{
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  "name": "IN RE: ORE, a minor child, DOB: 3/10/97, ESTER ORTIZ LECHUGA, Petitioner v. ALETA REGINA ORE, Respondent",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lechuga v. Ore",
  "decision_date": "2003-10-07",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:23.823025+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN RE: ORE, a minor child, DOB: 3/10/97, ESTER ORTIZ LECHUGA, Petitioner v. ALETA REGINA ORE, Respondent"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nAleta Regina Ore (\u201crespondent\u201d) appeals the 10 October 2002 order terminating her parental rights. We affirm the order of the trial court terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights on the basis of neglect.\nThe child was bom on 10 March 1997. In 1998, her father was granted custody, which he maintained until his death in 1999. Thereafter, on 20 April 2000, the child\u2019s paternal grandmother, Ester Ortiz Lechuga (\u201cpetitioner\u201d) was awarded temporary custody of the minor child. On 18 October 2000, petitioner was awarded permanent custody of the minor child, and respondent was awarded weekly supervised visitation. On 15 May 2002, petitioner filed for termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights. The hearing was held on 22 August 2002, and although respondent did not attend, she was represented by counsel. Respondent asserts the court erred in finding, inter alia, petitioner neglected the child within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101, and improperly terminated her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l). We disagree and affirm the order of the trial court.\nRespondent asserts: (1) termination on the basis of neglect applies only when the child has been removed from the parent\u2019s custody by the Department of Social Services; (2) petitioner failed to prove she neglected the child; (3) petitioner failed to prove the child was impaired or there was a substantial risk of impairment due to neglect, and therefore the court erred in terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nFirst, the plain language of the statute grants the authority to petition for termination of parental rights to \u201c[a]ny person with whom the juvenile has resided for a continuous period of two years or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1103(a)(5) (2001). Since the minor child lived with petitioner for the two years next preceding filing the motion, she was a proper person to file the petition. The statute thereafter provides the grounds for terminating parental rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111 (2001). One basis for termination is finding the parent has neglected the juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l). Nothing in the language of the statute supports respondent\u2019s assertion that termination on the basis of neglect is appropriate only when \u201ca child has been taken from a parent due to neglect.\u201d While the most common application of termination on the basis of neglect may arise after a child is removed from a parent\u2019s custody on this basis, we find no support for respondent\u2019s argument that the trial court improperly failed to limit the statute\u2019s application.\nSecond, respondent asserts petitioner failed to prove she neglected the child. A neglected juvenile is \u201c[a] juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile\u2019s parent. . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15) (2001). The trial court found as fact respondent rarely visited with her child, despite having the right to weekly supervised visitation. She spoke to her child on the phone only after calling petitioner to ask for money and petitioner requested she speak with the child. Moreover, respondent\u2019s attempts to visit with the child were often made at inappropriate times; for example four days before the hearing, respondent arrived at petitioner\u2019s door at 12:30 a.m. demanding money and visitation with the child. Through this lack of contact, the court found \u201c[Respondent has neglected the minor child in that she has not provided any parental guidance, personal contact, love or custodial /spiritual support for at least six (6) months prior to the filing of this petition. . . .\u201d Respondent argues her actions do not constitute neglect because \u201c[i]nfrequent visitation is not neglect\u201d nor is failure to provide \u201c \u2018parental guidance, personal contact, love or custodial/ spiritual support.\u2019 \u201d We disagree. As we have previously explained:\n\u2018Neglect may be manifested in ways less tangible than failure to provide physical necessities. Therefore, on the question of neglect, the trial judge may consider, in addition, a parent\u2019s complete failure to provide the personal contact, love, and affection that inheres in the parental relationship.\u2019\nIn re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 263, 312 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1984) (quoting In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 324, 296 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1982)). The trial court in the case at bar considered the parental relationship and found the child was neglected. We do not discern error.\nFinally, respondent asserts the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights without finding the child was impaired, or there was a substantial risk of impairment, by her neglect. To prove neglect in a termination case, there must be clear, cogent and convincing evidence of (1) neglect and (2) as a consequence of the neglect, \u201cthe juvenile has sustained \u2018some physical, mental, or emotional impairment ... or [there is] a substantial risk of such impairment. . . .\u2019\u201d In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000) (quoting In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993)). In the case at bar, the court did not make any findings of fact regarding the impairment prong, but this Court previously reasoned that an express finding of fact regarding impairment is not required where the evidence supports such a finding. Safriet, 112 N.C. App. at 753, 436 S.E.2d at 902. In the case at bar, the court found that respondent had failed to parent, or even maintain contact with, the child. Moreover, the court found respondent\u2019s neglectful behavior was likely to continue for the foreseeable future because \u201c[Respondent has a history of being incarcerated for various criminal offenses as well as a long history of substance abuse and failure to address those problems with necessary treatment....\u201d Finally, the court added that \u201cthese incapabilities of being capable to provide for proper care and supervision will continue for the foreseeable future.\u201d These facts demonstrate not only neglect, but also that the minor child was at a substantial risk of impairment due to the neglect. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nSince the termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights was proper on the basis of neglect, and a valid finding on one of the grounds for termination provided in the statute is \u201csufficient to support an order terminating parental rights[,]\u201d we need not address respondent\u2019s remaining assignments of error. In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 678, 373 S.E.2d 317, 322-23 (1988).\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CALABRIA, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Scott N. Dunn, for 'petitioner-appellee.",
      "Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN RE: ORE, a minor child, DOB: 3/10/97, ESTER ORTIZ LECHUGA, Petitioner v. ALETA REGINA ORE, Respondent\nNo. COA03-73\n(Filed 7 October 2003)\nTermination of Parental Rights\u2014 neglect \u2014 impairment\nThe trial court did not err by terminating respondent mother\u2019s parental rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(l) on the basis of neglect in a case where petitioner paternal grandmother filed for the termination of respondent\u2019s parental rights, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1103(a)(5) grants the authority to petition for termination of parental rights to any person with whom the juvenile has resided for a continuous period of two years or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion, and the minor child in this case has lived with petitioner for the two years next preceding filing the motion; (2) nothing supports respondent\u2019s assertion that termination on the basis of neglect is appropriate only when a child has been taken from a parent due to neglect; (3) respondent rarely visited with her child, despite having the right to weekly supervised visitation; (4) respondent spoke to her child on the phone only after calling petitioner to ask for money and petitioner requested she speak with the child; (5) respondent\u2019s attempts to visit with the child were often made at inappropriate times; and (6) an express finding of fact regarding the impairment of the minor child is not required where the evidence supports such a finding, and respondent continuously failed to parent or even maintain contact with her child.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 10 October 2002 by Judge William M. Neely in Randolph County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 September 2003.\nScott N. Dunn, for 'petitioner-appellee.\nRebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0586-01",
  "first_page_order": 616,
  "last_page_order": 620
}
