{ "id": 8957477, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS BRYANT HOLLAND", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Holland", "decision_date": "2003-11-18", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1474", "first_page": "326", "last_page": "330", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "161 N.C. App. 326" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305404 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 164-65, 388 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1990)" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 164-65, 388 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1990)" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568158 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519402 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497387 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" }, { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" }, { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 537, "char_count": 11318, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.45392434385512e-07, "percentile": 0.6555972954407767 }, "sha256": "40b9495a54467fdb18829c6c194bc957c58591ac9ede433409df3458d8ee4c25", "simhash": "1:07274926520b1d7e", "word_count": 1816 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:07.642184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS BRYANT HOLLAND" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nThomas Bryant Holland (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his convictions of robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and first-degree sexual offense. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nThe evidence presented by the State at trial tends to show the following: On 29 September 2000, C.C. was living in Fuquay-Varina, North Carolina. On that evening, C.C. and her boyfriend, James Brooks (\u201cBrooks\u201d), arrived at her home at 9:30 p.m. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Michael Booker (\u201cBooker\u201d) visited the residence, purchased marijuana from C.C. and left. Shortly thereafter, C.C. and Brooks were robbed in the house by two masked men with guns. C.C. recognized one of these two individuals as \u201cScoop Lover.\u201d Lover, whose given name is Donny McNeil (\u201cMcNeil\u201d), had recently visited her residence, accompanied by Booker and Christopher Shaw (\u201cShaw\u201d), to purchase marijuana.\nMcNeil and the unidentified male entered the house and at gunpoint demanded money and drugs. C.C. gave McNeil money that she kept in her bedroom. The second, unidentified individual then directed C.C. into her daughter\u2019s bedroom where he sexually assaulted her while threatening her with a gun. While these events transpired, Brooks escaped McNeil\u2019s grasp and ran toward the front door of the house. McNeil and the unidentified individual then fired their guns at Brooks, striking him five times. Brooks escaped the house, ran to a neighbor\u2019s house, and called 911.\nThe State presented evidence through McNeil, Booker and Shaw\u2019s testimony that defendant participated in the planning and commission of the sexual assault and robbery of C.C. and the felony assault of Brooks.\nThe issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred by (I) denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charges against him; (II) failing to provide the jury with a written copy of the jury instructions upon their request; and (III) instructing the jury on flight of the defendant.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and first-degree sexual offense. Defendant asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence to support these charges. We disagree.\nIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged. See State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 387 (1984). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). When reviewing the evidence, the trial court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, granting the State the benefit of every reasonable inference. See State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). \u201cThe trial court is not required to determine that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior to denying the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\u201d State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 178, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983).\nIn the present case, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for three reasons: (I) C.C. and Brooks never positively identified defendant at trial; (II) there was no physical evidence linking defendant to the crimes; and (III) co-defendants provided the only positive identification of defendant. Defendant argues that his co-defendants lack the credibility to provide honest testimony. We hold that the co-defendants\u2019 testimony identifying defendant as a co-conspirator provides substantial evidence that defendant was the unidentified individual who committed the crimes, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to dismiss.\nDefendant argues that \u201cthe identity evidence was inherently weak, biased, and unreliable.\u201d The trial court was required only to determine whether, in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence linked defendant to the crimes. The trial court was not permitted to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. The fact that neither C.C. nor Brooks could positively identify defendant and the lack of physical evidence to link defendant to the crimes does not negate the existence of other evidence that the State presented. The testimony of McNeil, Booker and Shaw viewed in the light most favorable to the State shows that defendant was armed during the commission of the crimes, entered C.C.\u2019s home and robbed her of personal property, sexually assaulted her, and fired his gun at Brooks while Brooks was escaping. The defendant did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses to contradict this testimony. Thus, all of the evidence presented permits a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nWe also disagree with defendant\u2019s contention that the State\u2019s evidence raises only a mere suspicion of defendant\u2019s identity as the second gunman. We agree that the law requires that when the evidence raises only a suspicion or conjecture as to the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed. Malloy, 309 N.C. at 179, 305 S.E.2d at 720. However, in the present case, the co-defendants positively identified defendant as the second gunman, which rises to more than a mere suspicion. Therefore, the trial court properly left the determination of the witnesses\u2019 credibility to the jury.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in not providing written instructions to the jury upon request. During its deliberations, the jury asked the trial court for written instructions on the elements of all of the charges which were submitted for the jury\u2019s consideration. The trial court declined to provide written instructions, but orally repeated the instructions to the jury.\nA trial court has inherent authority, in its discretion, to submit its instructions on the law to the jury in writing. State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 591, 417 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1992) citing State v. Bass, 53 N.C. App. 40, 45, 280 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1981). When a trial court fails to exercise its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented, there is error. State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 510, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980). However, where the trial court declines to provide written instructions, but repeats the requested instructions for the jury, thereby complying with the essence of the jury\u2019s request, there is no prejudicial error. McAvoy, 331 N.C. at 591, 417 S.E.2d at 494-95.\nIn the present case, the jury requested that the judge provide a written description of the charges. The judge replied, \u201c[i]f you\u2019re asking about getting a written copy of that description I do not have that for you. If you\u2019re talking about me re-charging you on some or all of those charges, I can do that.\u201d The jury later asked to be recharged on two specific counts. It is unclear from Judge Labarre\u2019s reply whether he believed that he had no discretion to provide written instructions, or whether he was simply stating that he had no written instructions available. However, the fact that the judge re-read the instructions for the two charges that the jury specifically requested represents compliance with the essence of the jury\u2019s request, and therefore we overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight of the defendant, because the evidence was insufficient to merit such an instruction. We agree.\nA trial judge may instruct a jury on a defendant\u2019s flight if \u201cthere is some evidence in the record reasonably supporting the theory that defendant fled after commission of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 489, 402 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1991) (quoting State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 164-65, 388 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1990)). \u201cMere evidence that defendant left the scene of the crime is not enough to support an instruction on flight. There must also be some evidence that defendant took steps to avoid apprehension.\u201d Thompson, 328 N.C. at 490, 402 S.E.2d at 392.\nIn the present case, the evidence presented, even in the light most favorable to the State, shows that defendant left the crime scene with his accomplices and drove to the home of one of the accomplices. Following this, defendant was driven to a girlfriend\u2019s residence. There is no evidence that he went there to avoid apprehension. Visiting a friend at their residence is not an act that, by itself, raises a reasonable inference that defendant was attempting to avoid apprehension. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on flight. However, in light of the remaining evidence in this case, including the identification of defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes charged, the error in instructing the jury on flight was harmless. Thus, we conclude that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper; by Assistant Attorney General Leonard G. Green, for the State.", "Lig\u00f3n & Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, attorney for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS BRYANT HOLLAND\nNo. COA02-1474\n(Filed 18 November 2003)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 credibility of witnesses \u2014 not for trial court to weigh\nThere was no error in the denial of a motion to dismiss charges of armed robbery, first-degree burglary, assault, sexual offense, and other crimes where defendant argued that the only evidence of identity was from codefendants whom defendant contended lacked credibility. The trial court was not permitted to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and all of the evidence permitted a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 request for written instructions \u2014 re-read instead\nThe trial court did not err by not providing written instructions upon the jury\u2019s request in a prosecution for armed robbery, first-degree burglary, assault, sexual offense, and other crimes. The fact that the judge re-read the instructions represents compliance with the essence of the jury\u2019s request.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 flight \u2014 visit to friend\u2019s house \u2014 not sufficient for instruction\nThe trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight on evidence that defendant went to the home of a friend after the crime. There was no evidence that defendant did so to avoid apprehension; visiting a friend at a residence is not an act that raises a reasonable inference that a defendant was avoiding apprehension. However, this error was harmless in light of the remaining evidence in the case, including the identification of defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes charged.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 9 May 2001 by Judge David Q. Labarre in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper; by Assistant Attorney General Leonard G. Green, for the State.\nLig\u00f3n & Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, attorney for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0326-01", "first_page_order": 356, "last_page_order": 360 }