{ "id": 8917781, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, by and through its Craven County Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., MARY B. GODWIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. JOSHUA H. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Craven County Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Williams", "decision_date": "2004-03-16", "docket_number": "No. COA03-268", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "357", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "163 N.C. App. 353" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" }, { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470348 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0751-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 491, "char_count": 8699, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3112980718180867 }, "sha256": "fc433cabcf763f65b046fd4ded614870f787d4c6fb28aeef179b1d9d5dc3b13c", "simhash": "1:6fe9e3aefe1e3e40", "word_count": 1408 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:37.331987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, by and through its Craven County Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., MARY B. GODWIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. JOSHUA H. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from an order awarding Mary B. Godwin (plaintiff) $95.00 per month in child support, in addition to providing medical insurance should it become available at a reasonable cost through defendant\u2019s employment.\nDefendant is the biological father of a minor child, Peyton E. Godwin (Peyton), born 3 July 2001. Plaintiff is the biological mother of Peyton and has custody of the child. At the time of Peyton\u2019s birth, defendant and plaintiff were seventeen-year-old minors in their junior year of high school. Prior to defendant\u2019s graduation from high school in June 2002, defendant was accepted for enrollment as a student at East Carolina University.\nIn 2001, defendant earned an average monthly gross income of $478.01, derived from his after-school part-time and summer seasonal employment at Outback Steakhouse in New Bern, North Carolina. In 2002, while still in high school, defendant continued to work after school at the Outback Steakhouse. After his high school graduation in June 2002, and prior to his college enrollment in August 2002, defendant worked full-time as a busboy at Clawson\u2019s restaurant (Clawson\u2019s) in Beaufort, North Carolina. At Clawson\u2019s, he earned approximately $5.25 per hour. At the time of the trial court\u2019s hearing on the matter of child support in September 2002, defendant was enrolled as a full-time student at East Carolina University and was seeking part-time employment.\nAfter hearing evidence regarding Peyton\u2019s needs and testimony on defendant\u2019s financial status, the trial court utilized an earning capacity standard to calculate defendant\u2019s monthly child support obligation, rather than relying on defendant\u2019s actual income. The trial court found that defendant was an able-bodied person capable of earning income at the minimum wage of $5.15 per hour, on a full-time basis. The trial court computed his imputed gross income to be $892.67 per month. Based upon the 1998 North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, the trial court announced its order in open court in September 2002, directing defendant to pay child support in the amount of $95.00 per month. The written order was entered on 16 December 2002. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant first assigns error to the trial court\u2019s use of the 1998 version of the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines) instead of the 2002 version. Defendant emphasizes that while the trial court announced its order in open court on 3 September 2002, the order was not entered until 16 December 2002, after the effective date of the 2002 version of the Guidelines.\nAlthough defendant did not include this issue in his assignments of error and thus has failed to preserve the issue for appellate review, this Court elects in the interest of judicial economy to consider the merits of defendant\u2019s argument. N.C.R. App. R 2.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 58 (2003) provides that \u201ca judgment is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court.\u201d This Court has held that Rule 58 applies to orders as well as to judgments. West v. Marko, 130 N.C. App. 751, 756, 504 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1998). As with a judgment, \u201can order rendered in open court is not enforceable until it is \u2018entered.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 756, 504 S.E.2d at 574. Thus, in the case before us, the trial court\u2019s child support order was not enforceable between the parties until it was entered on 16 December 2002.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) (2003) mandates that the trial court in an action for support of a minor child is to \u201cdetermine the amount of child support payments by applying the presumptive guidelines[.]\u201d None of the exceptions to this legislative directive are applicable in the case before this Court. The Guidelines are reviewed every four years and modified as necessary. At the time of the trial court\u2019s hearing and subsequent pronouncement in open court, the 1998 version of the Guidelines was in effect and the trial court was under a statutory obligation to follow the Guidelines current at that time. The 2002 version of the Guidelines became effective as of 1 October 2002.\nThe introductory portion of the 2002 version of the Guidelines does not elaborate as to whether it is applicable to orders not yet entered as of 1 October 2002. Defendant stresses that the introduction to the 2002 version of the Guidelines proscribes that \u201c[t]he guidelines must be used when the court enters a temporary or permanent child support order in a non-contested case or contested hearing.\u201d Defendant thus argues that since the order was not entered, until after 1 October 2002, the 2002 version is controlling. We construe this directive to be only a restatement of the presumptive nature of the Guidelines as mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c).\nWe recognize that the trial court was not required to announce its order in open court. However, by doing so, the trial court was required by statute to apply the presumptive Guidelines in effect on 3 September 2002. At that time, the revised 2002 version of the Guidelines was not yet applicable. In the absence of guidance from the General Assembly as to what cases were impacted by the 2002 version\u2019s stated effective date of 1 October 2002, we conclude that the trial court acted appropriately in applying the 1998 version of the Guidelines at the time the trial court announced its decision and subsequently entered its order. We find defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in using an earning capacity standard, instead of defendant\u2019s actual earnings, for the purpose of determining defendant\u2019s child support payments. Defendant argues the trial court, in imputing income to defendant, did not make the requisite findings or conclusions indicating any deliberate or bad faith conduct by defendant to suppress his income or otherwise avoid his child support obligation.\nUpon appellate review, a trial court\u2019s determination of the proper child support payment will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 731, 541 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2001). To support such a reversal, an appellant must show that the trial court\u2019s actions were manifestly unsupported by reason. Id.\nChild support payments are ordinarily determined based on a party\u2019s actual income at the time the award is made. Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 708, 493 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1997). Our appellate Courts have repeatedly held that the earning capacity standard can only be used in calculating child support payments where there are \u201cfindings, based on competent evidence, to support a conclusion that the supporting . . . parent is deliberately suppressing his or her income to avoid family responsibilities.\u201d Bowers, 141 N.C. App. at 732, 541 S.E.2d at 510; see Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C. App. 781, 787-88, 501 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1998); Ellis v. Ellis, 126 N.C. App. 362, 364-65, 485 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1997); Whitley v. Whitley, 46 N.C. App. 810, 812, 266 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1980). Standing alone, evidence that a defendant voluntarily depressed his income is insufficient to support the application of the earning capacity standard. Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. App. 657, 662, 583 S.E.2d 696, 699 (2003). In this case, the trial court\u2019s order lacks any finding or conclusion that defendant depressed his income in bad faith. Therefore, we reverse and remand for an appropriate determination of defendant\u2019s child support obligation in accordance with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges HUNTER and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brenda Eaddy, for plaintiffs-appellees.", "Jeffrey L. Miller for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, by and through its Craven County Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., MARY B. GODWIN, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. JOSHUA H. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA03-268\n(Filed 16 March 2004)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 support \u2014 Guidelines \u2014 current version\nThe trial court correctly applied the version of the Child \u2022 Support Guidelines in effect at the time of the hearing and the announcement of the decision in open court, even though a new version had come into effect by the time the written order was entered.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 support \u2014 earning capacity \u2014 no findings of suppressed income\nAn order determining child support to be paid by a student was remanded where the court used earning capacity rather than actual income without findings of bad faith.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 16 December 2002 by Judge Karen A. Alexander in District Court, Craven County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brenda Eaddy, for plaintiffs-appellees.\nJeffrey L. Miller for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 383, "last_page_order": 387 }