{ "id": 8955095, "name": "THOMASINE F. SMITH, Employee-Plaintiff v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ASHEVILLE, Employer-Defendant, Self-Insured", "name_abbreviation": "Smith v. Housing Authority of Asheville", "decision_date": "2003-07-15", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1138", "first_page": "198", "last_page": "204", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 N.C. App. 198" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "discussing North Carolina's interpretation of the term \"accident.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124766 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "discussing North Carolina's interpretation of the term \"accident.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520432 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239310 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081725 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11888632 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9366720 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250309 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11094153 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0480-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 629, "char_count": 13950, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.345432909102184e-08, "percentile": 0.44066681107663036 }, "sha256": "feadacdeaebea3fc854bc708c63f1a9e3ce3af88119a383dd7c1f68caa206c38", "simhash": "1:c5c22dfb2e87ab06", "word_count": 2196 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:55.515420+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "THOMASINE F. SMITH, Employee-Plaintiff v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ASHEVILLE, Employer-Defendant, Self-Insured" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nThomasine F. Smith (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals the opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d) finding plaintiffs psychological disorder was not the result of an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with the Housing Authority of Asheville (\u201cdefendant\u201d), but was \u201cthe result of the investigation of her claim for that injury or from perceived workplace retaliation for her injury.\u201d The Commission concluded as a matter of law \u201c[psychological injuries resulting from legitimate personnel action, including investigation of workers\u2019 compensation claims generally are not compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\nThe Commission found the following facts pertinent to this appeal. Plaintiff was fifty-four years old, and had worked for defendant for twenty-four years when, on 17 April 1997, plaintiff was injured by an accident at work. When plaintiff was returning from lunch, she discovered her new chair had arrived and was in her cubicle.\n5. . . . When she sat in the chair, it rolled out from under her and plaintiff landed on the floor. She was not seriously injured or knocked unconscious. Her co-workers helped her up. Plaintiff was not visibly shaken and actually laughed at herself. She complained only of some neck pain and later about her knee.\nPlaintiff was treated by a doctor for her minor physical injuries.\n9. Within a week of the accident, plaintiff had a difficult interaction with William Wynn, the safety coordinator for the Asheville Housing Authority. Mr. Wynn had instituted a program to improve workplace safety. When he heard about plaintiff\u2019s accident, Mr. Wynn spoke with plaintiff about her accident report. Plaintiff apparently believed that Mr. Wynn was accusing her of filing a lawsuit against the Housing Authority and she became upset. Renee Crane, a co-worker overheard the conversation and stated that Mr. Wynn was somewhat arrogant in his manner, but, that she did not recall Mr. Wynn stating that a suit was filed. Ms. Crane explained that plaintiff became upset and did not understand what Mr. Wynn was saying. This encounter with Mr. Wynn was upsetting to plaintiff, and Ms. Crane reported it to Constance Proctor, her supervisor.\nThereafter, plaintiff continued to work \u201cwithout any apparent difficulties.\u201d However, \u201c[i]n August 1997, she developed a panic disorder\u201d and throughout the Fall she was treated for mental illness. Plaintiff was thereafter diagnosed as paranoid delusional, a permanent condition \u201canticipated to preclude plaintiff from employment.\u201d Dr. Anthony Sciara, Ph.D., a psychologist who has treated plaintiff since December 1997, testified and the Commission found the following:\n17. ... Although Dr. Sciara stated that plaintiff\u2019s paranoid delusions were caused by the accident at work and the way it was handled by the employer, he was not able to explain how the accident (the fall in the new chair) caused the injury. Dr. Sciara explained that there was no evidence of a brain or other injury caused by the fall which would produce this condition and that her symptoms were not consistent with a traumatic head injury. In contrast, however, plaintiff was described by Dr. Sciara as a person with a significant moral structure who felt a need to follow the rules, perceived that her employer desired no lost day injuries at work, and that any accident at work would not be acceptable. Further, the perceived nature of the confrontation from Mr. Wynn accusing her of filing some type of legal action against the employer would significantly undermine her psychological stability and contribute to her decompression.\nIn finding of fact 21, the Commission gave greater weight to Dr. Sciara\u2019s testimony that the psychological condition was \u201cthe result of the investigation of her claim for that injury or from perceived workplace retaliation for her injury.\u201d Based on these facts, the Commission concluded that plaintiffs paranoid delusional disorder is not com-pensable. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff asserts the Commission erred by: (I) failing to find her psychological impairment arose out of her employment because there is \u201cno evidence\u201d to support the conclusion that her disorder did not arise from her fall; and (II) failing to conclude as a matter of law that her mental injury is compensable.\nThis Court\u2019s review of workers\u2019 compensation cases is \u201climited to the consideration of two questions: (1) whether the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence; and (2) whether its conclusions of law are supported by those findings.\u201d Calloway v. Memorial Mission Hosp., 137 N.C. App. 480, 484, 528 S.E.2d 397, 400 (2000). \u201cThis Court does not weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight; rather, this Court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u201d Devlin v. Apple Gold, Inc., 153 N.C. App. 442, 446, 570 S.E.2d 257, 261 (2002). \u201cIf there is competent evidence to support the findings, they are conclusive on appeal even though there is evidence to support contrary findings.\u201d Boles v. U.S. Air, Inc., 148 N.C. App. 493, 498, 560 S.E.2d 809, 812 (2002). \u201cThe Industrial Commission\u2019s conclusions of law, however, are reviewable de novo.\u201d Absher v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 156 N.C. App. 697, \u2014 S.E.2d-(2003).\nI. Findings of Fact\nPlaintiff appeals asserting the Commission erred in findings of fact 17 and 21 because there was \u201cno evidence\u201d to support these findings. In finding of fact 17, set forth above, the Commission found that, although Dr. Sciara concluded \u201cthe incident\u201d in April 1997 caused her illness, he could only explain how the investigation into the accident caused plaintiffs condition and he could not explain how the accident itself was the cause. Finding of fact 21 reads:\nPlaintiff has developed a paranoid delusional disorder. The greater weight of the competent evidence is that the paranoid delusional disorder is related to the employer\u2019s investigation of her claim for the April 17, 1997 injury, including plaintiff\u2019s perception of her employer\u2019s desire for no work injuries and perceived retaliation for being injured on the job. The Commission gives greater weight to the testimony of Dr. Sciara that plaintiff\u2019s psychological condition was not caused by a traumatic injury to her head or other injury sustained in the fall. Plaintiff\u2019s psychiatric condition was not due to an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment on April 17, 1997. Rather, this condition is the result of the investigation of her claim for that injury or from perceived workplace retaliation for her injury. Plaintiff has not established a psychological injury from an accident or untoward event.\nPlaintiff\u2019s assertion that no evidence supports these findings is incorrect. When asked to describe how the April 1997 incident caused plaintiff\u2019s psychological demise, Dr. Sciara testified:\nWhat I can do is to give you the best understanding that I have of it; to say absolutely beyond a doubt this is what occurred, I\u2019m not sure anybody can do.\nMs. Smith is somebody with a significant moral structure in her own life, tries to follow all the rules, believes in doing the right thing, believes in taking absolute responsibility for herself, somewhat perfectionistic in her orientation to what she does and has a true belief in kind of right and wrong, that if you do the right things then good things will happen to you.\nThe understanding that I have is that while she had been an employee at the Housing Authority and although it was stressful at times, she felt she was doing a good thing, felt that she was following all the rules of the agency. She indicated a significant awareness that there were to be no lost day injuries at work, that this was a significant thing that was focused on a lot by the Housing Authority and that people were admonished not to take a day off if they didn\u2019t have to. And, that any accident related lost work days just was not acceptable and that\u2019s what she understood. She felt then very guilty that because of what happened to her and even though she was in significant pain that she wanted to take the day off and felt very coerced that she was to come to work.\nIt then began that she believed people were watching her to see if she was going to do anything against the Housing Authority and that began a psychological spiral from which she\u2019s not recovered.\nAs the Commission found, none of Dr. Sciara\u2019s explanation supports his conclusion that the patient\u2019s current psychiatric decomposition \u201cis a direct result of her work related injury. ...\u201d Rather, Dr. Sciara referenced only the investigation in describing the cause of plaintiff\u2019s illness and further explained the confrontational investigation \u201cwould have significantly undermined her psychological stability. . . .\u201d Accordingly, the testimony supports the Commission\u2019s finding that the investigation caused her mental illness. Although the evidence may have supported alternate findings, the Commission\u2019s findings are \u201cconclusive on appeal\u201d where they are supported by any competent evidence. Accordingly, we overrule plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error.\nII. Conclusions of Law\nPlaintiff also asserts the Commission erred in concluding as a matter of law that her injury was not compensable.\nWe note that \u201cas long as the resulting disability meets statutory requirements, mental, as well as physical impairments, are compensable under the Act.\u201d Jordan v. Central Piedmont Community College, 124 N.C. App. 112, 119, 476 S.E.2d 410, 414 (1996). Therefore, the essential question is not whether a mental injury is compensable but rather whether the injury met the statutory requirements.\nAlthough plaintiff argues \u201c[t]his case does not present the claim of an individual who suffers mental injury merely as a result of an investigation,\u201d that is precisely the case the Commission found was presented. Although plaintiff asserted the Commission\u2019s findings were not supported by competent evidence, since Dr. Sciara\u2019s testimony supports the Commission\u2019s findings, these findings are conclusive on appeal. Accordingly, we must consider whether a mental injury resulting from an investigation into an accident, and not the accident itself, is compensable.\n\u201c[A]n injury is compensable under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act only if (1) it is caused by an \u2018accident, \u2019 and (2) the accident arises out of and in the course of employment.\u201d Pitillo v. N.C. Dep\u2019t. of Envtl. Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 645, 566 S.E.2d 807, 811 (2002) (emphasis added). \u201cAn accident under the workers\u2019 compensation act has been defined as \u2018 \u201can unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury,\u2019 \u201d and which involves \u201c \u2018the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Id., (quoting Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112, 115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999) (quoting Adams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983))); see also Lovekin v. Lovekin & Ingle, 140 N.C. App. 244, 248, 535 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2000) (discussing North Carolina\u2019s interpretation of the term \u201caccident.\u201d) In Pitillo, this Court held plaintiff\u2019s mental illness was not caused by an \u201caccident\u201d where plaintiff required psychiatric treatment after a job performance review. Pitillo, 151 N.C. App. at 646, 566 S.E.2d at 812. Similarly, in the case at bar, although an accident occurred, the Commission found the investigation thereof caused plaintiff\u2019s mental injury. The investigation into the accident cannot be considered an \u201caccident\u201d as it is not \u201can unlooked for and untoward event\u201d involving \u201cthe interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\u201d Since the investigation is not an \u201caccident,\u201d and the Commission found the investigation caused plaintiff\u2019s mental injury, we find the Commission properly determined plaintiff\u2019s injury is not compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey and Bailey, by J. Todd Bailey, and Gum & Hillier, P.A., by Patrick S. McCroskey, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Root & Root, P.L.L.C., by Louise Critz Root, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMASINE F. SMITH, Employee-Plaintiff v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ASHEVILLE, Employer-Defendant, Self-Insured\nNo. COA02-1138\n(Filed 15 July 2003)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 injury by accident \u2014 psychological disorder \u2014 investigation of claim\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee\u2019s psychological disorder was not the result of an injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant, but was the result of the investigation of her claim for that injury or from perceived workplace retaliation for her injury.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 psychological disorder \u2014 investigation of claim not an accident\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff employee\u2019s psychological disorder was not compensable, because: (1) although an accident occurred, the Commission found the investigation thereof caused plaintiff\u2019s mental injury; and (2) the investigation into the accident cannot be considered an accident as it is not an unlooked for and untoward event involving the interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an opinion and award entered 17 April 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2003.\nBailey and Bailey, by J. Todd Bailey, and Gum & Hillier, P.A., by Patrick S. McCroskey, for plaintiff-appellant.\nRoot & Root, P.L.L.C., by Louise Critz Root, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0198-01", "first_page_order": 228, "last_page_order": 234 }