{ "id": 8955624, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DOUGLAS EARL COLLINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Collins", "decision_date": "2003-09-16", "docket_number": "No. COA02-415", "first_page": "310", "last_page": "325", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 N.C. App. 310" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564626 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 33, 215 S.E.2d 589, 598 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238372 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 33, 215 S.E.2d 589, 598 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12167877 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560498 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574166 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521862 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11242838 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527541 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526069 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that an officer may rely upon information received through an informant \" 'so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 940", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 351911, 353703, 353383, 351755, 354797, 353869, 354381, 354546, 354291, 352566, 353431, 354873, 351866, 352734 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that an officer may rely upon information received through an informant \" 'so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0940-01", "/us/535/0940-09", "/us/535/0940-12", "/us/535/0940-13", "/us/535/0940-04", "/us/535/0940-11", "/us/535/0940-05", "/us/535/0940-02", "/us/535/0940-14", "/us/535/0940-06", "/us/535/0940-07", "/us/535/0940-03", "/us/535/0940-10", "/us/535/0940-08" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138343 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511457, 1511330, 1511564, 1511119, 1511449 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0172-01", "/nc/356/0172-05", "/nc/356/0172-04", "/nc/356/0172-03", "/nc/356/0172-02" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" }, { "page": "917", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081174 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" }, { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885-86" }, { "page": "886-87" }, { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143287 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133-34" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219945, 220139, 219894, 220120, 220187 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0752-04", "/nc/355/0752-03", "/nc/355/0752-01", "/nc/355/0752-02", "/nc/355/0752-05" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9126560 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "203-04" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523891 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511457, 1511330, 1511564, 1511119, 1511449 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0172-01", "/nc/356/0172-05", "/nc/356/0172-04", "/nc/356/0172-03", "/nc/356/0172-02" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" }, { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081174 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886-87" }, { "page": "886-87" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143287 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219945, 220139, 219894, 220120, 220187 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0752-04", "/nc/355/0752-03", "/nc/355/0752-01", "/nc/355/0752-02", "/nc/355/0752-05" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "\"[a] known informant's information may establish probable cause based on a reliable track record\"" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9126560 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "203-04" }, { "page": "203-04" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0200-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1151, "char_count": 36233, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5348916254453356e-07, "percentile": 0.8128290491067239 }, "sha256": "dcd9e0e0c8a54c6df8b386dda9e38c6bed5861217f7cadca6f7ac5185fe22829", "simhash": "1:273b747a0e0f054e", "word_count": 5902 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:23.823025+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge CALABRIA concurs.", "Judge McGEE concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DOUGLAS EARL COLLINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nDouglas Earl Collins (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. For the reasons stated herein, we hold there was no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following: Officer C. A. Kimball (\u201cOfficer Kimball\u201d), of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, arrested Calvin Cunningham (\u201cCunningham\u201d) for drug offenses on 6 October 2000. While in custody, Cunningham was informed by Officer Kimball that Cunningham could help his case by assisting the police catch other individuals involved in illegal drug activities. Consequently, Cunningham provided Officer Kimball with detailed information regarding seven drug houses and drug markets in Charlotte; information the officer was able to corroborate.\nThereafter, Cunningham proceeded to make various telephone calls from a police cell phone over a one-hour period in an effort to create drug activity. Following these calls, Cunningham informed Officer Kimball that he had scheduled a meeting at the Fast Fare on the comer of Eastway and The Plaza with a black man, in his thirties, named \u201cDoug\u201d who would be driving a late 1980\u2019s model, white, four-door Cadillac Brougham with spoke or wire hubcaps. Cunningham also told Officer Kimball that the man would have a large amount of cocaine in the Cadillac and the approximate time the vehicle would arrive at the Fast Fare. Although Officer Kimball had no prior experience with Cunningham as an informant, he was familiar with Cunningham from an arrest several months earlier.\nBased on Cunningham\u2019s information, the police set up surveillance of the Fast Fare. As Cunningham stood by a phone at the Fast Fare, a black male, later identified as defendant, drove up in a white, four-door Cadillac. Cunningham got in defendant\u2019s Cadillac, and defendant drove to a house several blocks away. Cunningham entered the house alone, came back out, and told defendant to drive around the corner. As defendant drove away, he was stopped by the police. Officer Kimball and another officer immediately conducted a search of defendant\u2019s vehicle and found two baggies of cocaine under the driver\u2019s seat totaling approximately fifty-five grams in weight. Defendant was arrested and taken to a law enforcement center where, after waiving his Miranda rights, he gave a statement to the police.\nDefendant told police in his statement and later testified at trial that, although he was employed, he needed extra money. Defendant said he only knew the first names of two known drug dealers in his father\u2019s community, \u201cKevin\u201d (later identified as Calvin Cunningham) and \u201cOtis.\u201d Prior to 6 October 2000, defendant said he had asked Cunningham for money and had also given Cunningham his pager number in case Cunningham had some work for him. Defendant testified that he was only interested in doing non-drug-related work such as cutting grass. Shortly thereafter, Cunningham paged defendant and offered to pay him to deliver a \u201cpackage,\u201d but at that time defendant told Cunningham he did not want to be involved in any drug-related activities.\nDefendant also testified that on the night of 6 October 2000, Cunningham paged him four or five times. When defendant returned the pages, Cunningham urged him to deliver a package if he wanted to make extra money. Defendant then spoke with Otis who told him that Cunningham had called and expressed defendant\u2019s desire to make some money. Otis offered defendant fifty dollars to deliver a Crown Royal bag to Cunningham and collect $2,000.00 from Cunningham. Defendant testified that after Otis assured him that the bag contained \u201cpowder\u201d and not \u201ccrack,\u201d Otis put the bag under a seat of the Cadillac. Defendant then drove to the Fast Fare to meet Cunningham.\nAfter defendant picked up Cunningham, Cunningham put the Crown Royal bag in his pants and asked defendant to drive to Cunningham\u2019s house so that he could get the money for defendant. Defendant testified that Cunningham told him to drive around the corner while he was in the house. When defendant drove away, he was stopped and arrested. Defendant testified that he did not know that there were two baggies of cocaine in his Cadillac when the police stopped him. Defendant thought the cocaine was in the Crown Royal bag that Cunningham had put in his pants.\nOn 27 November 2000, defendant filed a motion to suppress based on a lack of probable cause to stop and search defendant\u2019s vehicle. An affidavit in support of the motion was filed on 8 December 2000. Defendant alleged in the motion and affidavit that he believed \u201cOtis or [Cunningham was an] agent of the state that entrapped him in this criminal enterprise, with the sole purpose of setting him up for arrest.\u201d The trial court ultimately denied defendant\u2019s motion. In a second motion, defendant sought to compel the identity of the confidential informant. The trial court also denied that motion, concluding that the State only had to provide defendant with anything it knew that would help defendant learn the whereabouts and last names of \u201cKevin\u201d (Cunningham) and \u201cOtis.\u201d Thus, the State told defendant Cunningham\u2019s full name and last known address. The State had no information about \u201cOtis.\u201d\nPrior to trial, defendant twice moved for a continuance in order to subpoena Cunningham for trial. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion on both occasions, stating that since defendant\u2019s arrest, there had been ample time for him to \u201cfind out what the last name of the local dope dealer was[.]\u201d Nevertheless, the State was ordered to pay for a private investigator to serve a subpoena on Cunningham. The investigator\u2019s attempts were unsuccessful.\nAt the close of the evidence, defendant was permitted to recall Officer Kimball to determine the identity of the State\u2019s confidential informant. Defendant learned Cunningham was the informant; however, Officer Kimball reiterated that the police were unable to locate \u201cOtis.\u201d\nThe trial court instructed the jury on the defense of entrapment. That defense was rejected, and the jury convicted defendant of trafficking in cocaine. Defendant was sentenced to a term of thirty-five months to forty-two months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nI.\nDefendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drugs obtained by the police when they conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle because Cunningham\u2019s informative tips were insufficient to establish probable cause. We disagree.\nA warrantless search may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest if probable cause to arrest exists prior to the search and the arrest is permitted by law. State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 728, 411 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1991). \u201c \u2018Probable cause exists where \u201cthe facts and circumstances within their [the officers\u2019] knowledge, and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that\u201d an offense has been or is being committed.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citations omitted). Specifically in the case of an informant\u2019s tip, probable cause is determined by a \u201c \u2018 \u201c \u2018totality-of-the circumstances\u2019 \u201d \u2019 \u201d test, using a \u201c \u2018 \u201c \u2018balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant\u2019s tip.[\u2019]\u201d \u2019 \u201d State v. Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. 200, 203, 560 S.E.2d 207, 209, disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 752, 565 S.E.2d 672 (2002) (citations omitted). The indicia of reliability may include (1) whether the informant was known or anonymous, (2) the informant\u2019s history of reliability, and (3) whether information provided by the informant could be and was independently corroborated by the police. Id.; State v. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 133-34, 516 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1999). An informant\u2019s tip is more reliable if it contains \u201c \u2018a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.\u2019 \u201d Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 310 (1990) (citation omitted).\nThere are several prior cases of this Court that are instructive as to determining the measure of probable cause based on an informant\u2019s tip. In one such case, State v. Martinez, 150 N.C. App. 364, 562 S.E.2d 914, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 172, 568 S.E.2d 859 (2002), Daniel Goff (\u201cGoff\u2019) was arrested for possession of drugs and contraband. In an effort to gain a plea bargain, Goff told the arresting officer that he normally purchased marijuana from two Hispanic males. He stated that the two males were en route to his home in a white four-door automobile to deliver marijuana \u201c \u2018right to [his] door.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 367, 562 S.E.2d at 916. Goff had not previously served as an informant. Acting on this information, the officers established surveillance in the immediate area. While the officers were waiting, the two men called Goff on his cellular phone and stated that they would be arriving in twenty minutes. Approximately twenty minutes later, a white four-door Neon, occupied by Mario Martinez (\u201cMartinez\u201d) and another Hispanic male, parked next to Goff\u2019s front door. The officers arrested both men and searched the vehicle.\nOn appeal, Martinez argued the police did not have probable cause to support the warrantless arrest and search. This Court recognized that \u201c \u2018[o]nce [officers] corroborate!] the description of the defendant and his presence at the named location, [they] ha[ve] reasonable grounds to believe a felony [i]s being committed in [their] presence which in turn create [s] probable cause to arrest and search defendant.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 369, 562 S.E.2d at 917 (citation omitted). Therefore, we concluded that once the officers corroborated (1) the description of the vehicle, (2) the description of the occupants, (3) the location of the activity, including the proximity of the automobile\u2019s position to the front door, and (4) the arrival time of the automobile, there was probable cause to justify the warrantless search. Id.\nMartinez is analogous to the present case. Here, Cunningham described the vehicle as a late 1980\u2019s model, white, four-door Cadillac Broughham with spoke or wire hubcaps. Cunningham described defendant as a black man, in his thirties, named \u201cDoug.\u201d Both of these descriptions were more detailed than the descriptions given by the informant in Martinez. Also, like the informant in Martinez, Cunningham provided the location and approximate time of the alleged activity. From all this information, the police were able to verify that defendant was the alleged perpetrator and establish probable cause to justify the warrantless stop and search of his vehicle.\nAdditionally, Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. 200, 560 S.E.2d 207, and Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 516 S.E.2d 883, are instructive in addressing defendant\u2019s first argument. The informant in Chadwick, who had a history of reliability, told police that the\ndefendant was about to (1) deliver a large amount of cocaine to a specific location, (2) be driven by a black female in an older model four-door black Nissan Sentra, because defendant did not have a driver\u2019s license, (3) be taken to a Texaco station at the corner of Highway 17 North and Piney Green Road, (4) be traveling from a certain direction, (5) park next to a telephone booth in the parking lot, (6) act like he was there to use the telephone, and (7) conduct a drug transaction there.\nChadwick, 149 N.C. App. at 203-04, 560 S.E.2d at 210. Our Court noted that the police verified every detail of the informant\u2019s tip \u201cwith minute particularity.\u201d Id. at 204, 560 S.E.2d at 210. Furthermore, a police officer testified that he recognized the defendant as soon as the vehicle drove up. Id. Thus, the warrantless search was upheld.\nIn Earhart, the sheriff\u2019s department received two tips concerning the defendant. The first informant, an anonymous male, called the sheriff\u2019s department and stated that\na white Trans Am would be traveling to a residence on North Spot Road in Powell\u2019s Point sometime between 27 April and 28 April and that it might be accompanied by a blue Subaru. The caller stated that the white Trans Am would be transporting approximately a pound of marijuana. The caller did not identify himself and Deputy Davidson did not recognize the voice.\nEarhart, 134 N.C. App. at 131, 516 S.E.2d at 885. The second tip, given by a police officer based on information he had received from an SBI agent, provided that\na person whose name sounded like \u201cAirhart\u201d was selling cocaine and marijuana from his home on North Spot Road and that he drove a white Trans Am, a blue Chevrolet Cavalier, and a rust Jeep. [The agent] also told him that the SBI had received this information from an individual who had been inside Earhart\u2019s residence.\nId. at 132, 516 S.E.2d at 885. Based upon the tips, law enforcement set up surveillance of the address. A license check revealed that the name of the driver of the Trans Am was Earhart, a man known to carry weapons. While on surveillance, law enforcement observed a blue Subaru pull up to the house. When the sheriffs deputy questioned the driver, she stated that she was visiting her sister and her boyfriend, Earhart, who drove a white Trans Am. Thereafter, Earhart passed by the law enforcement surveillance in a white Trans Am and was pulled over. The officers subsequently searched Earhart\u2019s car and found fifty grams of cocaine, marijuana, and a handgun. Id. at 132-33, 516 S.E.2d at 885-86. This Court found the informant\u2019s tips were sufficient to allow a warrantless stop, stating that\nin addition to the informant\u2019s tip ... , the officers involved were able to use separate information obtained from the SBI and from an independent investigation to corroborate the information received. This included the type of vehicle driven by the defendant, the name of the defendant, and information that the defendant was known to sell drugs including marijuana and cocaine.... The officers were able to independently verify all of the anonymous informant\u2019s tip except for the presence of drugs in the vehicle prior to the vehicle stop. Based on all this information, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe the tip was accurate and reliable and that drugs were in the vehicle.\nId. at 134, 516 S.E.2d at 886-87.\nThe present case can also be analogized to Chadwick and Earhart. Like the informants in those cases, Cunningham was a reliable informant. Prior to giving information about defendant, Cunningham had provided Officer Kimball with specific information about seven different drag locations in Charlotte, the names of several drug dealers, the names of their suppliers, their methods of operation, and even the location of their drug stashes. Officer Kimball testified that based on his experience and knowledge of particular drug areas, he knew the information Cunningham provided was correct thereby allowing him to rely on the information Cunningham gave him regarding defendant. See State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 10, 550 S.E.2d 482, 488 (2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 152 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2002) (holding that an officer may rely upon information received through an informant \u201c \u2018so long as the informant\u2019s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer\u2019s knowledge\u2019 \u201d).\nMoreover, similar to the informants in Earhart and Chadwick, Cunningham gave the police sufficient information to establish probable cause for the eventual warrantless arrest of defendant. To establish probable cause, the police need not verify the defendant\u2019s identity with someone other than the informant prior to making the arrest as long as the informant provides sufficient details of the defendant\u2019s appearance in order for the police to recognize the defendant. See State v. Trapp, 110 N.C. App. 584, 430 S.E.2d 484 (1993). In Earhart, the only identifying information the officers received about the defendant was that he drove a white Trans Am and his name sounded like \u201c \u2018Airhart.\u2019 \u201d Earhart, 134 N.C. App. at 132, 516 S.E.2d at 885. Similarly, in Chadwick, the only identifying information the informant provided was that the defendant was known as \u201c \u2018Breeze.\u2019 \u201d Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. at 201, 560 S.E.2d at 208. Here, Cunningham described defendant as a black male in his thirties named \u201cDoug.\u201d Cunningham further provided details regarding the make and model of defendant\u2019s vehicle and the approximate time defendant would arrive at the Fast Fare. Thus, the information Cunningham provided about the physical description of defendant, coupled with additional detailed information, was sufficient to establish probable cause.\nAccordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to justify the warrantless search of defendant\u2019s vehicle and his subsequent arrest.\nII.\nNext, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for a continuance to locate and subpoena Cunningham for trial. We disagree.\n\u201cIt is well settled that a motion for continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and we will not disturb that ruling absent an abuse of that discretion.\u201d State v. Wilfong, 101 N.C. App. 221, 223, 398 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1990). However, defendant contends that his motions were based on his state and federal Constitutional rights to confront the evidence against him. \u201cWhen a defendant\u2019s motion to continue \u2018 \u201c \u2018is based on a right guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions, the question presented is one of law and not of discretion, and the decision of the court below is reviewable.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 \u201d Id. (citations omitted). On review, this Court looks for detailed proof that fully establishes the reasons for the delay as well as a showing of whether the party requesting the continuance would be materially prejudiced if the motion was denied. State v. Cody, 135 N.C. App. 722, 726, 522 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1999).\nThe evidence in the case sub judice does not fully establish that defendant made any real effort to identify or locate Cunningham during the nine months between his arrest and trial. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Cunningham should have been easily identified or located by defendant considering defendant (1) knew Cunningham to be a well-known drug dealer in his father\u2019s community; (2) returned several of Cunningham\u2019s pages on the night of his arrest; and (3) went to Cunningham\u2019s house after meeting him at the Fast Fare. Therefore, we hold that it was not error for the trial court to deny defendant\u2019s motions for a continuance.\nIII.\nDefendant also argues the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to reveal the identity of the confidential informant when that motion was made. We disagree.\nGenerally, the State may withhold the identity of a confidential informant subject to certain exceptions. See State v. Newkirk, 73 N.C. App. 83, 85, 325 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1985). \u201c[A] defendant who requests that the identity of a confidential informant be revealed must make a sufficient showing that the particular circumstances of his case mandate such disclosure.\u201d State v. Watson, 303 N.C. 533, 537, 279 S.E.2d 580, 582 (1981). Here, defendant\u2019s guilt was established through other evidence and not by Cunningham, especially considering he did not testify at trial. Morever, when Cunningham was identified as the confidential informant at the end of the trial, defendant was not surprised by this revelation since he had essentially stated in his motion to suppress (filed approximately seven months earlier) that he believed Cunningham was one of two likely candidates to have been an \u201cagent of the state[.]\u201d Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to compel the State to reveal the informant\u2019s identity.\nIV.\nFinally, defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to find that he was entrapped as a matter of law. We disagree.\nEntrapment is a defense to conviction of a crime when\nthere are acts of persuasion, trickery or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or their agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime and when the origin of the criminal intent lies with the law enforcement agencies. We note that this is a two step test and a showing of trickery, fraud or deception by law enforcement officers alone will not support a claim of entrapment. The defendant must show that the trickery, fraud or deception was \u201cpracticed upon one who entertained no prior criminal intent Entrapment may occur through action of law enforcement officers or their agents.\nState v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 28, 296 S.E.2d 433, 449 (1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). \u201cThe defense is not available to a defendant who was predisposed to commit the crime charged absent the inducement of law enforcement officials [or their agents].\u201d State v. Worthington, 84 N.C. App. 150, 157, 352 S.E.2d 695, 700 (1987) (citation omitted).\nThe issue of whether or not a defendant was entrapped is generally a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. Id. In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury on the defense of entrapment, which defense the jury rejected. However, defendant argues that the court should have taken the issue from the jury and found defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. Such a decision by a trial court is appropriate \u201c[o]nly when \u2018the undisputed evidence discloses that an accused was induced to engage in criminal conduct that he was not predisposed to commit[.]\u2019 \u2019\u2019 Id. (quoting Hageman, 307 N.C. at 30, 296 S.E.2d at 450). Factors indicating a predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct include \u201cthe defendant\u2019s ready compliance, acquiescence in, or willingness to cooperate in the proposed criminal plan.\u201d Id.\nThe evidence in the record indicates that the informant, Cunningham, was working for the police at the time he called defendant on 6 October 2000. While Cunningham\u2019s calls could arguably be perceived as acts of persuasion to induce defendant to transport, \u201c[l]aw enforcement \u2018may rightfully furnish to the players of [the drug] trade opportunity to commit the crime in order that they may be apprehended. It is only when a person is induced by the officer to commit a crime which he did not contemplate that we must draw the line.\u2019 \u201d State v. Broome, 136 N.C. App. 82, 89, 523 S.E.2d 448, 454 (1999) (quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 33, 215 S.E.2d 589, 598 (1975)) (emphasis in original).\nWith that in mind, a further review of the evidence shows defendant initially gave Cunningham, a known drug dealer, his pager number in case he needed defendant to do some work. On one occasion prior to 6 October 2000, defendant refused to deliver a \u201cpackage\u201d for Cunningham because he did not want to be involved in drug-related activities. Yet, when defendant returned Cunningham\u2019s pages on 6 October 2000, the two men once again discussed defendant delivering a package to make money. Later that evening, defendant spoke with another known drug dealer, Otis, and agreed to make a delivery and pick up $2,000.00 from Cunningham, in exchange for fifty dollars. During the trial, defendant testified:\nI knew that I made a bad decision because I asked him, I said, \u201cWhat\u2019s in this bag?\u201d It was [a] Crown Royal bag. He said, \u201cDon\u2019t worry about it. It ain\u2019t crack. It\u2019s powder.\u201d And I was like, man\u2014 I said, \u201cYou can get in trouble doing that.\u201d He promised me that I would get in no trouble. He said, \u201cI promise you that.\u201d So, when I left, I went to the place and picked up [Cunningham] and we went to [Cunningham\u2019s] house, and I said, \u201c[Cunningham], you know, you got the bag . . .\u201d \u2014 He put it in his crotch and he got out and went in the house. . . . So, at this time I thought that he had took the drugs and went in the house with it... .\nThis testimony clearly indicates that defendant knew the \u201cpowder\u201d he was delivering to Cunningham was an illegal substance. When viewed in its entirety, the evidence does not demonstrate inducement as a matter of law, but rather a predisposition and opportunity to commit the offense in question. See Hageman, 307 N.C. at 31, 296 S.E.2d at 450. Therefore, the trial court properly submitted the issue of entrapment to the jury.\nIn conclusion, the trial court did not err in its judgment against defendant for trafficking in cocaine.\nNo error.\nJudge CALABRIA concurs.\nJudge McGEE concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." }, { "text": "McGEE, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI concur in the majority\u2019s conclusion that defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s conclusion that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless stop and search of defendant\u2019s vehicle based on an informant\u2019s tip. As correctly stated by the majority, in the case of an informant\u2019s tip, probable cause is determined by a \u201c \u2018totality-of-the circumstances\u2019 \u201d test, using a \u201c \u2018balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant\u2019s tip.\u2019\u201d State v. Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. 200, 203, 560 S.E.2d 207, 209, disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 752, 565 S.E.2d 672 (2002) (citations omitted). A court must review the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to make a warrantless stop and search. Id. In the present case, under the totality of the circumstances, probable cause did not exist.\nIn the present case, I take a different view of some of the facts as well as the cases the majority cites in support of its holding. I believe the present case can be distinguished from both Chadwick and State v. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 516 S.E.2d 883 (1999). The informant in the present case was certainly known to the police and was, in fact, in their custody. However, the informant was known to the police as a criminal defendant, not as an informant, since he had no track record of providing information to the police, and therefore no history of reliability. The fact that the informant gave Officer Kimball general information about drug houses and markets, that Officer Kimball knew was correct from his experience as a law enforcement officer, does not overcome this significant deficiency. The factor of being an informant on previous occasions serves the purpose of showing that the informant was reliable in the past, establishing a track record of reliability. The statements given by the informant to Officer Kimball concerning drug activity in Charlotte, even if about specific drug markets and the like, were merely statements showing the informant\u2019s knowledge of the drug trade in Charlotte; they were not prior tips the police acted upon, which could establish a track record of reliability as an informant. See Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. at 203, 560 S.E.2d at 209 (\u201c[a] known informant\u2019s information may establish probable cause based on a reliable track record\u201d). Statements made in a relatively contemporaneous manner with the tip acted upon, which simply show knowledge of the drug trade in the area do not convert an informant who has never provided prior reliable tips in the past, into an informant with a reliable history. See id.\nFurther, the facts that the informant gave the police in this case were not as specific as the facts given by informants in the cases discussed above. Information the informant gave to the police that could be and was independently verified was that a black man in his thirties, driving a 1980\u2019s model, white, four-door Cadillac with spoke wheels, would arrive at the Fast Fare at the corner of Eastway and The Plaza at an approximate time. The informant only gave police defendant\u2019s first name, \u201cDoug.\u201d The police did not check the registration of the vehicle that arrived at the Fast Fare, nor did they ask anyone other than the informant to confirm defendant\u2019s identity, as the deputies did in Earhart. I agree with the majority that the police need not verify the defendant\u2019s identity with someone else in every case, but such verification can strengthen the reliability of the informant\u2019s tip in the absence of other corroborating factors. The police in this case failed to independently verify key information given by the informant before stopping the vehicle. In addition, defendant\u2019s description of the man in the Cadillac was vague, consisting only of the identifying features that he was a black man in his thirties.\nThe case before us is further distinguishable from Earhart in that there was only one informant\u2019s tip, as opposed to the multiple, corroborating tips in Earhart. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. at 134, 516 S.E.2d at 886-87. Probable cause can be established on the basis of information provided by a single informant, see Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. at 203-04, 560 S.E.2d at 210; however, as shown in Earhart, when corroborating information is obtained from two different sources, the reliability of the information is strengthened under the totality of the circumstances test. See Earhart, 134 N.C. App. at 134, 516 S.E.2d at 886-87.\nThe present case is also distinguishable from Chadwick; the tip given by the informant in the present case did not include any details of what defendant would do once he arrived at the Fast Fare; the police did not verify every detail \u201cwith minute particularity,\u201d such as the identity of \u201cDoug,\u201d nor did the police recognize defendant as the officer in Chadwick did; and the informant in Chadwick had a history of proven reliability as an informant, unlike the informant in this case, despite the majority\u2019s conclusion to the contrary. Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. at 203-04, 560 S.E.2d at 210.\nThe majority relies on State v. Martinez, 150 N.C. App. 364, 562 S.E.2d 914, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 172, 568 S.E.2d 859 (2002); however, I find that case distinguishable from the present case as well. In Martinez, the informant was a college student in his early twenties who had been apprehended in his residence after police had searched his house and discovered illegal drugs, contraband, and cash. Id. at 367, 562 S.E.2d at 916. The informant \u201c \u2018was crying and . . . scared\u2019 \u201d when he told the police that from a conversation the informant had with his normal suppliers, two Hispanic males, approximately an hour before the police arrived at the informant\u2019s residence, the suppliers were already \u201cen route\u201d to deliver a shipment of marijuana to his house and would \u201c \u2018come right to [the informant\u2019s] door.\u2019 \u201d Id. After receiving this information, an officer overheard a conversation between the informant and the two suppliers, when the suppliers called the informant and told him they would arrive in about twenty minutes. Id. A car matching the description provided by the informant, containing two Hispanic males, turned into the informant\u2019s driveway and pulled right up to the front door of the informant\u2019s home. Id.\nIn Martinez, although the tip did-not describe the two suppliers with particular detail beyond the fact that they were two Hispanic males driving a small, white, four-door automobile, two men matching the description given by the informant pulled into the driveway of the informant\u2019s home and right up to the front door of the residence. Id. The lack of a particularly detailed description of the defendants in Martinez was balanced against the fact that the defendants drove into the driveway of a private home, as opposed to a convenience store, right up to the front door as predicted, and that the investigating police officer overheard the conversation the informant had with the defendants, confirming the transaction that had already been set up even before the police arrived at the informant\u2019s home. See id. at 369, 562 S.E.2d at 914.\nIn considering the totality of the circumstances, I believe the single informant\u2019s tip in the case before us was insufficient to allow the police to conduct a warrantless stop and arrest of defendant. While no one factor is necessarily conclusive, the failure to show sufficient past reliability of the informant, the fact that the informant\u2019s tip did not provide specific logistical details of the drug transaction, and the fact that the police did not independently verify defendant\u2019s name using a license check or any other method, compel this conclusion. I would hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and would vacate and remand for a new trial.\nFor the above reasons I respectfully dissent. Because defendant would receive a new trial, I would not address defendant\u2019s second and third assignments of error in light of the fact that the informant\u2019s identity was revealed to defendant at the previous trial and would no longer be an issue; and because defendant would have sufficient time to subpoena Cunningham prior to a new trial.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "McGEE, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.", "James M. Bell for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DOUGLAS EARL COLLINS\nNo. COA02-415\n(Filed 16 September 2003)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 warrantless search of vehicle \u2014 motion to suppress drugs \u2014 informant tip\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the drugs obtained by the police when they conducted a warrantless search of defendant\u2019s vehicle based on an informant\u2019s tip, because: (1) the police were able to verify that defendant was the alleged perpetrator and establish probable cause to justify the warrantless stop and search of defendant\u2019s vehicle based on the informant\u2019s description of the vehicle, description of defendant, and provision of the location and approximate time of the alleged activity; (2) the informant was a reliable informant and his information was reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer\u2019s knowledge; and (3) the informant gave the police sufficient information to establish probable cause for the eventual warrantless arrest of defendant.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 motion for continuance \u2014 locating police informant\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s motions for a continuance to locate and subpoena the police informant at trial, because: (1) the evidence does not fully establish that defendant made any real effort to identify or locate the informant during the nine months between defendant\u2019s arrest and trial; and (2) the evidence shows the informant should have been easily identified or located by defendant considering that defendant knew the informant to be a well-known drug dealer in his father\u2019s community, defendant returned several of the informant\u2019s pages on the night of defendant\u2019s arrest, and defendant went to the informant\u2019s house after meeting him at a store.\n3. Constituional Law\u2014 pretrial motion \u2014 identity of confidential informant\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to reveal the identity of the confidential informant when that motion was made, because: (1) a defendant who requests that the identity of a confidential informant be revealed must make a sufficient, showing that the particular circumstances of his case mandate such disclosure; (2) defendant\u2019s guilt was established through other evidence and not by the informant, especially considering that the informant did not testify at trial; and (3) when the informant was identified at the end of the trial, defendant was not surprised since he had essentially stated in his motion to suppress that he believed that the individual was one of two likely candidates to have been an agent of the state.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 entrapment \u2014 matter of law\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine case by failing to find that defendant was entrapped as a matter of law because when viewed in its entirety, the evidence does not demonstrate inducement as a matter of law, but rather a predisposition and opportunity to commit the offense in question.\nJudge McGee concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 July 2001 by Judge L. Oliver Noble in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 January 2003.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.\nJames M. Bell for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0310-01", "first_page_order": 340, "last_page_order": 355 }