{ "id": 8959520, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LOAN JONES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "2003-12-16", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1739", "first_page": "615", "last_page": "625", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "161 N.C. App. 615" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511417 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53881 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 717, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955701 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304-05", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 717, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512329 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516208 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685022 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526069 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552317 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 731", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179959 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740", "parenthetical": "\"[defendant], in allowing [his cousin] to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that [his cousin] would allow someone else to look inside\"" }, { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "\"[defendant], in allowing [his cousin] to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that [his cousin] would allow someone else to look inside\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "919 F.2d 1193", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1245025 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/919/1193-01" ] }, { "cite": "967 F.2d 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10516175 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/967/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790147 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172884 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "249-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "\"defendant gave general consent to search the vehicle, which allowed the officers to search the trunk of the car\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081982 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681-82", "parenthetical": "\"defendant gave general consent to search the vehicle, which allowed the officers to search the trunk of the car\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 565", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6227938 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520024 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "the \"Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a particular container within the automobile\"" }, { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "the \"Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a particular container within the automobile\"" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125", "parenthetical": "citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511176 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41", "parenthetical": "citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11339173 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/389/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239703 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188695 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0606-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 960, "char_count": 22246, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2814497102934934e-07, "percentile": 0.6176138068281201 }, "sha256": "a0fb0bcfeb6a4b17ed74a231f33edbb27addd063a9dcc3362ea14f2b26de904e", "simhash": "1:a183eaa2d6762a7a", "word_count": 3668 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:07.642184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LOAN JONES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEVINSON, Judge.\nDefendant (Anthony Jones) appeals from convictions and judgments of trafficking in cocaine by possession, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For the reasons that follow, we conclude defendant had a fair trial, free of reversible error.\nThe relevant evidence is summarized as follows: On the night of 4 February 2000, members of the Durham County Sheriffs Department took part in a street interdiction operation in Durham, North Carolina. As part of this operation, Detective R. L. Rose and several other officers were driving in the area of Hyde Park Avenue in Durham, when they saw a number of people gathered around a car stopped in the middle of Hyde Park. The car had its engine running and was blocking traffic. The officers parked their van on the side of the street, got out, and approached the group in the center of the street; as they did so, the vehicle drove away and the group dispersed. Defendant, who had been among the group gathered around the car, began walking towards a different car \u2014 a red Mustang parked on the side of the street. He went around the rear of the car, opened the passenger door, got into the Mustang\u2019s back seat, and shut the door. While Rose and several other officers watched, defendant took off the leather jacket he was wearing and set it on the back seat. He then got out of the car, wearing only a tee shirt despite the freezing (25% F) winter weather.\nMeanwhile, the officers had summoned Detective Ricky Keller, the Durham County Sheriff\u2019s Department canine handler. After observing defendant\u2019s behavior, Deputy J.M. Utley, another officer involved in the operation, asked Detective Keller to have his drug-sniffing dog, \u2018Marco,\u2019 walk around the outside of the Mustang. Marco alerted \u201cvery strongly\u201d on the passenger side of the car where defendant had gotten in the car. At around the same time, another man, Robert Jiggetts, emerged from a nearby house. Jiggetts told the officers that the Mustang belonged to his wife, and that he was in charge of the car. Lieutenant Norman Gordon, also of the Durham County Sheriff\u2019s Department, asked Jiggetts for permission to search his car; Jiggetts gave his consent to the search, and provided Officer Gordon with his keys. Detective Rose then unlocked the car and retrieved the defendant\u2019s jacket from the back seat. Rose found a shoulder holster and handgun under the jacket; he then searched the pockets of the jacket and discovered a digital scale, a butterfly knife, marijuana, approximately 43 grams of crack cocaine, and over $900 in currency. As these items were removed from the pockets of his jacket, defendant stated that the reason he had gotten into the car was because he had \u2018dope\u2019 in his possession. Defendant was arrested and transported to the law enforcement center by Deputy Utley. At the law enforcement center, he was informed of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver, and agreed to make a statement. Defendant dictated his statement to Deputy Utley, who transcribed defendant\u2019s words while reading them aloud. After writing the statement, Deputy Utley gave it to the defendant. The defendant looked over the statement, then signed it. In his statement, defendant acknowledged that he had money, a gun, and marijuana in his coat when he put it in the car; however, he denied ownership of the cocaine or scales.\nOn 15 May 2000 defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine by possession, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all charges. He received an active sentence of 35 to 42 months for the cocaine and marijuana charges, and a consecutive sentence of 12 to 15 months for the remaining offenses. From these judgments and convictions, defendant appeals.\nDefendant presents three arguments on appeal. He argues first that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence found inside his leather coat. We disagree.\nThe Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that \u201cthe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.\u201d \u201cThe Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d State v. Barnes, 158 N.C. App. 606, 609, 582 S.E.2d 313, 316-17 (2003) (citation omitted).\nUnder the Fourth Amendment, \u201c[as a] general rule, a warrant supported by probable cause is required before a search is considered reasonable. The warrant requirement is \u2018subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Woods, 136 N.C. App. 386, 390, 524 S.E.2d 363, 365 (2000) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, (1967)). \u201cConsent, however, . . . [is] excepted from the warrant requirement, and a search is not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when lawful consent to the search is given.\u201d State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 340-41, 572 S.E.2d 108, 125 (2002) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)).\nIn the present case, defendant concedes that the law enforcement officers had Jiggetts\u2019 consent to search the vehicle where he had left his coat. He contends, however, that Jiggetts\u2019 giving general consent to search the vehicle did not entitle the officers to search the coat on the back seat. Defendant asserts that he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his coat, even after leaving it in Jiggetts\u2019 car, and that Jiggetts did not have authority to consent to a search of his jacket. On this basis, defendant argues that without defendant\u2019s consent, the search of his jacket violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. We do not agree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that general consent to the search of an automobile, given without any limitations placed on its scope, encompasses the search of \u201ca closed container found within the car that might reasonably hold the object of the search.\u201d Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 301 (1991) (the \u201cFourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the suspect\u2019s consent permitted him to open a particular container within the automobile\u201d). The Court rejected the argument that, after receiving general consent to search a vehicle, the police nonetheless must obtain specific permission to search each container inside the car:\nRespondents argue . . . that if the police wish to search closed containers within a car they must separately request permission[.] ... [W]e see no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amendment\u2019s basic test of objective reasonableness. ... A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. But if his consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization.\nId. at 252, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303. Our Court cited Jimeno in State v. McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. 175, 188, 405 S.E.2d 358, 366 (1991), noting that \u201ca police officer may now search a closed container found in a vehicle, where the officer has the suspect\u2019s general consent to search and the officer might reasonably believe the container holds the object of the search.\u201d (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991), and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991)). See also State v. Castellon, 151 N.C. App. 675, 681-82, 566 S.E.2d 696, 700 (2002) (\u201cdefendant gave general consent to search the vehicle, which allowed the officers to search the trunk of the car\u201d). In the instant case we conclude that Jiggetts\u2019 general consent to the search of his car reasonably included the search of clothing lying on the seats of the car.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s argument that Jiggetts could not consent to a search of defendant\u2019s coat after defendant left it lying on the back seat of his car. \u201c[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a war-rantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it . . . may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.\u201d United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 249-50 (1974). Matlock was cited by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Garner, 340 N.C. 573, 592, 459 S.E.2d 718, 728 (1995). The defendant in Gamer moved to suppress evidence taken from his jacket, which he had left in another person\u2019s house. This third party consented to the search of her house, where police found defendant\u2019s jacket. Defendant argued that the third party did not have the authority to consent to a search of his personal belongings. The Court disagreed and, citing Matlock, upheld the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the \u201cdefendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the jacket . . . lying in a pile of clothes.\u201d Similarly, in a federal case from another jurisdiction, United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1992), the defendant argued that the owner of a car lacked authority to consent to a search of defendant\u2019s luggage. The Court held:\n[Defendant\u2019s] argument, however, ignores the \u2018assumption of the risk\u2019 approach adopted in United States v. Matlock, supra: \u201cThe underpinning of third-party consent is assumption of risk. One who shares a house or room or auto with another under- \u2022 stands that the partner, may invite strangers[, and that his] privacy is not absolute, but contingent in large measure on the decisions of another. Decisions of either person define the extent of the privacy involved, a principle that does not depend on whether the stranger welcomed into the [area] turns out to be an agent or another drug dealer.\n(quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1202 (7th Cir. 1990)). Although not binding on this Court, we find this analysis persuasive. See also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684, 694 (1969) (\u201c[defendant], in allowing [his cousin] to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that [his cousin] would allow someone else to look inside\u201d). We conclude that Jiggetts had the authority to consent to a search of his vehicle which encompassed items found lying around in the car, such as defendant\u2019s jacket. To paraphrase Garner, id., \u201cdefendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the jacket... lying in [Jiggets\u2019 car]. \u201d\nDefendant cites State v. Cole, 46 N.C. App. 592, 265 S.E.2d 507 (1980), in support of his argument that the evidence seized from his jacket should be suppressed. However, Cole involved a warrantless search of a jacket found inside an automobile in which the search was not supported by either probable cause or by consent from the vehicle\u2019s owner. We conclude that Cole is not germane to the resolution of the issues presented herein.\nOn appeal, \u201c[o]ur review of a denial of a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law are legally correct.\u201d State v. Trapp, 110 N.C. App. 584, 587, 430 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1993). In the present case, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were supported by the evidence. We further conclude that these findings support its conclusion of law, that the police did not violate the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights by searching his jacket after obtaining Jiggetts\u2019 consent to a search of the vehicle. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address the State\u2019s other arguments, that the search might equally be justified on the basis of probable cause or as a search incident to arrest. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements given to law enforcement officers. Defendant challenges the admission of both (1) an oral statement made at the time of his arrest, and (2) a statement taken by Officer Utley at the law enforcement center, which was reduced to writing and signed by the defendant. He argues that both of these statements should be suppressed. We disagree.\nRegarding the oral statement, Detective Rose testified that when he removed drugs and other items from the pockets of defendant\u2019s jacket, the defendant remarked that the reason he had gotten into the car was that he had \u2018dope\u2019 in his possession. Defendant argues on appeal that the statement was \u201cnot voluntary\u201d because it was uttered when he \u201chad just seen officers grab a coat they knew was his and search it without his permission.\u201d Defendant cites no cases in support of his argument that the \u201cenvironment\u201d of \u201chigh pressure\u201d surrounding his arrest rendered his statement involuntary. Moreover, the trial court found that:\n13. At the time that Det. Rose found the items in the coat, the Defendant. . . made a spontaneous utterance that the reason he got into the car was because he had the dope on him. This utterance was not in response to any question, and Det. Rose did not ask Defendant any questions.\nBased on this finding of fact, the trial court concluded that defendant\u2019s oral statement \u201cwas a voluntary spontaneous utterance which was not in response to any question by law enforcement[.]\u201d We conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding of fact was supported by competent evidence, and supports its conclusion of law. We further conclude that the trial court did not err by overruling defendant\u2019s motion to suppress this oral statement.\nRegarding his written statement, the trial court found that:\n14. After his arrest, the Defendant was brought to the Durham County Sheriff\u2019s office where he was read his Miranda rights by Deputy Utley. Defendant signed a Miranda rights form and gave a written statement to Deputy Utley, which he signed after Deputy Utley wrote it for him.\nOn this basis, the trial court concluded that:\n2. The Defendant was properly informed of his Miranda rights . . . stated that he understood them, and made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of those rights.\n3. The written statement signed by the Defendant is a true and accurate statement that was provided by the Defendant to Deputy Utley.\nWe conclude the trial court\u2019s finding of fact is supported by ample evidence, and supports its conclusion of law. Defendant, however, argues on appeal that his written statement must be suppressed because \u201cit differed dramatically from what he told the officer.\u201d Defendant contends that he was unaware of the difference between what he said and what Deputy Utley wrote down because he \u201ccannot read or write.\u201d This argument is without merit.\nDefendant testified that he was in school until the tenth grade, when he left to join the Job Corps. Moreover, on cross-examination, defendant denied telling Deputy Utley he was illiterate:\nProsecutor: But you\u2019re indicating that you don\u2019t read and write?\nDefendant: I can\u2019t read and write that well.\nProsecutor: Excuse me. Maybe that\u2019s where I\u2014\nDefendant: That\u2019s what I told him. I didn\u2019t sav I can\u2019t read and write: I can\u2019t read and write that well.\nProsecutor: So when Deputy Utley handed you back that statement, even though you can\u2019t read or write well, you should have been able to at least understand parts of it, correct?\nDefendant: Understand what?\nProsecutor: Your statement that you made to him.\nDefendant: Understand what? No, when he turned it to me, I immediately signed it. and trusted him that he was writing what I was saving. . . .\n(emphasis added). Thus, defendant\u2019s testimony does not suggest that he attempted to read the statement but was unable to do so. Additionally, the record contains testimony by Deputy Utley, that he wrote precisely what defendant said without paraphrasing, and that he read it aloud as he transcribed defendant\u2019s statements.\n\u201cIt is well established that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000)). \u201cIt is the trial court\u2019s duty to resolve any conflicts and contradictions that may exist in the evidence.\u201d State v. Johnson, 322 N.C. 288, 293, 367 S.E.2d 660, 663 (1988) (citation omitted).\nWe conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by the evidence, and that these findings support its conclusions of law regarding both the written and oral statement. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant was convicted of six separate criminal offenses; however, he argues the sufficiency of the evidence only with regards to the firearms charges. Accordingly, we confine our analysis to whether there was enough evidence presented to submit to the jury the charges of carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a felon.\nUpon a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the trial court \u201cmust determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992) (citation omitted). \u201cIf substantial evidence of each element is presented, the motion for dismissal is properly denied. \u2018Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Shelman, 159 N.C. App. 300, 304-05, 584 S.E.2d 88, 92 (2003) (quoting State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 717, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997)). Moreover, in its ruling on a motion to dismiss, \u201cthe trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State.\u201d State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 473, 573 S.E.2d 870, 889 (2002).\nIn the instant case, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish either his actual or constructive possession of the gun found under his jacket. However, in his written statement defendant stated that \u201c[t]he cops searched the car and found my coat. I had some herb, a gun \u2014 and a gun in my coat.\u201d As discussed above, we have concluded that the trial court did not err by admitting this statement. Because defendant acknowledges his possession of the gun in this statement, it effectively disposes of his argument that there is no evidence of possession. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFor the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the defendant had a fair trial, free of prejudicial error. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences are\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEVINSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.", "Richard E. Jester for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LOAN JONES\nNo. COA02-1739\n(Filed 16 December 2003)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 consent by car owner \u2014 jacket found in car \u2014 motion to suppress evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine by possession, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence found inside his leather coat that he placed in a car that was searched with the owner\u2019s consent because: (1) the car owner\u2019s general consent to the search of his car reasonably included the search of clothing lying on the seats of the car; and (2) the car owner had the authority to consent to a search of his vehicle which encompassed items found lying around in the car such as defendant\u2019s jacket, and defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the jacket.\n2. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 oral statement at time of arrest \u2014 statement signed by defendant\u2014 motion to suppress\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine by possession, possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements given to law enforcement officers, because: (1) regarding defendant\u2019s oral statement at the time of his arrest that he had dope in his possession, the statement was a voluntary spontaneous utterance which was not in response to any question by law enforcement; and (2) regarding defendant\u2019s written statement, defendant\u2019s testimony does not suggest that he attempted to read the statement but was unable to do so, and the record contains testimony by a deputy that he wrote precisely what defendant said without paraphrasing and that he read the statement aloud as he transcribed defendant\u2019s statements.\n3. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 carrying a concealed weapon \u2014 possession of a firearm by a felon \u2014 motion to dismiss\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charges of carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a felon based on a gun being found under defendant\u2019s jacket, because defendant acknowledged possession of the gun in his statement to police officers.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 29 August 2002 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 October 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.\nRichard E. Jester for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0615-01", "first_page_order": 645, "last_page_order": 655 }