{ "id": 8898010, "name": "VALERIE ENOCH, Plaintiff v. EDWARD R. INMAN and ALAMANCE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Enoch v. Inman", "decision_date": "2004-06-01", "docket_number": "No. COA02-1410", "first_page": "415", "last_page": "429", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "164 N.C. App. 415" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9173312, 9173411, 9173470, 9173445, 9173384, 9173361, 9173333, 9173526, 9173558, 9173502 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0948-01", "/us/534/0948-05", "/us/534/0948-07", "/us/534/0948-06", "/us/534/0948-04", "/us/534/0948-03", "/us/534/0948-02", "/us/534/0948-09", "/us/534/0948-10", "/us/534/0948-08" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9611137, 9610658, 9611044, 9610279, 9611213, 9610927, 9610831, 9610512, 9610354, 9611412, 9611316, 9610421, 9610751 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/1022-10", "/us/528/1022-05", "/us/528/1022-09", "/us/528/1022-01", "/us/528/1022-11", "/us/528/1022-08", "/us/528/1022-07", "/us/528/1022-04", "/us/528/1022-02", "/us/528/1022-13", "/us/528/1022-12", "/us/528/1022-03", "/us/528/1022-06" ] }, { "cite": "96 F.3d 1204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7649893 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1214", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e conclude that the amended 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 contains an implied cause of action against state actors, thereby overturning Jett's holding that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy against state actors for the violation of rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/96/1204-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 F.3d 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11243432 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894", "parenthetical": "\"The sparse legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not reveal a contrary intent\" to Jett" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/222/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 F.3d 458", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11108801 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/246/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 F.3d 1228", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 288348 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1231", "parenthetical": "\"[N]othing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicates congressional intent to overrule this appellate case law [retaining \u00a7 1983 as a parallel remedy for public sector employment discrimination].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/148/1228-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 575", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6186066 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6211653 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "limiting the scope of \u00a7 1981" }, { "parenthetical": "limiting the scope of \u00a7 1981" }, { "parenthetical": "limiting the scope of \u00a7 1981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532005 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 820", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183218 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833-34" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "1968" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "1966", "parenthetical": "\"The legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress was persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171755 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "158" }, { "page": "1019-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 USC \u00a7 1982", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 409", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171870 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not mention 42 USC \u00a7 1982, and we cannot assume that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or procedural, in the prior statute.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not mention 42 USC \u00a7 1982, and we cannot assume that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or procedural, in the prior statute.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not mention 42 USC \u00a7 1982, and we cannot assume that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or procedural, in the prior statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 F.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 633280 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/749/1199-01" ] }, { "cite": "766 F.2d 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 343892 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "\"Aplaintiff may sue her state government employer for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment through \u00a7 1983 and escape Title VII's comprehensive remedial scheme, even if the same facts would suggest a violation of Title VII.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/766/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "870 F.2d 1411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11648946 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1415", "parenthetical": "\"We agree with the reasoning of those courts that have held that Title VII does not preempt an action under section 1983 for a violation of the fourteenth amendment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/870/1411-01" ] }, { "cite": "913 F.2d 1064", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10538579 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1079", "parenthetical": "\"We have previously held that the comprehensive scheme provided in Title VII does not preempt section 1983, and that discrimination claims may be brought under either statute, or both.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/913/1064-01" ] }, { "cite": "971 F.2d 585", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10516137 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "plaintiff is not precluded by Title VTI from bringing a claim under \u00a7 1983 for race discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/971/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 F.3d 539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 405327 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50", "parenthetical": "a public employee may assert claims for racial discrimination under both Title VII and \u00a7 1983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/114/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 F.3d 1057", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 978096 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063", "parenthetical": "\"On the other hand, it is well established that Title VII does not preempt \u00a7 1983 for public employers.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/128/1057-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 F.3d 251", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10523202 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255", "parenthetical": "\"We therefore hold that an employment discrimination plaintiff alleging the violation of a constitutional right may bring suit under \u00a7 1983 alone, and is not required to plead concurrently a violation of Title VII.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/36/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 F.3d 1231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11243598 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1239", "parenthetical": "\"We therefore ... hold that a section 1983 claim predicated on the violation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution - here, the right to equal protection of the laws - can be pleaded exclusive of a Title VII claim.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/223/1231-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 F.3d 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9136079 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/327/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "827 F.2d 952", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1754077 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "963", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e think it difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would uphold a ruling that Title VII in fact preempts the remedy available for a violation of the fourteenth amendment for intentional employment discrimination provided by \u00a7 1983.\"" }, { "page": "958" }, { "page": "958" }, { "page": "962" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/827/0952-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 F.3d 524", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10525900 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "\"Title VII does not supplant \u00a7 1983\"" }, { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/30/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 S. Ct. 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132168, 132164, 132224, 132319 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0836-02", "/nc/350/0836-04", "/nc/350/0836-03", "/nc/350/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 819", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240834 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2394579 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575564 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S. Ct. 190", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff] cannot bring an action under \u00a7 1983 for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights because [she] originally could have instituted a Title VII cause of action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff] cannot bring an action under \u00a7 1983 for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights because [she] originally could have instituted a Title VII cause of action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 870", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 326656, 325248, 325219, 326406, 327336, 323240, 323658, 328558, 327760, 326195, 324409, 325082, 327742 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Plaintiff] cannot bring an action under \u00a7 1983 for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights because [she] originally could have instituted a Title VII cause of action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0870-05", "/us/516/0870-04", "/us/516/0870-08", "/us/516/0870-02", "/us/516/0870-10", "/us/516/0870-01", "/us/516/0870-13", "/us/516/0870-09", "/us/516/0870-06", "/us/516/0870-07", "/us/516/0870-12", "/us/516/0870-03", "/us/516/0870-11" ] }, { "cite": "48 F.3d 1376", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7413075 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/48/1376-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541307 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-60", "parenthetical": "private sector employee may seek relief under both \u00a7 1981 and Title VII" }, { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "private sector employee may seek relief under both \u00a7 1981 and Title VII" }, { "page": "1720", "parenthetical": "private sector employee may seek relief under both \u00a7 1981 and Title VII" }, { "page": "460" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "1720" }, { "page": "461" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "1720-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 701", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6218818 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "2722", "parenthetical": "noting that Brown relied upon Congress' perception that federal employees lacked any remedy as indicating an intent to create an exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme for redress of federal employment discrimination" }, { "page": "735" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "2723" }, { "page": "734" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "2722" }, { "page": "732" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "2721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 F.3d 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1527495 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "complaint sufficient under Monell where it described county policies that resulted in plaintiffs injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/15/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 163", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6224800 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "plaintiff is only required to include \"a short and plain statement,\" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), of the basis of municipal liability" }, { "page": "524", "parenthetical": "plaintiff is only required to include \"a short and plain statement,\" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), of the basis of municipal liability" }, { "page": "1163", "parenthetical": "plaintiff is only required to include \"a short and plain statement,\" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), of the basis of municipal liability" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490618 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "2037-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Due to the fact that the plaintiff alleged all the necessary elements of a \u00a7 1983 claim in his complaint, his failure specifically to include the statute in the pleadings is not fatal to his case.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 Mass. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3871100 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Due to the fact that the plaintiff alleged all the necessary elements of a \u00a7 1983 claim in his complaint, his failure specifically to include the statute in the pleadings is not fatal to his case.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/374/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Pa. Commw. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1442321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere failure to specifically plead Section 1983 will not doom the complaint.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere failure to specifically plead Section 1983 will not doom the complaint.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/153/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001 UT 10", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "UT", "case_ids": [ 11084055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A party must allege a constitutional violation but need not refer specifically to section 1983 to successfully plead a violation of it.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"A party must allege a constitutional violation but need not refer specifically to section 1983 to successfully plead a violation of it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/26/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "835 F.2d 627", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10547901 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "dismissal improper although complaint did not specifically recite \u00a7 1983 because plaintiff was only required to allege that it was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/835/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529130 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2643851 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 144", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169865 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "1604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568312 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520550 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 F.2d 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 841067 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "plaintiff may not sue directly under the federal constitution for violations by state or local government officials, but rather must proceed under \u00a7 1983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/586/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440839 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11357693 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 16, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "242, 276, 285, 314, 323" }, { "page": "344-409" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "1095", "parenthetical": "amendment no. 846" }, { "page": "1382", "parenthetical": "amendment no. 877" }, { "page": "1517" }, { "page": "1404", "parenthetical": "\"[T]o make Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination would be inconsistent with our entire legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. It would jeopardize the degree and scope of remedies available to the workers of our country.\"" }, { "page": "1407, 1521, 1790" }, { "page": "1815, 1837, 1875" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1521, "char_count": 37507, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6043217068009604e-07, "percentile": 0.6843960786903021 }, "sha256": "7b70ec2b545673cd9060c995a8755be0326b0cf7941e8ee56eea661333853f28", "simhash": "1:5acab0101d3f4e07", "word_count": 6239 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:16.246957+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "VALERIE ENOCH, Plaintiff v. EDWARD R. INMAN and ALAMANCE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiff Valerie Enoch appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s race discrimination claims. Although, unfortunately, the complaint fails to specifically reference any statute as the legal basis for the claim, we hold that its allegations are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. Although defendants contend that a public sector employee may only challenge race discrimination by filing a claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq., a review of United States Supreme Court decisions and the legislative history of Title VII establishes that state or local governmental employees may pursue claims of race discrimination under Title VII, \u00a7 1983, or both.\nFacts\nAt the time of the events alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was an African-American employee of the Alamance County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d). On 30 December 1998, defendants advertised for a vacant program manager position with DSS. The advertisement stated that only applicants meeting the minimum qualifications should apply. The minimum qualifications included at least 24 months of supervisory experience in social work programs.\nWhen Ms. Enoch applied for the program manager position, she had 67 months of supervisory experience in social work programs. Three other people, all white, also applied for the position. Each had less supervisory experience in social work programs than Ms. Enoch: Linda Allison had 18 months, Alexa Jordan had 10 months, and Phillip Laughlin had 8 months.\nIn February 1999, defendant Edward R. Inman, who was the Director of DSS, interviewed the four applicants. After the initial interview, Mr. Inman eliminated Laughlin from consideration and granted second interviews to the three remaining applicants. Ms. Enoch learned in June 1999 that Mr. Inman had selected Ms. Allison for the position despite the fact that she did not possess the minimum qualifications for the position.\nMs. Enoch and her husband met with Mr. Inman to discuss Mr. Inman\u2019s reasons for selecting Ms. Allison rather than Ms. Enoch. During the course of the conversation, Mr. Inman reportedly stated, \u201cYou people always want to believe there is race involved. There was no race involved in this decision.\u201d Ms. Enoch\u2019s husband replied, \u201cA lot of Black people consider the term \u2018you people\u2019 in itself to be racist. ... I would appreciate it if you would not use the term with us.\u201d After the meeting ended and as Ms. Enoch and her husband were walking out the door, they both heard Mr. Inman repeat, \u201cYou people always choose to believe there\u2019s race involved.\u201d\nOn 27 March 2002, Ms. Enoch filed suit alleging that she had been subjected to racial discrimination in violation of her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief, that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and that plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial judge granted defendants\u2019 motion on 4 September 2002. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from that order.\nDiscussion\nMs. Enoch contends that her complaint asserts a claim for relief under both 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983. When a party files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the question for the court is whether the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory, whether properly labeled or not. Grant Constr. Co. v. McRae, 146 N.C. App. 370, 373, 553 S.E.2d 89, 91 (2001). The court must construe the complaint liberally and \u201cshould not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.\u201d Block v. County of Person, 141 N.C. App. 273, 277-78, 540 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2000). We review the trial court\u2019s dismissal de novo.\nDefendants correctly point out'that even though state and local governmental employees may sue for federal constitutional violations only by bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, the complaint appears to attempt to assert a claim directly under the federal constitution. See Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff may not sue directly under the federal constitution for violations by state or local government officials, but rather must proceed under \u00a7 1983). Nevertheless, \u201c[t]he legal theory set forth in the complaint does not determine the validity of the claim.\u201d Braun v. Glade Valley Sch., Inc., 77 N.C. App. 83, 86, 334 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1985). An incorrect choice of legal theory \u201cshould not result in dismissal of the claim if the allegations are sufficient to state a claim under some legal theory.\u201d Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 202, 254 S.E.2d 611, 625 (1979). We must, therefore, determine whether the allegations of plaintiff\u2019s complaint are sufficient, as plaintiff argues, to support claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 and \u00a7 1983 even though plaintiff\u2019s complaint labels her claims solely as violations of the United States Constitution.\nI. Whether Plaintiffs Complaint is Sufficient to State a Claim for Relief under \u00a7 1983.\nSection 1983 provides that \u201c[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (2000). In order to state a claim under \u00a7 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendant \u201cdeprived him of a right secured by the \u2018Constitution and laws\u2019 of the United States[;]\u201d and (2) that defendant acted \u201cunder color of law.\u201d Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 150, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (1970).\nDefendants argue that plaintiffs failure to specifically reference \u00a7 1983 renders the complaint deficient. This Court rejected this contention in Jones v. City of Greensboro, 51 N.C. App. 571, 592-93, 277 S.E.2d 562, 576 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Fowler v. Valencourt, 334 N.C. 345, 435 S.E.2d 530 (1993), holding that a trial court erred in granting a motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff\u2019s complaint contained no specific reference to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 because the factual allegations of the complaint, when liberally construed, supported a claim for relief under \u00a7 1983.\nNumerous other jurisdictions have held likewise that the mere fact that a complaint neglects to specify that it is based on \u00a7 1983 does not require dismissal. See, e.g., Am. United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids, 835 F.2d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissal improper although complaint did not specifically recite \u00a7 1983 because plaintiff was only required to allege that it was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law); Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10 \u00b6 34 n.14, 26 P.3d 193, 200 n.14 (2001) (\u201cA party must allege a constitutional violation but need not refer specifically to section 1983 to successfully plead a violation of it.\u201d); Heinly v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 153 Pa. Commw. 599, 605 n.5, 621 A.2d 1212, 1215 n.5 (1993) (\u201c[T]he mere failure to specifically plead Section 1983 will not doom the complaint.\u201d); Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 374 Mass. 475, 484 n.8, 373 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 n.8 (1978) (\u201cDue to the fact that the plaintiff alleged all the necessary elements of a \u00a7 1983 claim in his complaint, his failure specifically to include the statute in the pleadings is not fatal to his case.\u201d).\nThus, the fact that the complaint does not reference \u00a7 1983, standing alone, does not justify dismissal of plaintiffs complaint. We stress, however, that specification of the statute upon which a plaintiff relies is by far the preferable course.\nWe next turn to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Plaintiffs complaint alleges each of the elements required by Adickes. First, she alleges that defendant Inman subjected her to race discrimination in failing to promote her in violation of her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, plaintiff alleges that Inman, as the DSS Director, was acting under color of law when discriminating against plaintiff. These allegations, including the factual details summarized above, are sufficient to support a \u00a7 1983 claim against an individual government employee.\nIn addition, however, plaintiffs complaint must include sufficient allegations to establish grounds to hold DSS liable. In Monell v. New York City Dep\u2019t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), the Supreme Court held for the first time that a local governmental body could be sued under \u00a7 1983, but that liability could not be based upon a theory of respondeat superior. Under Monell, a municipality may be held liable only \u201cwhen execution of a government\u2019s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury[.]\u201d Id. at 694, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 638, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38.\nPlaintiff in this case has alleged that DSS \u201chas engaged in a longstanding pattern and practice against African American professionals, and has never placed an African American in a management position.\u201d Under notice pleading, there is no requirement that plaintiffs allegation be more specific. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517, 524, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (plaintiff is only required to include \u201ca short and plain statement,\u201d under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), of the basis of municipal liability). See also Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 1994) (complaint sufficient under Monell where it described county policies that resulted in plaintiffs injury). We hold, therefore, that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim under \u00a7 1983 for violation of her equal protection rights against both defendants.\nDefendants, however, urge that a state or local governmental employee subjected to race discrimination may only sue under Title VII. More specifically, defendants argue first that, under Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598, 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989), a state or local governmental employee may not sue for race discrimination under \u00a7 1981, but rather is limited to \u00a7 1983. Defendants then contend that any \u00a7 1983 claims are in turn preempted by Title VII.\nIf we were to adopt defendants\u2019 reasoning, we would be holding that private employees may sue for race discrimination under both Title VII and \u00a7 1981, but that state or local governmental employees are limited only to Title VII. Private employees could take advantage of the multi-year statute of limitations of \u00a7 1981, would be subjected to no cap on compensatory or punitive damages, and could sue employers with fewer than 15 employees. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 301, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975) (private sector employee may seek relief under both \u00a7 1981 and Title VII). On the other hand, under defendants\u2019 approach, state or local governmental employees could only sue for race discrimination if they complied with the stringent time limitations of Title VII, they could not sue any employers with fewer than 15 employees, and any compensatory or punitive damages would be subject to the caps set forth in 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981a (2000).\nWe are unwilling to so dramatically limit a state or local governmental employee\u2019s rights in comparison with the rights of a private employee confronted with the same unlawful, discriminatory conduct without a clear expression of such an intent by Congress. Not only have defendants failed to point to any evidence of this intent, we do not believe that their reasoning is consistent with United States Supreme Court authority or the legislative history of Title VII.\nDefendants argue that we are bound by a footnote in the Fourth Circuit decision of Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 n.6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 870, 133 L. Ed. 2d 126, 116 S. Ct. 190 (1995) (\u201c[Plaintiff] cannot bring an action under \u00a7 1983 for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights because [she] originally could have instituted a Title VII cause of action.\u201d). The North Carolina Supreme Court has, however, twice held that North Carolina appellate courts are not bound, as to matters of federal law, by decisions of federal courts other than the United States Supreme Court. In Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.C. 525, 529, 189 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1972), the Supreme Court held:\nOur attention has been directed to no decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which determines either of these questions [of federal law]. Decisions of the lower federal courts, construing this Act of Congress, are not binding upon us, notwithstanding our respect for the tribunals which rendered them .... We must, therefore, construe this Act of Congress ourselves ....\nSimilarly, the Supreme Court in State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), wrote:\nState courts are no less obligated to protect and no less capable of protecting a defendant\u2019s federal constitutional rights than are federal courts. In performing this obligation a state court should exercise and apply its own independent judgment, treating, of course, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as binding and according to decisions of lower federal courts such persuasiveness as these decisions might reasonably command.\nSee also State v. Adams, 132 N.C. App. 819, 820, 513 S.E.2d 588, 589 (in construing the Double Jeopardy clause, holding, \u201cwith the exception of decisions of the United States Supreme Court, federal appellate decisions are not binding upon either the appellate or trial courts of this State\u201d), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 836, 538 S.E.2d 570, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022, 145 L. Ed. 2d 414, 120 S. Ct. 534 (1999).\nIn any event, Hughes does not appear to be the law in the Fourth Circuit. Prior to Hughes, the Fourth Circuit rendered two decisions both expressly holding that Title VII does not preclude a public sector employee from bringing a \u00a7 1983 action based on violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994) (\u201cTitle VII does not supplant \u00a7 1983\u201d); Keller v. Prince George\u2019s County, 827 F.2d 952, 963 (4th Cir. 1987) (\u201c[W]e think it difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would uphold a ruling that Title VII in fact preempts the remedy available for a violation of the fourteenth amendment for intentional employment discrimination provided by \u00a7 1983.\u201d). The Fourth Circuit recently recognized that Hughes could not overrule these two decisions:\nShortly after our decision in Beardsley was issued, however, a separate panel of our court, in a footnote, declined to consider a public sector employee\u2019s sex discrimination claim -under \u00a7 1983. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995). . . . This footnote, in turn, has led several district courts to erroneously conclude that [they] must follow Hughes, instead of Keller, either because Hughes is a more recent decision by this court or because the plaintiff in Hughes, unlike the plaintiff in Keller, did not bring a Title VII claim along with a Section 1983 claim. . . .\nIt is quite settled that a panel of this circuit cannot overrule a prior panel. Only the en banc court can do that. . . . And, we are unpersuaded that the viability of a \u00a7 1983 claim hinges upon whether a plaintiff pleads a Title VII claim alongside it. . . . Because this panel is bound to follow the decisions in Keller and Beardsley, we reverse and remand [plaintiffs] \u00a7 1983 claim to the district court for further proceedings.\nBooth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2003).\nWith the exception of the footnote in Hughes, all the federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue have held, consistent with Keller, Beardsley, and Booth, that a public employee is not limited to Title VII, but may also sue for discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment under \u00a7 1983. See Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (\u201cWe therefore ... hold that a section 1983 claim predicated on the violation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution \u2014 here, the right to equal protection of the laws \u2014 can be pleaded exclusive of a Title VII claim.\u201d); Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1994) (\u201cWe therefore hold that an employment discrimination plaintiff alleging the violation of a constitutional right may bring suit under \u00a7 1983 alone, and is not required to plead concurrently a violation of Title VII.\u201d); Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (\u201cOn the other hand, it is well established that Title VII does not preempt \u00a7 1983 for public employers.\u201d); Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1997) (a public employee may assert claims for racial discrimination under both Title VII and \u00a7 1983); Notari v. Denver Water Dep\u2019t, 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff is not precluded by Title VTI from bringing a claim under \u00a7 1983 for race discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1079 (3d Cir. 1990) (\u201cWe have previously held that the comprehensive scheme provided in Title VII does not preempt section 1983, and that discrimination claims may be brought under either statute, or both.\u201d); Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cWe agree with the reasoning of those courts that have held that Title VII does not preempt an action under section 1983 for a violation of the fourteenth amendment.\u201d); Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1985) (\u201cAplaintiff may sue her state government employer for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment through \u00a7 1983 and escape Title VII\u2019s comprehensive remedial scheme, even if the same facts would suggest a violation of Title VII.\u201d); Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) (\u201cWhere an employee establishes employer conduct which violates both Title VII and rights derived from another source \u2014 the Constitution or a federal statute \u2014 which existed at the time of the enactment of Title VII, the claim based on the other source is independent of the Title VII claim, and the plaintiff may seek the remedies provided by \u00a7 1983 in addition to those created by Title VIL\u201d). After reviewing these decisions, we find no reason to diverge from the overwhelming weight of authority, especially in light of Title VII\u2019s legislative history and the United States Supreme Court\u2019s relevant decisions.\nOriginally, as passed in 1964, Title VII did not provide a remedy for discrimination by public employers. Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to provide remedies for federal, state, and local employees. The question at issue here is whether Congress intended, through the 1972 amendments, to make Title VII the exclusive remedy for state and local governmental employees.\nAs Keller notes, 827 F.2d at 958, the House Committee on Education and Labor first proposed amendments to Title VII to eliminate the exemption for state and local employers. See H.R. 1746, Subcomm. on Labor, U.S. Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, (H.R. 1746, P. L. 92-261) Amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1-60 (Comm. Print 1972) (hereafter \u201cLegislative History\u201d). The House Committee Report expressly explained that these amendments were not intended to eliminate the right to sue under \u00a7 1983:\nIn establishing the applicability of Title VTI to State and local employees, the Committee wishes to emphasize that the individual\u2019s right to file a civil action in his own behalf, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983, is in no way affected. . . . The bill, therefore, by extending jurisdiction to State and local government employees does not affect existing rights that such individuals have already been granted by previous legislation. . . . Inclusion of state and local employees among those enjoying the protection of Title VII provides an alternate administrative remedy to the existing prohibition against discrimination \u201cunder color of state law\u201d as embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\nLegislative History, at 78-79. When, however, the bill reached the House floor, it was amended to make Title VII \u201cthe exclusive remedy of any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice.\u201d Id. at 144. Over objections that the amendment would effectively erase the Civil Rights Acts, the House approved the amendment to the bill. Id. at 242, 276, 285, 314, 323.\nWhen the bill moved to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare responded to testimony criticizing the exclusivity provision and substituted a bill that omitted that provision. Id. at 344-409. The Senate Committee Report explained its intent: \u201c[N] either the above provisions regarding the individual\u2019s right to sue under title VII, nor any of the other provisions of this bill, are meant to affect existing rights granted under other laws.\u201d Id. at 433. When the committee bill was reported to the floor of the Senate, amendments were proposed restoring the exclusivity provision in order to bar remedies such as \u00a7 1983. Id. at 1095 (amendment no. 846); id. at 1382 (amendment no. 877). During the debates on the bill and the amendments, the sponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Williams, explained:\n[The Civil Rights Act of 1866] was followed up, in 1871, by another provision. These are basic laws from which, as the Attorney General stated, developed a body of law that should be preserved and not wiped out, and that all available resources should be used in the effort to correct discrimination in employment.\nId. at 1517. See also id. at 1404 (\u201c[T]o make Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination would be inconsistent with our entire legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. It would jeopardize the degree and scope of remedies available to the workers of our country.\u201d), 1400, 1403, 1405, 1512. The Senate ultimately rejected the amendments and passed the bill without any exclusivity provision. Id. at 1407, 1521, 1790. When the House and Senate bills were sent to conference, the House agreed to the omission of the exclusivity provision. Id. at 1815, 1837, 1875.\nLike the Fourth Circuit in Keller, we believe that this legislative history \u2014 in which Congress expressly declined to adopt an exclusivity provision so as to preserve rights under \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983\u2014 \u201cclearly indicates\u201d that the 1972 amendments were not intended to preempt the preexisting remedy under \u00a7 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Keller, 827 F.2d at 958. In the face of this legislative history, we cannot simply assume otherwise. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416-17 n.20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1189, 1194-95 n.20, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2191 n.20 (1968) (\u201cThe Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not mention 42 USC \u00a7 1982, and we cannot assume that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or procedural, in the prior statute.\u201d). As the court in Keller explained:\nTo conclude that Title VII preempts an action under \u00a7 1983 for a violation of the fourteenth amendment, we would be required to substitute our own notions of federal policy for those of Congress. The final result would vitiate the intent of \u00a7 2 of the 1972 Act to adopt an aggressive pro-civil rights measure. We decline to adopt as law the view of a minority of Congress when the majority will is so well documented.\nKeller, 827 F.2d at 962.\nMoreover, this view is consistent with the analysis of the United States Supreme Court. In 1974, only two years after the amendments to Title VII, the Court pointed to Congress\u2019 rejection in 1964 and 1972 of amendments that would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination and stated \u201cthe legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.\u201d Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147, 158, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1019-20 (1974).\nA year later, the Court noted \u201cthe independence of the avenues of relief respectively available under Title VII and the older \u00a7 1981.\u201d Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 301, 95 S. Ct. at 1720. In holding that a private employee may choose to sue under \u00a7 1981 rather than Title VII, the Court rejected arguments that allowing claims under other statutes would undermine Title VII:\nBut these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one. Under some circumstances, the administrative route may be highly preferred over the litigatory; under others, the reverse may be true. We are disinclined, in the face of congressional emphasis upon the existence and independence of the two remedies, to infer any positive preference for one over the other, without a more definite expression in the legislation Congress has enacted, as, for example, a proscription of a \u00a7 1981 action while an EEOC claim is pending.\nId. at 461, 44 L. Ed. 2d at 302, 95 S. Ct. at 1720-21.\nIn 1976, the Supreme Court held, after again reviewing the 1972 amendments, that federal employees asserting employment discrimination claims are limited to Title VII. Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 48 L. Ed. 2d 402, 96 S. Ct. 1961 (1976). In doing so, however, the Court stressed that the legislative history of Title VII explicitly manifested an intent to preserve existing discrimination remedies. Id. at 833-34, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 412, 96 S. Ct. at 1968. The Court reasoned that since Congress was unaware of any pre-existing remedies for federal employees, it could not have intended to preserve such remedies. Id. at 828, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 96 S. Ct. at 1966 (\u201cThe legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress was persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy.\u201d). The legislative history, or lack thereof, was dispositive. See also Jett, 491 U.S. at 734, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 626, 109 S. Ct. at 2722 (noting that Brown relied upon Congress\u2019 perception that federal employees lacked any remedy as indicating an intent to create an exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme for redress of federal employment discrimination).\nIn 1979, the Supreme Court again emphasized in Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 60 L. Ed. 2d 957, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979), that the Civil Rights Acts that gave rise to \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983 survived the passage of Title VII. Although the Court held that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1985(3) could not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII, the Court noted:\n[T]he Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 were explicitly discussed during the course of the legislative debates on both the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the 1972 Amendments to the 1964 Act, and the view was consistently expressed that the earlier statutes would, not be implicitly repealed. . . . Specific references were made to \u00a7\u00a7 1981 and 1983, but, significantly, no notice appears to have been taken of \u00a7 1985.\u201d\nId. at 377 n.21, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 967 n.21, 99 S. Ct. at 2351 n.21 (emphasis added).\nFinally, defendants\u2019 contention that \u00a7 1983 claims are barred by Title VII cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Jett, addressing the question whether state or local governmental employees may sue directly under \u00a7 1981. The Court held: \u201c[T]he express \u2018action at law\u2019 provided by \u00a7 1983 for the \u2018deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,\u2019 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by \u00a7 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.\u201d Jett, 491 U.S. at 735, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 627, 109 S. Ct. at 2723. Jett did not strip public sector employees of their substantive rights under \u00a7 1981, but held that \u201cCongress thought that the declaration of rights in \u00a7 1981 would be enforced against state actors through the remedial provisions of \u00a7 1983.\u201d Id. at 734, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 626, 109 S. Ct. at 2722.\nThe Supreme Court would not have held that \u00a7 1981 rights could be enforced under \u00a7 1983 if it nonetheless believed that no remedy was available to local and state governmental employees under \u00a7 1983 for employment discrimination. Although the Supreme Court had implied a private right of action under \u00a7 1981 for private employees because there was no other procedural mechanism to enforce their rights under \u00a7 1981, the Jett Court found, with respect to local and state employees, \u201c[t]hat is manifestly not the case,\u201d because of the existence of \u00a7 1983. Id. at 732, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 624, 109 S. Ct. at 2721. If \u00a7 1983 is not available as a remedy, then the entire underpinning for the Supreme Court\u2019s decision evaporates. Jett presumes the existence of a remedy for race discrimination under \u00a7 1983.\nCourts have also considered the effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. In 1991, Congress passed a new Civil Rights Act, amending \u00a7 1981 to overrule Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (limiting the scope of \u00a7 1981) and amending Title VII to allow jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages (subject to caps). As the Fourth Circuit recognized in Beardsley, however, there is no indication that this Act manifested a change by Congress from its previous desire that Title VII supplement rather than supplant other existing laws governing race discrimination. Beardsley, 30 F.3d at 527. We agree that \u201cit is quite unlikely that Congress implicitly intended the 1991 Act to bar claimants from seeking relief under \u00a7 1983. It is more reasonable to presume that Congress intended both avenues of relief to remain open.\u201d Id. at 527. It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that Congress is presumed to be aware of a judicial construction of a statute and to have adopted that construction when it re-enacts that statute without expressing any intention to reject the judicial interpretation. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40, 46, 98 S. Ct. 866, 870 (1978). Since Congress, when amending Title VII in 1991, never expressed any intention to preclude \u00a7 1983 claims, there is no basis for concluding that Congress\u2019 intention has changed since 1972. See also Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 1998) (\u201c[N]othing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicates congressional intent to overrule this appellate case law [retaining \u00a7 1983 as a parallel remedy for public sector employment discrimination].\u201d).\nWe, therefore, hold that public sector employees may sue for discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under \u00a7 1983. Title VII does not provide an exclusive remedy for unlawful employment discrimination.\nII. Whether Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint States a Claim for Relief under \u00a7 1981.\nPlaintiff also contends that her complaint is sufficient to state a claim for relief under \u00a7 1981, which provides:\n(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981(a) (2000). The 1991 Civil Rights Act amended \u00a7 1981 to confirm that the term \u201cmake and enforce contracts\u201d includes \u201cthe making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981(b) (2000).\nEven though, as discussed above, \u201can incorrect choice of legal theory should not result in dismissal of the claim if the allegations are sufficient to state a claim under some legal theory[,]\u201d the complaint must still \u201cgive sufficient notice of the wrong complained of[.]\u201d Stanback, 297 N.C. at 202, 254 S.E.2d at 625. In plaintiffs complaint, \u201cthe wrong complained of\u2019 is repeatedly asserted to be a violation of plaintiffs federal constitutional rights. There is no indication in the complaint that plaintiff is attempting to enforce her substantive rights under \u00a7 1981. Even with notice pleading, we do not believe that the complaint gives sufficient notice that it is asserting a claim for violation of plaintiffs rights under \u00a7 1981 as opposed to the federal constitution.\nDefendants contend that any such claim is, in any event, barred by Jett. We note that in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress added a subsection (c) to \u00a7 1981 that provides: \u201cThe rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981(c) (2000) (emphasis added). The courts that have addressed this issue have split on the question whether \u00a7 1981(c) overrules Jett. Compare Oden v. Oktibbeha County, 246 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir.) (holding that the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act does not indicate an intent to overrule Jett), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 948, 151 L. Ed. 2d 258, 122 S. Ct. 341 (2001); Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000) (\u201cThe sparse legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not reveal a contrary intent\u201d to Jett) with Fed\u2019n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 1996) (\u201c[W]e conclude that the amended 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 contains an implied cause of action against state actors, thereby overturning Jett\u2019s holding that 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy against state actors for the violation of rights under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981.\u201d). Because of our holding, we need not address this question.\nIn summary, we hold that plaintiffs complaint states a claim for relief under \u00a7 1983, that Title VII does not preclude claims under \u00a7 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in granting the motion to dismiss.\nReversed.\nJudges McGEE and BRYANT concur.\n. The parties have not addressed any immunity defenses, whether defendant DSS is a state or local governmental entity, or whether DSS is a \u201cperson\u201d under \u00a7 1983. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as expressing an opinion as to any of those issues.\n. Section 1981a(b)(3) limits compensatory and punitive damages awarded under Title VII to a total of $50,000 for employers with fewer than 101 employees, to $100,000 for an employer with fewer than 201 employees, to $200,000 for an employer with fewer than 601 employees, and $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees.\n. Keller provides a comprehensive analysis of Title VU\u2019s legislative history. In this opinion, we simply note the most pertinent points.\n. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 ultimately became \u00a7 1981, while the Civil Rights Act of 1871 enacted the provision that became \u00a7 1983.\n. In other words, an employee could not base a \u00a7 1985(3) claim on the statutory rights of Title VII.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McSurely & Osment, by Alan McSurely and Ashley Osment, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Office of the County Attorney of Alamance County, by David I. Smith, and Adams Kleemeier Hagan Hannah & Fouts, by Brian S. Clarke, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VALERIE ENOCH, Plaintiff v. EDWARD R. INMAN and ALAMANCE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendants\nNo. COA02-1410\n(Filed 1 June 2004)\nPublic Officers and Employees\u2014 race discrimination claim\u2014 \u00a7 1983 \u2014 Title VII\nThe trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss plaintiff county DSS employee\u2019s race discrimination claims even though the complaint appears to attempt to assert a claim directly under the federal constitution instead of referencing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, because: (1) the mere fact that a complaint neglects to specify that it is based on \u00a7 1983 does not require dismissal even though referencing the statute is the more preferable course; (2) the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to support a \u00a7 1983 claim for violation of plaintiff\u2019s equal protection rights against both defendant DSS director individually and defendant DSS employer; and (3) a state or local government employee may pursue claims of race discrimination under Title VII, \u00a7 1983, or both.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 September 2002 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr., in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 June 2003.\nMcSurely & Osment, by Alan McSurely and Ashley Osment, for plaintiff-appellant.\nOffice of the County Attorney of Alamance County, by David I. Smith, and Adams Kleemeier Hagan Hannah & Fouts, by Brian S. Clarke, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0415-01", "first_page_order": 447, "last_page_order": 461 }