{ "id": 8953913, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONALD WEAVER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Weaver", "decision_date": "2003-08-19", "docket_number": "No. COA02-931", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "67", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 N.C. App. 61" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "77 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607564 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527707 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522558 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138558 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219976 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11355762 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867623 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12131958 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 F. Supp. 300", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5334288 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he verbal offer of a bribe by [declarant] does not constitute hearsay evidence. Rather, it is in the nature of a 'verbal act'. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/277/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 F.3d 543", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10511131 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "testimony that witness was solicited to offer a bribe was offered to prove that solicitation was made and, therefore, was not hearsay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/9/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "testimony by victim that, during a robbery, a robber stated that defendant, one of the other robbers, would hurt him if he did not turn over money was not hearsay" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644432 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "testimony by victim that, during a robbery, a robber stated that defendant, one of the other robbers, would hurt him if he did not turn over money was not hearsay" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563", "parenthetical": "\"Notable examples of admissible non-hearsay include statements which are offered to prove only that the statement was actually made ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2645963 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214", "parenthetical": "\"Notable examples of admissible non-hearsay include statements which are offered to prove only that the statement was actually made ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461", "parenthetical": "\"The Hearsay Rule does not preclude a witness from testifying as to a statement made by another person when the purpose of the evidence is not to show the truth of such statement but merely to show that the statement was, in fact, made.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565179 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "\"The Hearsay Rule does not preclude a witness from testifying as to a statement made by another person when the purpose of the evidence is not to show the truth of such statement but merely to show that the statement was, in fact, made.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-218", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 707, "char_count": 14200, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5046715916883656e-08, "percentile": 0.2825324951377474 }, "sha256": "6defd7c5f17fc7034cb7113eeff8669d1d7882da9fff1163102d01e03d8a0d64", "simhash": "1:865968a7f5ded548", "word_count": 2316 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:23.823025+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONALD WEAVER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nThis appeal arises out of defendant Ronald Weaver\u2019s conviction for bribery of a public officer. Defendant contends primarily that the trial court erred (1) in admitting the out-of-court statements of his co-defendant offering the alleged bribe; and (2) in admitting into evidence a district court conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia that had been appealed to superior court. Because we find that the co-defendant\u2019s statements were not hearsay but rather verbal acts and because Rule 609 permits admission of the conviction, we find no error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nFacts\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following. On 26 July 2000, the Salisbury Police Department obtained a search warrant for Apartment 2 at 203 Pearl Street, Salisbury, North Carolina, the residence of James Edward Blakeney, who was suspected of selling drugs at that location. The search warrant also authorized the police to search Blakeney\u2019s vehicle and any people in the area surrounding Apartment 2.\nThe police \u201cstaked out\u201d the area until Blakeney returned to his apartment. At 5:00 p.m., Blakeney\u2019s car pulled up with defendant Weaver driving and Blakeney in the front passenger seat. Pursuant to the search warrant, Detective Mike Dummett of the Salisbury Police Department searched Blakeney and found 65 \u201crocks of crack cocaine\u201d and $600.00 in cash on his person.\nDummett escorted Blakeney inside and the officers began to search his apartment. At that point, Blakeney asked Dummett if they could speak in private. They stepped outside onto the apartment\u2019s porch. According to Dummett, defendant Weaver was standing only three to five feet away.\nDummett testified that Blakeney asked him \u201cif there was anything that [Dummett] could do to just forget about the drugs that [he] had found.\u201d Dummett asked Blakeney what he meant by that. Blakeney responded \u201cthat his friend, Ronald Weaver was coming into four hundred thousand dollars from a military type of settlement and he would give [Dummett] some money, just for free, to drop the charges.\u201d Blakeney then turned to defendant and asked, \u201cHow much money are you willing to give him to make this go away?\u201d Defendant replied: \u201cIt doesn\u2019t matter to me, whatever it takes.\u201d\nBlakeney told Dummett that defendant loved him, would not let anything happen to him, and would use his settlement money to get Blakeney out of trouble. Blakeney then turned again to defendant and said, \u201cIsn\u2019t that right?\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cThat\u2019s right.\u201d Defendant showed Dummett a power of attorney that he had just signed giving Blakeney control over defendant\u2019s assets.\nBlakeney asked Dummett, \u201cDon\u2019t you need a vacation or something?\u201d Dummett responded that he was not interested in a bribe. Blakeney claimed that he was not offering a bribe, but instead it was \u201cjust a gift from one black man to another black man.\u201d He urged, \u201cCome on brother, help me out.\u201d Blakeney again mentioned money, turned to defendant, and said, \u201cWe can do that, can\u2019t we?\u201d Defendant responded: \u201cWhatever he wants, we can do it.\u201d Dummett turned and returned to the apartment.\nAt trial, Blakeney did not testify. Defendant testified that on 26 July 2000, he was driving Blakeney\u2019s car because Blakeney had been drinking. He stated that they had gone to sign the power of attorney that he showed to Dummett so that Blakeney could help him obtain additional Veterans Administration benefits. Defendant denied bribing Dummett and denied hearing Blakeney say anything about money, trips, or a vacation.\nOn 13 February 2002, a jury found defendant guilty and he was sentenced to a minimum of 13 months and a maximum of 16 months. The sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for 24 months.\nI\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Blakeney\u2019s out-of-court statements. Defendant contends that these statements were inadmissible hearsay and that their admission therefore violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and effective assistance of counsel under Article 1, \u00a7 19 and \u00a7 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina and under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree.\nDefendant was convicted under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-218 (2001), which provides: \u201cIf any person shall offer a bribe, whether it be accepted or not, he shall be punished as a Class F felon.\u201d To prove that a person has offered a bribe, the State must necessarily offer evidence that words amounting to a bribe were spoken. The State offered Blakeney\u2019s statements not for the truth of the matter asserted in those statements, but rather to prove that Blakeney spoke words that amounted to an offer of a bribe. When offered for that purpose, the statements do not amount to hearsay. See State v. Kirkman, 293 N.C. 447, 455, 238 S.E.2d 456, 461 (1977) (\u201cThe Hearsay Rule does not preclude a witness from testifying as to a statement made by another person when the purpose of the evidence is not to show the truth of such statement but merely to show that the statement was, in fact, made.\u201d); State v. Grier, 51 N.C. App. 209, 214, 275 S.E.2d 560, 563 (1981) (\u201cNotable examples of admissible non-hearsay include statements which are offered to prove only that the statement was actually made ....\u201d); State v. Cleveland, 51 N.C. App. 159, 160, 275 S.E.2d 284, 285 (1981) (testimony by victim that, during a robbery, a robber stated that defendant, one of the other robbers, would hurt him if he did not turn over money was not hearsay).\nBlakeney\u2019s statements, fall into the category of \u201coperative facts\u201d or \u201cverbal acts.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801 Commentary (2001) (\u201cThe effect is to exclude from hearsay the entire category of \u2018verbal acts\u2019 and \u2018verbal parts of an act,\u2019 in which the statement itself affects the legal rights of the parties or is a circumstance bearing on conduct affecting their rights.\u201d). As 2 Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 195 (5th ed.) notes, \u201c[a] person\u2019s utterances may be admissible because they are operativ\u00e9 facts in the case, as where they are words of. . . attempted bribery . . . .\u201d See also United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1993) (testimony that witness was solicited to offer a bribe was offered to prove that solicitation was made and, therefore, was not hearsay); United States v. Gonsiewski, 277 F. Supp. 300, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (\u201c[T]he verbal offer of a bribe by [declarant] does not constitute hearsay evidence. Rather, it is in the nature of a \u2018verbal act\u2019. . . .\u201d).\nAlternatively, these statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(B), which provides that a statement is admissible if offered against a party and it is \u201ca statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(d)(B) (2001). Adoptive admissions generally fall into one of two categories: (1) those adopted through an affirmative act of a party; and (2) those inferred from silence or a failure to respond in circumstances that call for a response. State v. Sibley, 140 N.C. App. 584, 588-89, 537 S.E.2d 835, 839 (2000). This case does not present a scenario in which defendant simply remained silent while Blakeney spoke. Instead, the State offered evidence that defendant participated in the conversation and affirmatively endorsed Blakeney\u2019s statements.\nWhen Blakeney asked defendant what he would be willing to pay to help Blakeney with the drug charges, he responded, \u201c[W]hatever it takes.\u201d After Blakeney assured Dummett that defendant would do whatever necessary to get Blakeney out of trouble, defendant confirmed, \u201cThat\u2019s right.\u201d Finally, after Blakeney again mentioned money and asked defendant, \u201cWe can do that, can\u2019t we?\u201d he responded, \u201cWhatever he wants, we can do it.\u201d In short, after each of Blakeney\u2019s statements, defendant asserted his agreement.\nBlakeney\u2019s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay verbal acts or as adoptive admissions. Because the statements either were not hearsay or fell within a well-recognized exception to the rule barring hearsay evidence, the admission of the statements did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 503, 476 S.E.2d 301, 312 (1996). This assignment of error is overruled.\nII\nIn his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine defendant with respect to his district court conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argues only that the conviction was inadmissible because it had been appealed to superior court. The plain language of Rule 609 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609 (2001), provides otherwise.\nRule 609(e) specifically states that \u201c[t]he pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.\u201d Defendant cites no authority suggesting that Rule 609(e)\u2019s reference to \u201can appeal\u201d excludes appeals from district court to superior court and we have found none. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIII\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying the appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence. \u201cIn reviewing a motion to dismiss, \u2018the trial court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence (a) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (b) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Stancil, 146 N.C. App. 234, 244, 552 S.E.2d 212, 218 (2001) (quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982)), aff'd as modified, 355 N.C. 266, 559 S.E.2d 788 (2002). \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Matias, 354 N.C. 549, 552, 556 S.E.2d 269, 270 (2001) (quoting State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984)). When reviewing a defendant\u2019s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, with the State receiving the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Compton, 90 N.C. App. 101, 103-04, 367 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1988).\nThe elements of bribery of a public officer include (1) the offer of something of value, (2) to a person known to be a public official, and (3) with the corrupt intent to influence the official\u2019s actions in the performance of a legal duty. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-218; State v. Hair, 114 N.C. App. 464, 467, 442 S.E.2d 163, 164 (1994) (quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953)) (emphasis original) (defining bribery as \u201c \u2018the voluntary offering [or] giving ... of any sum of money, present, or thing of value with the corrupt intent to influence the recipient\u2019s action as a public officer ... in the performance of any official duty required of him.\u2019 \u201d).\nHere, the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Blakeney and defendant together offered to share a portion of defendant\u2019s claimed $400,000.00 settlement with Dummett if Dummett would ignore the drugs that he had found when he searched Blakeney. Defendant\u2019s argument on appeal that there was no evidence that defendant offered money to Dummett overlooks the State\u2019s evidence that defendant said he was willing to pay \u201cwhatever it takes\u201d and \u201c[w]hatever he wants, we can do it.\u201d This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to convict defendant of bribery of a public officer.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Melissa L. Trippe, for the State.", "J. Stephen Gray, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONALD WEAVER, Defendant\nNo. COA02-931\n(Filed 19 August 2003)\n1. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 codefendant\u2019s out-of-court statements \u2014 bribery of public officer \u2014 verbal acts \u2014 adoptive admissions\nThe trial court did not err in a bribery of a public officer case by admitting testimony of the out-of-court statements of a code-fendant offering the alleged bribe even though defendant contends the statements were hearsay, because: (1) to prove that a person has offered a bribe, the State must necessarily offer evidence that words amounting to a bribe were spoken; (2) the State offered the codefendant\u2019s statements to prove that he spoke words that amounted to an offer of a bribe rather than for the truth of the matter asserted in those statements; (3) the code-fendant\u2019s statements fall into the category of operative facts or verbal acts; and (4) as an alternative basis, the evidence was admissible as adoptive admissions since the State offered evidence that defendant participated in the conversation and affirmatively endorsed his codefendant\u2019s statements. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801.\n2. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 possession of drug paraphernalia \u2014 pendency of appeal\nThe trial court did not err in a bribery of a public officer case by allowing the State to cross-examine defendant with respect to his district court conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia even though the conviction had been appealed to superior court, because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 609 specifically states that pen-dency of an appeal from a conviction does not render evidence of the conviction inadmissible.\n3. Bribery\u2014 public officer \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence the charge of bribery of a public officer, because: (1) the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that defendant and a codefendant together offered to share a portion of defendant\u2019s claimed settlement with a police officer if the officer would ignore the drugs that he had found when he searched the codefendant; and (2) the State offered evidence that defendant stated he was willing to pay whatever it takes and whatever the officer wants.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 February 2002 by Judge Larry G. Ford in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 May 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Melissa L. Trippe, for the State.\nJ. Stephen Gray, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 91, "last_page_order": 97 }