{ "id": 8954617, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CORRIE MAURICE MAY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. May", "decision_date": "2003-07-15", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1158", "first_page": "159", "last_page": "166", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 N.C. App. 159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574230 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552042 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2396898 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574594, 8574566, 8574510, 8574546, 8574524 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0737-05", "/nc/294/0737-04", "/nc/294/0737-01", "/nc/294/0737-03", "/nc/294/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547131 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729998 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 320 N.C. 746, 360 S.E.2d 676 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523715 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 320 N.C. 746, 360 S.E.2d 676 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 670, "char_count": 16777, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.405803399609354e-08, "percentile": 0.5160995872732348 }, "sha256": "4412192cc0d937d0251ef45324115e7ab1caba6025f44f8af66ecbe05cda8a86", "simhash": "1:276980ebd679a3a8", "word_count": 2669 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:55.515420+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CORRIE MAURICE MAY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nCorrie Maurice May (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals two judgments entered on two charges of obtaining property by false pretense, each accompanied by a separate indictment charging defendant with attaining habitual felon status. We find no error.\nOn 15 June 2001, defendant was apprehended by Raleigh Police Officer Kevin Gregson (\u201cOfficer Gregson\u201d) while exiting a department store after Officer Gregson learned defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant for robbery with a dangerous weapon and obtaining property by false pretense. Officer Gregson called out \u201cHey, Corrie\u201d and defendant responded \u201cWhat.\u201d Officer Gregson then asked defendant if he was Corrie May, and defendant confirmed he was. At that point, Officer Gregson placed defendant under arrest; defendant protested, asserting his name was Fred Campbell and asking Officer Gregson to confirm his identity by checking the driver\u2019s license in his pocket. Officer Gregson removed the driver\u2019s license from defendant\u2019s pocket. The license was issued 30 January 2001, bore the name \u201cFred Alfonso Campbell, III,\u201d and pictured defendant. Defendant was arrested, taken into custody, and fingerprinted. Fingerprint analysis revealed defendant was Corrie May.\nDefendant was indicted for obtaining property by false pretense for possessing the false driver\u2019s license and for charges relating to the outstanding arrest warrant for robbery with a dangerous weapon and obtaining property by false pretense involving tire rims. Both indictments were accompanied by charges for attaining habitual felon status.\nOn 2 January 2002, defendant\u2019s case was called for trial in the Wake County Superior Court, the Honorable J.B. Allen, Jr. presiding. The trial court allowed amendment of the indictment for the false pretense charge involving the driver\u2019s license and the accompanying habitual felon indictment to reflect the correct date of the offense, 30 January 2001, rather than 15 June 2001, the date of arrest.\nThe State\u2019s evidence consisted of testimony by Officer Gregson and DMV Driver License Examiner Glen Barefoot (\u201cOfficer Barefoot\u201d). Defendant presented no evidence, and the jury found defendant guilty. Defendant then pled no contest to the accompanying habitual felon charge, and was sentenced to 80 to 105 months\u2019 imprisonment. In the same session of court, defendant pled \u201cno contest\u201d to the other charges of obtaining property by false pretense involving tire rims and of attaining habitual felon status. The court sentenced defendant to 80 to 105 months\u2019 imprisonment to run concurrently with his first sentence. Defendant appeals.\nBecause defendant failed to object at trial, defendant asserts the trial court committed plain error by: (I) permitting the State to amend the date of offense on the indictments; (II) entering judgment on the false pretense charge involving the driver\u2019s license; (III) allowing the false pretense claim involving the driver\u2019s license to go to the jury; and (IV) accepting defendant\u2019s no contest plea to both the false pretense charge involving tire rims and the accompanying habitual felon charge.\n\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (2003).\nIn criminal cases, a question which was not preserved by objection noted at trial and which is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action, nevertheless may be made the basis of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\nN.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (2003). Plain error is \u201c \u2018fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done . .. grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right... a miscarriage of justice or .. . the denial to appellant of a fair trial[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis in original). \u201cIt is axiomatic that \u2018[a] prerequisite to ... engaging in a \u201cplain error\u201d analysis is the determination that the [action] complained of constitutes \u201cerror\u201d at all.\u2019 \u201d State v. Parks, 96 N.C. App. 589, 593, 386 S.E.2d 748, 751 (1989) (quoting State v. Johnson, 320 N.C. 746, 360 S.E.2d 676 (1987)). For the reasons that follow, we hold the trial court did not err.\nI. Amendment to the Indictments\nDefendant asserts the trial court committed plain error by permitting the State to amend the date appearing on the indictments to accurately reflect the date of the offense rather than the date of arrest. Defendant contends this constituted a substantial alteration in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-923(e) (2001).\nNorth Carolina General Statute \u00a7 15A-923(e) states \u201c[a] bill of indictment may not be amended.\u201d\nThis statute, however, has been construed to mean only that an indictment may not be amended in a way which \u201cwould substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.\u201d State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53, 240 S.E.2d 475, disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 737, 244 S.E.2d 155 (1978). Thus, for example, where time is not an essential element of the crime, an amendment relating to the date of the offense is permissible since the amendment would not \u201csubstantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.\u201d State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596, 598-99, 313 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1984).\nState v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 767, 448 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1994) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, allowing amendment of the indictment would not constitute reversible error unless the date was an essential element of the crime.\nThe elements of the crime of obtaining property by false pretense are \u201c(1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another.\u201d State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 242, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980). Since time is not an \u201cessential element\u201d of the crime, the amendment to the indictment did not affect a \u201csubstantial\u201d alteration.\nA habitual felon is \u201c[a]ny person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to three felony offenses in any federal court or state court in the United States or combination thereof[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.1 (2001). An indictment charging a person of having established habitual felon status is sufficient where it\nset[s] forth the date that prior felony offenses were committed, the name of the state or other sovereign against whom said felony offenses were committed, the dates that pleas of guilty were entered to or convictions returned in said felony offenses, and the identity of the court wherein said pleas or convictions took place.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.3 (2001). The date of the felony offense accompanying the habitual felon indictment is not an essential element of establishing habitual felon status. Rather, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.3 requires, in relevant part, only the dates of the underlying felony convictions or pleas and the dates the underlying felonies were committed. Accordingly, neither amendment affected a \u201csubstantial\u201d alteration, and this assignment of error is overruled.\nMoreover, we note the change in the dates on the indictment did not affect defendant\u2019s planned defense. Following the State\u2019s motion to amend the indictments, the following exchange took place between defense counsel and the court:\nThe Court: So you\u2019re moving to amend the bill of indictment instead of June 15th, 2001, show it January 30?\n[State]: 2001, yes, sir.\nThe Court: What says the defendant?\n[Defense Counsel]: Well, I was aware of that to begin with.\nThe Court: So no objection?\n[Defense Counsel]: I can\u2019t object to it.\nThe Coukt: All right, without any objections the motion is allowed.\nIn light of this exchange, it is difficult to conceive how defendant\u2019s planned defense was affected by the State\u2019s amendments.\nII. Variance between the indictment and the proof offered at trial\nDefendant asserts the court committed plain error in entering judgment on the false pretense charge involving the driver\u2019s license because there was no direct evidence of how defendant came into possession of the driver\u2019s license. Specifically, defendant argues the State failed to prove he made a false representation as alleged in the indictment.\nThe indictment alleges \u201cdefendant represented his name to be Fred Alphonso Campbell, III . . . when, in fact, his name is Corrie Maurice May . ...\u201d At trial, the State called Officer Barefoot, who issued the duplicate license, and he testified, in relevant part, as follows:\nQ. Officer Barefoot, did this defendant, Corrie Maurice May, represent to you that he in fact was the person whose license he was requesting a duplicate for?\nA. He did.\nQ. And it was based on that that you issued [the driver\u2019s license bearing the name Fred Alphonso Campbell, III]?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nThis testimony directly supports the indictment\u2019s allegation that defendant misrepresented both his identity and his name to Officer Barefoot in order to procure the driver\u2019s license issued to defendant\u2019s alias. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIII. Sufficiency of the evidence\nDefendant asserts the trial court committed plain error by allowing the false pretense charge involving the driver\u2019s license to go to the jury because the State failed to present evidence that defendant obtained the false license by any actual deception. Specifically, defendant contends Officer Barefoot admitted he did not recall defendant or having any conversation with him, and it is \u201cfeasible\u201d that the license found on defendant came from some other source.\nAs illustrated above, Officer Barefoot did not testify as defendant contends in his brief. Instead, Officer Barefoot testified unequivocally that defendant came into the DMV, presented a defaced driver\u2019s license with the photograph missing and represented he was Fred Alphonso Campbell, III. Based upon defendant\u2019s representations, Officer Barefoot issued him a duplicate license. Furthermore, the trial transcript reveals Officer Barefoot remembered all the essential facts. On cross examination, he was unable to recall whether the conversation with defendant was limited solely to the subject of the driver\u2019s license and whether anyone accompanied defendant. Defense counsel\u2019s characterization of Officer Barefoot\u2019s testimony does not comport with the transcript; therefore, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.\nIV. Factual basis for defendant\u2019s no contest plea\nDefendant asserts the trial court committed plain error by failing to establish the prerequisite factual basis for the charge of obtaining property by false pretense involving tire rims before accepting defendant\u2019s plea of no contest in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022 (2001). A trial court may determine a factual basis for a plea exists based upon the following non-exclusive, statutory list:\n(1) A statement of the facts by the prosecutor.\n(2) A written statement of the defendant.\n(3) An examination of the presentence report.\n(4) Sworn testimony, which may include reliable hearsay.\n(5) A statement of facts by the defense counsel.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022(c). The trial court \u201cmay accept the defendant\u2019s plea of no contest even though the defendant does not admit that he is in fact guilty if the judge is nevertheless satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022(d) (2001).\nIn the instant case, the prosecutor for the State briefly recited the facts of the charged offense by stating to the court that defendant agreed to sell car rims to Bruce Thomas, took the money from Bruce Thomas, and failed to deliver the rims. Defendant\u2019s arguments that he ultimately repaid the money to Bruce Thomas or that this was simply an unfulfilled contract are unavailing in light of the fact that, directly following the State\u2019s brief recital of the facts of the charged offense, defendant stipulated to the existence of a factual basis for his plea. Based on the facts presented by the State and the defendant\u2019s stipulation, the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed.\nDefendant similarly asserts no factual basis was established for the no contest plea for the accompanying habitual felon indictment. However, habitual felon status had already been established using the same underlying offenses in the false pretense charge involving the driver\u2019s license, which defendant does not attack. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed and entered a sentence of 80 to 105 months\u2019 imprisonment, which was to run concurrently with his first sentence.\nDefendant contends, in the alternative, that the trial court erroneously failed to explain the consequences of a no contest plea. \u201cThe judge must advise the defendant that if he pleads no contest he will be treated as guilty whether or not he admits guilt.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022(d) (2001). The court stated the following to defendant: \u201cAnd do you understand that upon your plea of no contest you\u2019ll be treated as being guilty whether or not you admit you are in fact not guilty?\u201d Defendant answered in the affirmative. Defendant further acknowledged under oath that he understood that by pleading no contest he was giving up his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and that he considered it in his best interest to plead no contest. This exchange adequately tracks the language of the statute and sufficiently explains the consequences of defendant\u2019s no contest plea. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General James C. Holloway, for the State.", "George E. Kelly, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CORRIE MAURICE MAY\nNo. COA02-1158\n(Filed 15 July 2003)\n1. Indictment and Information\u2014 obtaining property by false pretense \u2014 amendment to date of offense\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in an obtaining property by false pretense case by permitting the State to amend the date of offense on the indictment to accurately reflect the date of the offense rather than the date of arrest, because: (1) the date was not an essential element of the crime; and (2) the change in the date on the indictment did not affect defendant\u2019s planned defense.\n2. Motor Vehicles\u2014 obtaining property by false pretense\u2014 driver\u2019s license\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in an obtaining property by false pretense case by entering judgment on the false pretense charge involving a driver\u2019s license, because an officer\u2019s testimony directly supported the indictment\u2019s allegation that defendant misrepresented both his identity and his name to an officer in order to procure a driver\u2019s license issued to defendant\u2019s alias.\n3. Motor Vehicles\u2014 obtaining property by false pretense\u2014 driver\u2019s license \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in an obtaining property by false pretense case by allowing the false pretense claim involving the driver\u2019s license to go to the jury even though defendant contends an officer admitted he did not recall defendant or having any conversation with him, and that it was feasible the license found on defendant came from some other source, because: (1) the transcript revealed that the officer remembered all the essential facts; and (2) defense counsel\u2019s characterization of the officer\u2019s testimony did not comport with the transcript.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 no contest plea \u2014 factual basis \u2014 consequences\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in an obtaining property by false pretense case by accepting defendant\u2019s no contest plea to both the false pretense charge involving tire rims and the accompanying habitual felon charge, because: (1) a factual basis existed for the plea regarding the false pretense charge based on the facts presented by the State and defendant\u2019s stipulation; (2) a factual basis existed for the plea regarding the habitual felon indictment when habitual felon status had already been established using the same underlying offenses in the false pretense charge involving a driver\u2019s license; and (3) the trial court sufficiently explained the consequences of defendant\u2019s no contest plea.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 2 January 2002 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General James C. Holloway, for the State.\nGeorge E. Kelly, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0159-01", "first_page_order": 189, "last_page_order": 196 }