{ "id": 8958109, "name": "BRIGITTE G. HELMS, Plaintiff v. PAUL SCHULTZE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Helms v. Schultze", "decision_date": "2003-12-02", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1439", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "414", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "161 N.C. App. 404" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138349, 138447, 138328, 138329, 138427 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0069-01", "/nc/354/0069-03", "/nc/354/0069-05", "/nc/354/0069-04", "/nc/354/0069-02" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436669 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525439 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525570 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491711 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11651873 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132162, 132163, 132009, 132270, 131932 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0829-01", "/nc/350/0829-04", "/nc/350/0829-03", "/nc/350/0829-05", "/nc/350/0829-02" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11217428 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155745, 1155825, 1155730, 1155644, 1155613 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0186-03", "/nc/351/0186-05", "/nc/351/0186-02", "/nc/351/0186-01", "/nc/351/0186-04" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11146705 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "709 A.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Conn. App. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn. App.", "case_ids": [ 1063834 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn-app/48/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549060 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0062-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 830, "char_count": 24222, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.061821815428082e-07, "percentile": 0.5572844208291681 }, "sha256": "e6517b7cbe979a4e10a4dea683e3048de2a176189ffce6009e60d40893cd2ab2", "simhash": "1:8aa8e62a19180df3", "word_count": 3754 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:07.642184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur." ], "parties": [ "BRIGITTE G. HELMS, Plaintiff v. PAUL SCHULTZE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nPaul Schultze (defendant) appeals from a judgment requiring him to pay his ex-wife Brigitte G. Helms (plaintiff) the principal amount of $76,758.48 as reimbursement for plaintiffs overpayment of certain college and medical expenses incurred by their two sons, which expenses were anticipated and deemed the responsibility of the parties by a previous court order entered several years earlier in connection with the parties\u2019 divorce. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 27 November 1976. Two children were born of their marriage: Greg, bom 13 November 1977, and Pierre, born 30 April 1979. While living in Connecticut, the parties separated. Thereafter, on 19 December 1988, the Connecticut Superior Court entered an order (the Connecticut Order) which addressed, inter alia, the parties\u2019 responsibilities concerning payment of (1) future college expenses for the then-minor children, and (2) the children\u2019s present and future medical expenses. Regarding future college expenses, the Connecticut Order provided as follows:\nAnd that, to the extent that they are reasonably financially able, the parties shall be solely responsible for the education of the parties\u2019 minor children and shall pay any and all expenses incurred by the children during their attendance at a junior college, a four (4) year college, or their respective equivalents.\nAnd that, in the event that the parties are in dispute as to each party\u2019s ability to pay for the children\u2019s college education, the matter shall be submitted to and determined by the [Connecticut Superior Court]. In making its determination, the Court shall consider the assets, liabilities, and income of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and the contributions being made by the parties toward the children\u2019s support.\nAnd that, the parties [\u2019] obligation with respect to [payment of the children\u2019s college expenses] shall continue with respect to the children despite the children\u2019s attaining majority.\nWith respect to the children\u2019s medical expenses, the Connecticut Order provided:\nAnd that, [defendant] represents that his employer provides him with a group hospital and medical plan and that the children are presently covered by such a plan. [Defendant] shall, at his expense and at no cost to [plaintiff], maintain such hospital and medical plan, or the equivalent thereof, with respect to the children, so long as he is obligated to support such children, as provided in this decree.\nAnd that, in addition to the foregoing obligation of [defendant], the [defendant] shall pay, for the benefit of the children, all unreimbursed reasonable medical, optical, surgical, hospital, psychiatric, psychological, and nursing expenses, the cost of prescriptive drugs [] ... so long as he is obligated to support the children ... as provided in this decree; provided, however, that no psychiatric, psychological, orthodontia expense, or elective surgery or treatment shall be incurred without the prior consent of [defendant], which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.\nAnd that, should the children need any elective surgery, psychiatric or psychological care, [plaintiff] shall notify [defendant] of such need, and [defendant] shall have the right to select a qualified professional in the same field as the professionals selected by [plaintiff] to examine the children and determine whether or not such treatment is reasonably necessary. If it is determined that it is reasonably necessary, then the [defendant] shall provide and pay for the reasonable cost of the same. If the [plaintiff\u2019s] professional and the one selected by [defendant] shall not agree that the same is reasonably necessary, or as to the reasonable cost or expense thereof, this issue shall be submitted to the [Connecticut Superior Court] for a determination.\nAnd that, all of [defendant\u2019s] obligations hereunder for the benefit of the minor children shall terminate when [defendant] is no longer obligated to support or educate the children under the orders of this decree or [defendant\u2019s] death, whichever is earlier.\nSubsequent to the parties\u2019 divorce and entry of the Connecticut Order, plaintiff and the two children moved to North Carolina in 1989. Plaintiff remarried in 1995. Plaintiff testified that Greg entered the University of North Carolina at Wilmington in 1996 and was still enrolled at the time of trial, and Pierre attended Cape Fear Community College from 1997 through 2000.\nPlaintiff testified that in 1997 a dispute arose between plaintiff and defendant concerning their respective obligations to pay expenses incurred by Greg and Pierre while the children were in college. Plaintiff commenced the present litigation in October 1998 by filing a complaint alleging that, pursuant to the Connecticut Order, (1) defendant was liable for a. greater share of the children\u2019s college-related expenses than defendant had previously paid; and (2) defendant was obligated to reimburse plaintiff for certain medical expenses plaintiff paid, including expenses incurred by Pierre for psychological and psychiatric treatment. The parties have stipulated that plaintiff properly obtained service on defendant, a German citizen who in 1998 resided in Sofia, Bulgaria, and that the Superior Court for the State of North Carolina, County of Union, had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter herein. On 9 December 1998, plaintiff obtained an entry of default against defendant. On 18 January 2000, defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the entry of default was denied, and the matter was set for trial to determine the amount of plaintiff\u2019s damages.\nFollowing a bench trial at which both parties presented evidence, the trial court entered a judgment on 20 March 2002 awarding plaintiff damages in the amount of $76,758.48 plus interest. In determining the total judgment amount, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n26. This Court has been called upon to determine the ability of the plaintiff and the defendant to pay the children\u2019s expenses while they were obtaining their college education. The [Connecticut Order] entered into by the parties in 1988 requires the Court to consider the assets, liabilities, and incomes of both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the contributions being made by them towards their children\u2019s support in determining each party\u2019s ability to pay the children\u2019s expenses. In making this determination, the Court has considered the plaintiff\u2019s estate and indebtedness, referred to above, and that the plaintiff should have earned the sum of $30,664.50 per year during the time that the children were in college. The Court has further considered the estate of the defendant, and the fact that the defendant has become debt free while his children were in college, and has also considered the defendant\u2019s income during the time that the children were in college. The Court also considered all of the children\u2019s expenses that either party had paid under the [Connecticut Order] during the time that the children were in college. The Court also considered that of the parties\u2019 combined income and income potential, the defendant earned approximately 69% of that amount while the children were in college.\n27. The Court finds, in its discretion, that the defendant should have paid $132,118.15 of the children\u2019s expenses (not including medical and psychological expenses), but paid $66,710.90. Therefore, the defendant underpaid the sum of $65,407.25, which the plaintiff has paid.\n28. The Court further finds that the defendant was solely responsible under the [Connecticut Order] for paying the children\u2019s medical expenses while they were enrolled in college, and that the defendant should have paid for Pierre\u2019s psychological expenses. Plaintiff has paid the sum of $11,351.23 of the children\u2019s medical and psychological expenses, which was the defendant\u2019s obligation.\n28. [sic] Based on the above, the Court finds that the defendant owes plaintiff the sum of $76,758.48, which the defendant should have paid, but the plaintiff paid for the children\u2019s expenses.\nFrom the judgment entered 20 March 2002, defendant now appeals.\nBy his first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit into evidence the following exhibits: number 31, a 1998 net worth statement listing the total assets of plaintiff and her husband; and numbers 38, 39, and 40, the federal income tax returns filed by plaintiff and her husband in 1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively. Defendant contends this evidence showing the income and estate of plaintiff\u2019s husband is relevant because the trial court, in determining plaintiff\u2019s appropriate share of the children\u2019s college and medical expenses, should have considered plaintiff\u2019s access to these assets. We disagree.\nAt the outset, we note that the parties\u2019 respective obligations to pay their children\u2019s college and medical expenses are established by the Connecticut Order, which we have examined and find to be in the nature of a consent order for post-majority support. Although entered in Connecticut, the parties have stipulated that the North Carolina trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction by interpreting the Connecticut Order in order to determine the amount of plaintiffs damages. The appellate courts of both states have held that a consent order establishing a parent\u2019s obligation to support his or her children past the age of majority is valid and must be enforced according to contract principles, and that the courts may not modify the obligation set forth therein. See Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 64, 264 S.E.2d 131, 132 (1980); see also Miner v. Miner, 48 Conn. App. 409, 417-18, 709 A.2d 605, 609-10 (1998). \u201c[I]f the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract.\u201d Bueltel v. Lumber Mut. Ins. Co., 134 N.C. App. 626, 631, 518 S.E.2d 205, 209 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 186, 541 S.E.2d 709 (1999). \u201cIt is well-established law that, when a contract is plain and unambiguous on its face, it will be interpreted by the courts as a matter of law,\u201d First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. 4325 Park Rd. Assocs., 133 N.C. App. 153, 156, 515 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1999), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 829, 539 S.E.2d 284 (1999), and \u201cthe court\u2019s only duty is to determine the legal effect of the language used and to enforce the agreement as written,\u201d Atlantic and East Carolina Ry. Co. v. Southern Outdoor Adven, 129 N.C. App. 612, 617, 501 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1998) (citations omitted).\nThe Connecticut Order provides that \u201cto the extent that they are reasonably financially able, the parties shall be solely responsible for the education of the parties\u2019 minor children and shall pay any and all expenses incurred by the children\u201d while they are enrolled in college. The Connecticut Order further states that if the parties cannot agree on their respective support obligations, the court \u201cshall consider the assets, liabilities, and income of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and the contributions being made by the parties toward the children\u2019s support\u201d in making this determination. We conclude that by its plain and unambiguous language, the Connecticut Order (1) obligates only the parties to pay for their children\u2019s expenses, and (2) mandates that only the parties\u2019 income, assets, and liabilities be considered in resolving the present dispute. Because plaintiff\u2019s husband is not a party to this action, the trial court properly excluded as irrelevant the challenged evidence of plaintiff\u2019s husband\u2019s income and assets. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 401 and 402 (2001). The record indicates substantial evidence of plaintiff\u2019s separate income and assets during the relevant time period was tendered to, and properly considered by, the trial court. This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next excepts to the trial court\u2019s finding that Greg was enrolled in college at the time of the trial below, arguing that this finding was not supported by the evidence. However, the transcript reveals the following testimony by plaintiff:\nQ: [Defendant] testified a few minutes ago \u2014 if I understood his testimony to be that Greg had not signed up for classes by the deadline. Do you know anything about that? Is Greg enrolled in school now?\nA: Yes. He is in school.\nQ: In classes?\nA: Yeah.\nIn a bench trial, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is competent evidence to support them, even though the evidence could be viewed as supporting a different finding. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 309, 582 S.E.2d 247, 252 (2003). Defendant\u2019s second assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his third assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to reimburse plaintiff the full $11,351.23 which the trial court found plaintiff expended for the children\u2019s medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses. Defendant argues he should not be assessed the total cost of these expenses because in some instances plaintiff neither made sure the children used the insurance cards defendant provided to them when obtaining treatment, nor sent copies of the children\u2019s medical bills to defendant for processing by his insurance company. We find no merit in this assignment of error.\nThe Connecticut Order required defendant to maintain the children on his health insurance plan while they were in college. By its clear and unambiguous language, the Connecticut Order also required plaintiff to pay \u201call unreimbursed reasonable medical, . . . psychiatric, [and] psychological^ . . . expenses\u201d for the children, provided that \u201cno psychiatric, psychological^ . . . treatment shall be incurred\u201d without defendant\u2019s prior consent, \u201cwhich consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.\u201d The Connecticut Order also provided that, should either child need psychological or psychiatric care, plaintiff must notify defendant, who is then entitled to seek a second opinion for determination of whether such treatment is reasonably necessary. Finally, the Connecticut Order prohibited either party from preventing or interfering with the processing of any insurance reimbursement claim.\nThe bulk of the medical expenses for which defendant was ordered to reimburse plaintiff were incurred for Pierre\u2019s psychological and psychiatric treatment. Regarding these expenses, the trial court found as follows:\n16. [Pierre] has been arrested and convicted of possession of marijuana on at least three occasions [].... In October of 1999, he entered a treatment center. He has also been treated by a psychologist for his problems, who referred him to a psychiatrist. The plaintiff discussed with the defendant Pierre\u2019s need for treatment, and the defendant disagreed that he needed treatment. In July, 1999, the Court ordered Pierre to obtain a substance abuse assessment, and he has been ordered to obtain treatment as a condition of probation. . . . [Defendant] has disagreed with Pierre\u2019s psychological treatment, but [defendant] has never sought a second opinion as to whether or not Pierre needed treatment.\n17. The Court finds that Pierre\u2019s psychological treatment was reasonably necessary, and that the expenses incurred by the plaintiff for Pierre\u2019s treatment and counseling was reasonably necessary, and that defendant was unreasonable in withholding his consent to psychological treatment. The plaintiff has paid $8590 for psychological treatment services for Pierre before he withdrew from college. The plaintiff has also paid $2761.23 for both children\u2019s medical bills, while they have been attending college.\nBecause defendant has not challenged findings of fact numbers 16 and 17, the findings contained therein are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are conclusive on appeal. Anderson Chevrolet/Olds v. Higgins, 57 N.C. App. 650, 653, 292 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1982). We are thus bound by the trial court\u2019s findings as to the amounts paid by plaintiff, the reasonableness of Pierre\u2019s psychological and psychiatric treatment, and defendant\u2019s failure to seek a second opinion as to whether this treatment for Pierre was appropriate. The record evidence indicates defendant simply refused to pay Pierre\u2019s psychological and psychiatric expenses because defendant disputed the appropriateness of this treatment, in violation of the Connecticut Order\u2019s plain language.\nLikewise, by refusing to reimburse plaintiff for both children\u2019s other medical expenses which were not paid by defendant\u2019s insurance carrier, defendant violated the Connecticut Order\u2019s clear and unambiguous terms. The trial court found that \u201c[o]n many occasions, the plaintiff has not known the defendant\u2019s location in order to send medical bills to him. For this reason, many of the children\u2019s medical bills were never submitted to the medical insurance carrier for payment.\u201d This finding was supported by record evidence tending to show that during the relevant time period, defendant was self-employed as a consultant and that he temporarily lived and worked in various European and Asian countries.\nWhere the trial court conducts a bench trial and is the finder of fact, the trial court\u2019s decision will not be upset on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Under this standard of review, we defer to the trial court\u2019s discretion and will reverse its ruling \u201conly upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). Because we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering defendant to comply with the Connecticut Order and reimburse plaintiff for the total amount of the disputed medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses, this assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his final assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by the methodology it employed to determine the parties\u2019 respective abilities to pay the children\u2019s college-related expenses. We disagree.\nWith respect to the children\u2019s expenses while attending college, the trial court concluded that \u201cthe plaintiff has paid $65,407.25 . . . that the defendant should have paid under the [Connecticut Order], and the defendant owes plaintiff that sum.\u201d In support of its conclusion, the trial court made, inter alia, the following findings:\n26. This Court has been called upon to determine the ability of the plaintiff and the defendant to pay the children\u2019s expenses while they were obtaining their college education. The [Connecticut Order] . .. requires the Court to consider the assets, liabilities, and incomes of both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the contributions made by them towards their children\u2019s support in determining each party\u2019s ability to pay the children\u2019s expenses. In making this determination, the Court has considered the plaintiff\u2019s estate and indebtedness,... and that the plaintiff should have earned the sum of $30,664.50 per year during the time that the children were in college. The Court has further considered the estate of the defendant, and the fact that the defendant has become debt free while his children were in college, and has also considered the defendant\u2019s income during the time the children were in college. The Court also considered all of the children\u2019s expenses that either party had paid under the [Connecticut Order] during the time that the children were in college. The Court also considered that of the parties\u2019 combined income and income potential, the defendant earned approximately 69% of that amount while the children were in college.\n27. The Court finds, in its discretion, that the defendant should have paid $132,118.15 of the children\u2019s expenses (not including medical and psychological expenses), but paid $66,710.90. Therefore, the defendant underpaid the sum of $65,407.25, which the plaintiff has paid.\nOur review of the record reveals that over the three days it took to try this matter, the parties introduced numerous documents detailing their respective incomes, assets, and liabilities during the relevant time period. As discussed above, the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s request to put on evidence regarding the income and assets of plaintiff\u2019s husband. The trial court made detailed findings as to each parties\u2019 average yearly income, assets, and liabilities during the relevant time period, including a finding that an average yearly income of $30,664.50 should be imputed to plaintiff because she was voluntarily underemployed while the children were in college. The trial court then combined defendant\u2019s average yearly income with plaintiff\u2019s imputed income and determined that defendant earned 69% of the parties\u2019 total income while the children were in college.\nThe parties likewise introduced evidence of hundreds of expenditures each claimed to have made on behalf of Greg and Pierre while they were in college. In its detailed and comprehensive findings, the trial court disallowed some of each parties\u2019 claimed expenditures and found that plaintiff spent $124,764.68 for expenses the children incurred while enrolled, while defendant paid $66,710.90. The trial\ncourt then added these figures to obtain a total sum for both parties\u2019 college expenditures of $191,475.58. The trial court determined what portion of this amount defendant should have paid by taking 69% of this amount, or $132,118.15, and subtracting from it the amount it found defendant actually paid, or $66,710.90, for a total amount owed to plaintiff of $65,407.25.\nThe trial court\u2019s award of damages at a bench trial is a matter within its sound discretion, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Mullins v. Friend, 116 N.C. App. 676, 684, 449 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1994). \u201c[I]n order to reverse the trial court\u2019s decision for abuse of discretion, we must find that the decision was unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a competent inquiry.\u201d Hamby v. Hamby, 143 N.C. App. 635, 638, 547 S.E.2d 110, 112, disc, review denied, 354 N.C. 69, 553 S.E.2d 39 (2001). Because we cannot conclude that the trial court\u2019s methodology in determining the parties\u2019 respective abilities to pay the children\u2019s college-related expenses \u201cwas unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a competent inquiry,\u201d this assignment of error is without merit.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUNTER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Baucom, Clay tor, Benton, Morgan and Wood, P.A., by Richard F. Kronk, for defendant-appellant.", "Perry, Bundy, Plyler & Long, L.L.P, by H. Lig\u00f3n Bundy, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIGITTE G. HELMS, Plaintiff v. PAUL SCHULTZE, Defendant\nNo. COA02-1439\n(Filed 2 December 2003)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 support \u2014 prior consent order \u2014 income of new spouse \u2014 not considered\nThe income of plaintiff\u2019s new husband was properly excluded as irrelevant in a post-majority support action because the plain language of the consent order obligated only the parties.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 support \u2014 post-maj ority \u2014 college enrollment \u2014 findings\nThe court\u2019s finding in a post-majority child support action that one of the children was enrolled in college classes at the time of trial was supported by the evidence.\n3. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 support \u2014 psychological and medical expenses \u2014 prior consent order\nThe court did not abuse its discretion in a post-majority support action by ordering defendant to reimburse plaintiff for medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses which defendant had refused to pay in violation of the plain language of the parties\u2019 consent order.\n4. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 support \u2014 post-majority \u2014 college expenses \u2014 ability to pay \u2014 methodology\nThe trial court\u2019s methodology for determining the parties\u2019 ability to pay college expenses in a post-majority child support action was not unsupported by reason and was not an abuse of discretion.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 March 2002 by Judge Joseph J. Williams in Union County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 September 2003.\nBaucom, Clay tor, Benton, Morgan and Wood, P.A., by Richard F. Kronk, for defendant-appellant.\nPerry, Bundy, Plyler & Long, L.L.P, by H. Lig\u00f3n Bundy, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 434, "last_page_order": 444 }