{ "id": 8915383, "name": "R.B. CRONLAND BUILDING SUPPLIES, INC., Plaintiff v. LEON J. SNEED and wife, BETSY SNEED, Defendants v. JAMES J. MAUNEY, JR. and wife, MELISSA H. MAUNEY, Third-Party Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "R.B. Cronland Building Supplies, Inc. v. Sneed", "decision_date": "2004-01-06", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1681", "first_page": "142", "last_page": "146", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 N.C. App. 142" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497849 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784-85", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "holding \"[cjourts should not under the guise of judicial construction supply key terms omitted by the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526287 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "holding \"[cjourts should not under the guise of judicial construction supply key terms omitted by the parties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564344 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627712 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598037 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082112 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "holding \"to constitute an enforceable contract within the statute of frauds, the written memorandum, though it may be informal, must be sufficiently definite to show the essential elements of a valid contract\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632292 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "holding \"to constitute an enforceable contract within the statute of frauds, the written memorandum, though it may be informal, must be sufficiently definite to show the essential elements of a valid contract\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574023 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "holding that \"Defendant's contract of guaranty is their own separate contract with plaintiff to pay the debts of [debtor] when due, if not paid by [debtor]. They are not in any sense parties to the note executed by [debtor]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550527 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486", "parenthetical": "holding that \"Defendant's contract of guaranty is their own separate contract with plaintiff to pay the debts of [debtor] when due, if not paid by [debtor]. They are not in any sense parties to the note executed by [debtor]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613670 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0483-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 496, "char_count": 9383, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.32373258054813236 }, "sha256": "47469c1fba34f5cbe28776a291545ff5869416e5ab3b3630b21cf3a7f5b3ed26", "simhash": "1:4a29d91b8e3c9042", "word_count": 1523 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:54.754463+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "R.B. CRONLAND BUILDING SUPPLIES, INC., Plaintiff v. LEON J. SNEED and wife, BETSY SNEED, Defendants v. JAMES J. MAUNEY, JR. and wife, MELISSA H. MAUNEY, Third-Party Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nThis appeal arises from a partial grant of summary judgment in an action by Plaintiff, R.B. Cronland Building Supplies, to recover a debt allegedly owed by Defendants Leon Sneed (a building general contractor), and his wife, Betsy Sneed. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.\nPreliminarily, we note that although the record appears to reflect an issue as to whether this appeal is interlocutory, we accept the trial court\u2019s certification under Rule 54 that this matter is ripe for review. Accordingly, we will address the merits of Betsy Sneed\u2019s appeal. However, Cronland Building Supplies\u2019 attempt to appeal from the denial of summary judgment on its claim against Leon Sneed is clearly interlocutory; accordingly, we summarily dismiss that part of the appeal. Thus, we review only the merits of the appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Betsy Sneed.\nRegarding the appeal against Betsy Sneed, the record in this case shows that under an undated document entitled \u201cConditions of Credit Guaranty of Payment,\u201d Leon Sneed and his wife, Betsy Sneed signed on the \u201cGuarantor\u201d lines. However, the document does not contain the name of the debtor, nor is there a signature over the \u201cdebtor\u201d line of the document. Apparently, what Cronland Building Supplies sought to obtain with the document, was Betsy Sneed\u2019s guaranty of payment for any debts incurred by her husband, a general building contractor. We, however, uphold the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Betsy Sneed for the following reasons.\nFirst, the record shows that Cronland Building Supplies sued Betsy Sneed only as a principal debtor, alleging that she had primary liability for a debt owed to Cronland Building Supplies based upon the alleged contract. However, in this case, Cronland Building Supplies failed to produce evidence that Betsy Sneed ever executed as a principal debtor. Consequently, Cronland Building Supplies failed to produce \u201ca forecast of evidence\u201d showing that it could establish a prima facie case at trial that Betsy Sneed was liable for the debt at issue. This basis suffices to support Betsy Sneed\u2019s entitlement to summary judgment on this issue.\nSecond, Cronland Building Supplies argues that Betsy Sneed is liable as a guarantor of her husband\u2019s debt. However, the complaint alleges an action against Betsy Sneed as a debtor, not a guarantor. It is well established that \u201c[guarantors are not sureties; nor are they endorsers, . . . [t]he obligation of a surety is primary, while that of a guarantor is collateral.\u201d Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N.C. 483, 485, 166 S.E. 334, 335 (1932) (citation omitted). Thus, \u201c[a] surety may be sued as a promisor with the principal debtor; a guarantor may not; his contract must be especially set forth or pleaded.\u201d Id. See also Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 12 N.C. App. 481, 486, 183 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1971) (holding that \u201cDefendant\u2019s contract of guaranty is their own separate contract with plaintiff to pay the debts of [debtor] when due, if not paid by [debtor]. They are not in any sense parties to the note executed by [debtor]\u201d). Since Cronland Building Supplies\u2019 complaint neither alleges that Betsy Sneed was a guarantor of her husband\u2019s debt nor specifically pleads or sets out a valid guaranty contract, summary judgment was appropriately entered on behalf of Betsy Sneed on this issue.\nFinally, we point out that the document submitted by Cronland Building Supplies was not a valid guaranty contract. To support its claim against Betsy Sneed as a guarantor, Cronland Building Supplies submitted (1) a 1994 document signed by Betsy Sneed and her husband as guarantors for an unidentified debtor, but not signed by Cronland Building Supplies, and (2) the affidavit of an officer of Cronland Building Supplies averring that Leon Sneed had \u201cinadvertently\u201d failed to sign the contract as debtor, and that Cronland Building Supplies had orally \u201cexplained\u201d to defendant that she was liable as a guarantor of her husband\u2019s debt.\n\u201cA guaranty of payment is an absolute promise by the guarantor to pay the debt at maturity if it is not paid by the principal debtor. The obligation of the guarantor is separate and independent of the obligation of the principal debtor, and the creditor\u2019s cause of action against the guarantor ripens immediately upon failure of the principal debtor to pay the debt at maturity.\u201d Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 145, 187 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1972) (citation omitted). Thus, rights against guarantors arise out of the guaranty contract and must be based on that contract. \u201cSuch an action is not a suit on the primary obligation which the guaranty contract secures, and the guarantor is not liable except under the terms of the guaranty contract.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nIn this case, Cronland Building Supplies argues that the 1994 document was a guaranty contract under whose terms Betsy Sneed is liable as a guarantor of her husband\u2019s debt. However, the contract fails to identify a debtor and does not contain the signature of a debtor. As such, that document does not constitute a valid guaranty contract.\nMoreover, to be enforceable, a guaranty contract must be in writing. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 22-1 (2001). Therefore, Cronland Building Supplies\u2019 alleged oral \u201cexplanations\u201d to defendant of her liability as guarantor do not create an enforceable contract. See Smith v. Joyce, 214 N.C. 602, 604, 200 S.E. 431, 433 (1939) (holding \u201cto constitute an enforceable contract within the statute of frauds, the written memorandum, though it may be informal, must be sufficiently definite to show the essential elements of a valid contract\u201d).\nFurthermore, we hold that Cronland Building Supplies\u2019 affidavit is not admissible to supply elements missing from the 1994 document. A guaranty contract is subject to the parol evidence rule which \u201cprohibits the consideration of evidence as to anything which happened prior to or simultaneously with the making of a contract which would vary the terms of the agreement.\u201d Thompson v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 151 N.C. App. 704, 709, 567 S.E.2d 184, 188 (2002) (citation omitted); see also Wrenn v. Cotton Mills, 198 N.C. 89, 90, 150 S.E. 676, 677 (1929). However, while parol evidence may be admitted to clarify contract ambiguity, Robinson v. Benton, 201 N.C. 712, 713, 161 S.E. 208, 209 (1931), it is not admissible to supply a missing component of a contract. Rape v. Lyerly, 287 N.C. 601, 615, 215 S.E.2d 737, 746 (1975). In this case, the contract was fatally defective, not ambiguous. Indeed, there are no terms whose meaning is unclear nor conditions precedent that need explanation. Thus, parol evidence is not admissible. See Lewis v. Carolina Squire, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 588, 595, 372 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1988) (holding \u201c[cjourts should not under the guise of judicial construction supply key terms omitted by the parties\u201d).\nIn sum, we uphold the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for Betsy Sneed. Additionally, we dismiss Cronland Building Supplies\u2019 attempt to appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of summary judgment on its claims against Leon Sneed as interlocutory.\nAffirmed in part, dismissed in part.\nJudges TYSON and LEVINSON concur.\n. \u201c[T]he party moving for summary judgment ultimately has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact.\u201d Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985). However, \u201c[o]nce the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\u201d Gaunt v. Pittaway, 139 N.C. App. 778, 784-85, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664 (2000) (citations omitted).", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pendleton & Pendleton, PA., by Wesley L. Deaton, for the plaintiff-appellant.", "R. Locke Bell, P.C., by R. Locke Bell, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "R.B. CRONLAND BUILDING SUPPLIES, INC., Plaintiff v. LEON J. SNEED and wife, BETSY SNEED, Defendants v. JAMES J. MAUNEY, JR. and wife, MELISSA H. MAUNEY, Third-Party Defendants\nNo. COA02-1681\n(Filed 6 January 2004)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 denial of summary judgment\nPlaintiff\u2019s appeal from the denial of summary judgment on its claim against defendant husband in an action to recover a debt allegedly owed by defendants is dismissed as an appeal from an interlocutory order.\n2. Loans\u2014 debtor \u2014 guarantor\u2014guaranty contract\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant wife in an action to recover a debt allegedly owed by defendants, because: (1) plaintiff failed to produce evidence that defendant ever executed a loan document as a principal debtor; (2) the complaint alleges an action against defendant as a debtor and not as a guarantor of her husband\u2019s debt; (3) the pertinent 1994 document was not a valid guaranty contract since it failed to identify a debtor and does not contain the signature of a debtor; (4) plaintiffs alleged oral explanations to defendant of her liability as guarantor do not create an enforceable contract; and (5) plaintiff\u2019s affidavit is not admissible to supply elements missing from the 1994 document.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 26 September 2002 by Judge Timothy L. Patti in Superior Court, Gaston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 October 2003.\nPendleton & Pendleton, PA., by Wesley L. Deaton, for the plaintiff-appellant.\nR. Locke Bell, P.C., by R. Locke Bell, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0142-01", "first_page_order": 170, "last_page_order": 174 }