{ "id": 8899319, "name": "BARBARA GARRISON DALTON, Plaintiff v. ROBERT FRANK DALTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Dalton v. Dalton", "decision_date": "2004-06-01", "docket_number": "No. COA03-839", "first_page": "584", "last_page": "588", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "164 N.C. App. 584" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 S.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205", "parenthetical": "\"fraud may be said to embrace all acts, omissions, and concealments\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599905 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "\"fraud may be said to embrace all acts, omissions, and concealments\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703", "parenthetical": "\"[f]raud rests upon deception by misrepresentation or concealment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559944 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191", "parenthetical": "\"[f]raud rests upon deception by misrepresentation or concealment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080318 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548532 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "holding when one \"panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "holding when one \"panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "Greene, J. dissenting" }, { "page": "877-78" }, { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358522 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "Greene, J. dissenting" }, { "page": "508-09" }, { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522670 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522103 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525985 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0592-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 11636, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.485357372190296e-08, "percentile": 0.44584529831662 }, "sha256": "fa49fce38f30c154bea5d9839e4b0fd2d3a4b352d0a0051a9501c3515de24f32", "simhash": "1:65257376543d4446", "word_count": 1819 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:16.246957+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "BARBARA GARRISON DALTON, Plaintiff v. ROBERT FRANK DALTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nRobert Frank Dalton (\u201cdefendant\u201d) is appealing the entry of summary judgment against him on his counterclaim for equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital and divisible property. We affirm.\nDefendant and Barbara Garrison Dalton (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) were married on 22 May 1982. On or about 31 December 2000, the parties separated. The parties executed a document on 25 January 2001 entitled \u201cSeparation and Property Settlement Agreement.\u201d The agreement distributed the parties\u2019 real property and personal property, including seven parcels of real property, household and personal belongings, vehicles, bank and financial accounts and retirement benefits. In dividing the parties\u2019 retirement accounts, the agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows: \u201cf. Retirement Benefits. Husband shall be the sole owner of all funds and benefits in his name in the SEP account with Wachovia. Wife shall be the sole owner of all funds and benefits in her name in the SEP account with Wachovia.\u201d As of the date of separation, plaintiff\u2019s retirement savings account was valued at approximately $600,000 while defendant\u2019s retirement savings account was valued at approximately $100,000.\nOn 9 July 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint for absolute divorce and cited the parties\u2019 separation agreement as resolving \u201c[a]ny and all claims of the parties for support, alimony and/or equitable distribution of marital property.\u201d In an amended answer, defendant counterclaimed for equitable distribution, seeking to set aside the separation agreement on the grounds of fraud, constructive fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake, undue influence, unconscionability and manifest unfairness, and failure to observe the proper formalities in executing the agreement. Plaintiff replied to defendant\u2019s answer asserting defendant\u2019s counterclaims were barred by various affirmative defenses, including accord and satisfaction, waiver, estop-pel, and ratification. On 24 January 2003, plaintiff moved for summary judgment \u201con the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact related to Defendant\u2019s Counterclaim, and Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment in her favor as a matter of law.\u201d In an order filed 19 March 2003, the trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion. Defendant appeals.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003). The party moving for summary judgment must establish the lack of any triable issue, and all inferences of fact from the evidence proffered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion. Boyce v. Meade, 71 N.C. App. 592, 593, 322 S.E.2d 605, 607 (1984). Nonetheless, \u201c[sjummary judgment should be looked upon with favor where no genuine issue of material fact is presented.\u201d Lowry v. Lowry, 99 N.C. App. 246, 249, 393 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1990).\nHere, defendant asserts plaintiff engaged in a series of \u201cexpertly-machinated manipulations and deceptions\u201d resulting in \u201chis financial fleecing.\u201d Defendant contends the marital history of plaintiff\u2019s dominance conditioned him to follow her advice and, when they decided to separate, plaintiff suggested she prepare their separation agreement without involving attorneys and he assented. Defendant further contends that, after the unequal distribution of the parties\u2019 retirement savings accounts, plaintiff fraudulently or mistakenly represented to defendant that the law in North Carolina required each of them to retain their respective retirement savings accounts as their separate property.\nIt should be noted at the outset that there was no confusion as to any issue of fact on the part of either of the parties. To the contrary, both parties readily concede that (1) plaintiff had a retirement savings account in her name with approximately $600,000, (2) defendant had a retirement savings account in his name with approximately $100,000, and (3) both knew the respective amounts in each account. Defendant\u2019s claim depends on his assertion that plaintiff misrepresented the law of North Carolina when she divided the parties\u2019 retirement benefits in the separation agreement. In short, our holding is limited to situations involving misrepresentations of law and not of fact.\n\u201cA separation agreement which is not incorporated into a court judgment is a contract[.]\u201d Rose v. Rose, 108 N.C. App. 90, 94, 422 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1992). Generally speaking, a party cannot attack the making of a contract on the basis of fraud where the proof regarding the misrepresentation or misstatement relates to a matter of law. Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts \u00a7 69:10 (4th ed. 1993). This is based primarily on the following related principles: \u201cthat everyone is equally capable of determining the law, is presumed to know the law and is bound to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he or she has been misled.\u201d Id. A widely held exception to this rule is \u201cwhere there is a relation of trust and confidence between the parties[.]\u201d Avriett v. Avriett, 88 N.C. App. 506, 512, 363 S.E.2d 875, 880 (1988) (Greene, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). This exception, however, cannot avail defendant.\nIn Avriett, a wife claimed her former husband\u2019s failure to reveal his attorney\u2019s legal advice constituted fraud. The husband failed to reveal the \u201csignificant \u2018difference between the ramifications of alimony and property settlement as it pertains to the [husband\u2019s] military pension[.]\u2019 Id. The majority held the wife\u2019s claim for fraud was fatally deficient for three reasons. Id., 88 N.C. App. at 508-09, 363 S.E.2d at 877-78. One of the three alternative and independent grounds upon which the wife\u2019s claim failed was that \u201cfraud cannot be based upon ignorance of the law.\u201d Id., 88 N.C. App. at 508, 363 S.E.2d at 878. In so doing, this Court rejected the proposition that the existence of a relationship of confidence and trust operates as an exception to the general rule that fraud cannot be premised upon a misrepresentation of law. Id. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that each of these deficiencies was propounded by the majority as fatal to the wife\u2019s claim despite the dissent\u2019s specific reference to the exception in question. Accordingly, we are bound by our holding in Avriett and, thus, conclude that plaintiff\u2019s claims premised upon fraud axe fatally deficient. See In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (holding when one \u201cpanel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court\u201d).\nIn the alternative, defendant, relying on Durham v. Creech, asserts the separation agreement should be reformed because appellee\u2019s \u201cinducing statements about the law \u2018requiring\u2019 the parties to retain savings in their individual names ... clearly demonstrate she also was mistaken (at least) about the law.\u201d See id., 32 N.C. App. 55, 231 S.E.2d 163 (1977). Relief has been granted where there \u201cexist[s] ... a mutual mistake as to a material fact comprising the essence of the agreement....\u201d Lancaster v. Lancaster, 138 N.C. App. 459, 465, 530 S.E.2d 82, 85 (2000) (emphasis added). However, \u201c[a]bare mistake of law generally affords no grounds for reformation.\u201d Durham, 32 N.C. App. at 60, 231 S.E.2d at 167. In Durham, the sellers of certain real property sought to have the deed reformed to reflect the intention of the parties to reserve a life estate for the sellers. The deed failed to include the language reserving the life estate due to the mistake of the draftsman. This Court held a directed verdict for the buyers was improper because \u201cthe failure to accomplish the intention of the parties, to reserve a life estate, was a mistake of fact which will afford reformation.\u201d Id. This Court\u2019s analysis in Durham turned on the deed\u2019s failure to accomplish the intention of the parties. However, in the instant case, the separation agreement succeeded in accomplishing the intention of the parties. Specifically, the parties intended to distribute their retirement benefits pursuant to an erroneous understanding of North Carolina law. That the parties\u2019 distribution scheme, in actuality, differed from that established by North Carolina law constitutes merely a \u201cbare mistake of law.\u201d Defendant\u2019s claim cannot avail him.\nFinally, defendant contends the separation agreement cannot be upheld on the grounds that it was not acknowledged by both parties before a certifying officer as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10.1 (2003). Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the record contains a copy of the separation agreement bearing a notary stamp for the signatures of both plaintiff and defendant. We have carefully considered defendant\u2019s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.\n. We do not perceive a meaningful distinction between the plaintiffs failure to reveal certain information in Avriett as compared to plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation in the instant case. See Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 191, 179 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1971) (\u201c[f]raud rests upon deception by misrepresentation or concealment\u201d); Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 113, 63 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1951) (\u201cfraud may be said to embrace all acts, omissions, and concealments\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Diane Q. Hamrick, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Robert R. Schoch, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BARBARA GARRISON DALTON, Plaintiff v. ROBERT FRANK DALTON, Defendant\nNo. COA03-839\n(Filed 1 June 2004)\nDivorce\u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 unincorporated separation agreement \u2014 mistake of law\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff wife on defendant husband\u2019s counterclaim for equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital and divisible property even though defendant sought to set aside the parties\u2019 separation agreement drafted by plaintiff based on the fact that plaintiff fraudulently or mistakenly represented to defendant that the law in North Carolina required each of them to retain their respective retirement savings accounts as their separate property, because: (1) a separation agreement which is not incorporated into a court judgment is a contract, and a party cannot attack the making of a contract on the basis of fraud where the proof regarding the misrepresentation or misstatement relates to a matter of law since everyone is equally capable of determining the law; (2) the existence of a relationship of confidence and trust does not operate as an exception to the general rule that fraud cannot be premised upon a misrepresentation of law; (3) a bare mistake of law generally affords no grounds for reformation, and the separation agreement in the instant case succeeded in accomplishing the intention of the parties to distribute their retirement benefits pursuant to an erroneous understanding of North Carolina law; and (4) contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the record contained a copy of the separation agreement bearing a notary stamp for the signatures of both plaintiff and defendant.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 19 March 2003 by Judge Thomas G. Foster in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 April 2004.\nDiane Q. Hamrick, for plaintiff-appellee.\nRobert R. Schoch, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0584-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 620 }