{ "id": 8917137, "name": "EVELYN BARTON BECK, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of AVERY EDWARD BECK, Plaintiffs v. LARRY EUGENE BECK, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Beck v. Beck", "decision_date": "2004-03-16", "docket_number": "No. COA03-293", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "317", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "163 N.C. App. 311" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "205 S.E.2d 624", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11299278 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268-69", "parenthetical": "\"Where one has only a contingent interest in land and conveys such interest by warranty deed, such deed passes the contingent interest in the land, by way of estoppel, to the grantee as soon as remainder vests by the happening of contingency upon which such vesting depends\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625848 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 949", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" }, { "page": "950" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241257 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0626-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 674, "char_count": 15737, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.22383782585142e-08, "percentile": 0.3851660849725216 }, "sha256": "8cd1e95362d386739cec226593176a1f6f39e88789045befa9a95e567c3a5aa3", "simhash": "1:ca06c2ebd6564e12", "word_count": 2581 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:37.331987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "EVELYN BARTON BECK, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of AVERY EDWARD BECK, Plaintiffs v. LARRY EUGENE BECK, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nOn 18 February 2000, plaintiffs filed suit seeking to set aside a deed executed in 1998 by plaintiff and her late husband. Following Avery Edward Beck\u2019s (\u201cMr. Beck\u201d) death on 22 September 2000, two writings were discovered, one dated 1995 and the other 1998, each purporting to be Mr. Beck\u2019s will. Both wills named Evelyn Barton Beck (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) as the sole devisee and executor. Though plaintiff contended that Mr. Beck had not been competent to execute a will in 1998, the Clerk of Superior Court of Davidson County probated the 1998 will as the decedent\u2019s last known testamentary instrument. On 9 January 1998, the parties stipulated that evidence of plaintiff\u2019s qualification as executor under the 1998 will would not be admissible \u201cfor purposes of proving that Avery Edward Beck was competent on January 19, 1998.\u201d The court entered an order 24 July 2002 granting partial summary judgment and limiting the issue for trial to a determination of Mr. Beck\u2019s mental capacity to execute the 1998 deed. Shortly thereafter, on 20 August 2002, defendant gave \u201cNotice of Intention to Plead Title by Estoppel.\u201d At the close of plaintiffs\u2019 evidence, defendant moved for dismissal under Rule 41(b), arguing title by estoppel. The court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.\nPlaintiff is Mr. Beck\u2019s widow and the mother of defendant Larry Beck (\u201cdefendant\u201d). She testified that in 1980 Mr. Beck retired from his career as a professional golfer. Between 1985 and 1990, she began to see behavioral changes in her husband, including disorientation, forgetfulness and physical frailty. In 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Beck moved from Wake Forest back to their hometown of Lexington. Mr. Beck owned a six acre tract there, and the Becks owned an adjacent eight acre tract as tenants by the entirety. Larry Beck lived in a home on the six acre tract, and operated a driving range located partly on the six acre tract and partly on the eight acre tract. Plaintiff and her husband surveyed off a .96 acre portion of their tenants by the entirety property and built a home there.\nPlaintiff testified that her husband\u2019s condition continued to decline after the move, and that eventually she placed a lock on his bedroom door to prevent him from wandering alone. In August 1998, plaintiff placed her husband in a nursing home. At that time she discussed options for paying for Mr. Beck\u2019s care with her son, defendant Larry Beck. Defendant suggested that his parents convey their property to him to enable Mr. Beck to qualify for Medicaid, and trust him to return the property when paying for Mr. Beck\u2019s care was no longer an issue. Defendant introduced his mother to his attorney, Steven Holton (\u201cMr. Holton\u201d), and accompanied Mr. Holton on his visits to speak with plaintiff.\nOn 19 January 1998, defendant, plaintiff, Mr. Holton and two of his paralegals gathered at the Beck\u2019s home to execute the deed and other papers. According to plaintiff, her husband sat across the room facing the television and did not participate in any discussions. Defendant brought his father over to sign the papers at the appropriate time and then returned him to his chair in the living room. Several documents were executed by the Becks, including: a deed conveying the eight and six acre tracts to Larry Beck, less the .96 acre tract on which the Beck home sat; a deed conveying the .96 acre tract to the Becks\u2019 daughter Anita and reserving a life estate for themselves, and several other documents plaintiff testified that she did not clearly understand. Defendant paid no consideration for the property he received from his parents.\nSome time later, plaintiff contacted Mr. Holton for advice about regaining the property, but Mr. Holton continued to represent Defendant and suggested that plaintiff seek other counsel. Mr. Beck died on 22 September 2000. At trial in September 2002, plaintiff, Anita Beck, Anita\u2019s former husband, James Johnson, Jr., and Mr. Beck\u2019s primary care physician each testified that Mr. Beck did not have the capacity to execute a deed on 19 January 1998.\nPlaintiff first argues that dismissal was improper because it was based on documents which were not introduced into evidence. Specifically, plaintiff objects to finding of fact one, in which the court found that she executed several documents on 19 January 1998, including the deed at issue here, which was introduced. Finding one also includes other documents executed by Mr. Beck on that date, which were not introduced in evidence. However, all of the documents were widely discussed by plaintiff in her testimony before the court. We find no error in the court\u2019s consideration of testimony about the documents not formally admitted into evidence.\nNext, plaintiff challenges the court\u2019s conclusions 1) that she was estopped from challenging her husband\u2019s mental capacity and 2) that the property in question would pass to defendant regardless of Mr. Beck\u2019s capacity at the time of the deed\u2019s execution. Because the court\u2019s findings of fact are inadequate to support its conclusions, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nThe court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, based in part on the following conclusions of law:\n1. The Plaintiff, Evelyn Barton Beck, is estopped from challenging the mental capacity of her deceased husband as of January 19, 1998.\n2.The property would pass to the Defendant herein regardless of whether the Court finds the decedent Avery Edward Beck incompetent or not.\nThese conclusions of law purport to be based upon the court\u2019s eight findings of fact:\n1. That Avery Edward Beck executed a number of legal documents on January 19, 1998 which documents include the following:\na. A Last Will and Testament;\nb. A Power of Attorney in favor of his wife, Evelyn Barton Beck;\nc. A Revocation of a previous Power of Attorney;\nd. A Healthcare Power of Attorney in favor of his wife, Evelyn Barton beck;\ne. A Declaration of a Desire for a Natural Death;\nf. A Deed from Avery Edward Beck and Wife, Evelyn Barton Beck [sic] to Anita Beck; and\ng. A Deed from Avery Edward Beck and wife, Evelyn Barton Beck, to Larry Eugene Beck, which Deed is the subject matter of this action.\n2. That the Plaintiff now seeks to challenge that Deed referenced in Finding of Fact lg, [sic] above, on the grounds of Avery Edward Beck\u2019s alleged incompetence or lack of mental capacity at the time of the execution of the Deed.\n3. That Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint herein that she was Avery Edward Beck\u2019s \u201cduly appointed attorney-in-fact.\u201d\n4. That the Power of Attorney referenced above was executed contemporaneously with the Deed being challenged herein.\n5. That Plaintiff filed a wrongful death lawsuit against another party as his personal representative by virtue of his Last Will and Testament, also executed contemporaneously with the Deed challenged herein.\n6. That the Plaintiff is estopped from now challenging Avery Edward Beck\u2019s mental capacity as to one document when Plaintiff has accepted the validity of and exercised her rights under powers granted in documents executed contemporaneously therewith.\n7. That there is currently no challenge as to the validity of Plaintiffs execution of the Deed individually.\n8. That assuming that Plaintiff is not equitably estopped from challenging her deceased husband\u2019s mental capacity as of January 19, 1998, and that he was in fact incompetent, she cannot challenge her own conveyance of the property under the Deed in dispute.\n\u201cFindings\u201d six and eight are actually conclusions of law, essentially restating the court\u2019s two denominated conclusions. Standing alone, they cannot be a basis for the conclusion that defendant would own the property regardless of Mr. Beck\u2019s mental capacity.\nIn reaching its first conclusion of law, the court\u2019s order fails to specify what theory of estoppel it applied here. Defendant argues in his brief that the conclusion was proper under either the theory of quasi-estoppel or equitable estoppel. The doctrine of quasi estoppel appears most applicable here, but, even assuming this issue was addressed at trial, the court\u2019s findings are insufficient to support the court\u2019s first conclusion on that basis.\n\u201cQuasi-estoppel is based on a party\u2019s acceptance of the benefits of a transaction, and provides where one having the right to accept or reject a transaction or instrument takes and retains benefits thereunder, he ratifies it, and cannot avoid its obligation or effect by taking a position inconsistent with it.\u201d Parkersmith Props. v. Johnson, 136 N.C. App. 626, 632, 525 S.E.2d 491, 495 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court must determine whether plaintiff ratified the deed and other instruments executed 19 January 1998 by accepting benefit under them, such that she may not now take an inconsistent position.\nFinding five, that Mrs. Beck filed a wrongful death suit as personal representative of the estate, is the only finding relating to a possible benefit received by plaintiff, but the court did not specify how she benefitted, if at all. In his brief, defendant summarizes a number of \u201cfacts\u201d which he contends are relevant to these issues and which address possible benefits to plaintiff from the execution from these documents. However, the court did not make these or any other specific findings that plaintiff received a benefit of any kind, which would be necessary to support the application of quasi-estoppel.\nFurther, the stipulation of the parties barred the court from using the fact of her qualification as personal representative as evidence of Mr. Beck\u2019s competence in 1998. After Mr. Beck\u2019s death, two wills appeared, one executed in 1995 and the other executed in 1998, at the time of the deed execution. After the Clerk of Superior Court in Davidson County insisted on probating only the 1998 will, the parties stipulated that:\n6. Rather than subject the estate to the expense which would be involved in determining the validity of the 1998 will, the parties have agreed to stipulate that, if Evelyn Barton Beck qualifies as the executor of Avery Edward Beck under the 1998 will, evidence of this fact will not be admissible in the present action for the purpose of proving that Avery Edward Beck was competent on January 19, 1998.\nThis stipulation is binding on the court and prevents it from considering the plaintiff\u2019s appointment as personal representative under the 1998 will as evidence of Mr. Beck\u2019s mental capacity to execute that will. Thus, the findings are insufficient to support the court\u2019s first conclusion that plaintiff was estopped from challenging her husband\u2019s capacity.\nPlaintiff next argues that the court erred in concluding that the property in dispute would pass to defendant \u201cregardless of whether the Court finds the decedent Avery Edward Beck incompetent or not.\u201d For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the court\u2019s findings are insufficient to support this second conclusion, and we thus remand the case to the trial court for additional findings.\nThe court\u2019s second conclusion of law, that \u201c[t]he property would pass to the defendant herein regardless of whether the Court finds the decedent Avery Edward Beck incompetent or not,\u201d appears to be based on \u201cfindings\u201d 7 and 8:\n7. That there is currently no challenge as to the validity of Plaintiff\u2019s execution of the Deed individually.\n8. That assuming that Plaintiff is not equitably estopped from challenging her deceased husband\u2019s mental capacity as of January 19, 1998, and that he was in fact incompetent, she cannot challenge her own conveyance of the property under the Deed in dispute.\nFinding 8, as we explained earlier, is actually a conclusion of law.\nAlthough the order does not refer expressly to estoppel by deed, we believe that the conclusion may be referring to this theory. Estoppel by deed provides that \u201c [i]f a grantor having no title, a defective title, or an estate less than that which he assumed to grant, conveys with warranty or covenants of like import, and subsequently acquires the title or estate which he purported to convey . . . such after-acquired . . . will inure to the grantee ... by way of estoppel. Baker v. Austin, 174 N.C. 433, 434, 93 S.E. 949, 950 (1917). \u201cThis is well settled: Where a deed is sufficient in form to convey the grantor\u2019s whole interest, an interest afterwards acquired passes by way of estoppel to the grantee.\u201d Id. See also Barnes v. House, 253 N.C. 444, 449, 117 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (1960) (\u201cWhere one has only a contingent interest in land and conveys such interest by warranty deed, such deed passes the contingent interest in the land, by way of estoppel, to the grantee as soon as remainder vests by the happening of contingency upon which such vesting depends\u201d); Sparkes v. Choate, 22 N.C. App. 62, 62, 205 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1974) (holding as a matter of law that a person who joins in the execution of a general warranty deed without limitation, reservation, or exception, and who later obtains an interest through a conveyance from an independent source, is later estopped to assert a claim of right of way over the land conveyed by such deed).\nIf the court is basing its decision on the doctrine of estoppel by deed, additional findings are needed to support such a conclusion. Estoppel by deed requires a showing 1) that plaintiff Mrs. Beck had no title, a defective title, or an estate less than that which she assumed to grant at the time of the deed execution, 2) that she purported to convey the property in dispute with warranty or covenants of like import, and 3) that she subsequently acquired the title or estate which she had previously purported to convey. See Baker, 174 N.C. at 434, 93 S.E. at 950.\nBecause the findings of fact are insufficient to support the court\u2019s conclusions and the order granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41 we vacate the order and remand for additional findings consistent with this opinion.\nVacated and remanded for additional findings of fact.\nJudges TYSON and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Brinkley Walser, P.L.L.C., by Walter F. Brinkley and April D. Craft, for plaintiff-appellants.", "Cunningham & Crump, P.L.L.C., by R. Flint Crump, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EVELYN BARTON BECK, Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of AVERY EDWARD BECK, Plaintiffs v. LARRY EUGENE BECK, Defendant\nNo. COA03-293\n(Filed 16 March 2004)\nDeeds\u2014 motion to set aside \u2014 incompetency\u2014quasi-estoppel\u2014 estoppel by deed\nThe trial court erred by granting defendant son\u2019s motion to dismiss under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41 an action seeking to set aside a deed executed in 1998 by plaintiff mother and her late husband based on decedent\u2019s incompetency, because: (1) the court\u2019s order fails to specify what theory of estoppel it applied, and the court did not make any finding that plaintiff received a benefit of any kind which would be necessary to support the application of quasi-estoppel; (2) the findings are insufficient to support the court\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff was estopped from challenging her husband\u2019s capacity when the stipulation of the parties barred the court from using the fact of plaintiff\u2019s qualification as personal representative as evidence of decedent\u2019s competence in 1998; and (3) the court\u2019s findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that the property in dispute would pass to defendant regardless of whether the court finds decedent incompetent, and if the court based its decision on the doctrine of estoppel by deed, additional findings are needed to support such a conclusion.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order entered 13 September 2002 by Judge Christopher M. Collier in the Superior Court in Davidson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 November 2003.\nBrinkley Walser, P.L.L.C., by Walter F. Brinkley and April D. Craft, for plaintiff-appellants.\nCunningham & Crump, P.L.L.C., by R. Flint Crump, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 341, "last_page_order": 347 }