the New Jersey court\u2019s determination that Corinne was une-mancipated. In so doing, the court applies North Carolina law. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52C-6-611(b) & (c). North Carolina law is clear that, absent a contrary agreement, a parent is no longer responsible for child support for a dependent child who has reached the age of 18 and graduated from secondary school or until the age of 20 if still enrolled in secondary school or its equivalent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c). The North Carolina General Assembly has established no exception for disabled children. Id. Accordingly, we must conclude that the trial court had no choice but to declare Corinne ineligible for continuing child support. An evidentiary hearing was not required.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert L. Inge, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Mary R. Blanton, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICIA S. LOMBARDI, Plaintiff v. DONALD C. LOMBARDI, Defendant\nNo. COA02-474\n(Filed 6 May 2003)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 foreign support order \u2014 modification\u2014emancipation\nThe trial court did not err in a child support modification case by concluding that North Carolina did not require defendant father to continue his child support obligations of a foreign support order originally entered by a New Jersey court under that state\u2019s laws regarding the parties\u2019 mentally retarded daughter who was born in May 1964, because: (1) New Jersey had lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order because defendant father now lives in Maryland and plaintiff mother and the daughter reside in North Carolina; (2) contrary to New Jersey law which sets no fixed age at which the obligation to pay child support terminates but looks at the demonstrable needs of the child, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) provides that in the absence of an agreement otherwise, a parent is no longer required to pay for child support for a dependent child regardless of disability once that child reaches the age of eighteen and graduates from secondary school or until the age of twenty if still enrolled in secondary school or its equivalent; and (3) contrary to plaintiff mother\u2019s assertion, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 52C-6-611(c) does not prevent the modification of the original order since the New Jersey court\u2019s determination that the party\u2019s child was unemancipated was not a final, nonmodifiable term of the order.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 foreign support order \u2014 modification\u2014substantial change in circumstances \u2014 failure to conduct evidentiary hearing\nThe trial court did not err in a child support modification case by declaring the parties\u2019 mentally retarded child ineligible for continuing child support and by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of a prior New Jersey order, because: (1) in North Carolina a parent is no longer responsible for child support for a dependent child who has reached the age of eighteen and graduated from secondary school or until the age of twenty if still enrolled in secondary school or its equivalent; and (2) the North Carolina General Assembly has not established an exception for disabled children.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 30 January 2002 by Judge L.T. Hammond in Rowan County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 January 2003.\nRobert L. Inge, for plaintiff-appellant.\nMary R. Blanton, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0540-01", "first_page_order": 572, "last_page_order": 577 }