{ "id": 8917014, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY FERNANDO MATTHEWS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Matthews", "decision_date": "2004-01-20", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1690", "first_page": "339", "last_page": "344", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 N.C. App. 339" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520316 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "Concluding no discriminatory intent where the State excused a potential juror because she was \"young and immature\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867611 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558", "parenthetical": "Concluding no discriminatory intent where the State excused a potential juror because she was \"young and immature\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793102 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53983 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "830" }, { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. 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ANTHONY FERNANDO MATTHEWS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nAnthony Fernando Matthews (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. For the reasons stated herein, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nThe pertinent procedural history of this case is as follows: During jury selection at trial, the State peremptorily challenged prospective jurors Sandra Haney (\u201cHaney\u201d) and Raecheal Weaver (\u201cWeaver\u201d). The defense counsel objected to their removal, noting that defendant, Haney and Weaver were all African-Americans and contended that the challenges were racially motivated. Defense counsel argued that \u201c[n]othing stuck out as anything that would give rise to a reason to excuse them, therefore we\u2019re left with something that\u2019s [sic] on its face would deprive [defendant] of having two to three members on the panel that are African-American.\u201d The State responded stating that because there remained one African-American prospective juror, \u201cI don\u2019t think I should have to answer to that.\u201d Based on the exchange, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s objection, asserting that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. The court reserved the right to revisit the issue pending further jury selection.\nAfter the State chose twelve jurors, eleven of whom were Caucasian and one of whom was African-American, the court sua sponte reconsidered the State\u2019s use of its peremptory challenges and ruled \u201cthat without a showing of any intention or a showing of any discrimination . . . there is a prima facie basis shown by the defendant in his allegations of discrimination based on [Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)] and that 100 percent of the State\u2019s challenge [sic] were directed to black females and leaving only one black female on the jury.\u201d The court then gave the State the opportunity to \u201crebut the prima facie showing and present any reason ... to show that the peremptory challenges were not motivated by racial [sic] discriminatory or unconstitutional purposes.\u201d\nThe State offered that Weaver was challenged because when asked if she ever sat on a jury, she stated that she was once excused from a jury during voir dire and therefore he decided to excuse her from this case \u201cfor the reason that some other lawyer at another point in time . . . exercised a peremptory challenge as far as she goes.\u201d As for Haney, the State challenged her because she lived in the vicinity of the crime at issue in the case but was not familiar with the particular store that was robbed. In his response to the State\u2019s explanation, defense counsel pointed out that there were other potential jurors who stated that they were previously called for jury duty but were not chosen, and that the State did not challenge them. The defendant also noted that Haney was the only prospective juror who the State chose to focus on her residential proximity to the crime. The trial court ultimately overruled defendant\u2019s objection, having determined that the State \u201cexpressed valid, articulable reasons for the exercise of peremptory challenges not based on race.\u201d It is from this ruling that defendant appeals.\nThe issues presented on appeal are whether (I) the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s Batson challenges; and (II) the robbery with a dangerous weapon indictment was fatally defective.\nFor issues arising under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), trial courts must apply a three-step test to determine whether the State\u2019s peremptory challenges of prospective jurors are purposefully discriminatory. First, the defendant must successfully establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. If the prima facie case is not established, then the peremptory challenges will stand. If the prima facie case is established, however, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue. Id. at 97. If the prosecutor fails to rebut the prima facie case of racial discrimination with race-neutral explanations, then the peremptory challenges are not allowed. If the prosecutor does rebut the prima facie case with race-neutral explanations, the defendant has a right of surrebuttal to show that the prosecutor\u2019s explanations were merely pretextual. State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176, 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996), citing State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 631, 452 S.E.2d 279, 288 (1994), cert. denied 516 U.S. 834 (1995). If the trial court finds that the race-neutral reasons are not pretextual, the peremptory challenges are allowed. If the trial court finds, however, that the race-neutral explanations are pretextual, it follows that the peremptory challenges at issue are purposefully discriminatory; they are therefore not allowed.\nThe trial court\u2019s determination is given deference on review because it is based primarily on first-hand credibility evaluations. State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 427, 533 S.E.2d 168, 211 (2000). \u201cAppellate courts must uphold the trial court\u2019s findings of fact unless they are \u2018clearly erroneous.\u2019 \u201d State v. Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 268, 275-76, 498 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1998), quoting State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 210, 481 S.E.2d 44, 48 (1997). We cannot find clear error in the fact-finder\u2019s decision where the fact-finder chooses one of two permissible views of the evidence. Id., citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991). \u201cThis standard allows for reversal only when a \u2018reviewing court on the entire evidence [is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 \u201d Id.\nIn the present case, the fact that the State only used its peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors was deemed sufficient by the trial court to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. \u201cA prima facie case \u2018need only show that the relevant circumstances raise an inference that [counsel] used peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely because of their race.\u2019 \u201d Colfield, 129 N.C. App. at 276, 498 S.E.2d at 829, citing State v. Quick, 341 N.C. 141, 144, 462 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1995). Relevant circumstances include repeated use of peremptory challenges against prospective jurors of a particular race such that it tends to establish a pattern of strikes, and the attorney\u2019s acceptance rate of potential jurors of this race. Id. The State is allowed six peremptory challenges per defendant in a criminal case. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1217 (2003). In the case at bar, the State chose to exercise two of its six peremptory challenges, and both against African-American jurors.\nIn response to the court\u2019s ruling, the State argued that Weaver was challenged because she was removed from a jury pool in a previous case. The State asserted that Haney was challenged because her statement that she lived in the neighborhood where the robbery occurred but did not know of the particular store that was robbed raised concerns about her level of awareness. In Colfield, this Court held that the challenging attorney\u2019s\nexplanations need not \u2018rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause,\u2019 and need not be \u2018persuasive, or even plausible.\u2019 Barnes, 345 N.C. at 209, 481 S.E.2d at 57. In fact, the challenges may be based on [the challenging attorney\u2019s] \u2018legitimate hunches and past experience.\u2019 Id. [Counsel] must, however, articulate \u2018legitimate race-neutral reasons that are clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried.\u2019 State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 176, 472 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1996). \u2018Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in [the challenging attorney\u2019s] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral at this secondary stage of the inquiry.\u2019 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.\nColfield, 129 N.C. App. at 277, 498 S.E.2d at 830.\nWe hold that while the State\u2019s challenge against Haney may have been based on a legitimate hunch, the basis for the challenge against Weaver is not sufficiently related to the case at bar. In our opinion, striking a potential juror from a jury pool because another attorney exercised a peremptory challenge against her in a previous unrelated case without further explanation from the challenging attorney in the present case does not articulate a legitimate reason that is reasonably specific and related to the particular case to be tried. Arbitrary as this explanation is, however, under our existing case law we are compelled to hold that it does not rise to the level of demonstrating discriminatory intent. See e.g. State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 558, 476 S.E.2d 658, 666 (1996) (Concluding no discriminatory intent where the State excused a potential juror because she was \u201cyoung and immature\u201d).\nAfter the State offers its race-neutral explanation, the trial court must consider that explanation as well as the defendant\u2019s surrebuttal to the State\u2019s argument to determine whether the State\u2019s explanation is pretextual. Colfield, 129 N.C. App. at 279, 498 S.E.2d at 831. This Court held in Colfield that \u201ceven if answers of a prospective juror of one race who is later peremptorily excused are similar to those of a juror of another race who is not challenged, \u2018this state of circumstances in itself does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the reasons given by [the challenging attorney] were pretextual.\u2019 \u201d Id., quoting Barnes, 345 N.C. at 212, 481 S.E.2d at 59. Thus, defendant\u2019s argument that there were other prospective jurors who gave answers similar to Haney and Weaver does not provide an adequate basis for ascribing error to the trial court\u2019s finding that the State\u2019s use of its peremptory challenges was not in violation of Batson. Because we are unable to conclude that there is clear error in the trial court\u2019s decision, we overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next argues that the State\u2019s indictment was fatally defective in that it fails to properly identify the target of the robbery. We disagree.\nNorth Carolina General Statute \u00a715A-924(a)(5) (2003) requires that an indictment describe the crime charged \u201cwith sufficient precision to apprise the defendant... of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.\u201d \u201c[T]he purpose of an indictment is to identify clearly the crime being charged, thereby putting the accused on reasonable notice to defend against it and prepare for trial.\u201d State v. Thrift, 78 N.C. App. 199, 201, 336 S.E.2d 861, 862 (1985).\nThe person in the store at the time of the robbery was an employee and not the owner of the store. The indictment in pertinent part reads as follows:\n. . . the defendant . . . unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did steal, take and carry away and attempt to steal, take and carry away another\u2019s personal property, to wit: two twelve packs of Bud Light beer, having an approximate value of twenty dollars ($20), from the person, presence and place of business of Zaka Ullah. The defendant committed this act by means of assault having in his possession and with the use and threatened use of a knife, a dangerous weapon whereby the life of Zaka Ullah was endangered and threatened.\nAlthough the relationship of the robbery victim to the store that was robbed raises a question of fact, it does not raise any doubt as to the crime being charged, nor does it hinder defendant\u2019s ability to prepare his defense. The indictment alleges that defendant committed the offense by threatening Ullah with a knife and taking twenty dollars worth of merchandise from the store. The evidence tendered by the state was consistent with the allegations contained in the indictment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges HUDSON and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tammera S. Hill and Special Deputy Attorney General T. Lane Mallonee, for the State.", "Irving Joyner, attorney for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY FERNANDO MATTHEWS\nNo. COA02-1690\n(Filed 20 January 2004)\n1. Jury\u2014 Batson challenge \u2014 failure to show discriminatory intent\nThe trial court did not err in a robbery with a dangerous weapon case by denying defendant\u2019s Batson challenges to the State\u2019s use of its peremptory challenges to excuse two female African-American jurors, because: (1) the strike of one of the jurors was based on a legitimate hunch; (2) although striking the other potential juror from the jury pool based on the fact that another attorney exercised a peremptory challenge against her in a previous unrelated case without further explanation from the challenging attorney does not articulate a legitimate reason that is reasonably specific and related to the particular case being tried, it does not rise to the level of demonstrating discriminatory intent; and (3) defendant\u2019s argument that there were other prospective jurors who gave answers similar to the two excused jurors does not provide an adequate basis for ascribing error to the trial court\u2019s finding that the State\u2019s use of its peremptory challenges was not a violation of Batson.\n2. Robbery\u2014 with dangerous weapon \u2014 indictment\u2014identity of victim\nAn indictment for armed robbery sufficiently identified the target of the robbery where it alleged that defendant committed the offense by threatening a store employee with a knife and taking twenty dollars worth of merchandise from the store.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 February 2002 by Judge W. Osmond Smith in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 September 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tammera S. Hill and Special Deputy Attorney General T. Lane Mallonee, for the State.\nIrving Joyner, attorney for defendant." }, "file_name": "0339-01", "first_page_order": 367, "last_page_order": 372 }