{ "id": 8919120, "name": "BRENDA HOUSE, Plaintiff v. LEVI STONE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "House v. Stone", "decision_date": "2004-04-06", "docket_number": "No. COA03-671", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "527", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "163 N.C. App. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "\"timing and amount of settlement offers and the amount of the jury verdict are significant factors for the trial court to consider in determining whether to award attorney's fees.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092425 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "\"timing and amount of settlement offers and the amount of the jury verdict are significant factors for the trial court to consider in determining whether to award attorney's fees.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74", "parenthetical": "holding that the absence of a finding concerning \"superior bargaining power\" does not require reversal where the trial court makes adequate findings on the whole record to support its award of attorney's fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436130 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618-19", "parenthetical": "holding that the absence of a finding concerning \"superior bargaining power\" does not require reversal where the trial court makes adequate findings on the whole record to support its award of attorney's fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186227 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435464 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11652448 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "quoting Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101, 109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082224 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727", "parenthetical": "quoting Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101, 109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562977, 8562958, 8563031, 8563002, 8562940 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0468-03", "/nc/307/0468-02", "/nc/307/0468-05", "/nc/307/0468-04", "/nc/307/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525918 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134273 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 11435704 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737049 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525581 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/75/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "334-35", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237900 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-20", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 680, "char_count": 16818, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.682524327565526e-08, "percentile": 0.4528825811852351 }, "sha256": "834c9f8ce1738762d871094b6f9fae41408d2615b6d143e5a8e2bfed3fb035e1", "simhash": "1:abead02874479d54", "word_count": 2719 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:37.331987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "BRENDA HOUSE, Plaintiff v. LEVI STONE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nBrenda House (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals the trial court\u2019s order denying attorney\u2019s fees. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe facts tend to show the following: On 15 July 1996, plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. Plaintiff\u2019s minor daughter, LaShay House (\u201cHouse\u201d), suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident. On 9 July 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint against the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, Levi Stone (\u201cdefendant\u201d), as well as the owner of the vehicle, Maggie Miller Corprew (\u201cCorprew\u201d), seeking recovery for her payment of House\u2019s medical bills. Luther D. Starling (\u201cStarling\u201d), guardian ad litem for House, also filed a claim. Starling\u2019s claim was later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Defendant and Corprew filed an answer denying liability. Plaintiff later dismissed her claim against Corprew.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 68, defendant filed an Offer of Judgment on 25 July 2000 in the amount of $1,264, which was \u201cinclusive of all damages [and] attorney\u2019s fees taxable as costs[.]\u201d Following a jury trial on 13 November 2000, defendant was found negligent and plaintiff was awarded $2,348 in damages.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-20 and \u00a7 6-21.1, plaintiff filed a motion on 21 November 2000 for costs and reasonable attorney\u2019s fees. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel, L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr. (\u201cArmstrong\u201d), filed an affidavit in support of the motion. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52, on 4 January 2001, plaintiff filed a motion requesting the trial court make \u201cspecific findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to [its] ruling on plaintiff\u2019s motion to tax reasonable attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d\nIn an order filed 8 January 2001, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorney\u2019s fees but granted plaintiff\u2019s request for costs in the amount of $1,692. In House v. Stone, 150 N.C. App. 713, 564 S.E.2d 319 (2002) (unpublished) (\u2018House 7\u201d), plaintiff appealed the order, arguing that (I) the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by our Court in Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 513 S.E.2d 331 (1999) and by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2); (II) the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were not supported by competent evidence; and (III) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award attorney\u2019s fees. This Court overruled plaintiff\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were not supported by competent evidence, but we reversed and remanded after we determined the trial court failed to make sufficient findings for appellate review, specifically whether the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d was more favorable than offers of judgment made pursuant to Rule 68. The Court did not address plaintiff\u2019s third assignment of error.\nOn remand, plaintiff again requested the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its ruling. On 5 March 2003, the trial court again denied plaintiffs motion for attorney\u2019s fees. It is from this order that plaintiff appeals.\nThe issues presented on appeal are whether (I) the trial court violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to make appropriate findings requested by plaintiff; (II) the trial court\u2019s findings were erroneous and unsupported by the record; (III) the trial court made sufficient findings as required by Washington-, and (IV) the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorney\u2019s fees.\nPlaintiff first argues that the trial court violated Rule 52(a)(2) by failing to make the appropriate findings of fact as plaintiff requested. Plaintiff also argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings as required by Washington. Because of the inherent similarities in the two arguments, we will consider them jointly.\nAs a general rule, attorney\u2019s fees are not recoverable as a part of court costs by the successful party at trial. Washington, 132 N.C. App. at 349, 513 S.E.2d at 333. However, attorney\u2019s fees are recoverable under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.1 (2003), which provides:\nIn any personal injury or property damage suit, . . . instituted in a court of record, where the judgment for recovery of damages is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for damages in said suit, said attorney\u2019s fee to be taxed as part of the court costs.\nIn Washington, we listed several factors the trial court must examine when determining whether to award attorney\u2019s fees. We required that the trial court:\nConsider the entire record in properly exercising its discretion, including but not limited to the following factors: (1) settlement offers made prior to the institution of the action ... (2) offers of judgment pursuant to Rule 68, and whether the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d was more favorable than such offers ... (3) whether defendant unjustly exercised \u201csuperior bargaining power\u201d ... (4) in the case of an unwarranted refusal by an insurance company, the \u201ccontext in which the dispute arose\u201d ... (5) the timing of settlement offers ... (6) the amounts of the settlement offers as compared to the jury verdict; and the whole record[.]\nWashington, 132 N.C. App. at 351, 513 S.E.2d at 334-35 (citations omitted).\nFindings of fact made pursuant to a Rule 52(a)(2) motion need only be sufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful appellate review. Andrews v. Peters, 75 N.C. App. 252, 258, 330 S.E.2d 638, 642 (1985), aff\u2019d, 318 N.C. 133, 347 S.E.2d 409 (1986). Thus, when we examine a trial court\u2019s decision concerning whether to award attorney\u2019s fees, we require more than \u201c[m]ere recitation by the trial court that it has considered all Washington factors.\u201d Thorpe v. Perry-Riddick, 144 N.C. App. 567, 572, 551 S.E.2d 852, 857 (2001). However, the trial court is not required to make detailed findings of fact as to each factor. Tew v. West, 143 N.C. App. 534, 537, 546 S.E.2d 183, 185 (2001). Instead, the trial court is required only to make the additional findings necessary to preserve its ruling on appeal. Thorpe, 144 N.C. App. at 573, 551 S.E.2d at 857.\nIn House I, we held that the trial court made sufficient findings for all but the second of the six factors enumerated in Washington. We determined that because the trial court failed to properly assess the second Washington factor, the trial court also failed to make sufficient findings pursuant to Rule 52. Therefore, on remand we mandated that the trial court make \u201cadditional findings showing that [it] properly utilized the \u2018judgment finally obtained\u2019 in consideration of the second Washington factor and in its determination as to whether to award attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d Thus, if the trial court utilized the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d in its consideration of the second Washington factor on remand, then not only will the trial court have made sufficient findings as required by Washington, it will also have made sufficient findings pursuant to Rule 52.\nOn remand, the trial court made the following findings with respect to the second Washington factor:\n5. In response to plaintiffs\u2019 demands, the defendant served a lump sum offer of judgment to Brenda House in the amount of $1,264.00 on July 24, 2000.\n10. This Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to recover costs from the defendant of $1,692.00, which resulted in plaintiff\u2019s final judgment against defendant being $4,040.00. The \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d was therefore greater than the Offer of Judgment.\n11. The final judgment for the plaintiff was $2,500 less than the plaintiff had originally asked for in medical damages and $2,300 more than defendant\u2019s last offer.\nIt is clear from these findings that the trial court did not merely recite that it had considered the second Washington factor in making its decision. Instead, the trial court made additional findings of fact that reflect that the trial court weighed the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d and the Offer of Judgment when it made its decision not to award attorney\u2019s fees. These findings allow meaningful appellate review of the decision. Therefore, we hold that the trial court considered the second Washington factor in its decision not to award attorney\u2019s fees, and that its findings are sufficient under the requirements of both Washington and Rule 52.\nPlaintiff next argues that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were unsupported by the record. We disagree.\nAs discussed above, in House I we held that the trial court made sufficient findings for all but the second of the six factors enumerated in Washington. We therefore remanded the case and instructed the trial court to assess the second Washington factor properly by examining whether the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d was larger than the Offer of Judgment filed pursuant to Rule 68. However, before remanding the case, we concluded that \u201cthe trial court [had] properly considered the entire record in determining whether to award an attorney fee.\u201d In support of this conclusion, we cited to the trial court\u2019s 2 January 2001 order, which stated that prior to making its decision, the trial court had \u201creviewed the court file, heard arguments from counsel, [reviewed] the Affidavit of L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., and . . . received, reviewed, and considered relevant case law, including [Washington].\u201d Thus, because we determined supra that the trial court assessed the second Washington factor properly on remand, we necessarily now hold that its findings are supported by the entire record.\nPlaintiff further asserts that the trial court made erroneous findings in its review. We disagree.\nDespite our instructions to focus its review solely on the second Washington factor, the trial court made numerous other findings of fact. Only numbers 5, 10, and 11 concern either the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d or the Offer of Judgment. Plaintiff submits that finding of fact number 10 is erroneous because the trial court incorrectly found that the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d was $4,040 rather than $4,340. According to plaintiff, the trial court failed to take into account the eight-percent interest added to the jury verdict pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 24-1. However, we are not convinced that the trial court found that $4,040 was the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d by plaintiff. As detailed above, in the second sentence of finding of fact number 10, the trial court put the term \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d in quotation marks. This was presumably done to distinguish the term \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d from the \u201cfinal judgment against defendant\u201d that the trial court referenced without quotation marks in its previous sentence. Furthermore, we fail to see how a $300 increase in the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d would have influenced the trial court\u2019s ultimate finding that the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d was greater than the Offer of Judgment. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in making its findings on remand.\nPlaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for attorney\u2019s fees. We disagree.\nThe decision to award attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 6-21.1 is discretionary. Washington, 132 N.C. App. at 351, 513 S.E.2d at 334. However, the trial court\u2019s discretion is not \u201cunbridled.\u201d Id. If the trial court is shown to have abused its discretion, its decision will be overturned. Whitfield v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 86 N.C. App. 466, 469, 358 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1987); Hillman v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 156, 296 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1982), disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 221 (1983). \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court\u2019s ruling \u2018is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d Sowell v. Clark, 151 N.C. App. 723, 727, 567 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (quoting Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101, 109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997)). However, when reviewing a decision concerning attorney\u2019s fees, we must \u201calso [be] mindful that \u2018the scope of appellate review ... is strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u2019 \u201d Robinson v. Shue, 145 N.C. App. 60, 65, 550 S.E.2d 830, 833 (2001) (quoting State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982)). Therefore, a trial court has properly exercised its discretion unless it either fails to consider both the entire record and all the factors enumerated in Washington or its decision is unsupported by the record before it. Messina v. Bell, 158 N.C. App. 111, 115, 581 S.E.2d 80, 84 (2003).\nWith respect to the first Washington factor, the trial court found that plaintiff made no attempt prior to the institution of litigation to negotiate a settlement with defendant or his insurance carrier. With respect to the second Washington factor, the trial court found that the Offer of Judgment made by defendant was much less than the \u201cjudgment finally obtained\u201d by plaintiff. With respect to the third Washington factor, the trial court found that defendant did not unjustly exercise \u201csuperior bargaining power.\u201d The trial court did not need to make a finding with respect to the fourth Washington factor because this action was not instituted by an insured or a beneficiary against an insurance company defendant. With respect to Washington\u2019s fifth and sixth factors, the trial court found that (a) plaintiff notified defendant on 17 July 2000 that the value of plaintiff and House\u2019s claim exceeded $75,000 and that plaintiff would try her claim for $6,500 in medical bills; (b) defendant responded with an Offer of Judgment of $1,264 on 24 July 2000, which included attorney\u2019s fees; (c) mediation was conducted and ended in an impasse on 20 October 2000, plaintiff\u2019s last offer being $4,741 and defendant\u2019s last offer being $1,788; and (d) the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff\u2019s favor, awarding $2,348 in damages.\nCase law suggests that where the trial court makes findings on the entire record, we should defer to the trial court\u2019s discretion in determining how much weight to give its findings. See Olson v. McMillian, 144 N.C. App. 615, 618-19, 548 S.E.2d 571, 573-74 (2001) (holding that the absence of a finding concerning \u201csuperior bargaining power\u201d does not require reversal where the trial court makes adequate findings on the whole record to support its award of attorney\u2019s fees); see also Culler v. Hardy, 137 N.C. App. 155, 159, 526 S.E.2d 698, 702 (2000) (\u201ctiming and amount of settlement offers and the amount of the jury verdict are significant factors for the trial court to consider in determining whether to award attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d) In the case sub judice, we concluded supra that the trial court properly considered Washington\u2019s six enumerated factors in making its decision to deny attorney\u2019s fees. Furthermore, based on the law of the case established in House I, we also concluded that the trial court properly considered the entire record in making its decision, and that the trial court did not err in making its findings of fact. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for attorney\u2019s fees.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and LEVINSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Armstong & Armstrong, P.A., by L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Robert E. Ruegger for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRENDA HOUSE, Plaintiff v. LEVI STONE, Defendant\nNo. COA03-671\n(Filed 6 April 2004)\n1. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 amount of offer and judgment\nFindings regarding the denial of attorney fees in a personal injury case were sufficient where they reflected the court\u2019s weighing of the offer of judgment and the judgment finally obtained when it decided not to award attorney fees.\n2. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 findings\nThe findings on a denial of attorney fees were supported by the entire record.\n3. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 amount of judgment\nThere was no error in the trial court\u2019s findings on the amount of the judgment finally obtained where defendant contended that the court did not take into account the interest added to the judgment.\n4. Costs\u2014 attorney fees \u2014 consideration of record\u2014 Washington factors \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThere was no abuse of discretion in the denial of a motion for attorney fees where the court properly considered the entire record and made findings on the Washington factors.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 5 March 2003 by Judge Jack A. Thompson in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 March 2004.\nArmstong & Armstrong, P.A., by L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nRobert E. Ruegger for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 550, "last_page_order": 557 }