{ "id": 9188383, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SIDNEY RAY CRUDUP", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crudup", "decision_date": "2003-05-20", "docket_number": "No. COA02-649", "first_page": "657", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 N.C. App. 657" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "496 U.S. 582", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12124771 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853-55", "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524981 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-40", "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "adopting 102 N.C. App. 535, 538-40, 402 S.E.2d 851, 853-55 (1991) (Greene, J., dissenting)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512094 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "adopting 102 N.C. App. 535, 538-40, 402 S.E.2d 851, 853-55 (1991) (Greene, J., dissenting)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573594 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" }, { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" }, { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 649", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572036 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E.2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550660 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572884 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684963 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "holding \"that handcuffing defendant in the back of a police car\" constituted custody under Buchanan." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250876 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "holding \"that handcuffing defendant in the back of a police car\" constituted custody under Buchanan." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11354849 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092188 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 778, "char_count": 17625, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5644444338015457e-07, "percentile": 0.6774719298306581 }, "sha256": "1056416cc60339295d2cc33e48de9b7aa31612f6f17dd31c4f187feea9c74d6a", "simhash": "1:ab68f07a760e9c60", "word_count": 2724 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:54:20.581695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SIDNEY RAY CRUDUP" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nSidney Ray Crudup appeals his conviction for felonious possession of cocaine and presents one issue: Did the trial court err by admitting defendant\u2019s incriminating statements (made without Miranda warnings in response to police questioning while handcuffed and detained) in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)? We conclude, based upon the totality of the circumstances, defendant was subjected to an unconstitutional custodial interrogation. Furthermore, we hold that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; accordingly, we grant defendant a new0trial.\nIn February 2001, James Patterson rented an apartment to defendant with the understanding that defendant would not reside in the apartment; instead, defendant\u2019s girlfriend and baby would reside therein. Under that understanding, Patterson gave one key to defendant. On 22 May 2001, Patterson asked defendant to move his girlfriend and baby out of the apartment because of delinquent rent payments. After arguing, Patterson called the police and, for reasons not revealed in the record, reported a break-in.\nIn response to Patterson\u2019s call, Officer Jeff Marbrey and five to six other officers went to the apartment to investigate the alleged break-in. However, as Officer Marbrey prepared to enter the residence, defendant exited the front door. Three officers handcuffed defendant and detained him as a burglary suspect. Thereafter, Officer Marbrey and another officer searched the house for the alleged burglar; in the course of doing so, Officer Marbrey observed numerous plastic sandwich bags in the bedroom closet. Upon closer inspection, Officer Marbrey discovered what was later determined to be crack cocaine. No one else was found in the house. Shortly thereafter, Officer Marbrey asked defendant if he: (1) resided in the house, (2) was the only resident, and (3) owned the possessions found on the premises. Defendant answered the questions affirmatively. Officer Marbrey placed defendant under arrest for drug possession.\nAt trial, over defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court admitted defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements into evidence. The trial court reasoned that the questions \u201cby the officers were objective and reasonable . . . for their own protection [and] the protection of the public at large.\u201d On 17 October 2001, defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to 8 to 10 months in the North Carolina Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the admission of his inculpatory statements into evidence. Furthermore, defendant contends that the statements were incurably prejudicial. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree.\n\u201cIt is well-established that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826 (citation omitted). \u201cThe determination of whether a defendant was in custody, based on those findings of fact, however, is a question of law and is fully reviewable by this Court.\u201d State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 128, 526 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000) (citations omitted). Likewise, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s determination of whether an interrogation is conducted while a person is in custody [also] involves reaching a conclusion of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal.\u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we review the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings under a de novo review.\n\u201cMiranda warnings are required only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.\u201d State v. Patterson, 146 N.C. App. 113, 121 552 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2001) (citations omitted). The Miranda Court defined \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d as \u201cquestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Accordingly, in determining whether defendant was entitled to Miranda protections this Court must make three inquires: First, was defendant in custody? Second, was defendant interrogated? Third, do any exceptions to the Miranda rule apply?\nFirst, was defendant in custody? In State v. Buchanan, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that \u201cthe appropriate inquiry in determining whether a defendant is in \u2018custody\u2019 for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was a \u2018formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (2001) (citations omitted). \u201c[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood this situation.\u201d Id. at 341-42, 543 S.E.2d at 829 (citations omitted).\nUnder the facts of this case, we conclude, as a matter of law, that defendant was in \u201ccustody.\u201d The record reveals that defendant was immediately handcuffed and detained as a possible burglary suspect. While handcuffed, defendant was questioned while four officers, including Officer Marbrey, surrounded him. Most assuredly, defend- . ant\u2019s freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. A reasonable person under these circumstances would believe that he was under arrest. See e.g., State v. Johnston, 154 N.C. App. 500, 503, 572 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2002) (holding \u201cthat handcuffing defendant in the back of a police car\u201d constituted custody under Buchanan.).\nSecond, was defendant interrogated? Our Supreme Court has held that \u201cany words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect\u201d constitute an interrogation. State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d 168, 199 (2000).\nIn the case sub judice, after searching the residence and finding what he believed to be crack cocaine, Officer Marbrey questioned defendant, asking if he or anyone else lived in the residence and whether he owned the contents therein. Unquestionably, a reasonable officer would know, or should have known, that any response to these questions would have incriminated defendant. If defendant denied having a right to be in the home, then defendant\u2019s response would have tended to incriminate him as a burglar. On the other hand, if defendant admitted that he lived at the home and owned the possessions therein, then his response would have tended to incriminate him for possessing cocaine. Therefore, under the definition articulated by our Supreme Court in Golphin, we conclude that defendant was interrogated.\nThird, do any exceptions to the Miranda rule apply? The trial court in this case held that defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings because (1) the questions were permissible as routine on-the-scene questions, and (2) the questions were permissible under the public safety exception.\nMiranda warnings are not required during normal investigative activities conducted prior to arrest, detention, or charge. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477; State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638 (1968). In determining whether specific questions constitute custodial interrogation or general on-the-scene questioning, this Court has found the following factors to be relevant: (1) the nature of the interrogator, (2) the time and place of the interrogation, (3) the degree to which suspicion had been focused on the defendant, (4) the nature of the interrogation and (5) the extent to which defendant was restrained or free to leave. State v. Clay, 39 N.C. App. 150, 155, 249 S.E.2d 843, 846-47 (1978), rev\u2019d, on other grounds by 297 N.C. 555, 256 S.E.2d 176 (1979). While none of the factors standing alone is determinative, each factor is relevant.\nIn light of these factors, we hold that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and not general on-the-scene questioning because: (1) defendant was interrogated by a police officer; (2) defendant was interrogated while in handcuffs; (3) Officer Marbrey testified that defendant was immediately considered a burglary suspect; (4) Officer Marbrey asked incriminating questions; and (5) defendant was not free to leave.\nIn the alternative, the trial court found, and the State contends, that the questions asked were legitimately based upon Miranda\u2019s \u201cpublic safety exception.\u201d State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 144, 446 S.E.2d 579, 587 (1994). In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the United'States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings are not required where \u201cpolice officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.\u201d The essential purpose of the public safety exception is the \u201cobjectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with . . . weapon[s].\u201d Id. at 659. However, the Quarles Court characterized the public safety exception as a \u201cnarrow exception,\u201d intended to neutralize volatile situations and to address situations where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessary.\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that \u201cthe questioning by the officers [was] objective and reasonable . . . for their own protection [and] the protection of the public at large.\u201d We hold the circumstances in this case exceed the narrow scope of the public safety exception. Defendant was handcuffed and surrounded by three officers. There was no risk of imminent danger to the public, the officers, or even to the defendant. Absent the protection of this exception, or any other exception, the officers had a duty to administer to defendant his Miranda rights before proceeding with questioning. Accordingly, the trial court committed error by not suppressing defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements obtained in violation of Miranda.\nWhile we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements, we recognize that not all constitutional errors warrant a new trial. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2002), \u201c[a] violation of the defendant\u2019s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d An error of constitutional magnitude will be held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt only when \u201cthe court can declare a belief . . . that there is no reasonable possibility that the violation might have contributed to the conviction.\u201d State v. Lane, 301 N.C. 382, 387, 271 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1980) (emphasis added). After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude, in light of the State\u2019s tenuous evidence of defendant\u2019s constructive possession, the trial court\u2019s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nTo convict a defendant of possessing a controlled substance, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly possessed the substance. State v. Givens, 95 N.C. App. 72, 76, 381 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1989). Knowledge may be shown even where the defendant\u2019s possession of the illegal substance is merely constructive rather than actual. See, e.g., State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972). Constructive possession may be inferred when a defendant has exclusive control over the premises where a substance is found. State v. Givens, 95 N.C. App. at 76, 381 S.E.2d at 871. Even where a defendant has nonexclusive control over the premises, one can infer constructive possession if other incriminating circumstances exist to show defendant had the power and intent to control the substance. Id.\nIn a strikingly similar case, State v. Washington, 330 N.C. 188, 410 S.E.2d 55 (1991), a police officer observed a vehicle with a broken headlight and other damage. Suspecting a possible hit and run, the officer stopped the vehicle. Defendant, the driver of the vehicle, did not have a license. Accordingly, the officer placed defendant in his patrol car while checking his identity. Upon returning to defendant\u2019s car, the officer noticed a round of ammunition on the floorboard. The officer asked defendant, still sitting in the backseat of the patrol car, where the gun was located. Defendant denied having a gun, and, further, stated that the car did not belong to him. Furthermore, defendant stated: \u201cMan, there ain\u2019t no gun in the car. It\u2019s not my car. You can search it, you\u2019re not going to find anything.\u201d\nWhile searching the vehicle, the officer found small plastic bags with a white powdery substance, later proved to be cocaine. The officer showed the bags to defendant and said, \u201clook what I found.\u201d Defendant said that \u201che had bagged up baking soda to look like cocaine so that he could sell it as cocaine and make a good profit.\u201d At that point, the officer placed defendant under arrest for possession of cocaine.\nAt trial, defendant moved to suppress his inculpatory statements because they were obtained in violation of Miranda. Although defendant\u2019s movement was involuntarily restricted, the trial court found that defendant was not \u201cin custody.\u201d Accordingly, the trial court concluded that defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings.\nOur Supreme Court, based upon Judge Greene\u2019s dissent, reversed the trial court\u2019s decision. In addition to finding custodial interrogation, the Court found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Court adopted Judge Greene\u2019s reasoning that: \u201cWithout the unlawfully obtained statements, the only evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt [was] circumstantial. As to the possession element, the only evidence is that the cocaine was found in a car driven by the defendant. However, the car belonged to someone else.\u201d Accordingly, the Court held that \u201cin light of the less than overwhelming circumstantial evidence, [we conclude admission of defendant\u2019s statement] was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d State v. Washington, 330 N.C. 188, 188, 410 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1991) (adopting 102 N.C. App. 535, 538-40, 402 S.E.2d 851, 853-55 (1991) (Greene, J., dissenting)).\nIn the case sub judice, the State\u2019s evidence of constructive possession substantially rested upon defendant\u2019s unconstitutionally procured statement claiming possession of the items in the apartment. Absent this evidence, the State\u2019s theory of constructive possession, as in Washington, rested on defendant\u2019s physical presence in a house where he did not reside. Based on this scant circumstantial evidence, it can not be said that \u201cthere is no reasonable possibility that the violation might have contributed to the conviction.\u201d State v. Lane, 301 N.C. at 387, 271 S.E.2d at 277. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court error in admitting defendant\u2019s incriminating statements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant is therefore entitled to a,\nNew trial.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and LEVINSON concur.\n. Of the three questions asked by Officer Marbrey, only two exceeded the scope of either the on-the-scene general questioning or routine booking exceptions. See e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (where Supreme Court held that questions regarding a suspect\u2019s name, address, physical characteristics, date of birth, are permitted under the \u2018routine booking question\u2019 exception which exempts from Miranda\u2019s coverage certain \u201cbiographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.\u201d).\nUnder these exceptions, defendant\u2019s statement that he lived at the residence were permissible. However, questions regarding who-else lived in or stayed at the home, and the ownership of the belongings in the home were, under the particular facts of this case, outside the scope of these exceptions.\n. As noted, the burden is upon the State to show that a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State\u2019s brief, six pages in length, does not make one argument that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On this basis alone \u2014 the State\u2019s failure to shoulder its burden \u2014 we could find prejudice.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by W. Richard Moore, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Paul Pooley, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SIDNEY RAY CRUDUP\nNo. COA02-649\n(Filed 20 May 2003)\nConfessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 custodial interrogation \u2014 motion to suppress-failure to give Miranda warnings\nThe trial court erred in a felonious possession of cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress incriminating statements made without Miranda warnings in response to police questioning while he was handcuffed and detained, and defendant is entitled to a new trial because: (1) the totality of circumstances revealed that defendant was in custody when he was immediately handcuffed and detained as a possible burglary suspect; (2) defendant was being interrogated when a reasonable officer would have known that any response to the pertinent questions would have incriminated defendant; (3) defendant was not subjected to general on-the-scene questioning and the circumstances of this case exceeded the narrow scope of the public safety exception; and (4) the error was not harmless when the State\u2019s evidence of constructive possession rested upon defendant\u2019s unconstitutionally procured statement claiming possession of the items in an apartment which rested on defendant\u2019s physical presence in a house where he did not reside.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 17 October 2001 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr., in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 March 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by W. Richard Moore, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nPaul Pooley, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0657-01", "first_page_order": 689, "last_page_order": 696 }