{
  "id": 8553527,
  "name": "HATTIE M. BRYANT v. SHIRLEEN WYKE WINKLER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bryant v. Winkler",
  "decision_date": "1972-11-22",
  "docket_number": "No. 7225SC802",
  "first_page": "612",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "263 N.C. 317",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:31.279819+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Vaughn and Hedrick concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "HATTIE M. BRYANT v. SHIRLEEN WYKE WINKLER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "GRAHAM, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the denial of her request for jury instructions on the doctrine of sudden emergency. She says that she was confronted with a sudden emergency when the Bryant car stopped after having started from a stopped position as if it would proceed across the bridge.\nWe agree with the trial court that the doctrine of sudden emergency is not applicable here. The doctrine is not available to a party who contributes to the creation of the emergency in whole or in part. 6 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Negligence, \u00a7 4, p. 9. Defendant\u2019s conduct in failing to bring her automobile under control as she proceeded onto a narrow bridge where two cars were meeting in front of her contributed to whatever emergency arose from the sudden stop by the Bryant vehicle.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignment of error is to the court\u2019s instruction to the jury that they might assess damages for permanent injury. She contends that there was no evidence on which to base this instruction.\nIt is elementary that there can be no recovery for a permanent injury unless there is some evidence tending to establish one with reasonable certainty. Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E. 2d 753; Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E. 2d 40; Johnson v. Brown, 11 N.C. App. 323, 181 S.E. 2d 321, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 349. While the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s physician on the question of permanent injury was far from explicit, we are of the opinion that it was sufficient to permit the element of permanency to be considered by the jury. He testified as a medical expert and described the physical injuries suffered by plaintiff in the accident. His testimony, when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, would permit the jury to find that plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury that consisted of a disarrangement or separation and stretching of the inner fascia and ligaments about the spine. Fibrous or scar tissue can be expected to form in the healing process and remain during the remainder of plaintiff\u2019s life. This scar tissue or fibrous tissue is abnormal and constitutes some disability.\nNo error.\nJudges Vaughn and Hedrick concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GRAHAM, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "No brief filed for plaintiff.",
      "Toxvnsend and Todd by J. R. Todd, Jr., for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "HATTIE M. BRYANT v. SHIRLEEN WYKE WINKLER\nNo. 7225SC802\n(Filed 22 November 1972)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 72\u2014 sudden emergency \u2014 refusal to give instructions proper\nDefendant\u2019s conduct in failing to bring her automobile under control as she proceeded onto a narrow bridge where two cars were meeting in front of her contributed to whatever emergency arose from the sudden stop by the vehicle in her lane of travel; therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency.\n2. Damages \u00a7 15 \u2014 damages for permanent injury \u2014 sufficiency of evidence to support award\nThe trial court properly allowed the jury to assess damages for permanent injury where there was evidence tending to show some permanent injury to plaintiff\u2019s spine and expected disability therefrom.\nOn certiorari to review judgment of Grist, Judge, 27 March 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Caldwell County.\nCivil action to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff while a passenger in an automobile operated by her husband, Grayson Bryant.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tends to show that before entering upon a bridge located on a rural paved road near Granite Falls, Bryant stopped his automobile so that a vehicle he was meeting could clear the bridge. The bridge was not wide enough for two cars to meet on it and pass. While Bryant was stopped at the bridge, defendant drove her automobile into the rear of the Bryant automobile, knocking it forward about 80 feet and causing plaintiff to sustain a whiplash type injury to her neck.\nDefendant testified that she was familiar with the bridge and knew the practice was for all motorists to stop at either end of the bridge for oncoming traffic. \u201cEverybody in the community did that.\u201d As defendant proceeded toward the bridge on the date of the accident, she saw a vehicle approaching on the other side, and she also saw the Bryant car stop in front of her about a car length from the edge of the bridge. Defendant stated that she applied her brakes but let up on them when she observed the Bryant automobile move forward as if it were going to proceed across the bridge. The Bryant automobile then stopped suddenly, and defendant was unable to bring her automobile under control and avoid striking the Bryant car from the rear.\nThe jury answered the issue of negligence in plaintiff\u2019s favor and awarded damages in the sum of $7,000.00. Defendant appeals from judgment entered upon the verdict.\nNo brief filed for plaintiff.\nToxvnsend and Todd by J. R. Todd, Jr., for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0612-01",
  "first_page_order": 636,
  "last_page_order": 638
}