{ "id": 8553559, "name": "SHIRLEY T. RAMSEY v. ROBERT EUGENE RAMSEY and BYRD E. BRITTAIN", "name_abbreviation": "Ramsey v. Ramsey", "decision_date": "1972-11-22", "docket_number": "No. 7226SC654", "first_page": "614", "last_page": "616", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "16 N.C. App. 614" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626965 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E. 2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630519 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555001 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547624 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0109-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 363, "char_count": 4828, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20596683435984106 }, "sha256": "d2def602afc261bd31d845c5d5d71ab80fa0756e344b96175008510323f332a8", "simhash": "1:bd09fa2c30f6467d", "word_count": 812 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:31.279819+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Vaughn concur." ], "parties": [ "SHIRLEY T. RAMSEY v. ROBERT EUGENE RAMSEY and BYRD E. BRITTAIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEAHAM, Judge.\nThe only question of substance raised by this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in denying appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss made at the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence. We hold that he did not.\nAppellant\u2019s motion to dismiss, made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Eule 41 (b), challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to establish plaintiff\u2019s right to relief, and in passing on the motion the trial judge was guided by the same principles expressed under our former procedure with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the motion of nonsuit. Presson v. Presson, 12 N.C. App. 109, 182 S.E. 2d 614; Wells v. Insurance Co., 10 N.C. App. 584, 179 S.E. 2d 806.\nThe evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, tends to show the following: On 17 August 1968 plaintiff was living separate and apart from her husband, defendant Eamsey. She was dating defendant Brittain on that evening and riding as a passenger in his automobile. Defendant Eamsey drove from a grill parking lot behind Brittain and passed him. Brittain then drove around Eamsey and proceeded to take a detour \u201cso he wouldn\u2019t follow us.\u201d Brittain eventually drove onto Interstate Highway # 85 and proceeded south. Eam-sey followed, drove around Brittain, and slowed to around 35 to 40 miles an hour. Brittain passed Eamsey again and then drove in the outside lane of the two southbound lanes. Eamsey pulled up alongside Brittain in the inside lane, and both defendants proceeded to drive side by side at speeds of 65 to 70 miles per hour for about a mile and a half, at which point the fronts of the vehicles collided, causing Brittain\u2019s automobile to strike the guardrail and injure plaintiff. While driving alongside Eamsey, Brittain would look at him and then look back at the road.\nAppellant makes no contention that plaintiff was contribu-torily negligent, nor does he contend that he was frightened by Eamsey or had any other reason to drive alongside of him at a high rate of speed for a mile and a half. His position is that by failing to show which lane the vehicles were in at the time of the collision, plaintiff failed to show that any negligence on appellant\u2019s part was a proximate cause of her injury. We do not agree. The immature and perilous conduct of both men in the operation of their automobiles invited the consequences that followed. As stated in Groome v. Davis, 215 N.C. 510, 514, 2 S.E. 2d 771, 773, \u201cthere is more involved in speed than the mere chance of being at a particular spot at a given instant. The event may not be left in the lap of the gods, when it should have been kept in the hands of the driver.\u201d While there is no allegation or contention by plaintiff that the men were engaged in speed competition, as that term is used in the statutes, we are nevertheless of the opinion that their conduct amounted to a joint tort in which each must be responsible for the acts of the other. Consequently, the fact Brittain\u2019s automobile may have been in its proper lane when the vehicles collided is immaterial. See Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E. 2d 12, and authorities collected there.\nNo error.\nJudges Brock and Vaughn concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEAHAM, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard A. Cohan for \u2018plaintiff appellee.", "Hedrick, McKnight, Parham, Helms, Warley & Kellarn by Thomas A. McNeely for defendant appellant Byrd E. Brittain." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHIRLEY T. RAMSEY v. ROBERT EUGENE RAMSEY and BYRD E. BRITTAIN\nNo. 7226SC654\n(Filed 22 November 1972)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 50; Negligence \u00a7 29 \u2014 automobile collision \u2014 personal injury\u2014 sufficiency of evidence to withstand nonsuit\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a personal injury action against him where the evidence tended to show that plaintiff was injured when defendant\u2019s car in which she was a passenger and the car of her defendant husband collided as a result of the negligence of the two drivers in operating their vehicles at speeds greater than were reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, failing to keep their vehicles under proper control and failing to reduce their speed in order to avoid colliding with each other\u2019s vehicle.\nAppeal by defendant Brittain from Chess, Special Judge, 10 April 1972 Schedule \u201cD\u201d Session of Superior Court held in Mecklenburg County.\nPersonal injury action tried by the court without a jury. The court concluded from extensive findings of fact that plaintiff\u2019s injuries were proximately caused by the joint and concurring negligence of defendants in driving their vehicles at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under conditions existing, failing to keep their vehicles under proper control and failing to reduce their speed in order to avoid colliding with each other\u2019s vehicle. Damages in the sum of $8,000.00 were awarded plaintiff. Defendant Brittain appeals.\nRichard A. Cohan for \u2018plaintiff appellee.\nHedrick, McKnight, Parham, Helms, Warley & Kellarn by Thomas A. McNeely for defendant appellant Byrd E. Brittain." }, "file_name": "0614-01", "first_page_order": 638, "last_page_order": 640 }