{ "id": 9188247, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: TRAVIS RAY BUTTS", "name_abbreviation": "In re Butts", "decision_date": "2003-05-20", "docket_number": "No. COA02-531", "first_page": "609", "last_page": "624", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 N.C. App. 609" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "503 U.S. 905", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6246661, 6248331, 6246155, 6248013, 6246957, 6249583, 6247669, 6247287, 6248665, 6248986, 6249245 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/503/0905-02", "/us/503/0905-07", "/us/503/0905-01", "/us/503/0905-06", "/us/503/0905-03", "/us/503/0905-11", "/us/503/0905-05", "/us/503/0905-04", "/us/503/0905-08", "/us/503/0905-09", "/us/503/0905-10" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524582, 11524807, 11525031, 11524710, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute \"pertains only to statements obtained from a juvenile defendant as the result of custodial interrogation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249618 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 280", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "1093" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 L. Ed. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 960", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11402755, 11402691, 11402887, 11402668, 11402932, 11402717 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0960-04", "/us/396/0960-02", "/us/396/0960-05", "/us/396/0960-01", "/us/396/0960-06", "/us/396/0960-03" ] }, { "cite": "419 F. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2162604 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/419/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "772 A.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 F.3d 432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 834045 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/109/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ky. L.J. 485", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ky. L.J.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Winter, 1999-2000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 347", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "J. Crim. L. & Criminology", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348-49", "parenthetical": "Fall, 1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "765 F. Supp. 847", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7388746 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "probation revocation impermissible where defendant pled guilty to reduced sexual assault but refused to admit to aggravated sexual behavior on which original charge was based" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/765/0847-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 5", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11924839 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 L. Ed. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "813 P.2d 979", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2705105 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985", "parenthetical": "stating \"it is clear... the defendant is being subjected to a penalty that he would not otherwise be subjected to if he would simply admit his guilt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/249/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 N.W.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9132631 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/257/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "877 P.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1484226 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/179/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336129 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "citing G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(18)" }, { "parenthetical": "noting that \"certain errors may be reviewed on appeal despite the absence of an objection, exception or motion made in the trial court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436444 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "citing G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(18)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729914 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513076 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219976 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "doctor's testimony that physical examination was \"consistent with\" victim's earlier statements held \"vastly different from\" comments on victim's credibility" }, { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515424 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820", "parenthetical": "doctor's testimony that physical examination was \"consistent with\" victim's earlier statements held \"vastly different from\" comments on victim's credibility" }, { "page": "822-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607-08", "parenthetical": "physician properly permitted to testify that witness had vaginal scarring which the physician concluded was \"consistent with sexual abuse\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079274 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78", "parenthetical": "physician properly permitted to testify that witness had vaginal scarring which the physician concluded was \"consistent with sexual abuse\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138480 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441531 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724664 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710305 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "\"testimony based on the witness's examination of the child witness and expert knowledge ... is not objectionable because it supports the credibility of the witness ...\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "\"the testimony of an expert to the effect that a prosecuting witness is believable, credible, or telling the truth is inadmissible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521188 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219", "parenthetical": "\"the testimony of an expert to the effect that a prosecuting witness is believable, credible, or telling the truth is inadmissible\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092797 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 137 N.C. App. 221, 226, 527 S.E.2d 700, 704 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249192 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 137 N.C. App. 221, 226, 527 S.E.2d 700, 704 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522308 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Rowland, 89 N.C. App. 372, 366 S.E.2d 550 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11920140 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Rowland, 89 N.C. App. 372, 366 S.E.2d 550 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888", "parenthetical": "\"finding that respondent's mother . . . waived respondent's juvenile rights is not equivalent to a finding that respondent knowingly and understandingly waived his rights. Furthermore, 'a parent, guardian, or custodian may not waive any right on behalf of the juvenile.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359037 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9248713 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507201 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11919643 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827", "parenthetical": "quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statute \"pertains only to statements obtained from a juvenile defendant as the result of custodial interrogation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "statute \"pertains only to statements obtained from a juvenile defendant as the result of custodial interrogation\"" }, { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "statute \"pertains only to statements obtained from a juvenile defendant as the result of custodial interrogation\"" }, { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520628 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Harvey, 78 N.C. App. 235, 237, 336 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11358700 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Harvey, 78 N.C. App. 235, 237, 336 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "960 S.W.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11874995 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "no threat of prosecution posed by probationer's admission of guilt where State statute provided \"[a]ll information obtained in the discharge of an official duty by any probation or parole officer shall be privileged and shall not be received as evidence in any court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/960/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 70", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715156 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0060-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1461, "char_count": 37179, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6972635395425616e-07, "percentile": 0.9286037525739917 }, "sha256": "bbb22d52c07f1b82249e107404447b3c86c27d1d0a236d8162086efda038c0ce", "simhash": "1:6a67c15a35668d56", "word_count": 5936 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:20.581695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge WYNN concurring in part, dissenting in part.", "Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: TRAVIS RAY BUTTS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nRespondent appeals from adjudication of delinquency for commission of a first degree sex offense. The juvenile charges arose from an incident occurring between respondent and C.C. (the prosecuting witness\u2019s initials are used to preserve his privacy). The two boys were seventh grade classmates in a self-contained special education class. On 16 March 2001, C.C. spent the night with respondent, who lived with his father. During the evening, the boys watched movies in respondent\u2019s room while his father, Willie Butts, watched TV in the living room. Butts owned several guns, including a .357 magnum, which he usually kept near him, or in a holster. Both boys acknowledge that at some point during the night they engaged in sexual activity. However, their testimony conflicted sharply regarding the nature of the sexual contact.\nAt the hearing, C.C. testified that after the boys watched a movie, respondent took him to his father\u2019s bedroom and showed him his father\u2019s .357 magnum gun. When they returned to respondent\u2019s bedroom, respondent warned C.C. that if he \u201ctold anybody what was about to happen, he\u2019d shoot [him].\u201d C.C. put on his pajamas and got ready for bed, while respondent tried to convince him to experiment with sexual activity, saying \u201cit\u2019ll be fun.\u201d When C.C. refused, respondent became upset and pinned C.C. down on the bed. He performed an act of oral sex on C.C. in which he bit his penis, and then had anal intercourse with C.C. After respondent stopped, he threatened to kill C.C. if he told anyone. The State presented several other witnesses whose testimony generally corroborated C.C.\u2019s account of the events in question. C.C.\u2019s mother testified that her son was in a special education class, and took medications for depression and \u201canger control.\u201d Two weeks after he spent the night with respondent, C.C. told his mother that respondent had \u201cpinned him down\u201d and forced him to engage in sexual acts. Dr. Mary Lou Cooke, a pediatrician, testified that C.C. had given her an account of the incident consistent with his trial testimony. She also testified that, notwithstanding the absence of physical or medical indicators of abuse, she considered C.C.\u2019s physical examination to be \u201cconsistent\u201d with his interview. Detective Robin Carrasquillo testified regarding her investigation of the charges. She first interviewed C.C. and his mother, and obtained a statement from C.C. She then interviewed respondent at the law enforcement center, where respondent signed a statement admitting the allegation in the petition.\nRespondent testified at the hearing and denied all charges. He testified that after the two boys watched a movie, they played video games and then went to sleep. When he awoke later in the night, C.C. was penetrating him from behind, and refused to stop. Respondent \u201cthrowed [sic] him off\u2019 and went to sl\u00e9ep in the living room. Respondent denied threatening C.C. with a gun, or performing anal or oral sex on C.C. Respondent\u2019s testimony in this regard conflicted with his admissions in a signed confession obtained by Carrasquillo and introduced over respondent\u2019s objection. Ellen Jones, the primary teacher for both boys, testified that C.C. had \u201cdifficulty getting along\u201d with other children and \u201cconflicted] with all the students in the classroom.\u201d Jones also testified that C.C. often told lies at school. Mr. Butts, respondent\u2019s father, testified that his son had no access to any of his guns, which were in a locked cabinet, and that he had noticed nothing unusual the night that C.C. stayed over. Other evidence will be discussed as necessary to resolve the issues presented herein.\nI.\nRespondent raises four arguments on appeal. In two of these, respondent contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statement obtained by Detective Carrasquillo.\n\u201c[I]n a suppression hearing, the State has the burden to demonstrate the admissibility of the challenged evidence.\u201d State v. Tarlton, 146 N.C. App. 417, 420, 553 S.E.2d 50, 53 (2001) (citing State v. Harvey, 78 N.C. App. 235, 237, 336 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1985)). In the instant case, respondent argues that his statement was procured in violation of his rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101, which provides in relevant part that:\n(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:\n(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and\n(b) When the juvenile is less than 14 years of age, no in-custody admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless the confession or admission was made in the presence of the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a)(3) and (b) (2001). Respondent notes that the waiver form he signed did not include any notification that he had the right to the presence of \u201ca parent, guardian, or custodian . . . during questioning.\u201d Moreover, it is undisputed that respondent was under 14 years old at the time, and that only Detective Carrasquillo and another officer were present when much of respondent\u2019s statement was obtained. Therefore, if respondent\u2019s confession was obtained during a custodial interrogation, it would be inadmissible.\nThe rights protected by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 apply only to custodial interrogations. State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997) (statute \u201cpertains only to statements obtained from a juvenile defendant as the result of custodial interrogation\u201d). Thus, the threshold inquiry for a court ruling on a suppression motion based on G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101, is whether the respondent was in custody when the statement was obtained. \u201c[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338, 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001) (quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405). This requires the trial court to apply \u201c \u2018an objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sanders, 122 N.C. App. 691, 693, 471 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1996) (quoting State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992)).\nIn the instant case, respondent argued to the trial court that he was in custody when his statement was taken, thus invoking his rights under G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 to the presence of a parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney and to be informed of this right. Respondent also argued that the express terms of the statute did not allow for any exceptions to the bar on confessions taken from a child of 13 in the absence of a parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney. G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 (\u201cno in-custody . . . confession . . . may be admitted into evidence unless . . . made in the presence of\u2019 parent, etc.). However, the trial court did not rule on this issue. Instead, following arguments of counsel for respondent and the State on whether respondent was in custody, the court ruled as follows:\nMr. Gurley (respondent\u2019s attorney): ... I filed the motion to suppress ... in regards to North Carolina General Statute 7B-2101(a)(3) and (b), \u201cthat no in-custody admission or confession . . . may be admitted. ... I would be objecting to admitting into evidence based upon the . . . Statute sections we just cited. . . .\nProsecutor: Your Honor, he was not in custody at the time. ...\nThe Court: Well, that\u2019s not really the issue, but I\u2019m going to OVERRULE the OBJECTION on the grounds that Mr. Butts voluntarily left the interrogation room.\n(emphasis added). Detective Carrasquillo continued testifying about her interview of respondent, until respondent again objected:\nMr. Gurley: Your honor,... I would OBJECT because I think it\u2019s obvious now that [respondent] is not free to leave . . . therefore, he would be in custody.\nThe Court: OVERRULED. Again, that\u2019s not the issue. The Miranda rights were read, Mr. Butts voluntarily left the room during the interrogation. There [were] no violations.\n(emphasis added). The trial court overruled respondent\u2019s objection on the basis that, inasmuch as Mr. Butts left the interview room of his own free will after respondent and Butts were apprised of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the issue of whether respondent was in custody was rendered moot.\nThe trial court\u2019s ruling was predicated on the assumption that if respondent\u2019s father voluntarily absented himself from the room, there would be no violation of G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. However, the statute protects the rights of the juvenile, which his parent cannot waive on his behalf. In State v. Branham, 153 N.C. App. 91, 98, 569 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2002), \u201c[t]he trial court made findings .. . that defendant\u2019s mother refused to see him.\u201d This Court held:\nThese .. . findings do not support the conclusion that the defendant\u2019s waiver and statement complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. Even if we assume that defendant\u2019s mother did not want to be present during defendant\u2019s interrogation, she did not have the ability to, in effect, waive his right to have her present during interrogation.\nId. at 98, 569 S.E.2d at 29 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also In re Ewing, 83 N.C. App. 535, 537, 350 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1986) (\u201cfinding that respondent\u2019s mother . . . waived respondent\u2019s juvenile rights is not equivalent to a finding that respondent knowingly and understandingly waived his rights. Furthermore, \u2018a parent, guardian, or custodian may not waive any right on behalf of the juvenile.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595(b)). We conclude the trial court erred by failing to determine whether respondent was in custody when he signed the statement.\nThe trial court\u2019s error was not harmless in light of the facts of this case. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443 provides in part:\nA defendant is prejudiced by errors ... when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2001). \u201cWhen a case turns on the credibility of the witnesses it is difficult to hold ... an admission harmless.\u201d State v. Wilson, 118 N.C. App. 616, 621, 456 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1995) (citing State v. Rowland, 89 N.C. App. 372, 366 S.E.2d 550 (1988)). In the instant case, the transcript does not establish that respondent confessed to committing a first degree sex offense while Mr. Butts was in the interrogation room. In this regard, Detective Carrasquillo testified in pertinent part as follows:\nDetective Carrasquillo: I began speaking with them about the allegations. I explained to Mr. Butts and to [respondent] the allegations, what [C.C.] had told me, and basically I asked [respondent] if any of this happened. [Respondent] denied that anything had happened. I began explaining in a little bit more detail to [respondent] in the fact that it was important that the truth be told regardless of the situation. [Respondent] then told me that it may have happened but he was. . . .\nQuestion: [Respondent] told you what?\nDetective Carrasquillo: [Respondent] then told me it may have happened but he was asleep. Mr. Butts then \u2014 and I quote \u2014 stated, \u201cDamn it, boy, you know whether it happened or not.\u201d At the time [respondent] said, \u201cYes, it happened.\u201d Mr. Butts became upset and left the room.\nDetective Carrasquillo\u2019s testimony indicates that when respondent admitted that \u201cit might have happened\u201d but that he \u201cwas asleep,\u201d his father scolded him to make a definite statement one way or the other, at which point respondent stated \u201cyes, it happened\u201d rather than \u201cit might have happened.\u201d While this statement may fairly be regarded as an admission that there was sexual contact between the boys, it is far from a confession to commission of a first degree sexual offense. There is nothing in this dialogue that constitutes a disavowal of respondent\u2019s initial contention that he was sleeping when the sexual contact began, much less an admission that he employed force or the use of a deadly weapon to sexually assault C.C. Further, while Detective Carrasquillo testified that before respondent made a statement, she had generally \u201cexplained to . . . [respondent] the allegations, what [C.C.] had told me[,]\u201d Detective Carrasquillo\u2019s testimony did not establish that her explanation included a recitation of all of the elements of first degree sex offense. We conclude that respondent\u2019s statement that \u201cit happened\u201d is insufficient, without more detail, to constitute the equivalent of a full confession to first degree sex offense, so as to render the later admission of his written statement harmless.\nMoreover, absent the signed confession, the evidence would have presented a much closer case. Without physical evidence or eyewitnesses, the only basis for the fact-finder to determine the truth of the matter was to weigh the credibility of C.C. and respondent. In this regard, C.C.\u2019s account was supported by testimony from his mother, Dr. Cooke, and Detective Carrasquillo, whose testimony attested to the consistency of C.C.\u2019s accounts of the events in question. On the other hand, respondent\u2019s father testified that respondent had no access to Mr. Butt\u2019s firearms, and that he noticed nothing unusual when C.C. spent the night. Moreover, Ms. Jones, who taught both boys in a special education class and is unrelated to either party, testified that it was C.C. who lied frequently, and who had social adjustment problems. In this context we conclude that without a signed confession \u201cthere is a reasonable possibility that... a different result would have been reached[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2001).\nWe conclude the trial court\u2019s failure to properly determine whether respondent was in custody before admitting his statement to law enforcement officers constituted \u201creversible error which denied the [respondent] a fair trial conducted in accordance with law.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1447(a) (2001). Accordingly, respondent is entitled to a new adjudication hearing at which the admissibility of respondent\u2019s statement to Detective Carrasquillo will be determined in accordance with the provisions of G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101.\nII.\nAlthough we have determined that a new adjudication hearing is required, we elect to review respondent\u2019s other assignment of error because the same issues may arise on remand. Respondent next argues the trial court committed plain error by allowing Dr. Cooke to testify that her physical examination of C.C. was \u201cconsistent\u201d with the interview in which he told Dr. Cooke about the incident involving respondent. We conclude that admission of this testimony was not plain error.\nPlain error is \u201c \u2018fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,\u2019 or . . . \u2018grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused].]\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)). \u201cTo prevail under a plain error analysis, a defendant must establish not only that the trial court committed error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d State v. Perkins, 154 N.C. App. 148, 152, 571 S.E.2d 645, 648 (2002) (quoting State v. Jones, 137 N.C. App. 221, 226, 527 S.E.2d 700, 704 (2000)).\nIn the instant case, Dr. Cooke testified on direct examination regarding C.C.\u2019s account of the assault by respondent. Her physical examination did not reveal physical injury, abnormalities, or evidence of sexually transmitted disease. When asked to evaluate the exam together with the interview, Dr. Cooke testified as follows:\n[Prosecutor]: And how did your findings on the physical exam compare with the interview that you had with [C.C.]\n[Dr. Cooke]: Its consistent because there \u2014 often times physical evidence and history do not collaborate. So lots of times you don\u2019t find physical evidence even if there has been some penetration unless you can \u2014 I mean, sometimes you will see tears and you will see scars and you will see some increase in anal tone, but that\u2019s not necessarily a given.\nRespondent did not object to the introduction of this testimony. He argues on appeal that, by declaring the interview to be \u201cconsistent\u201d with an exam that failed to show injury, Dr. Cooke\u2019s testimony \u201chad the effect of vouching for [C.C.\u2019s] credibility. . . .\u201d We disagree.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2001), \u201c[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.\u201d An expert witness may not attest to the victim\u2019s credibility, as he or she is in no better position than the jury to assess credibility. State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988) (\u201cthe testimony of an expert to the effect that a prosecuting witness is believable, credible, or telling the truth is inadmissible\u201d). However, otherwise admissible expert testimony is not rendered inadmissible merely because it enhances a witness\u2019s credibility. State v. Dick, 126 N.C. App. 312, 315, S.E.2d 88, 89 (1997) (\u201ctestimony based on the witness\u2019s examination of the child witness and expert knowledge ... is not objectionable because it supports the credibility of the witness ...\u201d). An expert\u2019s opinion that sexual abuse definitely occurred is inadmissible absent a foundation showing that \u201cthe opinion expressed by [the expert] was really based upon [the expert\u2019s] special expertise, or stated differently, that [the expert] was in a better position than the jury to have an opinion on the subject. . . State v. Trent, 320 N.C. 610, 614, 359 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1987). Therefore, an expert may not testify that a child \u201cwas sexually abused\u201d when the expert\u2019s opinion rests entirely on the child\u2019s statements, unsupported by physical or other evidence. State v. Grover, 142 N.C. App. 411, 417, 543 S.E.2d 179, 183, aff\u2019d, 354 N.C. 354, 553 S.E.2d 679 (2001).\nHowever, our appellate courts have generally upheld the admission of testimony from a medical expert in a sexual abuse case that her observations are \u201cconsistent with sexual abuse.\u201d State v. Brothers, 151 N.C. App. 71, 77-78, 564 S.E.2d 603, 607-08 (2002) (physician properly permitted to testify that witness had vaginal scarring which the physician concluded was \u201cconsistent with sexual abuse\u201d); see also State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C. 818, 820, 370 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1988) (doctor\u2019s testimony that physical examination was \u201cconsistent with\u201d victim\u2019s earlier statements held \u201cvastly different from\u201d comments on victim\u2019s credibility). The North Carolina Supreme Court recently delineated the distinction between admissible expert testimony and opinions that simply attest to the witness\u2019s credibility. In State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266, 267, 559 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2002), the Court ruled:\nIn a sexual offense prosecution involving a child victim, the trial court should not admit expert opinion that sexual abuse has in fact occurred because, absent physical evidence supporting a diagnosis of sexual abuse, such testimony is an impermissible opinion regarding the victim\u2019s credibility. However, an expert witness may testify, upon a proper foundation, as to the profiles of sexually abused children and whether a particular complainant has symptoms or characteristics consistent therewith.\n(citations omitted) (citing Stater v. Hall, 330 N.C. 808, 818, 412 S.E.2d 883, 888 (1992); Aguallo, 322 N.C. at 822-23, 370 S.E.2d at 678; State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366 (1987)).\nIn the present case, Dr. Cooke did not testify that the allegations in the juvenile petition were accurate, but only that her examination of C.C. was \u201cconsistent\u201d with her interview of him. We conclude that the admission of this testimony was neither error nor plain error. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nFinally, respondent argues the trial court committed reversible error by imposing a condition of probation that required him to admit guilt for the underlying offense, after he had testified at trial and denied guilt. Respondent contends this condition of probation violates his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. See U.S. Const, amd. V. Because respondent did not object at the time disposition was entered, the State urges us to apply plain error analysis to this issue. However, we note that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446 provides in relevant part as follows:\n(d) Errors based upon any of the following grounds, which are asserted to have occurred, may be the subject of appellate review even though no objection, exception or motion has been made in the trial division.\n(18) The sentence imposed was unauthorized at the time imposed, exceeded the maximum authorized by law, was illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(18) (2001). We conclude that respondent\u2019s argument raises the issue of whether his sentence \u201cwas illegally imposed, or is otherwise invalid as a matter of law.\u201d In re Allison, 143 N.C. App. 586, 592, 547 S.E.2d 169, 172 (2001) (citing G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(d)(18)). Accordingly, the issue is properly before us, notwithstanding respondent\u2019s failure to object at the disposi-tional hearing. Id. (noting that \u201ccertain errors may be reviewed on appeal despite the absence of an objection, exception or motion made in the trial court\u201d).\nAs a condition of probation, the trial court required the following:\n27. That the juvenile participate in and successfully complete sexual offender specific evaluation/treatment program. Participation is defined as attendance at all meetings, admission of responsibility for offense and progress toward reasonable treatment goals.\n(emphasis added). During the disposition hearing, the trial court underscored this point:\nThe Court: All right, at this point then, I\u2019m going to place [respondent] on supervised probation for 12 months initially. I order that he not have any contact with [C. C.] . . . [and that] he also participate in and complete the sex offender specific evaluation and treatment program by the Wayne County Mental Health Center. And participation is defined as attendance of all meetings, admission of responsibility for offense and progress toward reasonable treatment goals.\n(emphasis added). After the court stated the other probationary conditions, the Court Counselor asked to be heard:\nMr. Perry: May I ask something, Your Honor?\nThe Court: Yes, sir.\nMr. Perry: I just think it\u2019s important that [respondent] and his father understand that one violation he can end up back here and the recommendation will be training school. . . . He needs to be at every meeting and everything needs to be done. . . .\n(emphasis added).\nThe Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that no person \u201cshall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u201d U.S. Const, amd. V. Likewise, the North Carolina Constitution protects \u201cevery person charged with crime\u201d from being \u201ccompelled to give self-incriminating evidence.\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 23. The privilege against self-incrimination extends to juveniles charged with delinquency. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2405(4) (2001).\nThe U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984), the leading relevant case, \u201cmakes clear that the state cannot make waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination a condition of probation.\u201d State v. Eccles, 877 P.2d 799, 800 (Ariz. 1994). However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the North Carolina Supreme Court has addressed the precise issue before this Court: whether a court can condition probation on the probationer\u2019s admitting guilt of the offense for which he was convicted, when the offender has testified at trial and denied culpability.\nSome courts have held that probation requirements like the one in this case place respondent in a \u201cclassic penalty\u201d situation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 654 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Wis. 2002) (probation revoked for \u201cfailure to cooperate with sex offender treatment\u201d based on defendant\u2019s \u201cresistance to admitting sexual misconduct with the victim\u201d: Court holds that \u201cdefendant . . . cannot be subjected to probation revocation for refusing to admit to the crime of conviction, unless he is first offered the protection of use and derivative use immunity\u201d); State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 985 (Mont. 1991) (stating \u201cit is clear... the defendant is being subjected to a penalty that he would not otherwise be subjected to if he would simply admit his guilt\u201d), cert. granted sub nom. Montana v. Imlay, 503 U.S. 905, 117 L. Ed. 2d 489, cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 5, 121 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1992); compare Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F. Supp. 847 (D. Vt. 1991) (probation revocation impermissible where defendant pled guilty to reduced sexual assault but refused to admit to aggravated sexual behavior on which original charge was based). The \u201cclassic penalty\u201d argument sometimes is supported by concerns that a confession obtained during therapy would be admissible if the defendant were retried for the same offense, or could be the basis for a later prosecution for perjury. See, e.g., Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 347, 348-49 (Fall, 1998) (discussing, inter alia, differing Fifth Amendment implications based upon whether offender pleads guilty, and contrasting th\u00e9 difference in Fifth Amendment implications between penalty contexts and ineligibility for privileges circumstances); Brendan J. Shevlin, \u201cBetween the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea\u201d: A Look at the Fifth Amendment Implications of Probation Programs for Sex Offenders Requiring Mandatory Admissions of Guilt, 88 Ky. L.J. 485 (Winter, 1999-2000).\nConvincing arguments can also be advanced that a sentencing court may require the convicted to admit guilt as a condition of probation, without an associated constitutional violation. At least one court has held that, in the context of a prison sex offender treatment program, benefits can be denied to a prisoner who \u201crefuses to make statements necessary for his rehabilitation, as long as their denial is based on the prisoner\u2019s refusal to participate in his rehabilitation and not his invocation of his privilege.\u201d McMorrow v. Little, 109 F.3d 432, 436 (8th Cir. 1997). See State v. Carter, 772 A.2d 326, 328 (N.H. 2001) (where participation in sex offender therapy for prisoners is voluntary, court holds that \u201cthe defendant is not being compelled to incriminate himself: he may choose not to participate and thus not admit any guilt. . . . Such a tactical choice does not rise to the level of compulsion required for a Fifth Amendment violation.\u201d); see also Gollaher v. United States, 419 F. 2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 24 L. Ed. 2d 424 (State interest in rehabilitation can override compulsory self-incrimination). We conclude, however, that Murphy controls the outcome of the instant case, and does not afford such an option: \u201c[A] State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions ... as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding [so that].... a probationer\u2019s \u2018right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake.\u2019 \u201d Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 425 (quoting Sanitation Men v. Comm\u2019r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1089, 1093 (1968)).\nMoreover, since the time of the trial court\u2019s entry of a disposition order, this Court decided In re Lineberry, 154 N.C. App. 246, 572 S.E.2d 229 (2002). In Lineberry, as in the instant case, the juvenile respondent was charged with commission of a sexual offense and adjudicated delinquent following a hearing at which respondent testified and denied his guilt. Id. The disposition, like that before us, required the respondent to participate in, and cooperate with, a treatment program for sex offenders. Id. Following a subsequent motion for review, the juvenile was ordered held in secure custody, in part because of his refusal during sex-offender treatment to admit guilt of the underlying offense. Id. at 255, 572 S.E.2d at 231. This Court held:\nIn finding that juvenile\u2019s refusal to admit to the offenses was a factor justifying his continued custody pending appeal, the trial court exposed juvenile to the classic penalty situation of choosing between the privilege against self-incrimination and prolonged confinement. . . . Thus, the trial court\u2019s conclusion that juvenile should remain in custody pending appeal based on juvenile\u2019s refusal to admit to the offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent violated juvenile\u2019s constitutional right against self-incrimination.\nId. at 255, 572 S.E.2d at 236. We find Lineberry\u2019s holding functionally indistinguishable from the instant case and are therefore bound by it. Accordingly, we hold that, on the specific facts of this case, the trial court erred by specifically conditioning respondent\u2019s probation on his express admission of the underlying offense.\nWe are not unmindful of the therapeutic benefits that may be obtained by accepting responsibility for one\u2019s actions. We recognize, too, the trial court\u2019s need for flexibility in fashioning appropriate dispositions for offenders. This need can be especially compelling in the context of our juvenile courts. Our holding does not prevent a court from revoking probation based upon a probationer\u2019s overall failure to participate in a validly required program simply because one aspect of the probationer\u2019s refusal to cooperate is an unwillingness to admit responsibility for his offense. The trial court may require a juvenile to cooperate with his supervising court counselor and, if counseling or psychological treatment is a part of the disposition, the trial court may require a juvenile to complete a treatment regimen and generally engage honestly in the counseling process, without violating the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Murphy at 436, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 425, (probationer could be required \u201cto appear and give testimony about matters relevant to his probationary status\u201d provided the State \u201cdid not attempt to take the extra, impermissible step\u201d of requiring him \u201cto choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent\u201d). Moreover, if respondent were granted use immunity or \u201cprotected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant\u201d, id. at 426, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 418 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274, 282 (1973)), this would obviate the Fifth Amendment violation. In the case sub judice, the record contains no indication that such immunity was offered, or that respondent\u2019s admissions would be excluded from a subsequent hearing. See Razor v. Com., 960 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Ky. App. 1997) (no threat of prosecution posed by probationer\u2019s admission of guilt where State statute provided \u201c[a]ll information obtained in the discharge of an official duty by any probation or parole officer shall be privileged and shall not be received as evidence in any court\u201d).\nIn summary, this case is reversed and remanded for a new adjudication hearing at which the admissibility of respondent\u2019s statement to a law enforcement officers will be properly determined.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge WYNN concurring in part, dissenting in part.\nJudge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." }, { "text": "WYNN, Judge,\nconcurring in part, dissenting in part.\nI agree with majority\u2019s well-reasoned opinion; however, I am compelled to dissent and allow the State an opportunity to appeal to our Supreme Court the issue of whether the ultimate disposition of awarding a new trial in this matter overrules our earlier case of State v. Pugh, 138 N.C. App. 60, 530 S.E.2d 328 (2000) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).\nIn Pugh, this Court upon holding that the trial court erred in determining that the child was not competent to testify based on an inadequate inquiry, stated:\nWe remand to the juvenile court, for a determination consistent with this opinion, the issue of D.R.\u2019s competency to testify. If, after conducting an appropriate voir dire of D.R., the juvenile court determines that D.R. is incompetent to testify, the adjudicatory and dispositional order filed 23 March 1999 is affirmed. If, however, after proper inquiry, the juvenile court determines that D.R. is competent to testify, the juvenile shall be entitled to a new adjudicatory hearing.\nPugh, 138 N.C. App. at 68, 538 S.E.2d at 333.\nIn this case, upon determining that the trial court erred by admitting the juvenile\u2019s confession without taking evidence and ruling on whether the juvenile was in custody when he made the statement, the majority awards a new trial rather than remanding the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether respondent was in custody at the time he signed an admission of guilt. Since an apparent conflict exists in the mandate of this case and that in Pugh, I dissent to allow the State the opportunity to certify this issue to our Supreme Court for a resolution of the two conflicting opinions.\n. In dissent, Judge Timmons-Goodson stated that the error could not be cured by conducting a new competency hearing. Instead, she opined that \u201cthe juvenile is entitled to a new trial on the charges ....\u201d Id. at 68. Since the juvenile did not appeal, as a matter of right under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-30 (1999), the majority opinion was not reviewed by our Supreme Court.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "WYNN, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Crumpler, for the State.", "Marjorie S. Canaday for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: TRAVIS RAY BUTTS\nNo. COA02-531\n(Filed 20 May 2003)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 juvenile\u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 statement obtained in absence of parent\nThe trial court erred in a case adjudicating respondent juvenile a delinquent for commission of first-degree sexual offense by denying respondent\u2019s motion to suppress under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 his statement obtained by a detective after respondent\u2019s father voluntarily left the room and by failing to determine whether respondent was in custody when he signed the statement, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 allows a juvenile a right to the presence of a parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney and to be informed of this right while he is in custody, and that right cannot be waived by a parent on the juvenile\u2019s behalf; (2) respondent\u2019s statement that \u201cit happened\u201d was insufficient, without more detail, to constitute the equivalent of a full confession to first-degree sex offense so as to render the later admission of his written statement harmless; and (3) absent the signed confession, the evidence would have presented a much closer case when there was no physical evidence or eyewitnesses and the only basis for the factfinder to determine the truth was to weigh the credibility of respondent and the alleged victim.\n2. Evidence\u2014 expert testimony \u2014 sexual abuse\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a case adjudicating respondent juvenile a delinquent for commission of first-degree sexual offense by allowing a pediatrician to testify under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 that her physical examination of the victim was consistent with the interview in which the victim told the pediatrician about the incident involving respondent even though the exam failed to show any physical injury because the pediatrician- did not testify that the allegations in the juvenile petition were accurate, but only that her examination of the alleged victim was consistent with her interview of him.\n3. Probation and Parole\u2014 juvenile delinquency \u2014 admission of guilt as a condition of probation\nThe trial court erred in a case adjudicating respondent juvenile a delinquent for commission of first-degree sexual offense by specifically conditioning respondent\u2019s probation on his express admission of the underlying offense after he had testified at trial and denied guilt, because the record contains no indication that respondent was granted use immunity or protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant.\nJudge Wynn concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by respondent from adjudication entered 2 August 2001 by Judge Joseph E. Setzer, Jr. and from disposition entered 27 September 2001 by Judge David B. Brantley in Wayne County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 February 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Crumpler, for the State.\nMarjorie S. Canaday for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0609-01", "first_page_order": 641, "last_page_order": 656 }