{ "id": 8957863, "name": "THOMAS E. HODGIN, III, Employee, Plaintiff v. THOMAS E. HODGIN, III, d/b/a, HODGIN CARPET, Employer, and N.C. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hodgin v. Hodgin", "decision_date": "2003-08-05", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1007", "first_page": "635", "last_page": "643", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 N.C. App. 635" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630523 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630398 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135777 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "751" }, { "page": "751-52" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "753-54" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "753-54" }, { "page": "753-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491657 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "233-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569848 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "quoting Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 325, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965)" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "quoting Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 325, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965)" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155858 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131899, 132118, 132190, 132075 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0310-01", "/nc/350/0310-04", "/nc/350/0310-03", "/nc/350/0310-02" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237233 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12122648 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(18)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 800, "char_count": 19062, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.433503148251689e-08, "percentile": 0.3973745187460736 }, "sha256": "5996d34a2a0809b57e92e6570978d3f1e54f1155634fac3e40d32eba1a8bfd03", "simhash": "1:f53355ebf4e65ba7", "word_count": 3027 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:55.515420+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "THOMAS E. HODGIN, III, Employee, Plaintiff v. THOMAS E. HODGIN, III, d/b/a, HODGIN CARPET, Employer, and N.C. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nThis case arises from an award and opinion of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, finding plaintiff suffered a compensable hernia injury when he lifted a chest of drawers 9 February 1999. We reverse.\nOn 2 February 1999, plaintiff saw Dr. David Patterson for complaints of epigastric abdominal pain. He described to Dr. Patterson that \u201c[o]ver the last month he has had a feeling of \u2018gas being trapped\u2019 in his subxiphoid area, especially after eating rapidly.\u201d Dr. Patterson noted that plaintiff\u2019s symptoms were possibly caused by a hiatal hernia, gastroesophogeal reflux disease, and/or colon malignancy but concluded that further tests should be conducted to properly diagnose plaintiff. Those tests were scheduled for 22 February 1999.\nOn the morning of 9 February 1999, plaintiff saw Dr. Philip Carter for complaints of \u201cback and thigh pain.\u201d Dr. Carter noted that plaintiff had a \u201crecent history of either ulcer or hiatal hernia.\u201d Later that day, plaintiff felt a \u201cbad pain\u201d in his chest area under his ribs when he attempted to lift a particularly heavy chest of drawers. Although plaintiff initially sought medical attention that same day, he abandoned treatment after his pain subsided.\nOn 22 February 1999, plaintiff underwent an esophagogastroduo-denoscopy as part of the tests scheduled by Dr. Patterson on 9 February 1999. That test revealed a \u201clarge para-esophageal hernia.\u201d On 17 March 1999, complaining of chest pain, plaintiff saw Dr. Anita Lindsey who also diagnosed plaintiff with a paraesophageal hernia. Dr. Lindsey performed surgery to repair the hernia on 26 March 1999, and plaintiff subsequently returned to work on 19 May 1999.\nOn 31 August 2000, the Industrial Commission filed an opinion and award finding plaintiff suffered a paraesophageal hernia on 9 February 1999 as a direct result of lifting an \u201cunusually heavy chest of drawers,\u201d \u201cwhich constituted an interruption in [his] normal work routine.\u201d The Industrial Commission awarded plaintiff temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses incurred as a result of his injury. Both parties appealed to the Full Commission (Commission). On 28 May 2002, the Commission modified the opinion and award. Defendant now appeals, contending (1) the \u201cCommission erred by finding and concluding that plaintiff sustained a hernia as a direct result of\u201d his work related activity on 9 February 1999, and (2) the Commission erred in calculating plaintiffs average weekly wage.\nInitially we review the Commission\u2019s conclusions to determine whether they are supported by its findings.\nThe Commission found, in pertinent part:\n3. On February 9, 1999, . . . [a]s the plaintiff-employee and his assistant lifted the unusually heavy chest of drawers, the plaintiff-employee felt a sudden onset of severe pain in his chest that did not exist before. The plaintiff-employee experienced difficult breathing and took many breaks during the remainder of his shift. The plaintiff-employee completed his shift.\n4. Upon completion of his shift, the plaintiff-employee drove himself to the emergency room. After waiting approximately 45 minutes, the plaintiff-employee\u2019s chest pain subsided and the plaintiff-employee left without seeing a physician.\n5. On February 2, 1999, the plaintiff-employee presented to Dr. David R. Patterson, an internist and specialist in gastroenterol-ogy, for evaluation of epigastric abdominal pain. Dr. Patterson reviewed the plaintiff-employee\u2019s December 4, 1997 x-rays and examined the plaintiff-employee.\n6. The plaintiff-employee presented to Dr. Michael E. Norms, an internist, for an annual physical on February 7, 1999. The plaintiff had no complaints and felt well. The plaintiff-employee also presented to Dr. Philip J. Carter, an orthopedic, on February 9, 1999 complaining of low back pain, but no chest pains.\n7. Dr. Patterson eventually diagnosed the plaintiff-employee with a p [ara] esophageal hernia. Dr. Patterson opined that symptoms of a p [ara] esophageal hernia include chest pains and he stated that a p [ara] esophageal hernia might be asymptomatic for extended periods of time. Dr. Patterson further stated that on February 9, 1999, when the plaintiff-employee was at work and experienced acute chest pain which eventually subsided, this episode could have been related to the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p [ara] esophageal hernia.\n9. The plaintiff-employee presented to the emergency room on March 17, 1999 complaining of chest pain. Dr. Anita K. Lindsey, surgeon, diagnosed the . plaintiff-employee with a left p [ara] esophageal hernia. Dr. Lindsey recommended surgery to repair the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p [ara] esophageal hernia that she performed on March 26, 1999.\n10. Dr. Lindsey opined that a p [ara] esophageal hernia can be asymptomatic for some time and that there is no way to know exactly when the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p [ara] esophageal hernia appeared, although severe chest pain, heartburn and gas pressure felt in the chest are symptoms. Dr. Lindsey also stated that p[ara]esophageal hernias are rare.\n11. Dr. Lindsey further opined that there are three causes of p [ara] esophageal hernia: 1) congenital; 2) acquired; and 3) sudden trauma. Dr. Lindsey stated that the plaintiff-employee, a carpet layer, who constantly lifts carpet and moves some furniture is at an increased risk of developing a hernia of any type, but that it is rare for a person with several different types of hernias to be more likely to have a congenital predisposition to hernias.\n12. Dr. Lindsey opined that without x-rays of the plaintiff-employee between December 1997 and March 1999, there is no way to establish as a medical fact when the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p [ara] esophageal hernia occurred or presented. Dr. Lindsey further stated that no one could palpate the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p[ara]esophageal hernia because it was behind the plaintiff-employee\u2019s rib cage and that only the esophagogastroduo-denoscopy could reveal whether the plaintiff-employee had a p [ara] esophageal hernia prior to February 9, 1999. The plaintiff-employee\u2019s esophagogastroduodenoscopy was performed after February 9, 1999.\nThe Commission concluded, in pertinent part:\n1. The plaintiff [-employee] lifted the unusually heavy chest of drawers of February 9, 1999 that constituted an interruption in the plaintiff\u2019s normal work routine, as it was not a part of his usual routine for the chest of drawers to be so heavy. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6).\n2. The plaintiff[-employee] sustained a hernia that appeared suddenly and did not exist before arising out of the course of his employment with the defendant-employer and as a direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned on February 9, 1999[,] when he lifted the unusually heavy chest of drawers. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(18).\nOur review of the Commission\u2019s opinion and award \u201cis limited to a determination of (1) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence in the record; and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings justify its conclusions of law.\u201d Goff v. Foster Forbes Glass Div., 140 N.C. App. 130, 132-33, 535 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2000). \u201cThe facts found by the Commission are conclusive upon appeal to this Court when they are supported by [any] competent evidence, even when there is evidence to support contrary findings.\u201d Pittman v. International Paper Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 156, 510 S.E.2d 705, 709, disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 310, 534 S.E.2d 596, aff'd, 351 N.C. 42, 519 S.E.2d 524 (1999); see also Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 509 S.E.2d 411 (1998).\nIn order to recover for a hernia an employee has the burden of showing:\na. That there was an injury resulting in hernia or rupture[;]\nb. That the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly[;]\nd. That the hernia or rupture immediately followed an accident [or arose] out of... a specific traumatic incident^ and]\ne. That the hernia or rupture did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(18) (2001).\nFor an injury to be compensable under the terms of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act... [t]here must be competent evidence to support the inference that the accident in question resulted in the injury complained of, i.e., some evidence that the accident at least might have or could have produced the particular disability in question. The quantum and quality of the evidence required to establish prima facie the causal relationship will of course vary with the complexity of the injury itself. There will be \u201cmany instances in which the facts in evidence are such that any layman of average intelligence and experience would know what caused the injuries complained of.\u201d\nClick v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (quoting Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 325, 139 S.E.2d 753, 760 (1965)). However, in cases presenting \u201ccomplicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\u201d Id. at 167, 265 S.E.2d at 391. \u201cReliance on Commission expertise is not justified where the subject matter involves a complicated medical question.\u201d Id. at 168, 265 S.E.2d at 391.\nIn a case decided since the Commission\u2019s own decision in this case, our Supreme Court has held that in such cases, \u201cexpert medical testimony is necessary to provide a proper foundation for the Commission\u2019s findings.\u201d Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 234, 581 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003). But \u201c \u2018when such expert opinion testimony is based merely upon speculation and conjecture, ... it is not sufficiently reliable to qualify as competent evidence on issues of medical causation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 232, 581 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000)). \u201c \u2018The evidence must . . . take the case out of the realm of conjecture and remote possibility, that is, there must be sufficient competent evidence tending to show a proximate causal relation.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Gilmore v. Board of Education, 222 N.C. 358, 365, 23 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1942)).\nWe find the instant case functionally indistinguishable from Holley. In Holley, an employee twisted her leg while at work and felt a sudden pain in her left calf. She was subsequently diagnosed with a pulled calf muscle. Holley, 357 N.C. at 230, 581 S.E.2d at 751. Approximately six weeks later, the employee developed a painful, swollen leg. She was diagnosed with deep vein thrombosis (\u201cDVT\u201d), a condition caused by a blood clot in a deep vein that obstructed blood flow and caused inflammation. Id. at 230, 581 S.E.2d at 751-52. The issue presented to the Court was the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the cause of the employee\u2019s DVT. Id. at 231, 581 S.E.2d at 752. Although two physicians testified that it was possible that her DVT was caused by her earlier accident, both \u201cwere unable to express an opinion to any degree of medical certainty as to the cause of plaintiff\u2019s DVT.\u201d Id. at 234, 581 S.E.2d at 753-54. The Court found the expert testimony revealed that neither of plaintiff\u2019s physicians could establish the required causal connection between plaintiff\u2019s accident and her deep vein thrombosis.\u201d Id. at 234, 581 S.E.2d at 754.\nOur Supreme Court has recognized that although physicians \u201care trained not to rule out medical possibilities no matter how remote[,] . . . mere possibility has never been legally competent to prove causation.\u201d Id.) Young, 353 N.C. at 233, 538 S.E.2d at 916. Although our courts do not require medical certainty, a physician\u2019s \u201c \u2018speculation\u2019 is insufficient to establish causation.\u201d Holley, 357 N.C. at 234, 581 S.E.2d at 754; Young, 353 N.C. at 233, 538 S.E.2d at 916. Thus, the Court has held testimony that an event \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d be the cause of an injury to be insufficient to support a causal connection where there is further evidence tending to show that the expert\u2019s opinion is mere guess or speculation. Young, 353 N.C. at 233, 538 S.E.2d at 916.\nAs the case sub judice involves a complicated medical question, namely the genesis of plaintiff\u2019s paraesophageal hernia, we look to the findings associated with the physicians\u2019 testimonies. Click, 300 N.C. at 167, 265 S.E.2d at 391. We conclude the Commission\u2019s findings do not support its second conclusion of law.\nThe only findings by the Commission arguably relating to causation involve the testimonies of Drs. Patterson and Lindsey, experts called to testify by defendants. Although we note a third physician, Dr. Michael Norms, testified for plaintiff, he was neither asked his opinion regarding the likely cause or source of plaintiff\u2019s hernia nor did he offer such an opinion. Moreover, the Commission made no findings regarding Dr. Norms other than to state that plaintiff \u201cpresented to [Dr. Norms] for an annual physical on February 7,1999\u201d and that he \u201chad no complaints and felt well.\u201d\nThe Commission found that Dr. Patterson testified \u201cwhen the plaintiff-employee was at work and experienced acute chest pain which eventually subsided, this episode could have been related to the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p[ara]esophageal hernia.\u201d (emphasis added). As the Commission also found Dr. Patterson testified that parae-sophageal hernias can be asymptomatic for extended periods and chest pains are only symptomatic of the condition, an opinion by Dr. Patterson that plaintiff\u2019s chest pain on 9 February 1999 \u201ccould have been related to\u201d plaintiff\u2019s work related activity tends to show no more than plaintiff felt symptoms of his hernia on 9 February 1999, not causation, (emphasis added). In light of Dr. Patterson\u2019s other statements, which were noted by the Commission, this statement is not sufficient to establish a causal connection between the work related activity of lifting the chest of drawers on 9 February 1999 and the genesis of his hernia.\nFurthermore, even assuming arguendo, Dr. Patterson\u2019s statement was probative of causation, due to its speculative nature it would be insufficient to support the conclusion drawn by the Commission. Dr. Patterson merely stated that plaintiff\u2019s pain on 9 February 1999 \u201ccould have been related\u201d to his hernia, (emphasis added). Without some indicia of greater confidence or reliability, evidence that plaintiffs pain was merely possibly related to his hernia is insufficient expert evidence upon which to base a conclusion of causation. See Holley, 357 N.C. at 233-34, 581 S.E.2d at 753-54; Young, 353 N.C. at 233, 538 S.E.2d at 916. We conclude Dr. Patterson\u2019s testimony is within that realm of speculation or guesswork prohibited in forming the basis for a finding that plaintiff\u2019s injury was caused by his work related activity. See Holley, 367 N.C. at 233-34, 581 S.E.2d at 753-54.\nThe Commission\u2019s only other findings relating to an expert\u2019s theory of causation state that \u201cDr. Lindsey opined that a p [ara] esophageal hernia can be asymptomatic for some time and that there is no way to know exactly when the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p[ara]esophageal hernia appeared.\u201d The Commission also found that Dr. Lindsey testified, upon being asked whether plaintiff developed the hernia in 1998 or that portion of 1999 prior to February 22, 1999, that \u201cwithout x-rays of the plaintiff-employee between December 1997 and March 1999, there is no way to establish as a medical fact when the plaintiff-employee\u2019s p [ara] esophageal hernia occurred or presented.\u201d Rather than supporting the Commission\u2019s conclusion, these findings, together with plaintiff\u2019s prior complaints of epigastric pain, serve to undermine it.\nAt most, the Commission\u2019s findings support a conclusion that plaintiff, as a carpet layer, was at an increased risk of developing a hernia, that he developed a hernia sometime between 1997 and 22 February 1999, and that his 9 February 1999 pain may have been symptomatic of his hernia. The Commission\u2019s findings are completely devoid of any indication that any medical expert concluded there was anything more than the mere possibility that plaintiff\u2019s work related activity may have been related to, much less the cause of, his hernia.\nMoreover, our review of the record reveals the absence of any record evidence to support findings that would support the Commission\u2019s second conclusion of law. The physicians did not render an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty or within any discernible likelihood or probability the genesis of plaintiff\u2019s hernia. Rather, the entirety of the physicians\u2019 testimonies tends to show the cause of plaintiff\u2019s hernia remains unclear and the subject of mere speculation.\nIn addition to the testimony noted by the Commission in its findings, Dr. Patterson also testified, \u201cI don\u2019t think anybody really knows for sure what causes these hernias. . . When asked if parae-sophageal hernias can by caused by heavy lifting, he responded, \u201cI\u2019ve really looked a lot in the textbooks for what the cause of these is, and I can\u2019t find any definite studies that say. I would certainly think that it\u2019s possible, but I can\u2019t give you any medical data to support that.\u201d Furthermore, Dr. Patterson testified, when asked if he thought plaintiff had his hernia when he examined him on 2 February 1999, \u201c[t]his would just be conjecture. There\u2019s no way I can prove this, but I would say yes, most likely it probably was.\u201d And Dr. Patterson concluded, \u201c[t]here\u2019s certainly no way I could tell you when in time this hernia occurred.\u201d\nThe record does not support a finding that plaintiff\u2019s 9 February 1999 work related activity caused the hernia. The findings are insufficient to support a conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s injury was caused by his work related activity on 9 February 1999. Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proving that his claim is compensable. See Henry v. A.C. Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1950). As we find this issue dispositive, we need not address defendant\u2019s remaining assignment of error. The Commission\u2019s opinion and award is reversed.\nReversed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kathleen G. Sumner, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Young Moore and Henderson P.A., by Dawn Dillon Raynor, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS E. HODGIN, III, Employee, Plaintiff v. THOMAS E. HODGIN, III, d/b/a, HODGIN CARPET, Employer, and N.C. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA02-1007\n(Filed 5 August 2003)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 hernia \u2014 medical testimony as to cause \u2014 speculative\nSpeculative medical testimony was insufficient to support the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings and conclusion in a workers\u2019 compensation case that plaintiff\u2019s hernia was caused by work related activity. Plaintiff, a carpet layer, suffered a rare paraesophageal hernia which he contended was caused by lifting an unusually heavy chest of drawers, but the entirety of the medical testimony was that the cause of plaintiff\u2019s hernia remains unclear.\nAppeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 28 May 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May 2003.\nKathleen G. Sumner, for plaintiff-appellee.\nYoung Moore and Henderson P.A., by Dawn Dillon Raynor, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0635-01", "first_page_order": 665, "last_page_order": 673 }