{ "id": 8955701, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID PAUL SHELMAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Shelman", "decision_date": "2003-08-05", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1261", "first_page": "300", "last_page": "312", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 N.C. App. 300" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "court did not err by \"imposing a sentence against defendant which was greatly in excess of the sentence given his codefendant . . . under [his] plea bargaining arrangement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555758 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669", "parenthetical": "court did not err by \"imposing a sentence against defendant which was greatly in excess of the sentence given his codefendant . . . under [his] plea bargaining arrangement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902", "parenthetical": "\"There is no requirement of law that defendants charged with similar offenses be given the same punishment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576913 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "\"There is no requirement of law that defendants charged with similar offenses be given the same punishment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185823 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571168 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's argument that \"imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence and fine [for drug trafficking] violates . . . the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701428 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101", "parenthetical": "rejecting defendant's argument that \"imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence and fine [for drug trafficking] violates . . . the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715712, 4720431, 4715122, 4720187, 4718559 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0188-02", "/nc/315/0188-05", "/nc/315/0188-04", "/nc/315/0188-03", "/nc/315/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526305 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "\"Without an adequate record to fully reconstruct the [jury selection issue], this Court has no ability to determine whether prejudicial error occurred. . . . [T]he record before us is insufficient for appellate review and this assignment of error must be dismissed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954473 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568324 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 403, 508 S.E.2d 496, 510 (1998)" }, { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955476 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 403, 508 S.E.2d 496, 510 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59", "parenthetical": "citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-89" }, { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "96-98" }, { "page": "87-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551091 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's statement properly characterized as \"confession\" where he admitted acts constituting the offenses of rape and burglary, even though defendant stated the acts were committed as part of consensual sexual encounter with eleven year old girl" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569845 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant's statement properly characterized as \"confession\" where he admitted acts constituting the offenses of rape and burglary, even though defendant stated the acts were committed as part of consensual sexual encounter with eleven year old girl" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520654 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "\"To prove the offense of trafficking in cocaine by possession, the State must show 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188172 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "\"To prove the offense of trafficking in cocaine by possession, the State must show 1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-45", "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary 296 (6th ed. 1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793065 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "quoting Black's Law Dictionary 296 (6th ed. 1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559299 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.W.3d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11446012, 11446095 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/80/0509-01", "/sw3d/80/0509-02" ] }, { "cite": "818 So.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9416092 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/818/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922", "parenthetical": "\"Felonious possession of a controlled substance has two essential elements. The substance must be possessed, and the substance must be 'knowingly' possessed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549989 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "\"Felonious possession of a controlled substance has two essential elements. The substance must be possessed, and the substance must be 'knowingly' possessed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "\"To convict defendant of trafficking in heroin . . . the state was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the [drugs]\"." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693853 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "\"To convict defendant of trafficking in heroin . . . the state was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the [drugs]\"." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2487808, 2489862, 2491701, 2490491, 2492671 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0275-03", "/nc/325/0275-01", "/nc/325/0275-04", "/nc/325/0275-02", "/nc/325/0275-05" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511417 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219561 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512329 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53881 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716-17", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11432583 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4682939 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0386-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1143, "char_count": 29692, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0046269694766395e-07, "percentile": 0.7434002909049909 }, "sha256": "f0ff37c7b2fadd7d7b74e9a0fd468b19977d743048dff299e8ad47f440623527", "simhash": "1:1368e830ae062152", "word_count": 4651 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:55.515420+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID PAUL SHELMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nDefendant (David Shelman) appeals from conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation. We conclude the defendant had a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show, in relevant part, the following: U.S. Postal Inspector Charles Thompson testified that he was assigned to narcotics investigations and that in April, 2001, he was informed by postal inspectors from Indianapolis, Indiana, that a package of methamphetamine had been intercepted in Indianapolis. The box of methamphetamine was shipped to Inspector Thompson for investigation and delivered to him \u201cunder seal\u201d on 30 April 2001. Inspector Thompson met with members of the drug enforcement unit of the Wayne County Sheriffs department, and together they planned a \u201ccontrolled delivery.\u201d The officers conducted a preliminary field test of the box\u2019s contents to confirm that it contained a controlled substance, then resealed the package, attaching an electronic device that would emit a signal if someone attempted to break the seal.\nThe box was addressed to a \u201cDavid Pool\u201d of \u201c107 Squire Ridge Lane, Dueley, North Carolina,\u201d which Inspector Thompson determined was probably a misspelling of \u201c107 Squirrel Ridge Lane\u201d in Dueley. Accordingly, Inspector Thompson drove to defendant\u2019s family home at 107 Squirrel Ridge Road, posing as a letter carrier. There he spoke with defendant\u2019s sister, Veronica Shelman, who told him that the \u201cDavid Pool\u201d on the package was likely a misspelling of her brother\u2019s name, David Paul Shelman. Veronica signed for the package, and Inspector Thompson left it at the Shelman house.\nAfter delivering the package of methamphetamine, Inspector Thompson and the other officers set up a surveillance team to watch the house. Several hours later, the officers observed defendant arrive at the house in a car driven by another man, Cesar Rivera. Defendant went inside briefly, then reappeared carrying the package. He got back into Rivera\u2019s car and the men began driving away. The electronic device attached to the package began beeping almost immediately, and the law enforcement officers converged upon the car. The box of methamphetamine was found on the floor of the car, between the defendant\u2019s feet. Defendant was taken out of the car and arrested.\nInspector Thompson interviewed defendant shortly after his arrest. Defendant was advised of his rights and agreed to speak with Inspector Thompson. At trial, Inspector Thompson summarized defendant\u2019s statements as follows: Defendant admitted to recent use of marijuana and methamphetamine. Several weeks before defendant\u2019s arrest, Rivera received a package at 107 Squirrel Ridge Road. Defendant\u2019s brother later gave him some methamphetamine and told defendant that it came from the first package. Defendant heard Rivera was a methamphetamine dealer, and when Rivera told defendant a week earlier that another package would be arriving at the house, defendant knew the package would contain methamphetamine. Defendant and Rivera worked for the same employer, and on 30 April 2001 defendant made a phone call to his sister Veronica from work. Veronica told defendant that the package had arrived and that she suspected it contained drugs. In response, he told Veronica, \u201cI know.\u201d After work, defendant and Rivera drove directly to defendant\u2019s house to get the package. Defendant retrieved the package and he and Rivera were on the way to another friend\u2019s house when they were stopped by the police.\nSBI Agent Linda Farren testified that she subjected the material found in the box to chemical testing and determined that the package contained approximately 1700 grams of methamphetamine. Additionally, DEA Agent Terry Beckstrom testified on rebuttal that he observed Inspector Thompson\u2019s interview with defendant, and that Thompson\u2019s testimony generally comported with his own recollection of defendant\u2019s statements.\nDefendant testified that Rivera had lived with his family. He denied knowing the package would contain methamphetamine and denied telling Inspector Thompson that he knew Rivera was a methamphetamine dealer or that he knew the package held drugs.\nDefendant has raised five issues on appeal. He argues first that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the package of methamphetamine. Defendant contends the State failed to present adequate evidence of authenticity and chain of custody. We disagree.\nAccording to long-established precedent:\na two-pronged test must be satisfied before real evidence is properly received into evidence. The item offered must be identified as being the same object involved in the incident and it must be shown that the object has undergone no material change. The trial court . . . exercise[s] sound discretion in determining the standard of certainty that is required to show that an object offered is the same as the object involved in the incident and is in an unchanged condition. . . . Further, any weak links in a chain of custody relate only to the weight to be given evidence and not to its admissibility.\nState v. Campbell, 311 N.C. 386, 388-89, 317 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1984) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In the instant case, defendant concedes that \u201cthe State presented sufficient evidence under this standard to support a finding that the package seized . . . and the controlled substance analyzed by the SBI lab, were the same package and controlled substance as had been received by [Inspector Thompson].\u201d\nDefendant, however, contends that in addition to meeting the standard enunciated in Campbell, id., the State also was required to present evidence establishing the history of the drugs and of the package before Inspector Thompson received it. In support of this proposition, defendant cites only State v. Mason, 144 N.C. App. 20, 550 S.E.2d 10 (2001). However, in Mason the State failed to present sufficient evidence that a videotape introduced at trial was the same one that law enforcement officers obtained on the night of a robbery, and that the videotape was unchanged. As defendant acknowledges, in the present case the State presented sufficient evidence on the unity of identity between the methamphetamine delivered to Inspector Thompson and that which was admitted at trial. Therefore, Mason is not pertinent to the case sub judice.\nWe conclude that the issues raised by defendant essentially go to alleged weaknesses in the State\u2019s case, and do not render the methamphetamine package inadmissible. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for the charged offenses. We disagree.\nUpon a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence:\nthe trial court must determine whether the State has presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator. If substantial evidence of each element is presented, the motion for dismissal is properly denied. \u2018Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019\nState v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716-17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997) (quoting State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)). \u201cIt is immaterial whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or both.\u201d State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956). \u201cCircumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. The evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt in order for it to be properly submitted to the jury[.]\u201d State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988).\nIn determining whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction, \u201cthe trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State.\u201d State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 473, 573 S.E.2d 870, 889 (2002) (citation omitted). Thus, \u201c[contradictions and discrepancies must be resolved in favor of the State, and the defendant\u2019s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration.\u201d State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 388 (1984).\nIn the present case, defendant was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3b) (2001). The statute provides in pertinent part that \u201c[a]ny person who ... transports, or possesses 28 grams or more of methamphetamine . . . shall be guilty of. . . trafficking in methamphetamine[.\u201d] To convict a defendant of this offense, the State must prove the defendant (1) knowingly possessed or transported methamphetamine, and (2) that the amount possessed was greater than 28 grams. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) (2001); State v. Rosario, 93 N.C. App. 627, 634, 379 S.E.2d 434, 438 (\u201cGeneral Statute 90-95(h) provides that possession of specified amounts of controlled substances constitutes the offense of traffickingf.]\u201d), disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 275, 384 S.E.2d 527 (1989).\nIn the instant case, defendant does not dispute that he possessed and transported methamphetamine, or that the amount was well in excess of 28 grams. However, the State also must prove that the possession or transportation of a controlled substance was knowing. See, e.g., State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 403, 333 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1985) (\u201cTo convict defendant of trafficking in heroin . . . the state was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the [drugs]\u201d.); State v. Rogers, 32 N.C. App. 274, 278, 231 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1977) (\u201cFelonious possession of a controlled substance has two essential elements. The substance must be possessed, and the substance must be \u2018knowingly\u2019 possessed.\u201d). Defendant herein argues that, notwithstanding evidence that he knew the package would contain methamphetamine, the State also must present evidence of the package\u2019s \u201corigin\u201d and must prove defendant knew the weight of methamphetamine in the package, in order to establish that the package was the one \u201cto which defendant\u2019s alleged knowledge pertained.\u201d Defendant asserts that the \u201cmajor issue for the jury to decide was whether or not defendant knew that the package contained a trafficking amount of methamphetamine.\u201d On this basis, defendant contends that because the State failed to establish defendant knew the weight of the methamphetamine inside the package, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he \u201cknowingly\u201d possessed or transported the drugs. We disagree.\nThe gravamen of defendant\u2019s argument is an assertion that knowledge of the weight or amount of methamphetamine is an essential element of the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine. Defendant cites no authority for this position, and our own review of the relevant law reveals none. Knowing possession of any amount of methamphetamine is a felony, and the weight is relevant only as to whether trafficking can properly be charged. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(b)(1) and (h)(3b) (2001). We discern no legal basis for grafting anew essential element \u2014 knowledge of the weight of the drugs \u2014 onto the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine. We hold, therefore, that to convict an individual of drug trafficking the State is not required to prove that defendant had knowledge of the weight or amount of methamphetamine which he knowingly possessed or transported. Instead, the statute requires only that the defendant knowingly possess or transport the controlled substances; if the amount exceeds 28 grams, then a conviction for trafficking may be obtained. This is in accord will holdings in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ex parte Washington, 818 So.2d 424 (Ala. 2001), and State v. Wiley, 80 S.W.3d 509 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). We conclude the State\u2019s evidence was more than adequate to support defendant\u2019s conviction. Evidence established that the package contained approximately 1700 grams of methamphetamine. Several witnesses testified to observing defendant hold and carry the package; indeed, the defendant testified that he went to his house for the express purpose of retrieving the package. In addition, Inspector Thompson testified that defendant admitted knowing the package would contain drugs. Taken together, this evidence handily passes the threshold required to sustain his conviction. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant argues next that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that there was evidence tending to show defendant had confessed to trafficking in methamphetamine. We do not agree.\nThe instruction delivered by the trial court was taken from the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction 104.70:\nThere is evidence which tends to show that the defendant confessed that he committed the crime charged in this case. If you find that the defendant made that confession then you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made in determining whether it was a truthful confession and the weight you will give to it.\nJury instructions must be \u201cbased upon a state of facts presented by some reasonable view of the evidence.\u201d State v. Lampkins, 283 N.C. 520, 523, 196 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1973). Thus, this instruction is proper only where evidence is presented that the defendant confessed to the charged offense.\nA confession is a \u201cvoluntary statement made by one who is [a] defendant in [a] criminal trial at [a] time when he is not testifying in trial and by which he acknowledges certain conduct of his own constituting [a] crime for which he is on trial; a statement which, if true, discloses his guilt of that crime.\u201d State v. Cannon, 341 N.C. 79, 89, 459 S.E.2d 238, 244-45 (1995) (quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 296 (6th ed. 1990)) (upholding trial court\u2019s use of the instruction at issue herein). Defendant acknowledges that the State presented evidence that he made certain statements to Inspector Thompson. However, he contends that these statements, even if true, do not constitute a confession to trafficking in methamphetamine.\nWe again note that conviction of drug trafficking requires proof that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) possessed or transported a given controlled substance, and also that (3) the amount transported was greater than the statutory threshold amount. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3)(a) (2001); State v. Acolatse, 158 N.C. App. 485, 488, 581 S.E.2d 807, 809 (2003) (\u201cTo prove the offense of trafficking in cocaine by possession, the State must show 1) knowing possession of cocaine and 2) that the amount possessed was 28 grams or more.\u201d) (quoting State v. White, 104 N.C. App. 165, 168, 408 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1991)). Defendant asserts that he did not confess to \u201cthe crime charged\u201d because his statements to Inspector Thompson did not include evidence that he knew \u201cthe very large amount of drugs\u201d in the package. However, as discussed above, although conviction requires proof that defendant know the nature of the substance in his possession, neither the statute nor case law supports defendant\u2019s contention that the State also must prove defendant knew the weight of the methamphetamine he possessed, or that the drugs weighed more than the threshold amount for trafficking.\nDefendant also argues that his statements to Inspector Thompson were not a confession, but merely an \u201cexplanation of the circumstances leading up to his arrest[.]\u201d This argument is without merit. Regardless of defendant\u2019s characterization of the statements, or his intent in providing the information to Inspector Thompson, an instruction on confession is appropriate if defendant has admitted taking certain actions that, if true, would constitute a criminal offense. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 298 N.C. 238, 258 S.E.2d 350 (1979) (defendant\u2019s statement properly characterized as \u201cconfession\u201d where he admitted acts constituting the offenses of rape and burglary, even though defendant stated the acts were committed as part of consensual sexual encounter with eleven year old girl).\nDefendant further contends that he cannot be deemed to have confessed to trafficking in methamphetamine because his statements to Inspector Thompson did not indicate that he had \u201can ownership interest\u201d in the methamphetamine, nor that he had \u201cany power or intent to control its use or disposition, or to sharing any plan or common purpose . . . with [Rivera].\u201d However, the offense of trafficking does not require proof of \u201can ownership interest\u201d in the drugs. Further, as defendant was not charged with conspiracy, evidence of a \u201ccommon purpose\u201d or plan with Rivera is not required. Regarding evidence of defendant\u2019s \u201cpower or intent to control its use or disposition,\u201d we note that \u201cevidence which places an accused within close juxtaposition to a narcotic drug under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference that he knew of its presence may be sufficient to justify the jury in concluding that it was in his possession.\u201d State v. Weems, 31 N.C. App. 569, 571, 230 S.E. 2d 193, 194 (1976). In the present case, evidence established that the methamphetamine was delivered to defendant\u2019s family home; that he was the one who entered the house and retrieved the package; and that it was seized from between his feet on the floor of the car. Moreover, defendant told Inspector Thompson that he and Rivera had gone to the house to obtain the package. We conclude that Inspector Thompson\u2019s testimony was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury on confession. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to require the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for his peremptory excusal of three black female jurors.\nRacial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges is barred both by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, and by Art. I, \u00a7 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 83, (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court:\noutlined a three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause. . . . First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.\nHernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-89). \u201cAlthough Batson is usually applied in the context of racial discrimination, we have extended the Batson analysis to the issue of gender discrimination injury selection.\u201d State v. Wiggins, 159 N.C. App. 252, 262, 584 S.E.2d 303, 312 (2003) (citing State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 403, 508 S.E.2d 496, 510 (1998)). In reviewing a court\u2019s determination that defendant failed to make out a prima facie case, this Court must evaluate an array of relevant factors including:\n(1) the characteristic in question of the defendant, the victim and any key witnesses;\n(2) questions and comments made by the prosecutor during jury selection which tend to support or contradict an inference of discrimination based upon the characteristic in question;\n(3) the frequent exercise of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors with the characteristic in question that tends to establish a pattern, or the use of a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against venire members with the characteristic in question;\n(4) whether the State exercised all of its peremptory challenges; and,\n(5) the ultimate makeup of the jury in light of the characteristic in question.\nWiggins at 263, 584 S.E.2d at 312.\nIn the present case, the record indicates that after a number of jurors were selected, the defendant made a Batson motion alleging that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner by excusing black female jurors. There was some discussion between defense counsel and the trial court regarding the race and gender of the jurors already selected. The trial court obtained a stipulation from the defendant that the panel included both white and black males, and white females. The trial court also made a \u201cfind[ing] for the record that there were no racial remarks made to the jury by the State in their questions . . . [and] no gender remarks[.]\u201d Thereafter, the trial court ruled that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges, and denied defendant\u2019s Batson motion. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to find that he presented prima facie evidence of prosecutorial discrimination in jury selection, and by failing to require the prosecutor to offer a race and gender neutral reason for his use of peremptory challenges. We conclude, however, that the record is insufficient to permit proper appellate review of this issue.\nJury selection in this case was not recorded. Further, the record does not include any other document that purports to reconstruct the relevant details of jury selection. Without a transcript or some other document setting out pertinent aspects of jury selection, this Court does not have enough information upon which to assess defendant\u2019s claim. For example, the record does not indicate the total number of potential jurors questioned by the prosecutor; their race or gender; the number or percent accepted; whether similarly situated prospective jurors received disparate treatment on the basis of race or gender; or whether the remarks to prospective jurors suggested any bias. Nor is the transcript of the trial court\u2019s discussion with defense counsel regarding defendant\u2019s Batson challenge an adequate substitute for these factual details:\n[Counsel\u2019s statement] cannot serve as a substitute for record proof.... We hold that as a rule of practice, counsel who seek to rely upon an alleged impropriety in the jury selection process must provide the reviewing court with the relevant portions of the transcript of the jury voir dire.\nJackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 321 N.C. 584, 586, 364 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1988). See also State v. Bellamy, 159 N.C. App. 143, 146, 582 S.E.2d 663, 666 (2003) (\u201cWithout an adequate record to fully reconstruct the [jury selection issue], this Court has no ability to determine whether prejudicial error occurred. . . . [T]he record before us is insufficient for appellate review and this assignment of error must be dismissed.\u201d) (citing State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 548, 331 S.E.2d 251, 254-55, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985)). We conclude that the record does not reconstruct jury selection in sufficient detail to enable this Court to conduct appellate review of the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of race and gender discrimination in the prosecutor\u2019s exercise of peremptory challenges. Accordingly, this assignment of error is dismissed.\nFinally, defendant argues that his sentence was \u201csevere and disproportionate\u201d in violation of his \u201cstate and federal constitutional rights.\u201d We disagree.\nDefendant received the minimum sentence permitted by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h) (2001), which provides in relevant part that:\n(3b) Any person who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or possesses 28 grams or more of methamphetamine . . . shall be guilty of a felony . . . known as \u2018trafficking in methamphetamine\u2019 . . . and if the quantity of such substance or mixture involved . . . (c)[is] 400 grams or more, such person shall be punished as a Class C felon and shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 225 months and a maximum term of 279 months in the State\u2019s prison and shall be fined at least two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3b)(c). \u201cIt is well settled that the General Assembly and not the judiciary determines the minimum and maximum punishment which may be imposed on those convicted of crimes. The legislature alone can prescribe the punishment for those crimes.\u201d State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 101, 340 S.E.2d 450, 459 (1986) (rejecting defendant\u2019s argument that \u201cimposition of the mandatory minimum sentence and fine [for drug trafficking] violates . . . the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution\u201d) (citing State v. Jernigan, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971)). Moreover, this Court is bound by precedent of the North Carolina Supreme Court. State v. Gillis, 158 N.C. App. 48, 580 S.E.2d 32 (2003).\nNor did the court err by sentencing defendant to a greater sentence than that received by Rivera pursuant to a plea bargain. See, e.g., State v. Garris, 265 N.C. 711, 712, 144 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1965) (\u201cThere is no requirement of law that defendants charged with similar offenses be given the same punishment.\u201d); State v. Sligh, 27 N.C. App. 668, 669, 219 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1975) (court did not err by \u201cimposing a sentence against defendant which was greatly in excess of the sentence given his codefendant . . . under [his] plea bargaining arrangement\u201d). This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe conclude that defendant received a trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Margaret P. Eagles, for the State.", "Paul M. Green, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID PAUL SHELMAN\nNo. COA02-1261\n(Filed 5 August 2003)\n1. Evidence\u2014 package of methamphetamine \u2014 authenticity\u2014 chain of custody\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation case by admitting into evidence a package of methamphetamine found in defendant\u2019s possession even though defendant contends the State failed to present adequate evidence of authenticity and chain of custody, because: (1) the State presented sufficient evidence on the unity of identity between the methamphetamine delivered to an inspector and that which was admitted at trial; and (2) the issues raised by defendant essentially go to alleged weaknesses in the State\u2019s case and do not render the methamphetamine package inadmissible.\n2. Drugs\u2014 trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3b), because: (1) knowing possession of any amount of methamphetamine is a felony, and the weight is relevant only as to whether trafficking can properly be charged; (2) the State is not required to prove that defendant had knowledge of the weight or amount of methamphetamine which he knowingly possessed or transported; and (3) the evidence established that several witnesses testified to observing defendant hold and carry a package that contained approximately 1700 grams of methamphetamine, defendant testified he went to his house for the express purpose of retrieving the package, and an inspector testified that defendant admitted knowing the package would contain drugs.\n3. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation\u2014 instruction on confession\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation case by instructing the jury that there was evidence tending to show defendant had confessed to trafficking in methamphetamine, because: (1) an instruction on confession is appropriate if defendant has admitted taking certain actions that, if true, would constitute a criminal offense; and (2) an inspector\u2019s testimony was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury on confession.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 peremptory excusal of black female jurors \u2014 insufficient record\nAlthough defendant contends the trial court erred in a trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation case by failing to find that defendant presented prima facie evidence of prosecutorial discrimination in jury selection and by failing to require the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for his peremptory excusal of three black female jurors, the record is insufficient to permit proper appellate review of this issue because: (1) jury selection in this case was not recorded; and (2) the record does not include any other document that purports to reconstruct the relevant details of jury selection.\n5. Sentencing\u2014 trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation \u2014 same punishment not required for different defendants\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in methamphetamine by possession and by transportation case by its sentencing of defendant, because: (1) defendant received the minimum sentence permitted by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h); and (2) even though defendant received a greater sentence than his codefendant received pursuant to a plea bargain, there is no requirement of law that defendants charged with similar offenses be given the same punishment.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 February 2002 by Judge Donald M. Jacobs in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Margaret P. Eagles, for the State.\nPaul M. Green, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0300-01", "first_page_order": 330, "last_page_order": 342 }