{ "id": 8920575, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GENE PATRICK OAKS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Oaks", "decision_date": "2004-04-20", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1713", "first_page": "719", "last_page": "727", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "163 N.C. App. 719" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554114 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657830 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/181/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574015 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 F.3d 950", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9069536 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "953" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/348/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 F.3d 769", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9127198 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/329/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 F.3d 773", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9054340 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/350/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 F.Supp. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11432179 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/216/0568-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 F.3d 809", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9485194 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/264/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220197 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 922", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(3) and (g)(3)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)" }, { "page": "(g)(3)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)" }, { "page": "(d)(3) and (g)(3)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)" }, { "page": "(g)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-113.22", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.8", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 731, "char_count": 18640, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0052889892850951e-07, "percentile": 0.5403795742531707 }, "sha256": "118af68edf63aed8ed81569b7632ea87cf559cf012298167d450a9b660193bba", "simhash": "1:9bcad00e710e57e0", "word_count": 3080 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:37.331987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GENE PATRICK OAKS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nGene Patrick Oaks (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a trial court order providing that the Rockingham County Sheriff destroy weapons and ammunition seized during defendant\u2019s arrest on drug and weapons charges. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe factual and procedural history of this case is as follows: On 19 September 2001, Deputy F. K. Woods (\u201cDeputy Woods\u201d) of the Rockingham County Sheriff\u2019s Department executed a search warrant at defendant\u2019s residence. The search warrant was issued based on information provided by a confidential source claiming that marijuana was present in the home. The warrant alleged that defendant\u2019s wife, Elizabeth Shackleford Oaks (\u201cElizabeth\u201d), maintained and sold drugs at the home. When Deputy Woods arrived at the house, defendant was in the backyard on his lawn mower. Deputy Woods and another deputy approached defendant and explained that they had a warrant to search the residence. The three of them entered the house, where Elizabeth was located. Deputy Woods advised both defendant and Elizabeth of their Miranda rights and conducted a search of the residence.\nDuring the search, Deputy Woods found less than one-half ounce of marijuana, digital scales, rolling papers and a pipe. Deputy Gray Smith (\u201cDeputy Smith\u201d) found a fully automatic MAK 90 rifle and thirty other firearms in defendant\u2019s bedroom. Defendant was arrested and charged with the following crimes: one count of possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.8, based on his possession of the MAK 90 rifle; misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-113.22; and simple possession of marijuana, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(d)(4). The record does not reflect that Elizabeth was arrested or charged with any crimes.\nDefendant pled not guilty to the misdemeanor charges of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in district court, but was convicted of both charges. He appealed the judgments to the superior court for trial de novo. Prior to trial in superior court, the State and defendant entered into a negotiated plea whereby the felony charge of possession of a weapon of mass destruction was dismissed in return for defendant\u2019s pleas of guilty to the misdemeanors of simple possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. At defendant\u2019s guilty plea hearing on 4 June 2002, Deputy Woods testified as follows about the search of defendant\u2019s residence: \u201cI asked Mr. Oaks if he had narcotics in the house. He stated he had a small smoke sack in the kitchen behind the curtains, and told me at the time him and his wife smoked pot about every other day.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the plea hearing, the State notified defendant and the trial court that it would file a motion to have all of the firearms and ammunition seized from the residence destroyed. The trial court instructed the State to serve notice of the motion on defendant. In response to an inquiry from the State, defendant\u2019s attorney stated that he represented Elizabeth as well, and would accept service on her behalf. With the agreement of both counsel, the trial court scheduled the hearing for the disposition of the firearms for 28 June 2002.\nOn 28 June 2002, a hearing was conducted on the State\u2019s motion for an order of disposition of the firearms pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-11.l(bl) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 922(d)(3) and (g)(3). Defendant conceded that the MAX 90 rifle should be forfeited, but contested the motion as it pertained to the remaining non-automatic firearms. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order containing the following pertinent findings of fact:\n4. That the thirty-one firearms on the attached \u201cList of Firearms Still in Custody of Sheriff\u2019s Dept.\u201d were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant;\n5. That the ammunition was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant;\n6. That the firearms seized were manufactured outside of North Carolina and are \u201cin commerce\u201d;\n7. That the Defendant and Mrs. Oakes [sic] are unlawful users of the controlled substance marihuana;\n8. That the following items in the above mentioned attached list; namely, items 26-33, 26-24, 26-25, 25-28, 25-29, and 25-30 were purchased by Mrs. Oakes [sic];\n9. That the following items in the above mentioned attached list were not inherited by Mrs. Oakes [sic] from her father; namely, items 22, 24, 9, 14, and 8, having a value of at least $4,000.00;\n10.That all items except those listed in paragraph 8 and items 4, 17, and 15 belong to the Defendant. These excepted items belong to Mrs. Oakes [sic];\nThe trial court then concluded as a matter of law that defendant and Elizabeth were prohibited from possessing \u201cfirearms or ammunition on their own premises even for their own personal protection.\u201d The trial court ordered the destruction of all weapons and ammunition seized from the house. It is from this order that defendant appeals.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering the weapons and ammunition destroyed because (I) the trial court lacked authority to order the forfeiture and destruction of the firearms; (II) the decision not to return the weapons was improperly based on federal law; and (III) some of the weapons were the property of defendant\u2019s wife, who was not a defendant in the instant criminal action.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court did not have authority to order the forfeiture and destruction of the firearms seized from the house. We disagree.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes provide for the disposition of firearms seized pursuant to a search warrant as follows:\n[If] the district attorney determines the firearm is no longer necessary or useful as evidence in a criminal trial, the district attorney, after notice to all parties known or believed by the district attorney to have an ownership or a possessory interest in the firearm, including the defendant, shall apply to the court for an order of disposition of the firearm. The judge, after hearing, may order the disposition of the firearm in one of the following ways:\n(1) By ordering the firearm returned to its rightful owner, when the rightful owner is someone other than the defendant and upon findings by the court (i) that the person, firm, or corporation determined by the court to be the rightful owner is entitled to possession of the firearm and (ii) that the person, firm, or corporation determined by the court to be the rightful owner of the firearm was unlawfully deprived of the same or had no knowledge or reasonable belief of the defendant\u2019s intention to use the firearm unlawfully.\n(2) By ordering the firearm returned to the defendant, but only if the defendant is not convicted of any criminal offense in connection with the possession or use of the firearm, the defendant is the rightful owner of the firearm, and the defendant is not otherwise ineligible to possess such firearm.\n(3) By ordering the firearm turned over to be destroyed by the sheriff of the county in which the firearm was seized or by his duly authorized agent. The sheriff shall maintain a record of the destruction of the firearm.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-11.l(bl) (2003). Because the language of the statute authorizes the trial court to dispose of firearms at its discretion, we will not disturb such rulings unless an abuse of discretion is established. \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs where the trial judge\u2019s determination is manifestly unsupported by reason and is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Reed, 355 N.C. 150, 155, 558 S.E.2d 167, 171 (2002) (citations omitted).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court ordered defendant\u2019s firearms destroyed because it found as fact that defendant is an unlawful user of the controlled substance marijuana. This finding of fact is supported by Deputy Woods\u2019s testimony that defendant \u201ctold me at the time him and his wife smoked pot about every other day.\u201d Based on this evidence, the disposition of the weapons to defendant would have placed the trial court in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(d)(3) (2000), which prohibits disposing of firearms to an unlawful user of controlled substances, and it would have placed defendant in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(3), which prohibits an unlawful user of controlled substances from receiving firearms that have been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. Thus, the trial court acted in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-11.l(bl)(2), which permits the trial court to return firearms to a defendant only if the defendant is not otherwise ineligible to possess the firearm. Defendant may not receive those firearms as an unlawful user of controlled substances. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court acted properly within its discretion, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision to destroy defendant\u2019s weapons.\nThe trial court ordered Elizabeth\u2019s firearms destroyed because it found as fact that Elizabeth is also an unlawful user of the controlled substance marijuana. This finding of fact is supported by the following evidence entered at the hearing: (1) Deputy Woods\u2019s testimony that defendant \u201ctold me at the time him and his wife smoked pot about every other day;\u201d and (2) Elizabeth\u2019s prior convictions for simple possession of marijuana in 1992 and simple possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in 1988. The State argued at the disposition hearing that Deputy Woods\u2019s testimony regarding marijuana smoking was admissible against Elizabeth because Elizabeth\u2019s prior convictions corroborate Deputy Woods\u2019s testimony. We disagree.\nDeputy Woods\u2019s testimony at defendant\u2019s guilty plea hearing that \u201cdefendant told me at the time him and his wife smoked pot about every other day\u201d is hearsay without exception as it pertains to Elizabeth. \u201c \u2018Hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, N.C. R. Evid. 801(c) (2003). Elizabeth became involved in this case after the trial court accepted defendant\u2019s guilty plea, when the district attorney notified her that he would file a motion seeking the destruction of her firearms. Because Elizabeth was not a defendant in this case, and was not represented by counsel until the conclusion of the guilty plea hearing, it follows that she did not have the opportunity to object to this testimony at the time it was given. She had no notice, according to the record, that this testimony was to be offered to prove that she smokes marijuana on a regular basis until after it was entered into evidence. Therefore, we hold that this statement cannot be used to support a conclusion of law that Elizabeth is an unlawful user of controlled substances. To permit the use of this testimony against Elizabeth violates her rights of due process and constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.\nElizabeth\u2019s prior convictions for possession of marijuana in 1992 and 1988 are also not sufficient to support a finding of fact that she is currently an unlawful user of a controlled substance. The federal courts have consistently held that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(d)(3) applies where a defendant\u2019s possession of a firearm is concurrent with his or her habitual drug use. See United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 216 F.Supp. 2d 568, 575 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Collins, 350 F.3d 773, 775-76 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bennett, 329 F.3d 769, 776-77 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Edmonds, 348 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 2003). Because we conclude that the trial court may not use Deputy Woods\u2019s testimony as evidence of Elizabeth\u2019s recent drug use, we hold that evidence tending to show drug use ten to fourteen years prior is not sufficient to support a finding or conclusion that Elizabeth is presently an unlawful user of controlled substances. Accordingly, we vacate the conclusions of law by the trial court pertaining to Elizabeth. For the reasons stated above, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Elizabeth\u2019s weapons destroyed.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred because the decision not to return the weapons was improperly based on federal law. We disagree.\nThe United States Code provides for the disposition of firearms as follows:\nIt shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person ... is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance;\nIt shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.\n18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 922(d)(3) and (g)(3) (2000).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that \u201cit would be inappropriate for the Court to return the ammunition and guns to the Defendant. . . .\u201d This conclusion is supported by the finding of fact that defendant is an unlawful user of the controlled substance marijuana. Defendant argues that the trial court \u201clacks jurisdiction to apply federal law in a state criminal proceeding.\u201d However, the trial court cannot issue an order that would place the court and defendant in violation of federal law. Accordingly, the trial court sought to comply with 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(d)(3) by not disposing of the firearms to a defendant that it recognized as an unlawful user of controlled substances, and it sought to comply with 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(3) by not allowing an unlawful user of controlled substances to receive firearms that have been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order in this regard.\nWe do, however, take exception to the trial .court\u2019s conclusion of law that defendant and Elizabeth \u201cmay not possess firearms or ammunition on their own premises even for their own personal protection.\u201d Our concern is that the trial court\u2019s language is unconditional and without any time limits.\nNorth Carolina courts have long deemed it reasonable to regulate, without infringing upon, the right to bear arms under certain circumstances. We have prohibited \u201c \u2018the carrying of deadly weapons when under the influence of intoxicating drink, or to a church, polling place, or public assembly, or in a manner calculated to inspire terror ....\u2019\u201d State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1968) quoting State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1 (2003).\nHowever, in the case sub judice, for the trial court to decree that defendant may not possess firearms for an indefinite time is too open-ended to be reasonable. Even when we consider the fact that defendant is currently an unlawful user of controlled substances for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922, we cannot affirm an order that apparently presumes that he will always be an unlawful user of controlled substances, and therefore may never possess firearms. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law that defendant may not possess firearms or ammunition on his own premises, even for his own protection, without time limitation.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order in part, vacate in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.\nJudges HUDSON and ELMORE concur.\n. The trial court took judicial notice that \u201cthe firearms seized were manufactured outside of North Carolina.\u201d\n. This Court notes that neither the State nor defendant raises the question of whether defendant has standing to contest the destruction of Elizabeth\u2019s weapons. Hence, the question of standing is not.before this Court and we will not address that question in our analysis.\n. We note that a \u201cconclusion of law\u201d is typically a statement by which a trial court subjects the facts of a case to the applicable common or statutory law. However, a conclusion of law may also be a \u201cfinal judgment or decree which the law requires in view of the facts found.\u201d Cf Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 408, 179 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1971). By both definitions, a conclusion of law may be reviewed on appeal for errors in the underlying findings of fact or, as in the case sub judice, for errors in the application of the law.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joan M. Cunningham and Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.", "Robert A. Hassell for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GENE PATRICK OAKS\nNo. COA02-1713\n(Filed 20 April 2004)\n1. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 forfeiture \u2014 drug use\nThe trial court had the authority to order the forfeiture and destruction of firearms seized from a home where it found that defendant was an unlawful user of a controlled substance.\n2. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 forfeiture \u2014 evidence of drug use \u2014 not concurrent \u2014 opportunity to object\nThe court abused its discretion by ordering that firearms belonging to defendant\u2019s wife be destroyed because she was an unlawful user of controlled substances where the evidence against her consisted of hearsay testimony from her husband\u2019s plea hearing and marijuana convictions from 1992 and 1988. She had no notice or opportunity to object to the testimony at the time it was given, and the drug use was not concurrent with the firearms possession.\n3. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 forfeiture \u2014 federal law applied in state court\nThe trial court properly based its decision not to return weapons to a marijuana user on federal law despite defendant\u2019s contention that the court lacked jurisdiction to apply federal law in a state criminal proceeding. The court cannot issue an order that would place the court and defendant in violation of federal law.\n4. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 forfeiture order \u2014 indefinite time\nA trial court conclusion that defendant and his wife (who are marijuana users) may not possess firearms on their premises was vacated because it was for an indefinite time. The order apparently presumes that defendant will always be an unlawful user of controlled substances.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 July 2002 by Judge Melzer A. Morgan, Jr. in Rockingham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 September 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joan M. Cunningham and Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.\nRobert A. Hassell for defendant." }, "file_name": "0719-01", "first_page_order": 749, "last_page_order": 757 }