{ "id": 8550380, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY RAY WILSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wilson", "decision_date": "1972-10-25", "docket_number": "No. 7218SC636", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "312", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "16 N.C. App. 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560458 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E. 2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626244 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E. 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629012 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/196/0710-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 10989, "ocr_confidence": 0.545, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.36693432705922235 }, "sha256": "e2a729eeeabf5fc8ae8e8c4346b0f5336452399f7fdd46849cd445a01e3d0272", "simhash": "1:93350ccbd02815d1", "word_count": 1889 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:31.279819+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Bkock and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY RAY WILSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the failure of the court to allow his motion to dismiss as of nonsuit. The evidence was sufficient for submission of defendant\u2019s guilt to the jury, and this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant brings forward only one exception to the evidence. To the solicitor\u2019s question: \u201cWhat did he do with the knife ?\u201d the witness answered: \u201cHe cut me on my shoulder and head and this arm too. And about that time Ray got up from right here and went toward him, to help me out.\u201d Defendant objected in this form: \u201cObject to what he was going to do. Just tell what happened.\u201d The court overruled the objection. On appeal defendant argues the answer was not responsive and was an impermissible statement by the witness as to deceased\u2019s intent and mental processes. The question was not objectionable. True the answer, in part, is not responsive. \u201cIt is well settled in this jurisdiction that defendant\u2019s objection should have been accompanied by a motion to strike the objectionable statement from the record if he deemed it incompetent and prejudicial.\u201d State v. Gooding, 196 N.C. 710, 711, 146 S.E. 806 (1929); Highway Commission v. Black, 239 N.C. 198, 79 S.E. 2d 778 (1954). There was no motion to strike any portion of the answer. Additionally, upon cross-examination, the witness gave the same testimony without objection or motion to strike. This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant also assigns as error the refusal of the court to give instructions tendered in writing by defendant and, in addition, contends that prejudicial error appears in certain portions of the charge as given.\nDefendant contends that he was entitled to have the court instruct the jury that the fact that he had previously, even in the immediate past, been guilty of wrongful acts or of an unlawful homosexual act would not, standing alone, deprive him of his right of self-defense. We think defendant\u2019s position is well taken.\nOrdinarily the words \u201cwithout fault\u201d and \u201cfree from blame\u201d are words of such common usage that their use with respect to defendant\u2019s conduct in bringing on the controversy would not require definition or further explanation. Instructions to the jury using these words, or similar words of identical import, have frequently been approved in this jurisdiction. See State v. Jennings, 276 N.C. 157, 171 S.E. 2d 447 (1970).\nIn State v. Jennings, supra, at pp. 162-163, Justice Branch, writing for the majority of the Court, said:\n\u201cLikewise, it is our opinion that conduct towards another must be evaluated within the framework of the surroundings, circumstances and parties, including their previous relations and the then existing state of their feelings. However, the fact that a person has previously been guilty of immoral conduct or wrongful acts, or has had past difficulties with the decedent, does not, standing alone, deprive a defendant of his right of self-defense. 40 C.J.S., Homicide, \u00a7 119, at 990. The requirement that a defendant must be free from fault in bringing on the difficulty before he can have the benefit of the doctrine of self-defense ordinarily means that he himself must not have precipitated the fight by assaulting the decedent or by inciting in him the reaction which caused the homicide. Usually, whether the defendant is free from blame or fault will be determined by his conduct at the time and place of the killing. Yet the fault in bringing on a difficulty which will deprive him of the right of self-defense is not confined to the precise time of the fatal encounter, but may include fault so closely connected with the difficulty in time and circumstances as to be fairly regarded as operating to bring it on. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide, \u00a7 145, at 434.\u201d\nIn that case, defendant had been engaged for a period of years in conduct with deceased\u2019s wife which, in the eyes of an average juror, would fix him with blame and fault. There the court held that under the particular facts of that case, the court should have amplified and explained the meaning of \u201cwithout fault\u201d and \u201cfree from blame\u201d when defendant specifically requested such charge. In so doing, the Court said, \u201cWe wish to make it crystal-clear that we do not intend to overrule the line of cases which have used the words' \u2018without fault\u2019 or \u2018free from blame\u2019 .without further definition when there was no request for further instruction. We emphasize that this opinion must be read in connection with the facts of the case.\u201d Jennings, p.163.\nWe think the facts in the case before us require the application of the rule of Jennings. We, therefore, conclude that the court, upon request of counsel, should have further clarified the charge in order to relate the phrases \u201cwithout fault\u201d and \u201cfree from blame\u201d to defendant\u2019s conduct at the time of the homicide and to dispel any idea that defendant\u2019s improper or unlawful conduct prior to the homicide, standing alone, would preclude his right of self-defense.\nDefendant, therefore, must be given a\nNew trial.\nJudges Bkock and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Earnhardt, for the State.", "Cahoon and Swisher, by Robert S. Cahoon, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY RAY WILSON\nNo. 7218SC636\n(Filed 25 October 1972)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 162, 169 \u2014 unresponsive answer \u2014 no motion to strike \u2014 similar testimony subsequently given without objection\nAdmission of a witness\u2019s answer which allegedly was not responsive to the question put to him did not constitute prejudicial error where defendant objected but failed to make a motion to strike the answer and where the witness gave the same testimony on cross-examination without objection or motion to strike.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 28\u2014 instruction on self-defense \u2014 explanation of \u201cwithout fault\u201d and \u201cfree from blame\u201d\nIn a prosecution for second degree murder or manslaughter, the trial court erred in not granting defendant\u2019s written request for clarification of the charge in order to relate the phrases \u201cwithout fault\u201d and \u201cfree from blame\u201d to defendant\u2019s conduct at the time of the homicide and to dispel any idea that defendant\u2019s improper or unlawful conduct prior to the homicide, standing alone, would preclude his right of self-defense.\nAppeal by defendant from Seay, Judge, 31 January 1972 Session of Superior Court, Guilford County.\nDefendant was indicted for the murder of Ray Douglas Bunton. The State elected to try defendant for murder in the second degree or manslaughter. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, was found by the jury guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict.\nDefendant offered no evidence and did not testify in his own behalf. The evidence offered at the trial tends to show, in summary, the following: Earl Joseph Reardon (Reardon), who was 19 years of age at the time of the killing, and Ray Bunton, the deceased, who was 13 years of age, left the home of the deceased about noon on Sunday, 22 August 1971. They, with a brother of deceased, went to Greensboro where they visited at the hospital, visited some boys at their place behind a filling station and went to a drive-in beer joint. Reardon drank some beer. Deceased did not. They left the beer joint after dark and decided to go to the General Greene and arrived there about eleven o\u2019clock. They \u201chad heard that homosexuals hung out at the General Greene\u201d and that \u201cif you let them have a homosexual act with you they would give you money.\u201d All three went into the General Greene but came back out. Deceased\u2019s brother met a friend in the parking lot and did not go back in with Reardon and deceased. Reardon had not previously been there. They sat at a booth and Reardon ordered a beer. Deceased did not drink a beer. They saw defendant and a companion sitting at a bar. Defendant was dressed in a wig and a woman\u2019s purple pants suit and carried a lady\u2019s pocketbook. Reardon knew defendant was a man and they motioned for defendant and his companion to come sit with them. Defendant said he had an apartment at the O\u2019Henry Hotel across the street, that they \u201cwould get some beer, go there and have a party.\u201d The man with defendant was Raymond Bridges. The four of them went to defendant\u2019s room in the hotel. No conversation had been had with respect to homosexual activity. When they got into the room, defendant put the beer in an ice chest. Bridges and deceased got on the bed. Defendant went in the bathroom and Reardon followed him. They disrobed and Reardon allowed defendant to perform an homosexual act upon him. They remained in the bathroom about 30 minutes. When they came out deceased was sittihg on the edge of the bed fully clothed. Bridges was seated in a chair. Reardon put his clothes on. Defendant remained undressed with only a towel around his waist. Reardon asked defendant for money. Defendant refused and replied that \u201cwe should give them money, and told us to get out of there.\u201d Reardon hit defendant in the face with the back of his hand. \u201cI flew mad, I guess, because he got smart with me. I hit him hard.\u201d A scuffle ensued with Reardon and defendant. Reardon\u2019s head hit the wall. Defendant got a knife from the bureau and cut Reardon on the head, shoulder and arm. Deceased got up from the bed and went toward defendant. At that time \u201cI saw Wilson (defendant) make a motion toward Ray (deceased) with the knife.\u201d Both Reardon and deceased then left the room, Reardon a step or two ahead of deceased. A short distance down the hall deceased fell to the floor and Reardon realized he was badly injured and ran to the police station for help. The police officers arrived at the hotel at 2:45 and found the body of deceased lying in a pool of blood. Blood led to room 39 about 20 to 25 feet from the body. When the officers entered the room, defendant was seated in a chair dressed in a towel. He stood up when the officers entered. They saw no injuries, bruises, or lacerations on him. They warned him of his constitutional rights and he replied that he understood them. When the officer said that there must be a knife around, defendant said \u201cYou must mean this one\u201d and reached into the top dresser drawer and withdrew a hunting knife. As he pulled it from the drawer he said \u201cLet me show you how I did it.\u201d A statement was not taken from defendant at that time. There was blood on the floor, the bed and the walls. A stereo set had been turned over. \u201cIt looked like there had been a scuffle in the room.\u201d\nThe pathologist who performed the autopsy on the body of deceased testified that deceased had a superficial abrasion over the bridge of the nose and the right cheek. The main wound was in the right chest region. The wound extended from the chest wall back to the backbone lacerating the inferior vena cava. Death was caused by massive hemorrhage from the lacerated vein. \u201cThe sharp instrument went through the rib cage causing a complete transection or cutting across of the fifth rib on the right. The rib was cut in two pieces.\u201d\nAttorney General Morgan, by Associate Attorney Earnhardt, for the State.\nCahoon and Swisher, by Robert S. Cahoon, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 331, "last_page_order": 336 }