{
  "id": 8915177,
  "name": "BRENDA WATTS, Plaintiff v. SHARON F. SLOUGH, STEPHEN H. SLOUGH, Individually and as Trustee, BRIAN K. SHEETS and JEFFREY L. SHEETS, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Watts v. Slough",
  "decision_date": "2004-02-17",
  "docket_number": "No. COA03-393",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges McGEE and HUNTER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BRENDA WATTS, Plaintiff v. SHARON F. SLOUGH, STEPHEN H. SLOUGH, Individually and as Trustee, BRIAN K. SHEETS and JEFFREY L. SHEETS, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiff Brenda Watts filed suit asserting eight claims for relief based on her loss of $243,000 as a result of an investment made in reliance on representations and omissions by defendant Sharon Slough that Ms. Watts contends were materially false and misleading. Defendants appeal from the trial court\u2019s entry of partial summary judgment in plaintiffs favor as to two claims for relief and its denial of summary judgment as to the remaining six claims for relief. Because defendants\u2019 appeal is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right, we dismiss the appeal.\nIn the spring of 2000, Ms. Watts and Ms. Slough discussed possible investment opportunities for Ms. Watts\u2019 retirement funds. Ultimately, Ms. Watts agreed to invest in a program involving Global Telelink Services, Inc. (\u201cGlobal\u201d). Under this program, the investor would purchase from Cord Communications, Inc. telephone switch equipment called a Packet Gateway System (\u201cPGS\u201d) and then would lease the PGS to Global in return for monthly payments resulting in a 14% annual return plus one-half percent of lease income. On 17 May 2000, Ms. Watts purchased nine PGS \u201cbundles\u201d at a cost of $243,000.\nPlaintiff received distributions totaling $16,569.50 over an eight-month period beginning in June 2000. Payments ceased in March 2001 when Global closed its doors. Ms. Watts learned that on 8 March 2001, the SEC had filed a complaint alleging that this investment program was a \u201cponzi\u201d scheme that had raised more than $10 million. On 9 March 2001, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia entered an order granting the injunctive relief sought by the SEC, appointing a receiver for Global, and freezing Global\u2019s and other entities\u2019 assets.\nPlaintiff brought suit on 28 March 2002 against Ms. Slough; Ms. Slough\u2019s husband, Stephen H. Slough; and Ms. Slough\u2019s sons, Brian K. Sheets and Jeffrey L. Sheets. Ms. Watts asserted seven claims for relief against Ms. Slough only: (1) sale of unregistered securities in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 78A-24 and -56(a), (2) sale of securities by an unlicensed person in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 78A-36(a) and -56(a), (3) fraudulent sale in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 78A-8 and -56(a), (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1, (6) fraud, and (7) negligent misrepresentation. In her eighth claim for relief, Ms. Watts alleged that the transfer of a home owned by Ms. Slough to her sons and the transfer by them to her husband in trust was a fraudulent conveyance under the North Carolina Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 39-23.1 et seq. (2003).\nMs. Watts moved for partial summary judgment against Ms. Slough on the claims of unlicensed sale of securities and sale of unregistered securities, seeking $243,000 plus interest, costs, and attorney\u2019s fees. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs claims.\nThe trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Ms. Watts on the claims of unregistered securities and unlicensed sale. The court ruled:\nPlaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is allowed. Judgment is entered against defendant Sharon F. Slough on plaintiffs first and second claims for relief under the North Carolina Securities Act in the amount of $243,000, plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum from May 17, 2000, until paid, costs and reasonable attorney\u2019s fees, less the income plaintiff received upon the investment in the amount of $16,569.50. The Court will assess the amount of recoverable costs and attorney\u2019s fees at a later hearing.\n(Emphasis added) The trial court allowed defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s fourth and seventh claims for relief (breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation). The court ruled \u201c [defendants\u2019 motion is denied as to all other claims for relief.\u201d\nBecause the decision enters judgment only as to one defendant and only as to four of eight claims for relief, this order is interlocutory. An interlocutory order is immediately appealable in only two circumstances: (1) if the trial court has certified the case for appeal under Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) \u201cwhen the challenged order affects a substantial right of the appellant that would be lost without immediate review.\u201d Embler v. Embler, 143 N.C. App. 162, 165, 545 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2001).\nSince there was no certification in this case under Rule 54(b), \u201cthis avenue of interlocutory appeal is closed to defendant[s].\u201d Id. We must determine, therefore, whether the trial court\u2019s order affects a substantial right that would otherwise be lost without immediate review.\nWe first hold that defendants Stephen H. Slough, Brian K. Sheets, and Jeffrey L. Sheets have not demonstrated that they have any substantial right requiring an immediate appeal. The trial court entered judgment in plaintiffs favor only as to the first two claims for relief and those claims were not asserted against these defendants. Their appeal can only relate to plaintiff\u2019s eighth claim for relief, alleging a fraudulent transfer of property. As to that claim, the trial court denied summary judgment. \u201c[D]enial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable unless a substantial right of one of the parties would be prejudiced should the appeal not be heard prior to final judgment.\u201d First Atl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 247, 507 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1998). Defendants do not make any argument that the denial of summary judgment affects a substantial right. Instead, defendants contend that plaintiff may now execute on their property as a result of the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s first two claims. This assertion is mistaken. As a result of the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion for summary judgment, a jury must still determine whether there was a fraudulent transfer before Ms. Watts may undertake to execute on the property at issue. We therefore dismiss the appeal of defendants Stephen H. Slough, Brian K. Sheets, and Jeffrey L. Sheets.\nAs for Ms. Slough, against whom judgment was entered, she likewise argues that \u201c[s]ince this judgment allows the Plaintiff to seek execution in satisfaction of the judgment, it affected a substantial right[.]\u201d The question whether this argument entitles a party in Ms. Slough\u2019s circumstances to an interlocutory appeal was answered by Beau Rivage Plantation, Inc. v. Melex USA, Inc., 112 N.C. App. 446, 436 S.E.2d 152 (1993). In Beau Rivage, the trial court entered summary judgment on a claim in the amount of $74,793 and awarded unspecified attorney\u2019s fees, providing: \u201c[T]he Court reserves ruling on the amount of such fees until supporting affidavits are filed and a further hearing is conducted[.]\u201d Id. at 452, 436 S.E.2d at 155. This Court held that a judgment for a specified sum leaving unresolved the amount recoverable in attorney\u2019s fees lacks \u201cthe requisite finality to make it subject to immediate appeal.\u201d Id.\nIn this case, the trial court similarly reserved for \u201ca later hearing\u201d the amount to be awarded in costs and attorney\u2019s fees. As a result, under Beau Rivage, the partial summary judgment order is not subject to immediate appeal. Plaintiff cannot seek execution on the judgment until the precise amount due from Ms. Slough has been determined. See also Steadman v. Steadman, 148 N.C. App. 713, 714, 559 S.E.2d 291, 292 (2002) (dismissing appeal as interlocutory when trial court had yet to determine the precise amount of money due plaintiff). Since Ms. Slough makes no other argument justifying an interlocutory appeal and since Ms. Slough presents no compelling circumstances to justify this Court\u2019s reviewing her appeal based on a writ of certiorari, we dismiss her appeal as well.\nDismissed.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GEER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hartzell & Whiteman, L.L.P., by Andrew O. Whiteman, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., by Steven C. Lawrence, for defendants-appellants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BRENDA WATTS, Plaintiff v. SHARON F. SLOUGH, STEPHEN H. SLOUGH, Individually and as Trustee, BRIAN K. SHEETS and JEFFREY L. SHEETS, Defendants\nNo. COA03-393\n(Filed 17 February 2004)\nAppeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 partial summary judgment\nAppeals from partial summary judgments were dismissed as interlocutory where the judgments were entered for one of four defendants and on four of eight claims for relief arising from investment sales; the trial court did not certify the case for appeal; and the lack of immediate review did not cause the loss of a substantial right.\nAppeal by defendants from order and judgment entered 27 December 2002 by Judge Clarence E. Horton, Jr. in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2003.\nHartzell & Whiteman, L.L.P., by Andrew O. Whiteman, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAnderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., by Steven C. Lawrence, for defendants-appellants."
  },
  "file_name": "0069-01",
  "first_page_order": 99,
  "last_page_order": 103
}