{ "id": 8958460, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER O'BRIAN MASON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mason", "decision_date": "2003-08-05", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1115", "first_page": "691", "last_page": "696", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "159 N.C. App. 691" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551315 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 317, 492 S.E.2d 609, 613 (1997)" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131972 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 317, 492 S.E.2d 609, 613 (1997)" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497335 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168626 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696763 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519858 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573188 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867652 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 L. Ed. 2d 795", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "taken in context, evidence linking defendant to victim's car was not a Harbison violation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220016 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "finding no Harbison violation where defendant took challenged statements out of context" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793130 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "finding no Harbison violation where defendant took challenged statements out of context" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "507-08", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716847 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0175-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 653, "char_count": 12297, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8294491594179206e-08, "percentile": 0.36252094234065385 }, "sha256": "2f3dd11641310b77366527b9095fff298cc235d482a69087c99bcaa27b7c1481", "simhash": "1:0763a023773e8574", "word_count": 1992 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:55.515420+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER O\u2019BRIAN MASON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nFrom a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for first degree minder, first degree burglary, and robbery with a firearm, defendant, Christopher O\u2019Brian Mason, argues on appeal that (1) he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because during oral argument, his attorney committed a lap-sus linguae \u2014 a slip of the tongue \u2014 by asking the jury to find him guilty, (2) the trial erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial, and (3) the trial court erroneously admitted prejudicial hearsay. We find no error for the reasons stated herein.\nAt the conclusion of his closing argument, counsel for the defendant stated: \u201cWe ask you to find Chris Mason guilty of all charges based upon the failure of the State to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d After some confusion, wherein defense counsel apparently was uncertain whether he committed the error, the trial court responded, \u201cI didn\u2019t hear not guilty. I heard you [say to the jury that they] should find the defendant guilty.\u201d At the trial court\u2019s request, the court reporter played back a tape recording of the closing argument. After listening to the t\u00e1pe, the trial court indicated: \u201cwhat I thought I heard was a statement to find him guilty.\u201d\nThereafter, the trial court stated: \u201c[This] is as close to what is meant or intended by the phrase, \u2018you cannot un-ring a bell.\u201d Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. After listening to the tape again, the trial court determined defense counsel had committed a lapsus lin-guae. Defense counsel renewed his motion for mistrial based on the \u201capparent misstatement.\u201d Defendant consented to this motion. The trial court expressed concern about:\n[T]he issue of whether or not jeopardy has attached in this case and if so whether the allowance of a motion for mistrial made by counsel [with] the defendant\u2019s concurrence might mean that the defendant may not be subject to be retried ....\nThe trial court allowed defense counsel to make an additional closing argument. Defense counsel stated to the jury:\nThe question has arisen as to what last thing I said to you was. I hope you understand that it is my purpose and intent to ask you to find Chris Mason not guilty. ... I [have] retaken this opportunity to, under the law, argue again. Obviously, the stresses and strains of these trials can take there [sic] tolls at times and if any of you misunderstood or if you believe I misstated what I intended to say, I am asking you, based on the evidence before you, to find that the State has failed to meet its burden of proving Chris Mason guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . and I ask you to find Christopher Mason not guilty and I hope you all understand that if I have made what in legal latin is a lapsus linguae before lunch ... I certainly apologize but our request is that you find Chris not guilty. Thank you very much.\nAfter defense counsel\u2019s second closing argument, the trial court excused the jury; heard arguments from the State and defendant; and denied defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.\nBy his first argument, defendant contends that under the Sixth Amendment and State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (1985), the admission of guilt by defendant\u2019s counsel, without defendant\u2019s consent, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se. We hold that defendant\u2019s reliance on Harbison is misplaced.\nIn Harbison, defense counsel stated during closing argument:\nLadies and Gentlemen of the Jury .... I don\u2019t feel that [defendant] should be found innocent. I think he should do some time to think about what he has done. I think you should find him guilty of manslaughter and not first degree.\nHarbison at 177-78, 337 S.E.2d at 506. In granting defendant a new trial, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that:\nWhen counsel admits his client\u2019s guilt without first obtaining the client\u2019s consent, the client\u2019s rights to a fair trial and to put the State to the burden of proof are completely swept away. The practical effect is the same as if counsel had entered a plea of guilty without the client\u2019s consent. Counsel in such situations denies the client\u2019s right to have the issue of guilt or innocence decided by a jury. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel, per se in violation of the Sixth Amendment, has been established in every criminal case in which the defendant\u2019s counsel admits the defendant\u2019s guilt to the jury without the defendant\u2019s consent.\nHarbison, at 180, 337 S.E.2d at 507-08 (citations omitted).\nHowever, unlike the defense counsel in Harbison, the defense counsel in this case made a misstatement, not a strategic decision to admit guilt without the client\u2019s consent. Contextually, the defense counsel did not admit defendant\u2019s guilt by making the statement that the jury should find defendant \u201cguilty... based upon the failure of the state to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d See, e.g., State v. Hinson, 341 N.C. 66, 78, 459 S.E.2d 261, 268 (1995) (finding no Harbison violation where defendant took challenged statements out of context); State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 620, 565 S.E.2d 22, 42 (2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 154 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2003) (taken in context, evidence linking defendant to victim\u2019s car was not a Harbison violation). Furthermore, any prejudice to defendant was cured by additional argument made by defense counsel emphasizing defendant\u2019s innocence.\nBy his second argument, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1061 (2002) which states that the trial court \u201cmust declare a mistrial upon the defendant\u2019s motion if there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s case.\u201d However, \u201c[t]he decision of whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.\u201d State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 537, 476 S.E.2d 349, 361 (1995) (citation omitted). \u201c[A] mistrial is appropriate only when there are such serious improprieties as would make it impossible to attain a fair and impartial verdict under the law.\u201d State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 754, 291 S.E.2d 622, 627 (1982); State v. Ward, 338 N.C. 64, 92-93, 449 S.E.2d 709, 724 (1994); State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 243, 333 S.E.2d 245, 252 (1985).\nDefendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial because it acted under a misapprehension of the law when it stated that Double Jeopardy might prevent the State from placing defendant on trial again. Assuming this solitary statement was error, see e.g., State v. Major, 84 N.C. App. 421, 424-25, 352 S.E.2d 862, 864-65 (1987), we are not persuaded that \u201chad the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a); State v. Reeb, 331 N.C. 159, 179, 415 S.E.2d 362, 373-74 (1992). As discussed supra, the trial court had no basis on which to grant defendant a mistrial because defense counsel\u2019s error was in form, not substance; furthermore, defense counsel\u2019s formal error was cured. Finally, in ruling on defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial, the trial judge correctly based his ruling on the \u201ctotality of the circumstances.\u201d\nBy his final argument, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce prejudicial hearsay. The State claims, that defendant \u201copened the door\u201d to incompetent evidence by eliciting information requiring rebuttal. We agree with the State and, therefore, find no error.\nUnder the North Carolina Rules of Evidence: \u201cHearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these rules.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802 (2002). Despite the hearsay rule, \u201c[t]he law wisely permits evidence not otherwise admissible to be offered to explain or rebut evidence elicited by the defendant himself.\u201d State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 682, 518 S.E.2d 486, 501 (1999) (citing State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 317, 492 S.E.2d 609, 613 (1997)) (quoting State v. Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 177, 277 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1981)). \u201cWhere one party introduces evidence as to a particular fact or transaction, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such latter evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.\u201d Albert, 303 N.C. at 177, 277 S.E.2d at 441.\nIn the present case, defendant challenges certain testimony offered by Deputy Darrell Rogers and Detective Michael Glenn. Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting Deputy Rogers to testify about a domestic violence call which involved defendant on the night of the shooting. On cross-examination, however, defendant asked the deputy specific questions concerning a report he had written about the incident and his failure to record certain data. To rehabilitate Deputy Rogers, the trial court permitted the State to re-direct Deputy Rogers about the contents of the report. By raising the issue of why Deputy Rogers was called to the scene and his subsequent report on the domestic violence allegation, defendant \u201copened the door\u201d to allow the State to ask similar or related questions. The trial court warned defendant on a number of occasions to be careful in his questioning. The trial court even explained to defendant how he could have obtained the same evidence without opening the door. Furthermore, the trial court properly limited the use of that evidence to identity and opportunity. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). Accordingly, under our long-standing exception in State v. McNeil, this evidence was properly admitted. McNeil, 350 N.C. at 682, 518 S.E.2d at 501.\nAdditionally, defendant claims the trial court erred in permitting Detective Glenn to testily about statements identifying defendant as being outside the victim\u2019s home on the night of the shooting. However, an examination of the record clearly reveals defendant opened the door to Detective Glenn\u2019s testimony. On cross examination, defendant asked Detective Glenn why the police did not follow any other leads. In an effort to rehabilitate the witness, the trial court permitted the State to re-direct Detective Glenn. The State asked Detective Glenn why other potential suspects were not pursued and, furthermore, why the investigation focused on defendant. Detective Glenn testified that two people identified defendant as being at the crime scene at the time of the shooting. Under our long-standing exception in State v. McNeil, this evidence was properly admitted. McNeil, 350 N.C. at 682, 518 S.E.2d at 501 (1999).\nNo Error.\nJudges HUDSON and CALABRIA concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwin L. West, III, PLLC, by Heather Wells, for defendant-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Steven F. Bryant, for State-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER O\u2019BRIAN MASON\nNo. COA02-1115\n(Filed 5 August 2003)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 misstatement during closing argument\nDefendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where his attorney misspoke during his closing argument and urged the jury to find defendant guilty of all charges. Contextually, counsel did not admit guilt, and the additional argument allowed by the court emphasized defendant\u2019s innocence and cured any prejudice.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 mistrial \u2014 lapsus linguae during closing argument \u2014 no prejudice\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant a mistrial after defense counsel misspoke during his closing argument. Although defendant contended that the court acted under a misapprehension of the law in stating that double jeopardy would prevent a mistrial, there was no prejudice because counsel\u2019s error was in form, not substance.\n3. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 door opened on cross-examination\nThe trial court did not err by admitting hearsay from detectives in a trial for murder, burglary, and robbery where defendant opened the door through questions on cross-examination.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 March 2001 by Judge Gregory A. Weeks in Superior Court, Columbus County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 June 2003.\nEdwin L. West, III, PLLC, by Heather Wells, for defendant-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Steven F. Bryant, for State-appellee." }, "file_name": "0691-01", "first_page_order": 721, "last_page_order": 726 }