{ "id": 8958329, "name": "KATRINA LETRESS GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. PATRICIA JOYCE LAZAROVICH and JOHN EDWARD LAZAROVICH, and CASSANDRA MICHELLE LEAK, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Griffis v. Lazarovich", "decision_date": "2003-12-02", "docket_number": "No. COA03-181", "first_page": "434", "last_page": "444", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "161 N.C. App. 434" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496763 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" }, { "page": "799" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725187 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733-34" }, { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4713937 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892", "parenthetical": "quoting Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219936 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "quoting Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755493, 4755336, 4753483, 4753324, 4752111 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0622-01", "/nc/312/0622-05", "/nc/312/0622-03", "/nc/312/0622-04", "/nc/312/0622-02" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 911", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526362 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-58.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568177, 8568082, 8568215, 8568120, 8568153, 8568254 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0393-04", "/nc/279/0393-01", "/nc/279/0393-05", "/nc/279/0393-02", "/nc/279/0393-03", "/nc/279/0393-06" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556360 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/11/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" }, { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241701 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795907, 796070, 795979, 795917, 795935 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0653-02", "/nc/342/0653-05", "/nc/342/0653-03", "/nc/342/0653-01", "/nc/342/0653-04" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916513 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793129 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9191775 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0609-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 848, "char_count": 23258, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0485787639202902e-07, "percentile": 0.7550926714260175 }, "sha256": "02bd8a2f8968d2b7b6a0ce871b3e0cbbeb1a59d70d0b0c6499844e6f9dbb7167", "simhash": "1:0aaac82276385cec", "word_count": 3729 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:07.642184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "KATRINA LETRESS GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. PATRICIA JOYCE LAZAROVICH and JOHN EDWARD LAZAROVICH, and CASSANDRA MICHELLE LEAK, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nKatrina Letress Griffis (\u201cGriffis\u201d) appeals from judgment entered after a jury\u2019s verdict and order denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for new trial. The jury found that Griffis was not injured by the negligence of Patricia Joyce Lazarovich (\u201cLazarovich\u201d) or Cassandra Michelle Leak (\u201cLeak\u201d). We find no error and affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying Griffis\u2019s motions.\nI. Background\nOn 2 December 2000, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Griffis was riding as a \u201cguest passenger\u201d in a vehicle owned and operated by Leak, Griffis\u2019s cousin and friend. Both Griffis and Leak testified that Lazarovich negligently drove a vehicle, owned by her husband John Edward Lazarovich, from a stopped position into the side of Leak\u2019s vehicle. Lazarovich denied negligence and testified that she was stopped in the median when Leak drove her vehicle into Lazarovich\u2019s car. Lazarovich testified that she never took her foot off the brake or accelerated prior to the collision. She described the collision as a \u201cslight impact.\u201d The parties pulled over to the curb to allow traffic to pass, which caused the vehicles not to be in the same position when the police arrived as when the accident occurred.\nLazarovich testified, without objection, that both Griffis and Leak exited the vehicle, cursed, and hurled derogatory racial slurs and threats at her after the collision. Two witnesses, who arrived at the scene after the collision, testified and corroborated Lazarovich\u2019s testimony regarding the vulgar and derogatory language used by Griffis and Leak. Griffis testified that at no point did she have a conversation with or \u201csay one word\u201d to Lazarovich. Griffis asserted she remained in Leak\u2019s vehicle until the investigative officer arrived on the scene.\nDr. George Case (\u201cDr. Case\u201d), Griffis\u2019s chiropractor, testified that he had examined and treated Griffis. In his opinion, the accident caused Griffis to sprain her lower back, neck, upper back, and rotator cuff.\nThe jury\u2019s verdict found that Griffis\u2019s injuries were not caused by the negligence of Lazarovich or Leak. The trial court denied Griffis\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for new trial. Griffis appeals.\nII. Issues\nGriffis contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying her motion in limine and allowing Lazarovich to testify concerning communications and interactions between Griffis and Lazarovich immediately following the accident; (2) refusing to allow Dr. Case to be rehabilitated on redirect examination; (3) refusing to allow Leak to testify concerning injuries that Leak sustained as a result of the collision; (4) refusing to submit Griffis\u2019s requested five issues and submitting three issues to the jury; (5) refusing to submit Griffis\u2019s requested instructions on the issues of negligence, proximate cause, and the plaintiff\u2019s burden of proof; (6) refusing to instruct the jury regarding a presumption of reasonableness for Griffis\u2019s medical expenses; (7) signing and entering a judgment based on inappropriate and inadequate evidence; and (8) denying Griffis\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for new trial.\nITT. Motion in Limine\nGriffis argues that the trial court should have granted her motion in limine and prohibited Lazarovich from testifying concerning her conversations with Griffis immediately following the collision. Although Griffis filed a motion in limine, she failed to object to the admission of this testimony at trial.\nWe have held:\n[although defendant filed and the trial court ruled on the motion in limine, defendant failed to object at trial to the admission of [witness\u2019s] testimony. The rule is that a motion in limine is insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence if the movant fails to further object to that evidence at the time it is offered at trial. Defendant failed to object to this testimony at trial and waived his right to appellate review of the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion in limine.\nCity of Wilson v. Hawley, 156 N.C. App. 609, 613, 577 S.E.2d 161, 164 (2003) (internal citations omitted). Griffis failed to object to Lazarovich\u2019s testimony at trial regarding her conversations and interactions with Griffis. During Griffis\u2019s case-in-chief, her counsel questioned Lazarovich regarding the events following the collision and solicited the testimony she now assigns as error. This assignment of error is dismissed.\nIV. Rehabilitation of Witness\nGriffis argues the trial court erred by refusing to allow her to rehabilitate Dr. Case. Dr. Case was duly qualified as an expert in the chiropractic field. During cross-examination, Lazarovich\u2019s counsel asked Dr. Case if he had referred Griffis to her attorney. Dr. Case could not remember any referral, but admitted that Griffis\u2019s attorney had previously represented him in an action wherein Lazarovich\u2019s attorney had represented the defendant. On redirect examination, Griffis\u2019s attorney attempted to have Dr. Case identify the defendant in that action. On appeal, Griffis contends that Dr. Case would have testified that Lazarovich\u2019s counsel represented an insurance company.\n\u201c[A] party must preserve the exclusion of evidence for appellate review by making a specific offer of proof unless the significance of the evidence is ascertainable from the record.\u201d In re Dennis v. Duke Power Co., 341 N.C. 91, 102, 459 S.E.2d 707, 714 (1995). Further, evidence of insurance is generally inadmissible as relevant evidence unless offered for some collateral purpose. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 411 (2001); Carrier v. Starnes, 120 N.C. App. 513, 516, 463 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1995), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 653, 467 S.E.2d 709 (1997).\nGriffis argues that Lazarovich\u2019s line of questioning was propounded to inform the jury of Dr. Case\u2019s potential bias. Griffis contends the trial court should have allowed her to rehabilitate Dr. Case\u2019s credibility. Griffis did not make an offer of proof indicating the relevance of the question or that the testimony sought was for purposes allowed under N.C.R. Evid. 411. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 43(c) (2001) (\u201cIn an action tried before a jury, if an objection to a question propounded to a witness is sustained by the court, the court on request of the examining attorney shall order a record made of the answer the witness would have given.\u201d). Griffis failed to make an offer of proof and has waived appellate review of this assignment of error. This assignment of error is dismissed.\nV. Evidence of Similar Occurrences\nGriffis argues the trial court erred by not allowing her to cross-examine Leak regarding the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident. Griffis contends that Leak\u2019s injuries were identical, relevant, and admissible. This Court has held:\nwhen substantial identity of circumstances and reasonable proximity in time is shown, evidence of similar occurrences or conditions may, in negligence actions, be admitted as relevant to the issue of negligence. Admission of evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and may be disturbed on appeal only where an abuse of such discretion is clearly shown.\nLane v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 135 N.C. App. 494, 498, 521 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1999), disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 357, 542 S.E.2d 212 (2001) (internal citations omitted).\nHere, the jury was to determine: (1) whether Lazarovich or Leak was negligent, (2) whether such negligence caused injury to Griffis, and if so, (3) what amount of damages Griffis was entitled to recover. Griffis attempted to compel Leak to testify that she also suffered back and neck pain following the collision. We cannot conclude that testimony from one occupant of a vehicle regarding her injuries in an accident would tend to show that another occupant, with a different medical history, threshold for pain, and susceptibility to injury, was also injured to the same degree in the collision. See Horrv. Kansas C. E. R. Co., 137 S.W. 1010, 1011 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (\u201c[T]o . . . show how [other passengers] were affected by their injuries would be evidence not pertaining to the res gestae and devoid of any but a remote bearing on the issues .... [S]uch evidence would tend to enlarge into importance and . . . give undue influence to, at best, a weakly relevant fact of the slightest evidentiary worth and to confuse the jury ....\u201d). Griffis failed to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s refusal to admit this evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Jury Issues\nGriffis argues that the trial court erred and confused the jury by failing to give her requested issues. Griffis requested the court to submit five issues to the jury:\n1. Was the negligence of the defendant, Patricia Joyce Lazarovich, a proximate cause of the accident on December 2, 2000?\n2. Was the negligence of the defendant, Cassandra Michelle Leak, a proximate cause of the accident on December 2, 2000?\n3. Was the plaintiff, Katrina Letress Griffis, injured by the negligence of the defendants, Patricia Joyce Lazarovich and John Edward Lazarovich?\n4. Was the plaintiff, Katrina Letress Griffis, injured by the negligence of the defendant, Cassandra Michelle Leak?\n5. What amount is the plaintiff, Katrina Letress Griffis, entitled to recover for her personal injuries?\nThe trial court submitted the following issues:\n1. Was the Plaintiff, Katrina Letress Griffis, injured by the negligence of the Defendant, Patricia Joyce Lazarovich?\n2. Was the Plaintiff, Katrina Letress Griffis, injured by the negligence of the Defendant, Cassandra Michelle Leak?\n3. What amount is the Plaintiff, Katrina Letress Griffis, entitled to recover for personal injuries?\nThe trial court gave Griffis\u2019s last three jury instructions as requested, with the omission of \u201cJohn Edward Lazarovich.\u201d\n\u201cIt is an elementary principle of law that the trial judge must submit to the jury such issues as are necessary to settle the material controversies raised in the pleadings and supported by the evidence.\u201d Uniform Service v. Bynum International, Inc., 304 N.C. 174, 176, 282 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1981). \u201cThe number, form and phraseology of the issues lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issues will not be held for error if they are sufficiently comprehensive to resolve all factual controversies and to enable the court to render judgment fully determining the cause.\u201d Chalmers v. Womack, 269 N.C. 433, 435-36, 152 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1967). Further, N.C.R. Civ. P. 49(b) provides that \u201c[i]ssues shall be framed in concise and direct terms, and prolixity and confusion must be avoided by not having too many issues.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 49(b) (2001).\nHere, the issues submitted to the jury properly reflect the \u201cmaterial controversies\u201d involved in this negligence action. Uniform Service, 304 N.C. at 176, 282 S.E.2d at 428. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by combining the issues. The issues as presented allowed the jury to render judgment fully determining the cause. Chalmers, 269 N.C. at 435-36, 152 S.E.2d at 507. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVII. Jury Instructions\nA. Negligence\nGriffis contends the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on her requested instructions. \u201cWhen charging the jury in a civil case, it is the duty of the trial court to explain the law and to apply it to the evidence on the substantial issues of the action.\u201d Adams v. Mills, 312 N.C. 181, 186, 322 S.E.2d 164, 168 (1984); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 51(a) (2001).\nOn appeal, this Court considers a jury charge contextually and in its entirety. The charge will be held to be sufficient if it presents the law of the case in such manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the jury was misled or misinformed. The party asserting error bears the burden of showing that the jury was misled or that the verdict was affected by an omitted instruction.\nBass v. Johnson, 149 N.C. App. 152, 160, 560 S.E.2d 841, 847 (2002) (internal citations omitted).\nGriffis requested the court to instruct the jury that she did not have to prove by the greater weight of the evidence who was negligent, but that the defendants\u2019 joint and concurring negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries. The trial court denied Griffis\u2019s request and instructed the jury using North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions as follows:\nThe plaintiff not only has the burden of proving negligence, but also has \u2014 [sic] but also such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury or damage. . . .\nThere may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Therefore, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant\u2019s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury. The plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence only that the defendant\u2019s negligence was a proximate cause.\nFinally, ... if you find by the greater weight of the evidence that either defendant or both were negligent in any one or more of the ways intended by the plaintiff and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, then it would be your duty to answer the issues yes ....\nGriffis\u2019s proposed jury instructions would allow the jury to presume negligence solely because an accident occurred. \u201c[A] defendant\u2019s negligence will not be presumed from the mere happening of an accident, but, on the contrary, in the absence of evidence on the question, freedom from negligence will be presumed.\u201d Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N.C. 616, 618, 24 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1943); see also Coakley v. Motor Co., 11 N.C. App. 636, 641, 182 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1971), cert. denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d 244 (1971).\nThe trial court properly instructed the jury on the applicable North Carolina law and was not required to submit Griffis\u2019s proposed instructions. Griffis has not met her burden of showing that the jury was misled by the trial court\u2019s instructions. Bass, 149 N.C. App. at 160, 560 S.E.2d at 847. This assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Presumptions\nGriffis argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the amount of her medical expenses was presumed reasonable. N.C.R. Evid. 301 states that the trial court must instruct the jury when a statutory or judicial presumption exists. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 301 (2001). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-58.1 (2001) creates a mandatory presumption of reasonableness for a plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses if the medical expenses are an issue and evidence is presented showing the total charges.\nHere, all parties stipulated to the amount of Griffis\u2019s medical charges and to the reasonableness of the charges. Neither the amount nor reasonableness of Griffis\u2019s medical expenses were \u201can issue.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8-58.1 (2001). Any instruction regarding the reasonableness of Griffis\u2019s medical expenses would have been redundant and confusing to the jury. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVIII Signing of Judgment,\nGriffis also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s signing and entry of the judgment. An assignment of error concerning the signing and entry of a judgment \u201cpresents only the question of whether an error of law appears on the face of the record, which includes whether the facts found or admitted support the judgment and whether the judgment is regular in form.\u201d Green v. Maness, 69 N.C. App. 403, 407, 316 S.E.2d 911, 913, disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 622, 323 S.E.2d 922 (1984).\nTo support this assignment of error, Griffis argues that \u201csomebody had to be negligent\u201d in order for the collision to have occurred. As we previously stated, \u201ca defendant\u2019s negligence will not be presumed from the mere happening of an accident. . . .\u201d Etheridge, 222 N.C. at 618, 24 S.E.2d at 479. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIX. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial\nGriffis assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of her motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial. We address these assignments of error together. \u201cThe test for determining whether a motion for directed verdict is supported by the evidence is identical to that applied when ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\u201d Martishius v. Carolco Studios, Inc., 355 N.C. 465, 473, 562 S.E.2d 887, 892 (2002) (quoting Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986)). \u201cIn ruling on the motion, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in his favor.\u201d Id. (quoting Taylor v. Walker, 320 N.C. 729, 733-34, 360 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1987)). \u201cThe party moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, like the party seeking a directed verdict, bears a heavy burden under North Carolina law.\u201d Id. (quoting Taylor, 320 N.C. at 733, 360 S.E.2d at 799).\nHere, Griffis had the burden of proving the negligent acts of the defendants. The evidence tended to show that one of the two drivers could have been negligent, neither Leak nor Lazarovich were negligent, or that both were negligent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties indicates that neither Leak nor Lazarovich were negligent in causing the accident. Griffis did not meet her \u201cheavy burden\u201d of proving the negligence of Leak or Lazarovich and, thus, was not entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This assignment of error is overruled.\n\u201cGenerally, a motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.\u201d Kinsey v. Spann, 139 N.C. App. 370, 372, 533 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2000). In support of her motion for new trial, Griffis reasserts the arguments stated in her prior assignments of error. We have either dismissed or overruled Griffis\u2019s prior assignments of error and find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. This assignment of error is overruled.\nX. Conclusion\nThe evidence presented at trial supports the jury\u2019s verdict, that neither Lazarovich nor Leak negligently caused Griffis\u2019s alleged injuries. In her brief, Leak argues cross-assignments of error to be addressed in the event this Court reverses the trial court\u2019s order. Since we affirm the trial court\u2019s order, we do not reach Leak\u2019s cross-assignments of error.\nNo error at trial. Affirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "E. Gregory Stott, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Bailey & Dixon, L.L.P., by Dayatra T. King, for defendants-appellees Patricia Joyce Lazarovich and John Edward Lazarovich.", "Hall & Messiah, L.L.P, by Jonathan E. Hall and Kathleen M. Millikan, for defendant-appellee Cassandra Michelle Leak." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATRINA LETRESS GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. PATRICIA JOYCE LAZAROVICH and JOHN EDWARD LAZAROVICH, and CASSANDRA MICHELLE LEAK, Defendants\nNo. COA03-181\n(Filed 2 December 2003)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 motion in lim-ine \u2014 failure to object to testimony\nAlthough plaintiff contends the trial court erred in a negligence case by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion in limine seeking to prohibit defendant from testifying concerning her conversations with plaintiff immediately following the parties\u2019 car collision, this assignment of error is dismissed because plaintiff failed to object to the admission of the testimony at trial.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to make offer of proof\nAlthough plaintiff contends the trial court erred in a negligence case by refusing to allow plaintiff to rehabilitate her witness chiropractor, this assignment of error is dismissed because plaintiff failed to make an offer of proof indicating the relevance of the question and has therefore waived appellate review.\n3. Evidence\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 testimony from occupant of vehicle regarding injuries\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence case by failing to allow plaintiff to cross-examine one defendant about the injuries she sustained as a result of the car accident in question, because: (1) it cannot be concluded that testimony from one occupant of a vehicle regarding her injuries in an accident would tend to show that another occupant, with a different medical history, threshold for pain, and susceptibility to injury, was also injured to the same degree in the collision; and (2) such evidence would tend to enlarge into importance and give undue influence to a weakly relevant fact that would confuse the jury.\n4. Negligence\u2014 requested issues \u2014 abuse of discretion standard\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by allegedly failing to give plaintiff\u2019s requested issues, because: (1) the issues submitted to the jury properly reflected the material controversies involved; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by combining the issues; and (3) the issues as presented allowed the jury to render judgment fully determining the cause.\n5. Negligence\u2014 requested instructions \u2014 no presumption of negligence based on accident\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by failing to instruct the jury on plaintiffs requested instructions that plaintiff did not have to prove by the greater weight of the evidence who was negligent, but that defendants\u2019 joint and concurring negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries, because: (1) the trial court instructed according to the pattern jury instructions; and (2) plaintiffs proposed jury instructions would allow the jury to presume negligence solely based on the fact an accident occurred.\n6. Negligence\u2014 requested instructions \u2014 medical expenses presumed reasonable\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by failing to instruct the jury that the amount of plaintiffs medical expenses was presumed reasonable, because any instruction regarding the reasonableness of plaintiffs medical expenses would have been redundant and confusing to the jury when: (1) all parties stipulated to the amount of plaintiffs medical charges and to the reasonableness of the charges; and (2) neither the amount nor reasonableness of plaintiffs medical expenses were an issue.\n7. Negligence\u2014 signing and entry of judgment \u2014 no presumption based on happening of accident\nAlthough plaintiff assigns error to the trial court\u2019s signing and entry of judgment in a negligence case, this assignment of error is overruled because a defendant\u2019s negligence will not be presumed from the mere happening of an accident.\n8. Negligence\u2014 motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict \u2014 motion for new trial\nThe trial court did not err in a negligence case by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for new trial, because: (1) in regard to the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party indicated that neither defendant was negligent in causing the accident; and (2) plaintiff reasserted her prior assignments of error to show she was entitled to a new trial, and those assignments were either dismissed or overruled, and there was no abuse of discretion.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 26 July 2002 and order entered 29 August 2002 by Judge Paul G. Gessner in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 October 2003.\nE. Gregory Stott, for plaintiff-appellant.\nBailey & Dixon, L.L.P., by Dayatra T. King, for defendants-appellees Patricia Joyce Lazarovich and John Edward Lazarovich.\nHall & Messiah, L.L.P, by Jonathan E. Hall and Kathleen M. Millikan, for defendant-appellee Cassandra Michelle Leak." }, "file_name": "0434-01", "first_page_order": 464, "last_page_order": 474 }