{ "id": 8918609, "name": "TESHA V. CHERRY and BRIDGETTE D. ALLEN, Co-Administratrix of the Estate of CRAIG G. ALLEN, Plaintiffs v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Cherry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "2004-02-03", "docket_number": "No. COA03-14", "first_page": "535", "last_page": "539", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 N.C. App. 535" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525003 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 672, 336 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511400, 1511252, 1511605, 1511430 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 672, 336 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0164-03", "/nc/356/0164-02", "/nc/356/0164-04", "/nc/356/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829", "parenthetical": "quoting Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 672, 336 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9125145 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "quoting Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 672, 336 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491681, 491748, 491590, 491718, 491627, 491664, 491741, 491550 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0504-08", "/nc/357/0504-01", "/nc/357/0504-06", "/nc/357/0504-02", "/nc/357/0504-03", "/nc/357/0504-07", "/nc/357/0504-04", "/nc/357/0504-05" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433081 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736888 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" }, { "page": "664-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9381274 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555455 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "quoting Haithcock v. Chimney Rock Co., 10 N.C. App. 696, 698-99, 179 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520003 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "quoting Haithcock v. Chimney Rock Co., 10 N.C. App. 696, 698-99, 179 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0036-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 629, "char_count": 11164, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.32294817188183556 }, "sha256": "df2ba78360131b4363f133423f7d09f7efa5577296097b3d095024d08c33204f", "simhash": "1:8260d46a24eea55e", "word_count": 1818 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:27:54.754463+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "TESHA V. CHERRY and BRIDGETTE D. ALLEN, Co-Administratrix of the Estate of CRAIG G. ALLEN, Plaintiffs v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nOn 10 February 2001, Paul Bryan Jump (\u201cJump\u201d) and William Craig Herring (\u201cHerring\u201d) were returning from a field trial competition for foxhounds. Jump was operating Herring\u2019s 2000 Chevrolet truck when it collided with a vehicle operated by Craig G. Allen (\u201cAllen\u201d), who was killed as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.\nOn the date of the accident, Jump was an \u201cinsured\u201d under a personal automobile policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (\u201cState Farm\u201d) to his wife. State Farm tendered the policy limits available under this policy to plaintiffs. In addition, plaintiffs accepted the policy limits tendered under Herring\u2019s automobile liability insurance on the 2000 Chevrolet truck driven by Jump.\nThe issue in this case is whether plaintiffs are entitled to coverage under a commercial policy of insurance (the \u201csubject policy\u201d) issued by State Farm to B&L Mobile Repair, Inc. (\u201cB&L\u201d), a corporation owned and operated by Jump. On 29 August 2001, Tesha V. Cherry and Bridgette D. Allen, co-administratrix of Allen\u2019s estate, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties.\nState Farm moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting the subject policy did not provide coverage to Jump as an \u201cinsured\u201d or to the vehicle he operated as an insured vehicle. Plaintiffs asserted the corporate veil of B&L should be pierced and the corporate form disregarded so as to provide coverage to Jump as the insured. After examining the insurance contract and hearing oral arguments, the trial court denied State Farm\u2019s summary judgment motion and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs. State Farm appeals.\n\u201cSummary judgment is designed to \u2018ferret out those cases in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and in which, upon such undisputed facts, a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Cameron & Barkley Co. v. American Insurance Co., 112 N.C. App. 36, 39, 434 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1993) (quoting Haithcock v. Chimney Rock Co., 10 N.C. App. 696, 698-99, 179 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1971)). \u201cThe construction and application of insurance policy provisions to undisputed facts is a question of law, properly committed to the province of the trial judge for a summary judgment determination.\u201d Certain Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s London v. Hogan, 147 N.C. App. 715, 718, 556 S.E.2d 662, 664 (2001).\nWe begin by setting forth several well-settled principles governing the construction of insurance policies. \u201c \u2018[A]n insurance policy is a contract and its provisions govern the rights and duties of the parties thereto[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dortch, 318 N.C. 378, 380, 348 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1986)). \u201c \u2018[A]s with all contracts, the goal of construction is to arrive at the intent of the parties when the policy was issued.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Woods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 500, 505, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978)). \u201cThe parties\u2019 intent may be derived from the language employed in the policy.\u201d Rouse v. Williams Realty Bldg. Co., 143 N.C. App. 67, 69, 544 S.E.2d 609, 612 (2001).\nIn determining the meaning of the language used in an insurance policy, the following general rules of construction apply: \u201cWhere a policy defines a term, that definition is to be used. If no definition is given, non-technical words are to be given their meaning in ordinary speech, unless the context clearly indicates another meaning was intended. The various terms of the policy are to be harmoniously construed, and if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect. If, however, the meaning of words or the effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several reasonable interpretations, the doubts will be resolved against the insurance company and in favor of the policyholder. Whereas, if the meaning of the policy is clear and only one reasonable interpretation exists, the courts must enforce the contract as written; they may not, under the guise of construing an ambiguous term, rewrite the contract or impose liabilities on the parties not bargained for and found therein.\u201d\nHogan, 147 N.C. App. at 718-19, 556 S.E.2d at 664-65 (quoting Woods, 295 N.C. at 505-06, 246 S.E.2d at 777); see also Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 351 N.C. 293, 299-300, 524 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2000). With these principles in mind we turn to the subject policy to see whether the vehicle being operated at the time of the accident was a covered vehicle under the policy or whether Jump was a person to whom the policy provided coverage as an insured.\nI. Covered Vehicles\nThere is no dispute the 2000 Chevrolet truck was not a vehicle covered by the subject policy issued to B&L. Liability insurance is vehicle-oriented rather than person-oriented, Smith v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 148, 400 S.E.2d 44, 50 (1991); Haight v. Travelers/Aetna Property Casualty Corp., 132 N.C. App. 673, 679, 514 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1999), and we have upheld exclusions that limit \u201cliability coverage to personal injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the covered vehicle.\u201d Haight, 132 N.C. App. at 679, 514 S.E.2d at 106.\nThe subject policy provided State Farm would pay, on behalf of the insured, any amount the insured was legally obligated to pay as damages due to bodily injury or property damage covered if \u201ccaused by an occurrence and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, ... of an owned automobile or of a temporary substitute automobile . ...\u201d An owned automobile was defined, in pertinent part, as one \u201cowned by the named insured and described in the declarations[.]\u201d In the instant case, the subject policy set forth two owned automobiles, a 1992 Dodge truck used primarily by Jump for business purposes and a 1983 Toyota truck used by Jump to get to and from work and around town. Neither of these trucks were the trucks driven by Jump at the time of the accident.\nThe subject policy also provided coverage for temporary substitute automobiles. This category included any \u201cautomobile not owned by the named insured or any resident of the same household, while temporarily used with the permission of the owner as a substitute for an owned automobile when withdrawn from normal use for servicing or repair or because of its breakdown, loss, or destruction[.]\u201d Herring\u2019s 2000 Chevrolet truck driven by Jump could not be considered a temporary substitute vehicle since it was not being used as a replacement for an owned automobile withdrawn from normal use. Accordingly, the exclusions in the subject policy preclude the conclusion that it provided coverage for the vehicle driven by Jump in the instant case.\nII. Piercing the Corporate Veil\nPlaintiffs ask this Court to pierce the corporate veil of B&L, the named insured. Plaintiffs assert that once the corporate veil is pierced, B&L would have no legal independent existence from Jump; therefore, Jump would be construed as the insured under the subject policy at the time of the accident in which Allen was killed. We find plaintiffs\u2019 proposed use of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil misplaced.\n\u201c[T]he doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct from the persons composing it is a legal fiction devised to serve the ends of justice.\u201d Atlantic Tobacco Co. v. Honeycutt, 101 N.C. App. 160, 164, 398 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1990). The doctrine of disregarding a corporation\u2019s separate and independent existence is commonly referred to as piercing the corporate veil, and we do not invoke it lightly. Department of Transp. v. Airlie Park, Inc., 156 N.C. App. 63, 68, 576 S.E.2d 341, 344, appeal dismissed by, 357 N.C. 504, \u2014 S.E.2d \u2014 (2003). Accord Keener Lumber Co. v. Perry, 149 N.C. App. 19, 37, 560 S.E.2d 817, 829, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 164, 568 S.E.2d 196 (2002) (quoting Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 672, 336 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1985)) (noting that piercing the corporate veil is \u201c \u2018a drastic remedy\u2019 and \u2018should be invoked only in an extreme case where necessary to serve the ends of justice\u2019 \u201d). \u201cPiercing the corporate veil of a corporation allows a plaintiff to impose legal liability for a corporation\u2019s obligations, or for torts committed by the corporation, upon some other company or individual that controls and dominates the corporation.\u201d Id.\nPlaintiffs have not asserted Jump has dominated or controlled B&L for the purpose of imposing the legal liability of B&L\u2019s obligations on Jump and thereby reach Jump\u2019s individual assets. Rather, plaintiffs ask this Court to disregard B&L\u2019s separate corporate identity under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil for the purpose of reaching State Farm\u2019s coverage. Granting plaintiffs\u2019 request would be tantamount to rewriting the terms of the subject policy by requiring State Farm, B&L\u2019s liability insurance provider, to cover someone other than the named insured. Plaintiffs have cited no authority supporting the application of piercing the corporate veil in this manner, and we decline to adopt it.\nIn summary, the insurance policy by State Farm covered solely owned and temporary substitute vehicles of B&L, the insured. Jump was neither an insured, nor was the truck he was driving a covered vehicle. We reject plaintiffs\u2019 propounded application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs against State Farm. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for State Farm.\nReversed and remanded with instructions.\nJudges McGEE and HUDSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Taylor Law Office, by W. Earl Taylor, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Patterson, Dilthey, Clay, Bryson & Anderson, L.L.P., by Mary McHugh Webb and Heather R. Waddell, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TESHA V. CHERRY and BRIDGETTE D. ALLEN, Co-Administratrix of the Estate of CRAIG G. ALLEN, Plaintiffs v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant\nNo. COA03-14\n(Filed 3 February 2004)\nInsurance\u2014 automobile \u2014 commercial policy \u2014 piercing the corporate veil\nThe trial court erred in an action arising out of an automobile accident by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs against defendant insurance company based on the erroneous conclusion that plaintiffs were entitled to coverage under a commercial policy of insurance issued by defendant insurance company to a corporation owned and operated by the driver of the pickup truck involved in the collision, because: (1) the insurance policy covered solely owned and temporary substitute vehicles of the insured company, and the pertinent truck did not fall under these exclusions in the subject policy; (2) the driver of the truck was neither an insured nor was the truck he was driving a covered vehicle; and (3) plaintiffs\u2019 propounded application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is rejected.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 17 October 2002 by Judge Milton F. Fitch, Jr., in Wilson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 October 2003.\nTaylor Law Office, by W. Earl Taylor, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellees.\nPatterson, Dilthey, Clay, Bryson & Anderson, L.L.P., by Mary McHugh Webb and Heather R. Waddell, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0535-01", "first_page_order": 563, "last_page_order": 567 }