{ "id": 8900335, "name": "JEFFREY PAUL TRIVETTE, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Trivette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "2004-06-01", "docket_number": "No. COA03-986", "first_page": "680", "last_page": "686", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "164 N.C. App. 680" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520789 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497849 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790083, 790182, 790069, 790070, 790172 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0359-05", "/nc/340/0359-02", "/nc/340/0359-01", "/nc/340/0359-03", "/nc/340/0359-04" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917278 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138403, 138376, 138473, 138511, 138363 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0371-02", "/nc/354/0371-04", "/nc/354/0371-05", "/nc/354/0371-01", "/nc/354/0371-03" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433394 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2984985 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189113 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707-08" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" }, { "page": "(b)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520789 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 14672, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.43904972838184775 }, "sha256": "4ad235104dbbebcbb4dc017d4e2651d44de2102c13850965b6a2fe66989fbff2", "simhash": "1:89235c5203b72ed8", "word_count": 2328 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:16.246957+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge McGEE concurs.", "Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs in the result by separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "JEFFREY PAUL TRIVETTE, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nJeffrey Paul Trivette (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from a judgment granting summary judgment for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (\u201cdefendant\u201d) and denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. We affirm.\nI. Background\nOn '17 August 2000, plaintiff was operating his vehicle and was hit by a 1992 Ford owned by Jose Hernandez (\u201cHernandez\u201d). At the time of the accident, a policy issued by New South Insurance Company (\u201cNew South\u201d) provided Hernandez with liability limits of $25,000.00 per person and $50,000.00 per accident. Plaintiff claimed damages for bodily injuries sustained in the accident and w;as paid the per person liability limit of $25,000.00 in Hernandez\u2019s policy.\nPlaintiff owned an automobile insurance policy issued by Integon Casualty Insurance Company (\u201cIntegon\u201d) that provided uninsured motorist (\u201cUM\u201d) coverage limits of $30,000.00 per person and $60,000.00 per accident. Plaintiff also filed a UM claim with Integon, contending Hernandez was underinsured. Integon agreed and paid plaintiff $5,000.00, the difference between Hernandez\u2019s policy limits and Integon\u2019s per person limit.\nAt the time of the accident, plaintiff lived with his parents who were named insureds under an automobile policy issued by defendant. This policy contained UM limits of $50,000.00 per person and $100,000.00 per accident. Plaintiff claimed damages for bodily injury in excess of the $30,000.00 received from New South and Integon. Defendant contended entitlement to a credit or setoff for the $25,000.00 liability paid by New South and the $5,000.00 UM payment previously paid by Integon. Defendant paid plaintiff $20,000.00 under the UM coverage and claimed it had met the policy\u2019s per person UM limit of $50,000.00.\nOn 3 October 2002, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action alleging defendant owed additional UM liability payments under the policy. Plaintiff contended the UM limits under all the insurance policies should be \u201cstacked\u201d or combined and that defendant was not entitled to a credit or setoff for the payments made by New South and Integon. Defendant denied further UM liability and filed a motion for summary judgment on 21 April 2003. Plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment on 14 May 2003. After reviewing the documents and hearing oral arguments, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Issue\nThe sole issue is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and concluding inter-policy stacking of UM coverage was prohibited by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3).\nIII. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment\nPlaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and in concluding that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.210X3) prohibits inter-policy stacking of UM coverage here.\nOur standard to review the granting of a motion for summary judgment is whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 705, 707-08, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 137, 591 S.E.2d 520 (2004), reh\u2019g denied, 2004 N.C. Lexis 520 (N.C. May 6, 2004) (citing Willis v. Town of Beaufort, 143 N.C. App. 106, 108, 544 S.E.2d 600, 603, disc. rev. denied, 354 N.C. 371, 555 S.E.2d 280 (2001)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003).\nA defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by \u201c(1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff\u2019s case is nonexistent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense.\u201d\nDraughon, 158 N.C. App. at 708, 582 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting James v. Clark, 118 N.C. App. 178, 181, 454 S.E.2d 826, 828, disc. rev. denied, 340 N.C. 359, 458 S.E.2d 187 (1995)).\n\u201c \u2018Once the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\u2019 \u201d Draughon, 158 N.C. App. at 708, 582 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting Gaunt v. Pittaway, 139 N.C. App. 778, 784-85, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664 (2000)).\nTV. N.C. Gen. St,at.. \u00a7 20-279.2KW3)\nIn 1991, our Legislature amended the Financial Responsibility Act to provide when UM coverage could be aggregated or stacked.\nWhere coverage is provided on more than one vehicle insured on the same policy or where the owner or the named insured has more than one policy with coverage under this subdivision, there shall not be permitted any combination of coverage within a policy or where more than one policy may apply to determine the total amount of coverage available.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (2001).\nPlaintiff argues the anti-stacking provisions of the statute do not apply because he was neither defendant\u2019s insured nor the owner of any vehicle covered by defendant\u2019s policy. We disagree.\nIn Hoover v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist while driving a vehicle he jointly owned with his employer, 156 N.C. App. 418, 576 S.E.2d 396, 397 (2003). Plaintiff owned an insurance policy with UM coverage of $250,000.00 per person on the jointly owned automobile. Id. His employer owned an insurance policy with UM coverage of $1,000,000.00 per person on the same automobile. Id. Plaintiff sought to stack the UM coverage from both policies. Id. at 419, 576 S.E.2d at 397. The insurance carriers argued that UM coverage was capped at the higher limit of the two policies or $1,000,000.00. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the carriers and concluded that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) prohibited inter-policy stacking of UM coverage. Id. This Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision and held:\nIt is illogical that an individual who has purchased multiple UM policies and who pays multiple insurance premiums for those policies would not be allowed to stack coverage from those policies but an individual who has only one UM policy and is injured while driving another\u2019s vehicle for which the individual may have third party UM coverage could stack coverage.\nId. at 420, 576 S.E.2d at 398.\nHere, plaintiff received $25,000.00 from Hernandez\u2019s policy and another $5,000.00 from his own policy, which provided UM coverage limits of $30,000.00 per person. Plaintiff then sought to recover an additional $50,000.00 of UM coverage from his parents\u2019 insurance policy issued by defendant. Plaintiff paid no premiums for this policy. Plaintiff was covered under this policy solely because he was a resident within his parents\u2019 home. The policy at bar contained a clause that limited defendant\u2019s UM liability to the highest amount in either policy if both policies covered the same accident:\nIf this policy and any other auto insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum amount payable for all injuries caused by an uninsured motor vehicle under all policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy.\nPlaintiff\u2019s insurance policy issued by Integon contained virtually the same provision. These two policies unambiguously limit total UM coverage under both policies to the higher of the two limits, which is $50,000.00 under the policy issued by defendant.\nIn Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Herndon, this Court reviewed two policies with clauses virtually identical to those at bar and held, \u201c[t]here is no ambiguity in the language used in GEICO\u2019s policies. Recovery under both policies is clearly limited to the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy.\u201d 79 N.C. App. 365, 368, 339 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1986). Where there is no ambiguity in a policy\u2019s language, the courts must apply the plain meaning of the policy language and enforce the policy as written. Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970).\nAs plaintiff received UM coverage from his own policy and his parents\u2019 policy, we hold plaintiff \u201chas more than one policy with coverage under this subdivision\u201d and is not entitled to stack UM coverage limits under the policies. The plain language of both policies clearly limits the total UM coverage to the \u201chighest applicable limit of liability under any one policy\u201d Plaintiff was paid $30,000.00: $25,000.00 for his personal injuries from Hernandez\u2019s policy and $5,000.00 in UM coverage from his own policy. Between his policy and defendant\u2019s policy, the \u201chighest applicable limit\u201d was $50,000.00. As plaintiff had already been paid $30,000.00, defendant was liable for $20,000.00, to bring the total amount to the \u201chighest applicable limit\u201d of $50,000.00.\nAdopting plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) would allow those who are not named insureds on a policy to stack coverage limits and receive a UM windfall while denying equal treatment to named insureds who actually pay the premiums for UM coverage. This \u201cillogical\u201d conclusion is unsupported by amended N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21 and precedent. Hoover, 156 N.C. App. at 420, 576 S.E.2d at 398. The trial court did not err by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nThe trial court did not err in concluding that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) prohibited stacking the UM coverage at bar and in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The plain language of plaintiff\u2019s policy and the policy issued by defendant plainly and clearly limits plaintiff\u2019s recovery to the \u201chighest applicable limit.\u201d The trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudge McGEE concurs.\nJudge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs in the result by separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." }, { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,\nconcurring in the result.\nI agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. However, unlike the majority, I believe the trial court\u2019s decision is supported more by the language of the applicable insurance policies than by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21 and Hoover. Therefore, I write separately to distinguish the reasoning behind my conclusion.\nBecause the words used in an insurance company\u2019s policy are chosen by the insurance company itself, \u201cany ambiguity or uncertainty as to their meaning must be resolved in favor of the policyholder, or the beneficiary, and against the company.\u201d Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970). \u201cHowever, ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy is not established by the mere fact that the plaintiff makes a claim based upon a construction of its language which the company asserts is not its meaning.\u201d Id. Instead, ambiguity exists only where, in the opinion of the court, the language of the policy is \u201cfairly and reasonably susceptible to\u201d differing interpretations by the parties. Id. Where there is no ambiguity in a policy\u2019s language, courts \u201cmust enforce the contract as the parties have made it[,] and [courts] may not, under the guise of interpreting an ambiguous provision, remake the contract and impose liability upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did not pay.\u201d Id.\nIn Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. 365, 339 S.E.2d 472 (1986), this Court reviewed two policy clauses similar to those in the instant case. Noting that \u201c[Recovery under both policies is clearly limited to \u2018the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy,\u2019 \u201d we concluded there was \u201cno ambiguity in the language used\u201d in the policies, and we held that the defendants were not allowed to \u201cstack\u201d uninsured motorist compensation claims. Id. at 368, 339 S.E.2d at 474.\nIn the instant case, the policy of plaintiffs parents with defendant reads as follows:\nIf this policy and any other auto insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum payable for injuries to you or a family member caused by an underinsured motor vehicle shall be the sum of the highest limit of liability for this coverage under each such policy.\n(emphasis in original). According to the record, plaintiffs own policy with Integon contained the same provision. I conclude the plain and unambiguous language of both policies clearly limits the total under-insured motorist coverage to the \u201chighest applicable limit of liability\u201d for underinsured motorist coverage under each policy.\nPlaintiffs Integon policy offered him $30,000 in underinsured motorist coverage, while his parent\u2019s policy with defendant offered him $50,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, defendant was only responsible for underinsured motorist coverage up to $50,000, the \u201chighest applicable limit of liability\u201d under the two policies. Hernandez\u2019s policy paid plaintiff $25,000 for his personal injuries, while plaintiff\u2019s own Integon policy paid plaintiff $5,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, under the unambiguous terms of the insurance policies, defendant was liable only for the $20,000 necessary to bring the total amount paid to plaintiff to $50,000, and plaintiff was not entitled to stack underinsured motorist coverage limits under the two policies.\nFor the reasons discussed above, I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Lewis & Daggett, Attorneys at Law, P.A., by Michael P. Williams, for 'plaintiff-appellant.", "Kent L. Hamrick, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JEFFREY PAUL TRIVETTE, Plaintiff v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA03-986\n(Filed 1 June 2004)\nInsurance\u2014 automobile \u2014 UIM coverages \u2014 stacking\u2014two policies \u2014 highest applicable limit\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) prohibited stacking the underinsured motorists (UIM) coverages at bar and by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The plain language of plaintiff\u2019s policy and the policy issued by defendant to plaintiff\u2019s parents, with whom plaintiff lived, plainly and clearly limits plaintiff\u2019s recovery to the highest applicable limit. Plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the statute would allow those who are not named insureds to stack coverage limits and receive a UIM windfall denied to named insureds who pay premiums for UIM coverage.\nJudge Timmons-Goodson concurring in the result.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 27 May 2003 by Judge Russell G. Walker, Jr., in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 April 2004.\nLewis & Daggett, Attorneys at Law, P.A., by Michael P. Williams, for 'plaintiff-appellant.\nKent L. Hamrick, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0680-01", "first_page_order": 712, "last_page_order": 718 }