{ "id": 8915690, "name": "JANE DOE 1, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 1, Minor Child, JANE DOE 2, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 2, Minor Child, and JOHN and JANE DOE 3, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 3, Minor Child, Plaintiffs v. SWANNANOA VALLEY YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER, a North Carolina State Agency, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, a North Carolina State Agency, BRIAN HARKINS, PHIL LYTLE, LANI LANCASTER, KEN ARONTIN, T. CORDELL, J.B. SIMMONS and MICHAEL SWEITZER, Individually and as Public Employees, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Doe v. Swannanoa Valley Youth Development Center", "decision_date": "2004-03-02", "docket_number": "No. COA03-416", "first_page": "136", "last_page": "142", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "163 N.C. App. 136" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2565350 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358131 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549", "parenthetical": "holding that the Commission abused its discretion by failing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 where the defendant failed to comply with the deputy commissioner's order to compel discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915700 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "holding that the Commission abused its discretion by failing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 where the defendant failed to comply with the deputy commissioner's order to compel discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-300", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-296", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219987, 220132, 219965, 220110 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0292-04", "/nc/355/0292-02", "/nc/355/0292-03", "/nc/355/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9379559 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564079 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-291", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135616, 135649, 135948, 135763, 135735 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0371-05", "/nc/353/0371-03", "/nc/353/0371-01", "/nc/353/0371-02", "/nc/353/0371-04" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439394 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155801 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0159-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 702, "char_count": 16115, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.281014191024533e-07, "percentile": 0.6175348446955787 }, "sha256": "99294de2449658e1e9ec93ae62f8958d976e71f1bda8fee6ae6b407a5ca251da", "simhash": "1:98102c45489f2817", "word_count": 2467 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:37.331987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "JANE DOE 1, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 1, Minor Child, JANE DOE 2, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 2, Minor Child, and JOHN and JANE DOE 3, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 3, Minor Child, Plaintiffs v. SWANNANOA VALLEY YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER, a North Carolina State Agency, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, a North Carolina State Agency, BRIAN HARKINS, PHIL LYTLE, LANI LANCASTER, KEN ARONTIN, T. CORDELL, J.B. SIMMONS and MICHAEL SWEITZER, Individually and as Public Employees, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nDefendants Swannanoa Valley Youth Development Center (\u201cSwannanoa\u201d) and the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, along with the named individual defendant employees (collectively hereafter \u201cDefendants\u201d), appeal from an order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) compelling discovery in a case filed by minor Plaintiffs and their respective guardians. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude the Commission was authorized to compel discovery and therefore affirm the order of the Commission.\nOn 7 June 2002, Plaintiffs filed a claim with the Commission against Defendants for damages arising under the North Carolina Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs alleged that, while in the care of Defendants, they suffered physical mistreatment and sexual assault at the hands of both facility employees and fellow minors, resulting in serious emotional and physical injuries to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further alleged that although Defendants were aware of such abuse, they took no steps to prevent harm to Plaintiffs, and \u201cundertook measures to destroy evidence and quash investigation of complaints of staff on child and child on child abuse.\u201d\nAs part of their requests for discovery, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to\nplease identify the name[,] address and telephone number of each child at your facility, and their legal custodians, who were residents of Frye Cottage and/or any other dormitory at which [named employee] worked during the period of [his] employment.\nDefendants objected to the request, contending that the information was confidential under the North Carolina General Statutes. Plaintiffs also requested Defendants to\nidentify the name[,] address, social security number, employment status and telephone number of each individual who investigated any and all incidents of alleged sexual assault involving [named employee] including, but not limited to, any and all internal and external investigators, [Department of Social Services], the State Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Juvenile Justice Investigators.\nDefendants objected to the request, stating that the information was protected and confidential. On the same grounds, Defendants denied other similar requests by Plaintiffs for information related to potential investigations conducted by the State Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Social Services, or the Department of Juvenile Justice Investigators.\nOn 26 September 2002, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel Defendants\u2019 discovery responses. After conducting a hearing on the matter, a deputy commissioner of the Commission entered an order compelling Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with most of the requested information and documentation. The deputy commissioner also entered a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the requested information to anyone not associated with the case, and allowing the parties to submit any confidential documents under seal. Defendants appealed to the Commission, which dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and ordered Defendants to comply with the deputy commissioner\u2019s order compelling discovery. Defendants appealed the order of the Commission.\nDefendants present two arguments on appeal, contending the Commission (1) lacked authority to order disclosure of the information sought by Plaintiffs in the instant case and (2) improperly dismissed Defendants\u2019 appeal.\nPreliminarily, we address Plaintiffs\u2019 motion before this Court to dismiss this appeal as interlocutory. Indeed, Defendants acknowledge that the instant appeal is from an interlocutory order, but contend that the order affects a substantial right which will be lost absent immediate review.\nGenerally, an order compelling discovery is not immediately appealable. Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 163, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999). Where, however, \u201ca party asserts a statutory privilege which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion of such privilege is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, the challenged order affects a substantial right.\u201d Id. at 166, 522 S.E.2d at 581. Defendants concede that the information subject to discovery in the instant case is \u201cnot specifically covered by statutory privilege.\u201d Defendants further admit that the information sought by Plaintiffs is subject to disclosure through court order. Defendants nevertheless assert that the Commission is not a \u201ccourt\u201d for purposes of ordering disclosure of confidential records, and it therefore lacked authority to issue an order compelling discovery of the information sought by Plaintiffs. Following the reasoning set forth in Sharpe, we determine that Defendants\u2019 assertion of privilege, while not a privilege arising directly by statute, is nonetheless neither frivolous nor insubstantial. We hold, therefore, that Defendants\u2019 appeal affects a substantial right which would be lost if not reviewed before the entry of final judgment and deny Plaintiffs\u2019 motion to dismiss the appeal. Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass\u2019n, 142 N.C. App. 18, 24, 541 S.E.2d 782, 786 (holding that the appeal from an order compelling discovery affected the defendants\u2019 substantial rights, although the privilege asserted was a common law privilege and not a statutory one), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810 (2001).\nDefendants argue that juvenile records, social services records, law enforcement records, and records maintained by Swannanoa and the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention are confidential and cannot be disclosed \u201cwithout a proper court order.\u201d In support of their argument, Defendants point to statutory provisions prohibiting the various agencies at issue from disclosing information unless by court order. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-3000(b) (juvenile records may be examined only by order of the court); 7B-2901(b) (records kept by the Department of Social Services may be examined by the juvenile or guardian ad litem; otherwise, only by order of the court); 132-1.4(a) (records of criminal investigations conducted by public law enforcement agencies or records of criminal intelligence information may be released by order of a court of competent jurisdiction). While acknowledging that the Commission constitutes a \u201ccourt\u201d for purposes of hearing and ruling upon tort claims brought against agencies of the State, Defendants nevertheless assert that the Commission is not a \u201ccourt\u201d for purposes of ordering disclosure of records. According to Defendants, the Commission must obtain an order from the district court to have these records released. We disagree.\nSection 143-291 of the North Carolina General Statutes states, in pertinent part, that \u201c[t]he North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-291(a) (2003) (emphasis supplied). Thus, in North Carolina, our superior and district courts have no jurisdiction over a tort claim against the State, or its agencies, as the Commission is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction of such actions. Guthrie v. State Ports Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 539-41, 299 S.E.2d 618, 628 (1983); Wood v. N.C. State Univ., 147 N.C. App. 336, 342, 556 S.E.2d 38, 42 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 292, 561 S.E.2d 887 (2002).\nUnder the Tort Claims Act, the Commission and its deputies are empowered to\nissue subpoenas, administer oaths, conduct hearings, take evidence, enter orders, opinions, and awards based thereon, punish for contempt, and issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum pursuant to G.S. 97-101.1. The Industrial Commission is authorized to appoint deputies and clerical assistants to carry out the purpose and intent of this Article, and such deputy or deputies are hereby vested with the same power and authority to hear and determine tort claims against State departments, institutions, and agencies as is by this Article vested in the members of the Industrial Commission. Such deputy or deputies shall also have and are hereby vested with the same power and authority to hear and determine cases arising under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act when assigned to do so by the Industrial Commission. The Commission may order parties to participate in mediation, under rules substantially similar to those approved by the Supreme Court for use in the Superior Court division, except the Commission shall determine the manner in which payment of the costs of the mediated settlement conference is assessed.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-296 (2003). Further, the Commission is authorized to \u201cadopt such rules and regulations as may, in the discretion of the Commission, be necessary to carry out the purpose and intent of [the Tort Claims Act].\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-300 (2003). Moreover, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply in tort claims before the Commission, to the extent that such rules are not inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act, in which case the Tort Claims Act controls. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-300; 4 NCAC 10B.0201(a). Pursuant to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the Commission may enter an order compelling discovery and may impose sanctions on a party refusing to comply with such order. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 37(a)-(b) (2003); Williams v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 120 N.C. App. 356, 363, 462 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1995) (holding that the Commission abused its discretion by failing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 where the defendant failed to comply with the deputy commissioner\u2019s order to compel discovery).\nDefendants\u2019 argument that the Commission is not a \u201ccourt\u201d for purposes of discovery is similar to one rejected by this Court in Karp v. University of North Carolina, 88 N.C. App. 282, 362 S.E.2d 825 (1987), affirmed per curiam, 323 N.C. 473, 373 S.E.2d 430 (1988). The issue in Karp was whether the Commission had authority to award attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to section 6-21.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes for actions brought under the Tort Claims Act. Section 6-21.1 provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn any personal injury or property damage suit, or suit against an insurance company under a policy issued by the defendant insurance company and in which the insured or beneficiary is the plaintiff, upon a finding by the Court that there was an unwarranted refusal by the defendant insurance company to pay the claim which constitutes the basis of such suit, instituted in a court of record, . . . the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant. ...\u201d\nId. at 283, 362 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 (1986)). Appealing from the Commission\u2019s grant of attorneys\u2019 fees in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant in Karp argued that the Commission was not a \u201ccourt,\u201d nor was a deputy commissioner a \u201cpresiding judge\u201d within the meaning of section 6-21.1. The Karp Court, while recognizing that the Commission is a \u201ccourt of limited jurisdiction having only those powers conferred upon it by statute[,]\u201d concluded that the Commission had the statutory authority to award attorneys\u2019 fees. Id. at 284, 362 S.E.2d at 826. The Court held that section 143-291 of the General Statutes, which designates the Commission a court for the purposes of hearing tort claims, combined with section 143-291.1, which authorizes the Commission to tax the costs of litigation, permitted the Commission to award attorneys\u2019 fees. Id.\nSimilarly, we conclude the Commission acted within its authority in issuing its order compelling discovery. Sections 143-291 and 143-300 of the North Carolina General Statutes, together with the precedent set forth by this Court in Williams and Karp, compel this conclusion. The information sought by Plaintiffs is expressly subject to disclosure by order of the court, and the Commission, as sole arbiter of tort claims against the State, may properly order such disclosure. Given our conclusion, we need not address Defendants\u2019 remaining assignment of error. The order of the Commission is hereby\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and TYSON concur.\n. Section 143-291 further provides:\nThe Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If the Commission finds that there was negligence on the part of an officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority that was the proximate cause of the injury and that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted, the Commission shall determine the amount of damages that the claimant is entitled to be paid, including medical and other expenses, and by appropriate order direct the payment of damages as provided in subsection (al) of this section ....\n. We note that the deputy commissioner, in issuing the order compelling discovery, simultaneously issued a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the requested information to any person not associated with the case. Defendants\u2019 arguments, dire predictions, and fears regarding \u201cpublic dissemination\u201d of the documents at issue are therefore allayed.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Holtkamp Law Firm, by Lynne M. Holtkamp, and White & Stradley, by Nancy P. White, for plaintiff appellees.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Donna B. Wojcik, for defendant appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JANE DOE 1, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 1, Minor Child, JANE DOE 2, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 2, Minor Child, and JOHN and JANE DOE 3, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for JOHN DOE 3, Minor Child, Plaintiffs v. SWANNANOA VALLEY YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER, a North Carolina State Agency, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, a North Carolina State Agency, BRIAN HARKINS, PHIL LYTLE, LANI LANCASTER, KEN ARONTIN, T. CORDELL, J.B. SIMMONS and MICHAEL SWEITZER, Individually and as Public Employees, Defendants\nNo. COA03-416\n(Filed 2 March 2004)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 interlocutory order\u2014 discovery order \u2014 privilege\u2014substantial right\nAlthough defendants\u2019 appeal from an order compelling discovery is an appeal from an interlocutory order, defendants\u2019 assertion of privilege, while not a privilege arising directly by statute, is nonetheless neither frivolous nor insubstantial and thus affects a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review.\n2. Discovery\u2014 Tort Claims Act \u2014 juvenile records \u2014 social services records \u2014 law enforcement records \u2014 agency records\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a Tort Claims Act case by compelling discovery of records including juvenile records, social services records, law enforcement records, and records maintained by defendant agencies in a case filed by minor plaintiffs and their respective guardians arising out of physical mistreatment and sexual assault at the hands of both facility employees and fellow minors, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 243-291 and 143-300, together with the precedent already set forth by the Court of Appeals in prior opinions, compel the conclusion that the Commission acted within its authority; and (2) the information sought by plaintiffs is expressly subject to disclosure by order of the court, and the Commission, as sole arbiter of tort claims against the State, may properly order such disclosure.\nAppeal by defendants from order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 9 December 2002. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 January 2004.\nHoltkamp Law Firm, by Lynne M. Holtkamp, and White & Stradley, by Nancy P. White, for plaintiff appellees.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Donna B. Wojcik, for defendant appellants." }, "file_name": "0136-01", "first_page_order": 166, "last_page_order": 172 }