{ "id": 8957207, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DIONNE TERRELL PHILLIPS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Phillips", "decision_date": "2003-10-07", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1509", "first_page": "549", "last_page": "554", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 N.C. App. 549" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 A.L.R.5th 361", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "998 F.2d 8", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10507449 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12-13" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/998/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "241-42" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11890161 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "572-73" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "572" }, { "page": "572-73" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0565-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 594, "char_count": 12623, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3735778029010706e-07, "percentile": 0.6390125447468172 }, "sha256": "224b62d2172209b7119134929eeaa11e81adba1c1592545ba311484f2227b64d", "simhash": "1:c671f56709d79cf1", "word_count": 1982 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:23.823025+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DIONNE TERRELL PHILLIPS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nDionne Terrell Phillips (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant. Because we find no constitutional infirmity, we affirm.\nOn the morning of 23 January 2002, James Anders (\u201cDetective Anders\u201d) was working with the Guilford County Sheriff\u2019s Department\u2019s interdiction drug unit at a Federal Express facility in Greensboro. Detective Anders, a twenty-six-year veteran of the sheriff\u2019s department with over nineteen years\u2019 experience in the vice and narcotics division, scanned packages coming into the area by means of parcel company services to isolate those containing narcotics.\nWhen a parcel from California exhibited several characteristics indicating the possible presence of drugs, Detective Anders set the parcel aside for inspection by a K-9 unit. When the K-9 unit indicated the presence of narcotics in the package, a search warrant was obtained and executed. Detective Anders discovered the package contained approximately 1,000 grams of crack cocaine.\nDetective Anders obtained a second search warrant for the address to which the package was to be delivered based on the discovery of the narcotics and arranged a controlled delivery of the resealed package. The package itself was addressed to Sonya Moore at 1412 Hamlet Place, Greensboro, North Carolina. The pertinent part of the search warrant stated:\nOn this date, this applicant and other officers will attempt to make a controlled delivery of the Federal Express Package addressed to Sonya Moore, 1412 Hamlet PL, Greensboro, N.C. If this Federal Express Package is delivered to said residence within the forty eight hours of the Issuance of this Warrant, this search warrant will be executed shortly therafter (sic).\nThe controlled delivery took place that same day shortly before 11 o\u2019clock in the morning. Since there was no answer and the label indicated a signature release, allowing the package to be left at the destination if no one was home to sign for its receipt, the officer attempting the delivery left the package on the porch. A few minutes later, defendant opened the front door from the inside of the house and retrieved the package. Approximately twenty minutes later, Detective Anders executed the search warrant and forced entry into defendant\u2019s residence when no one answered the door. Detective Anders found defendant in the bathroom, using his body to prevent entry and flushing crack cocaine down the commode.\nDefendant was arrested and subsequently indicted for trafficking by possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine and maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the anticipatory search warrant. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion by order entered 29 May 2002 after concluding the description of the premises to be searched in the anticipatory warrant was adequate and it was appropriately drafted. Defendant was found guilty of trafficking by possessing 400 grams or more of cocaine and knowingly maintaining a dwelling for the keeping of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced defendant to 175 months to 219 months\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the anticipatory search warrant was facially invalid and failed to comply with the requirements of this Court\u2019s holding in State v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 565, 478 S.E.2d 237 (1996).\nAnticipatory search warrants are \u201cissued in advance of the receipt of particular property at the premises designated in the warrant . .. .\u201d U.S. v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). Issuance of an anticipatory warrant is \u201cbased on a showing of future probable cause to believe that an item will be at a specific location at a particular time in the near future.\u201d Norma Rotunno, Annotation, Validity of Anticipatory Search Warrants \u2014 State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, 374 (1999). In Smith, this Court noted our Constitution afforded greater protection for anticipatory search warrant challenges than its federal counterpart, and we examined our Constitution and general rules governing the issuance of a search warrant. Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 570, 478 S.E.2d at 240. We concluded that anticipatory search warrants did not violate constitutional strictures so long as it satisfied the following tripartite test:\n(1) The anticipatory warrant must set out, on its face, explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn triggering events which must occur before execution may take place; (2) Those triggering events, from which probable cause arises, must be (a) ascertainable, and (b) preordained, meaning that the property is on a sure and irreversible course to its destination; and finally, (3) No search may occur unless and until the property does, in fact, arrive at that destination.\nSmith, 124 N.C. App. at 577, 478 S.E.2d at 245. These requirements secure the privacy interests accorded by our Constitution, minimize the potential for abuse in warrants conditioned on what may occur in the future, and ensure that the magistrate fulfills his proper role in determining whether probable cause exists. Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 572-73, 478 S.E.2d at 241-42.\nI. Triggering Event\nThe first prong requires that the face of the warrant set out \u201cexplicit, clear, and narrowly drawn triggering events\u201d permitting execution of the warrant. Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 577, 478 S.E.2d at 245. \u201cThe warrant must minimize the officer\u2019s discretion in deciding whether or not the \u2018triggering event\u2019 has occurred to \u2018almost ministerial proportions.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 573, 478 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12). In the instant case, Detective Anders had no discretion to decide whether or not the triggering event had occurred. On the contrary, the triggering event was the successful controlled delivery of the Federal Express package to the listed address. Once delivery occurred, the warrant could be executed. Accordingly, we hold the trial court correctly found the first prong of Smith was met.\nDefendant nevertheless asserts the warrant in the instant case failed to appropriately limit the time during which either the triggering event for probable cause or the execution of the warrant would occur. Specifically, defendant contends forty-eight hours is too long for law enforcement to be entitled to execute a search warrant and the phrase \u201cshortly thereafter\u201d regarding the timing of execution after delivery is ambiguous. We disagree.\nWe note defendant asserts a requirement distinct from the tripartite test set out in Smith. Smith required, in relevant part, only that the execution of the search warrant succeed the triggering event and that the triggering event be appropriately drawn. By way of contrast, defendant\u2019s argument concerns post-issuance timing of the warrant\u2019s triggering event and execution.\nThe central concern in Smith was whether the officer executing the warrant could create the circumstances justifying its execution, and in so doing, violate one\u2019s privacy rights. Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 572, 478 S.E.2d at 241. When the warrant is executed after an appropriately drawn triggering event occurs, probable cause, justifying the invasion of privacy, has been established by a neutral and detached magistrate.\nAddressing defendant\u2019s arguments in the instant case, the forty-eight hour window to which defendant objects merely provided when the warrant would expire by its own terms. The language of the warrant clearly stated \u201c[o]n this date, . . . officers will attempt to make a controlled delivery\u201d and required execution \u201cshortly thereafter.\u201d This designation was reasonably precise in specifying the time frame in which execution of the warrant was to occur. Given the variety of circumstances which can be presented at the time a warrant is executed, we cannot agree with defendant that a magistrate must set forth the precise time following the occurrence of the triggering event when an officer must execute the warrant.\nII. Sure and Irreversible Course to Destination\nThe second requirement adopted by Smith is the so-called \u201csure and irreversible course to destination\u201d rule. Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 572-73, 478 S.E.2d at 242 (citing Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12-13). Stated succinctly, \u201ccontraband must be on a sure, irreversible course to the situs of the intended search, and any future search \u2018of the destination must be made expressly contingent upon the contraband\u2019s arrival there.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 573, 478 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12). This requirement prevents probable cause determinations from passing from the magistrate to the officer executing the warrant and ensures \u201cthe contraband, though not yet at the location of the intended search, will almost certainly be there at the time of the search.\u201d Id.\nIn the instant case, the package was addressed and sent through Federal Express. It was intercepted, and a controlled delivery to the listed address was undertaken. Anticipatory warrants executed after a controlled delivery of a package sent to a listed address by mail or a parcel service have been overwhelmingly approved. Norma Rotunno, Annotation, Validity of Anticipatory Search Warrants- \u2014 State Cases, 67 A.L.R.5th 361, 376 (1999). Moreover, by making execution of the warrant contingent on delivery of the package to the listed address, the warrant precluded delegation of power to the executing officer to find probable cause and ensured the contraband was present at the time of the warrant\u2019s execution. Accordingly, we hold the trial court correctly found the second prong of Smith was met.\nIII. Time of Search\nFinally, the third prong requires that any search must await the arrival of the contraband to the destination. Smith, 124 N.C. App. at 577, 478 S.E.2d at 245. It is undisputed that the package was delivered and taken into the listed address prior to the execution of the search warrant. Nothing more is required by this prong of Smith.\nDefendant asserts the warrant application provided insufficient information as to the premises to be searched because it listed an address not found in the Greensboro City Directory. Defendant concedes that, relevant to this case, a search warrant need only contain a \u201cdesignation sufficient to establish with reasonable certainty the premises ... to be searched\u201d to satisfy N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-246(4) (2001). Defendant cites no authority for, nor can we accept, the proposition that a valid and correct address, regardless of whether it is contained in a city directory, would be deficient as a means of establishing with \u201creasonable certainty the premises ... to be searched.\u201d We have carefully considered defendant\u2019s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David J. Adinolfi, II, for the State.", "J. Clark Fischer, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DIONNE TERRELL PHILLIPS\nNo. COA02-1509\n(Filed 7 October 2003)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 anticipatory search warrant \u2014 tripartite test \u2014 motion to suppress drugs\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine and maintaining a dwelling for the keeping of a controlled substance case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant, because the warrant met the tripartite test including: (1) the triggering event for execution of the warrant was the successful controlled delivery of a Federal Express package to the listed address, and a magistrate is not required to set forth the precise time following the occurrence of the triggering event when an officer must execute the warrant; (2) the warrant precluded delegation of power to the executing officer to find probable cause and ensured the contraband was present at the time of the warrant\u2019s execution when the execution of the warrant was contingent on delivery of the package to the listed address; and (3) it is undisputed that the package was delivered and taken into the listed address prior to the execution of the search warrant, and defendant failed to cite any authority for his proposition that a valid and correct address not contained in a city directory would be deficient as a means of establishing with reasonable certainty the premises to be searched.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 5 June 2002 by Judge Henry E. Frye, Jr., in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 September 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David J. Adinolfi, II, for the State.\nJ. Clark Fischer, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0549-01", "first_page_order": 579, "last_page_order": 584 }