{ "id": 8916833, "name": "GILBERT J. STANLEY and wife DOROTHY H. STANLEY, Plaintiffs v. BILLY ROGER LAUGHTER, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Stanley v. Laughter", "decision_date": "2004-01-20", "docket_number": "No. COA03-49", "first_page": "322", "last_page": "328", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 N.C. App. 322" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "68 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625718 ], "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627722, 8627751 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0537-01", "/nc/239/0537-02" ] }, { "cite": "39 S.E. 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1901, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661364 ], "year": 1901, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/128/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18-19", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614142 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785-86", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "787-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572593 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572271 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434391 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0028-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 14032, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.21239751815646396 }, "sha256": "fa71519bb175028fce5e0367b300a7207bafae594d9898284bf50fb8f15cde43", "simhash": "1:ab6c00bb54b77865", "word_count": 2356 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:54.754463+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "GILBERT J. STANLEY and wife DOROTHY H. STANLEY, Plaintiffs v. BILLY ROGER LAUGHTER, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nGilbert J. Stanley and Dorothy H. Stanley (\u201cplaintiffs\u201d) appeal the trial court\u2019s judgment granting Billy Laughter\u2019s (\u201cdefendant\u201d) motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence and dismissing the case with prejudice. We affirm.\nI. Background\nSardonyx Investments, Inc. (\u201cSardonyx\u201d) purchased a 118.62 acre tract of land from Fulton and Ruth Roper (\u201cRopers\u201d). The Ropers retained an easement, sixty-foot wide, running through a portion of the northern section of the property sold to Sardonyx. Sardonyx subdivided 111.87 acres of the original 118.62 into six tracts of land, labeled Lots \u201cA\u201d through \u201cF,\u201d to create the Stirrup Downs Development (\u201cdevelopment\u201d) by survey dated 25 April 1989, and revised 29 May 1989. Sardonyx recorded a plat entitled, \u201cSardonyx Investments, Inc.\u201d in the Polk County Registry on 3 June 1989. All six tracts of land are subject to the Declaration of Restrictions (\u201cdeclaration\u201d) recorded on 6 October 1992.\nThe remaining acreage, a 1.46 acre tract and a 5.29 acre tract, was not included in this subdivision. The 1.46 acre tract is located on the northern section of the original 118.62 acre tract and the 5.29 acre tract is located on the southern section. Both of these properties directly adjoin North Carolina Highway 9 (\u201cHighway 9\u201d).\nSardonyx established a thirty-foot (30) wide access road to the development known as Stirrup Downs Road (\u201cthe road\u201d) on the plat. The road begins at Highway 9 and continues into the development. The road runs concurrently with the southern portion of the sixty-foot wide easement. Each of the six subdivided tracts of land is subject to and has a right of ingress, egress, and regress along the road. The declaration requires each property owner of Lots A through F to pay one-sixth of the cost of maintaining the road. The declaration makes no reference to the 1.46 acre tract or the 5.29 acre tract retained by Sardonyx.\nAll of the land derives from a common source of title. Sardonyx conveyed to plaintiffs a 14.32 acre tract designated as Lot E of the recorded plat by deed recorded on 7 December 1992. The deed was expressly conveyed subject to the thirty-foot wide and the sixty-foot wide easements. Sardonyx conveyed to defendant a 16.65 acre tract designated as Lot F on the recorded plat. This lot was subject to the same easements as plaintiffs\u2019 lot. Sardonyx also conveyed the 1.46 acre tract of land to defendant\u2019s predecessors-in-title, John and Joyce Hart (\u201cHarts\u201d), and described the tract by incorporating the recorded plat map by reference. Defendant subsequently purchased this tract on 17 July 1999. No express language in the deed of the 1.46 acre tract granted the Harts use of the sixty-foot wide easement or the thirty-foot wide road. The deed, however, specifically referenced the plat map containing the easements. No language made the 1.46 acre tract subject to the declaration.\nThe plat clearly shows that the northern boundary of plaintiffs\u2019 property runs to the middle of the sixty-foot wide easement and stops at the road. This line is labeled as line \u201cC-D\u201d on the plat map. There is a thirty-foot strip of land that runs from the northern portion of the road to the southern boundary of defendant\u2019s 1.46 acre tract. This thirty-foot strip lies on the opposite side of the road from plaintiffs\u2019 land and is contained within the boundaries of the sixty-foot wide easement. When defendant purchased Lot F on 17 July 1999, this thirty-foot strip of land contained a thick screen of trees and shrubs. Plaintiffs were provided privacy and seclusion from the other properties by these trees and anticipated that these trees would remain in place when they purchased Tract E.\nDuring July of 2000, defendant removed the trees and shrubbery from his land and the thirty-foot strip of land in order to gain access to the sixty-foot wide easement from his 1.46 acre tract. In September of 2000, plaintiffs spoke to defendant\u2019s lawyer concerning the trees and shrubbery removed from the thirty-foot strip of land. On 2 October 2000, plaintiffs notified defendant that defendant was not to use the land for access to the sixty-foot wide easement and demanded compensation for the trees and shrubs cut on the strip. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant alleging trespass, injury to real property, and negligence. At trial, defendant moved for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence. Defendant\u2019s motion was granted and plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action was dismissed. Plaintiffs appeal.\nII. Issues\nThe issues are whether the trial court erred in: (1) granting defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict and finding that the recording of the plat constituted a dedication of the sixty-foot wide easement to all purchasers from Sardonyx Investments, Inc. and (2) failing to grant damages for the value of the trees and shrubbery removed by defendant.\nTTT. Dedication bv Reference to Plat Map\nPlaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict and finding that the recording of the plat constituted a dedication of the sixty-foot wide easement to benefit all property shown on the recorded plat including the 1.46 acre tract owned by defendant. We disagree.\n\u201cThe purpose of a motion for a directed verdict is to test the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury.\u201d Freese v. Smith, 110 N.C. App. 28, 33, 428 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1993). \u201cA motion for directed verdict, requires that the trial court consider the evidence in the fight most favorable to the non-movant, and determine whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury.\u201d Town of Highlands v. Edwards, 144 N.C. App. 363, 366, 548 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001). Only where the evidence, when considered in that fight, is insufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff\u2019s favor should defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict be granted. Snow v. Power Co., 297 N.C. 591, 596, 256 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1979). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence in the non-movant\u2019s favor, the motion must be denied. Freese, 110 N.C. App. at 33-34, 428 S.E.2d at 845.\nOur Supreme Court, in Wofford v. Highway Commission, stated the general rule of dedication by plat reference and held,\nwhere lots are sold and conveyed by reference to a map or plat which represents a division of a tract of land into subdivisions of streets and lots, such streets become dedicated to public use, and the purchaser of the lot or lots acquires the right to have all and each of the streets kept open.\n263 N.C. 677, 683, 140 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1965). Our Supreme Court further held,\n[i]t is a settled principle that if the owner of land, located within or without a city or town, has it subdivided and platted into lots and streets, and sells and conveys the lots or any of them with reference to the plat, nothing else appearing, he thereby dedicates the streets, and all of them, to the use of the purchasers, and those claiming under them, and of the public.\n[W]here lots are sold and conveyed by reference to a map or plat which represents a division of a tract of land into subdivisions of streets and lots, such streets become dedicated to the public use, and the purchaser of a lot or lots acquires the right to have all and each of the streets kept open; and it makes no difference whether the streets be in fact opened.... There is a dedication, and, if they are not actually opened at the time of the sale, they must be kept at all times free to be opened as occasion may require ....\nInsurance Co. v. Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 785-86, 7 S.E.2d 13, 18-19 (1940) (internal citations omitted).\nIn Collins v. Land Co., our Supreme Court held,\na map or plat, referred to in a deed, becomes a part of the deed as if it were written therein, and that, therefore, the plan indicated on the plat is to be regarded as a unity, and the purchaser of a lot acquires a right to have all and each of the ways and streets on the plat, or map, kept open.\n128 N.C. 563, 565-66, 39 S.E. 21, 22 (1901).\nSardonyx recorded a plat containing a sixty-foot wide easement running from Highway 9 to the eastern edge of Tract F, owned by defendant, and entirely along the southern boundary of the 1.46 acre tract also owned by defendant. The deed conveying Tract E to plaintiffs contained a specific reference to the plat map and the sixty-foot wide easement. Sardonyx expressly reserved the right in plaintiffs\u2019 deed to use the easement for itself, \u201cits successors and assigns together with Grantees, their heirs, assigns and all others having a like right to use the same.\u201d Sardonyx\u2019s deed conveying Tract F to defendant also referenced this recorded plat dedicating the sixty-foot wide easement.\nFurther, the initial deed conveying the 1.46 acre tract of land from Sardonyx to the Harts in 1995 specifically refers to the recorded plat containing the sixty-foot wide easement. The Harts conveyed the 1.46 acre tract to William Wayne Burgess (\u201cBurgess\u201d) in 1998, specifically referring to the original plat with the sixty-foot wide easement. When the 1.46 acre tract was conveyed from Burgess to defendant in 1999, the deed again specifically referenced the recorded plat map identifying the sixty-foot wide easement.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict and concluded that: (1) the trees and underbrush were within the sixty-foot wide easement as shown by the recorded plat, (2) the plat was referenced in all deeds, and (3) the recording of the plat constituted a dedication of the roads to the owners purchasing property from Sardonyx. As defendant\u2019s deed conveying the 1.46 acre tract specifically referred to the plat map containing the sixty-foot wide easement, the map became a \u201cpart of the deed as if it were written therein.\u201d Id. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict. Plaintiffs\u2019 assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Damages\nPlaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in not granting damages for the value of the trees and shrubbery defendant cleared on the sixty-foot wide easement. We disagree.\nAs we held earlier, defendant gained access to the sixty-foot wide easement through dedication, and his deed specifically referenced the original plat map. The general rule states:\n[i]t is not necessary to the dedication of streets, squares, parks, or alleys shown in a subdivision plat, that they be opened.\nWhere the dedication is created by the sale of lots with reference to a plat showing streets, parks, or alleyways, each purchaser has the right to have any that are not opened kept in such manner that they are free to be opened to their full length and width.\n9 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 4th Dedication \u00a7 10 (1991) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537, 80 S.E.2d 458 (1954); Lee v. Walker, 234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1951); Insurance Co., 216 N.C. 778, 7 S.E.2d 13 (1940)). In Insurance Co., our Supreme Court cited a long list of cases and held that where a street is dedicated by the sale of lots with reference to a plat showing it as being ninety-nine feet -wide, the purchasers of the lots with reference to the original plat have the right to have the land remain so that the streets may be opened to their full width. 216 N.C. at 787-88, 7 S.E.2d at 20.\nHere, defendant acquired the right to use the entire sixty-foot wide easement. It is apparent that the thirty-feet of the sixty-foot wide easement running along the southern boundary of defendant\u2019s 1.46 acre tract was covered in trees and shrubs making it impassible. As defendant was entitled to use the entire sixty-foot wide easement, he was free to remove the trees and shrubs, open the easement, and use it for its intended purpose of ingress, egress, and regress from his 1.46 acre tract. Id. Plaintiffs\u2019 assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nPlaintiffs failed to show that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict and in finding that the recording of the plat constituted a dedication of the sixty-foot wide easement to all purchasers from Sardonyx. Plaintiffs failed to show that the trial court erred in failing to grant damages for cutting and removing the trees and scrubs from the easement. The trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Baiba Bourbeau, for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Hamrick, Bowen, Mebane, Greenway & Lloyd, LLP, by James M. Bowen, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GILBERT J. STANLEY and wife DOROTHY H. STANLEY, Plaintiffs v. BILLY ROGER LAUGHTER, Defendant\nNo. COA03-49\n(Filed 20 January 2004)\n1. Easements\u2014 dedication \u2014 plat recordation\nThe trial court did not err in a trespass, injury to real property, and negligence case by granting defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict and by finding that the recording of a plat constituted a dedication of the sixty-foot wide easement to all purchasers from Sardonyx, because defendant\u2019s deed conveying the 1.46 acre tract specifically referred to the plat map containing the sixty-foot wide easement, and thus, the map became a part of the deed as if it were written therein.\n2. Easements\u2014 cutting and removing of trees and shrubs\nThe trial court did not err in a trespass, injury to real property, and negligence case by failing to grant damages for the value of the trees and shrubbery defendant cleared on a sixty-foot wide easement, because: (1) defendant was entitled to use the entire sixty-foot wide easement, and the thirty-feet of the sixty-foot wide easement running along the southern boundary of defendant\u2019s 1.46 acre tract was covered in trees and shrubs making it impassible; and (2) defendant was free to remove the trees and shrubs to open the easement and use it for its intended purpose of ingress, egress, and regress from his 1.46 acre tract.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 2 July 2002 by Judge Zoro Guice in Polk County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 October 2003.\nBaiba Bourbeau, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nHamrick, Bowen, Mebane, Greenway & Lloyd, LLP, by James M. Bowen, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0322-01", "first_page_order": 350, "last_page_order": 356 }