{
  "id": 8897426,
  "name": "JUSTICE FOR ANIMALS, INC. and HELEN WALKER, individually, Plaintiffs v. ROBESON COUNTY, BILL SMITH, Director of Robeson County Health Department, HUGH COLE, Director, Robeson County Animal Control Facility, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Justice for Animals, Inc. v. Robeson County",
  "decision_date": "2004-05-18",
  "docket_number": "No. COA02-1336",
  "first_page": "366",
  "last_page": "373",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "164 N.C. App. 366"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "537 S.E.2d 213",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "350 N.C. 594",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        132232,
        131953,
        132177,
        132117,
        131963
      ],
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/350/0594-03",
        "/nc/350/0594-02",
        "/nc/350/0594-01",
        "/nc/350/0594-04",
        "/nc/350/0594-05"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "505 S.E.2d 899",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "904",
          "parenthetical": "\"The burden of showing inadequacy [of the administrative remedy] is on the party claiming inadequacy, who must include such allegations in the complaint.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "131 N.C. App. 179",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11198145
      ],
      "year": 1998,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "186",
          "parenthetical": "\"The burden of showing inadequacy [of the administrative remedy] is on the party claiming inadequacy, who must include such allegations in the complaint.\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/131/0179-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "494 S.E.2d 406",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1997,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "347 N.C. 396",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        551335,
        551114,
        551379,
        551254,
        551354
      ],
      "year": 1997,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/347/0396-05",
        "/nc/347/0396-02",
        "/nc/347/0396-01",
        "/nc/347/0396-04",
        "/nc/347/0396-03"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "488 S.E.2d 269",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "273"
        },
        {
          "page": "274"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "127 N.C. App. 79",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11792232
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "86"
        },
        {
          "page": "87"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/127/0079-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "421 S.E.2d 812",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "815"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "107 N.C. App. 710",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8527932
      ],
      "year": 1992,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "715"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/107/0710-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "527 S.E.2d 307",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "311",
          "parenthetical": "if possible, a statute must be interpreted so as to give meaning to all of its provisions"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "351 N.C. 401",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1155640
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "408",
          "parenthetical": "if possible, a statute must be interpreted so as to give meaning to all of its provisions"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/351/0401-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "78 S. Ct. 1136",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "S. Ct.",
      "year": 1958,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2 L. Ed. 2d 1147",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d",
      "year": 1958,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "356 U.S. 973",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        6252835,
        6251878,
        6253674,
        6253293,
        6252525,
        6252188
      ],
      "year": 1958,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/356/0973-04",
        "/us/356/0973-01",
        "/us/356/0973-06",
        "/us/356/0973-05",
        "/us/356/0973-03",
        "/us/356/0973-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "252 F.2d 892",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "F.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        692726
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/f2d/252/0892-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "341 S.E.2d 108",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "112-13"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "80 N.C. App. 201",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522738
      ],
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "207"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/80/0201-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "558 S.E.2d 867",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2001,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "354 N.C. 573",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        138502,
        138441,
        138512,
        138513,
        138484
      ],
      "year": 2001,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/354/0573-02",
        "/nc/354/0573-04",
        "/nc/354/0573-01",
        "/nc/354/0573-03",
        "/nc/354/0573-05"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "552 S.E.2d 230",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "232"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "146 N.C. App. 258",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11355977
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "260"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/146/0258-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "447 S.E.2d 768",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "776-77",
          "parenthetical": "holding that the N.C. Administrative Procedure Act \"confers procedural rights and imposes procedural duties\" while \"[t]he organic statute . . . defines those rights, duties, or privileges, abrogation of which provides the grounds for an administrative hearing\""
        },
        {
          "page": "779"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "337 N.C. 569",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2551286
      ],
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "583",
          "parenthetical": "holding that the N.C. Administrative Procedure Act \"confers procedural rights and imposes procedural duties\" while \"[t]he organic statute . . . defines those rights, duties, or privileges, abrogation of which provides the grounds for an administrative hearing\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/337/0569-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "588 S.E.2d 880",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "882"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "357 N.C. 640",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        491640
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "644"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/357/0640-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "131 S.E.2d 441",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1963,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "446",
          "parenthetical": "quoting 3 C.J.S. Aggrieved, p. 350"
        },
        {
          "page": "446"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "259 N.C. 589",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8561548
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1963,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "595",
          "parenthetical": "quoting 3 C.J.S. Aggrieved, p. 350"
        },
        {
          "page": "595"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/259/0589-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "517 S.E.2d 406",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1999,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "410"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "134 N.C. App. 217",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11143772
      ],
      "year": 1999,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "220"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/134/0217-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "260 S.E.2d 611",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "615"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "298 N.C. 715",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8573981
      ],
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "721"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/298/0715-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "468 S.E.2d 58",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "343 N.C. 118",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        798827
      ],
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/343/0118-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "461 S.E.2d 13",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "14"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "120 N.C. App. 154",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11914421
      ],
      "year": 1995,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "155"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/120/0154-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-360",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "making cruelty to animals a crime"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 829,
    "char_count": 17582,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.747,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.215569744461071e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9137801084155872
    },
    "sha256": "1dbfb8c365c1dac9d45a31a8c594c61f1752b3465a917a192f364be04c616d91",
    "simhash": "1:1d2b957e3498275c",
    "word_count": 2769
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:16.246957+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "JUSTICE FOR ANIMALS, INC. and HELEN WALKER, individually, Plaintiffs v. ROBESON COUNTY, BILL SMITH, Director of Robeson County Health Department, HUGH COLE, Director, Robeson County Animal Control Facility, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiffs Justice for Animals, Inc. (\u201cJFA\u201d) and Helen Walker appeal from an order granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint challenging the euthanasia procedures and record keeping of the Robeson County Animal Control Facility. Because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, we affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal.\nFacts\nOn or about 5 November 2001, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Robeson County District Court against defendants Robeson County, the Director of the Robeson County Health Department, and the Director of the Robeson County Animal Control Facility for alleged violations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19A-1 el seq. (2003) (\u201cCivil Remedy for Protection of Animals\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-192 (2003) (requiring that dogs and cats be euthanized by approved procedures), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-360 (2003) (making cruelty to animals a crime), and a Robeson County ordinance entitled \u201cRules and Regulations Governing Animal Control in Robeson County.\u201d In our review of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we must treat the allegations of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint as true. Arroyo v. Scottie\u2019s Prof\u2019l Window Cleaning, 120 N.C. App. 154, 155, 461 S.E.2d 13, 14 (1995), disc. review improvidently allowed, 343 N.C. 118, 468 S.E.2d 58 (1996).\nAccording to the complaint, JFA is a non-profit domestic corporation dedicated to the health and welfare and the humane treatment of animals. Plaintiff Walker is a resident of Robeson County and an animal welfare advocate. Plaintiffs contend that the Robeson County Animal Control Facility, a division of the Robeson County Health Department, is handling and killing animals in an inhumane manner causing unnecessary pain, anxiety, and distress in the animals. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the Robeson County Animal Control Facility injects animals in their hearts without anesthesia resulting in pain, discomfort, and convulsive behavior, and euthanizes cats with a drug not approved for usage on cats. According to plaintiffs, these procedures are contrary to methods prescribed by the Humane Society of the United States, the American Humane Association, and the American Veterinary Medical Association.\nPlaintiffs further allege that the Robeson County Animal Control Facility engages in inadequate record keeping, in violation of state law and Robeson County ordinances. According to plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, the inadequate records result in the unnecessary killing of animals before their owners can reclaim them.\nFinally, plaintiffs allege that they, together with other animal welfare advocates, have expended time and funds to reform the Animal Control Facility and to provide training to county employees at no expense to the county. Although the Facility has accepted the assistance and represented that reforms were being made, plaintiffs allege that these representations were untrue. Plaintiffs allege that the citizens of Robeson County are exposed to a risk of immediate and irreparable injury should their pets and \u201cuseful animals\u201d be impounded at the Animal Control Facility in that impounded animals are \u201cin immediate danger of death, disease, or injury with no reasonable opportunity of an animal or pet owner to save his pet from inhumane destruction.\u201d\nThe complaint alleges that the treatment of animals at the Animal Control Facility is cruel and unlawful under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19A-1 et seq., \u00a7 130A-192, and \u00a7 14-360. As relief, plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction \u201cprohibiting [defendants] from maintaining or operating an animal control facility and destroying animals in the manner heretofore complained of or from failing to maintain complete and accurate records by law and making such records available at all reasonable hours.\u201d\nOn 4 January 2002, defendants answered and moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On 11 July 2002, Judge John B. Carter, Jr. entered a temporary restraining order barring defendants \u201cfrom continuing the euthanasia process in Robeson County, North Carolina until such time as this matter can be brought on for hearing as to whether or not there should be a preliminary injunction entered ordering preliminary relief, in anticipation of trial[.]\u201d The court scheduled a hearing for 16 July 2002. Following the hearing on 16 July 2002, Judge Carter filed an order on 30 August 2002 granting the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and denying any injunctive relief. Plaintiffs appeal from this order.\nDiscussion\nIt is well-established that \u201cwhere the legislature has provided by statute an effective administrative remedy, that remedy is exclusive and its relief must be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts.\u201d Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 721, 260 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1979). If a plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the action must be dismissed. Shell Island Homeowners Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 220, 517 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1999).\nDefendants contend that plaintiffs had an adequate administrative remedy under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24 (2003). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24 provides:\n(b) Appeals concerning the enforcement of rules adopted by the local board of health and concerning the imposition of administrative penalties by a local health director shall be conducted in accordance with this subsection and subsections (c) and (d) of this section. The aggrieved person shall give written notice of appeal to the local health director within 30 days of the challenged action. The notice shall contain the name and address of the aggrieved person, a description of the challenged action and a statement of the reasons why the challenged action is incorrect. Upon filing of the notice, the local health director shall, within five working days, transmit to the local board of health the notice of appeal and the papers and materials upon which the challenged action was taken.\n(c) The local board of health shall hold a hearing within 15 days of the receipt of the notice of appeal. The board shall give the person not less than 10 days\u2019 notice of the date, time and place of the hearing. On appeal, the board shall have authority to affirm, modify or reverse the challenged action. The local board of health shall issue a written decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing. The decision shall contain a concise statement of the reasons for the decision.\n(d) A person who wishes to contest a decision of the local board of health under subsection (b) of this section shall have a right of appeal to the district court having jurisdiction within 30 days after the date of the decision by the board. The scope of review in district court shall be the same as in G.S. 150B-51.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24(b)-(d). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that they are not \u201caggrieved persons\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24(b) and, therefore, no administrative remedy is available to them.\nThe term \u201caggrieved person\u201d is not defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24, but our Supreme Court has held:\nThe expression \u201cperson aggrieved\u201d has no technical meaning. What it means depends on the circumstances involved. It has been variously defined: \u201cAdversely or injuriously affected; dam-nified, having a grievance, having suffered a loss or injury, or injured; also having cause for complaint. More specifically the word(s) may be employed meaning adversely affected in respect of legal rights, or suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights.\u201d\nIn re Assessment of Sales Tax, 259 N.C. 589, 595, 131 S.E.2d 441, 446 (1963) (quoting 3 C.J.S. Aggrieved, p. 350). The Court has recently stressed \u201cthat whether a party is- a \u2018person aggrieved\u2019 must be determined based on the circumstances of each individual case.\u201d N.C. Forestry Ass\u2019n v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res., 357 N.C. 640, 644, 588 S.E.2d 880, 882 (2003).\nThe complaint alleges that conduct of the Animal Control Facility \u2014 which falls within the control of the Robeson County Board of Health \u2014 is exposing animal owners to a risk that their animals will be killed inhumanely and unnecessarily. While plaintiffs are animal welfare advocates who are in effect representing Robeson County animal owners, \u201c[o]ne may be aggrieved within the meaning of the various statutes authorizing appeals when he is affected only in a representative capacity.\u201d In re Assessment of Sales Tax, 259 N.C. at 595, 131 S.E.2d at 446. Under these circumstances, we agree with defendants that plaintiffs are \u201caggrieved persons\u201d entitled to proceed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24, especially in light of the provisions of Ch. 19A of the General Statutes, which govern \u201cProtection of Animals.\u201d\nThe Supreme Court has held that when a statute only sets out procedural rights and duties to resolve disputes between an agency and a \u201cperson aggrieved,\u201d the courts may look to other \u201corganic statutes\u201d to determine who qualifies as a \u201cperson aggrieved\u201d entitled to bring an administrative proceeding under the procedural statute. Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t, Health & Natural Res., 337 N.C. 569, 583, 447 S.E.2d 768, 776-77 (1994) (holding that the N.C. Administrative Procedure Act \u201cconfers procedural rights and imposes procedural duties\u201d while \u201c[t]he organic statute . . . defines those rights, duties, or privileges, abrogation of which provides the grounds for an administrative hearing\u201d). The court must decide whether the individual \u201cis a \u2018person aggrieved\u2019 as defined by the [procedural statute] within the meaning of the organic statute.\u201d Id. at 588, 447 S.E.2d at 779. See also In re Denial of Request for Full Admin. Hearing, 146 N.C. App. 258, 260, 552 S.E.2d 230, 232 (\u201cA person\u2019s rights, duties or privileges arise under the relevant organic statute.\u201d), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 573, 558 S.E.2d 867 (2001).\nLike the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24(b)-(d) sets forth only procedural rights for \u201caggrieved persons\u201d and imposes procedural duties on the local board of health. The statute does not specifically define who has the right to exercise the procedural rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 19A-1 and 19A-2, however, express the General Assembly\u2019s intent that the broadest category of persons or organizations be deemed \u201c[a] real party in interest\u201d when contesting cruelty to animals. Given that the General Assembly viewed \u201cpersons\u201d such as plaintiffs to be real parties in interest for the purpose of litigation in court, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 19A-1, we believe that plaintiffs should be considered \u201caggrieved persons\u201d for the purpose of raising concerns about animal control before local boards of health.\nPlaintiffs next contend that even if considered \u201caggrieved persons,\u201d their claims do not fall within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24(b). The statute permits \u201c[a]ppeals concerning the enforcement of rules adopted by the local board of health and concerning the imposition of administrative penalties by a local health director[.]\u201d Plaintiffs argue that their claims do not concern the enforcement of rules adopted by the local board of health. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 470 (1968) defines \u201cconcerning\u201d as meaning \u201crelating to: regarding, respecting, about[.]\u201d In short, the scope of appeals under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24(b) is broad.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint attached the applicable board of health rules and specifically alleged that the Animal Control Facility was failing to comply with the record keeping provisions of those rules. The rules repeatedly provide that animals must be destroyed \u201cin a humane manner.\u201d By alleging that the Animal Control Facility kills animals in an inhumane manner, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint necessarily alleges that defendants have failed to properly enforce the Robeson County Board of Health rules. We hold that plaintiffs\u2019 claims relate to and thus \u201cconcern[] the enforcement of rules adopted by the local board of health . . . .\u201d\nPlaintiffs argue alternatively that the use of the conjunctive \u201cand\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24(b) means that the appeal must involve both (1) the enforcement of rales and (2) the imposition of administrative penalties. This Court has previously recognized that \u201ccourts, in interpreting statutes and regulations, may substitute \u2018and\u2019 for \u2018or\u2019, and vice versa, where necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the law or to give full effect to the legislative intent, when the context so indicates.\u201d Pamlico Marine Co., Inc. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 80 N.C. App. 201, 207, 341 S.E.2d 108, 112-13 (1986). See also Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892, 893 n.1 (5th Cir.) (\u201cThe words \u2018and\u2019 and \u2018or\u2019 when used in a statute are convertible, as the sense may require. A substitution of one for the other is frequently resorted to in the interpretation of statutes, when the evident intention of the lawmaker requires it.\u201d), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1147, 78 S. Ct. 1136 (1958). Our review of the grammatical structure of the statutory provision reveals that the General Assembly must have intended to allow an appeal either to challenge the enforcement of rules or to challenge the imposition of administrative penalties. Plaintiffs\u2019 construction would render the portion relating to \u201cthe enforcement of rules\u201d meaningless since the imposition of administrative penalties will always involve the enforcement of rules. See State v. Buckner, 351 N.C. 401, 408, 527 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2000) (if possible, a statute must be interpreted so as to give meaning to all of its provisions).\nFinally, plaintiffs contend that the relief offered by the administrative proceedings is inadequate. Plaintiffs are correct that the exhaustion requirement may be excused if the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate. Huang v. N.C. State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 715, 421 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1992). In order, however, to rely upon futility or inadequacy, \u201callegations of the facts justifying avoidance of the administrative process must be pled in the complaint.\u201d Bryant v. Hogarth, 127 N.C. App. 79, 86, 488 S.E.2d 269, 273, disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 396, 494 S.E.2d 406 (1997). See also Jackson v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Human Res., 131 N.C. App. 179, 186, 505 S.E.2d 899, 904 (1998) (\u201cThe burden of showing inadequacy [of the administrative remedy] is on the party claiming inadequacy, who must include such allegations in the complaint.\u201d), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 594, 537 S.E.2d 213 (1999). In this case, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint fails to allege either the inadequacy or the futility of the administrative remedy.\nTo summarize, plaintiffs had administrative remedies available to them under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 130A-24 that they did not exhaust. Because they failed to plead a basis for avoiding the exhaustion requirement, the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bryant, 127 N.C. App. at 87, 488 S.E.2d at 274.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and BRYANT concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GEER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William A. Reppy, Jr. and Larry J. McGlothlin, for plaintiffs-appellants.",
      "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Mark A. Davis; and J. Hal Kinlaw, Jr., for defendants-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JUSTICE FOR ANIMALS, INC. and HELEN WALKER, individually, Plaintiffs v. ROBESON COUNTY, BILL SMITH, Director of Robeson County Health Department, HUGH COLE, Director, Robeson County Animal Control Facility, Defendants\nNo. COA02-1336\n(Filed 18 May 2004)\n1. Administrative Law\u2014 exhaustion of remedies \u2014 aggrieved persons \u2014 cruelty to animals\nPlaintiffs were aggrieved persons under statutes and ordinances concerning the euthanasia of animals. They therefore fell within the requirement that administrative procedures be exhausted before recourse to the courts, and defendants\u2019 motion for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was correctly granted. The General Assembly has expressed its intent that the broadest category of persons be deemed a real party in interest when contesting cruelty to animals. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 19A-1, 19A-2.\n2. Animals\u2014 euthanasia \u2014 board of health rules \u2014 exhaustion of administrative remedies\nPlaintiffs\u2019 claims concerning the euthanasia of animals were properly dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because their claims concerned the enforcement of rules adopted by a local board of health and thus fell within the scope of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 130A-24(b).\n3. Statutes\u2014 interpretation \u2014 use of conjunctive\nThe use of the conjunctive \u201cand\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 130A-24(b) did not mean that an appeal involving a county\u2019s euthanasia of animals had to involve both the enforcement of rules and administrative penalties. Courts may substitute \u201cor\u201d for \u201cand\u201d (and vice versa) to preserve constitutionality or give effect to legislative intent. Here, the General Assembly must have intended to allow an appeal on either ground because the imposition of administrative penalties will always involve the enforcement of rules.\n4. Administrative Law\u2014 exhaustion of administrative remedies \u2014 inadequate remedies \u2014 failure to allege\nPlaintiffs\u2019 contention that administrative penalties were inadequate in a challenge to a county\u2019s euthanasia of animals was correctly dismissed under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where plaintiffs did not include that contention in their complaint.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from an order entered 30 August 2002 by Judge John B. Carter, Jr., in Robeson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 June 2003.\nWilliam A. Reppy, Jr. and Larry J. McGlothlin, for plaintiffs-appellants.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Mark A. Davis; and J. Hal Kinlaw, Jr., for defendants-appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0366-01",
  "first_page_order": 398,
  "last_page_order": 405
}
