{ "id": 8901368, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: Q.V., DOB: 07/26/94", "name_abbreviation": "In re Q.V.", "decision_date": "2004-06-15", "docket_number": "No. COA03-738", "first_page": "737", "last_page": "743", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "164 N.C. App. 737" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "referring to the UCCJEA's predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11713345 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768", "parenthetical": "referring to the UCCJEA's predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560087 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219906, 220164, 220047, 220153, 220059 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0210-02", "/nc/355/0210-05", "/nc/355/0210-04", "/nc/355/0210-01", "/nc/355/0210-03" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "790" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435629 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0550-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 14182, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.060474078307292e-07, "percentile": 0.8565877778974759 }, "sha256": "3490b2ac8e133077c48d48fd60312f71200c02a978c65f440663e72cf35acf9b", "simhash": "1:9b197901da7c0e58", "word_count": 2244 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:16.246957+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and THORNBURG concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: Q.V., DOB: 07/26/94" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nRespondent-father appeals from an order denying his motion for reimbursement of costs incurred to recover physical custody of his son, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 50A-312, from the Orange County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d).\nDSS assumed emergency non-secure custody of respondent\u2019s son, Q.V., on 1 February 2001, upon the admittance of Q.V.\u2019s mother into the psychiatric unit of the North Carolina Memorial Hospital. On 5 February 2001, DSS filed a petition in the Orange County District Court alleging Q.V. was neglected and dependent. At a child planning conference held on 7 February 2001, Q.V. was adjudicated neglected and dependent in accordance with a stipulation by Q.V.\u2019s mother and stepfather, and placement authority was vested with DSS. The matter was set to be reviewed on 19 April 2001. Respondent-father, a California resident, was not notified of these proceedings.\nSubsequent to the adjudication, Q.V.\u2019s mother was extradited to California to face charges for parole violations. In a letter dated 18 February 2001, Q.V.\u2019s paternal grandmother informed the Orange County court that respondent-father was also incarcerated in California and requested that Q.V. be placed with her and Q.V.\u2019s paternal grandfather in California where Q.V.\u2019s sister also resided. On 3 April 2001, Q.V.\u2019s paternal grandmother filed documents in the superior court of California, County of Sonoma, requesting that court to assert its jurisdiction over Q.V. and communicate with the North Carolina court regarding resolution of the temporary custody order.\nRespondent-father was formally served with a summons and copy of the juvenile petition in this matter on 12 April 2001. On 13 April 2001, respondent-father filed an affidavit with the Orange County District Court stating that he was the natural father of Q.V. and that he had joint custody of Q.V. pursuant to a custody order entered in California on 7 July 2000 and attached to the affidavit. Respondent-father requested that the trial court place Q.V. with his mother, Q.V.\u2019s paternal grandmother, until respondent-father was released from jail. The attached custody order indicated that respondent-father and Q.V.\u2019s mother shared joint legal and physical custody of Q.V., with primary physical custody of Q.V. being with Q.V.\u2019s mother. The custody order specifically stated that jurisdiction over the issue of Q.V.\u2019s custody was to remain with the Sonoma County California Superior Court.\nOn 19 April 2001, a review hearing was held in the district court in Orange County. The court did not address the issue of jurisdiction, but ordered that Q.V.\u2019s custody should remain with DSS pending the completion of home studies of Q.V.\u2019s grandparents in California. There is no indication in the record that respondent-father was present or represented by counsel at this hearing.\nAt review hearings conducted on 21 June and 2 August 2001, the district court determined that it had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and concluded that the best interests of Q.V. required that he continue with DSS placement in North Carolina. Again, respondent-father was neither present nor represented by counsel at these hearings.\nOn 3 December 2001, the Sonoma County California Superior Court ordered Q.V.\u2019s mother and DSS to show cause as to why physical custody of Q.V. should not be placed with respondent-father and granted temporary physical custody of Q.V. to respondent-father. That same day, respondent-father, through counsel, filed a petition in Orange County for an expedited hearing to enforce the California child custody determination pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 50A-308, along with motions to dismiss and vacate Orange County District Court\u2019s previous orders due to lack of jurisdiction. The matter was heard on 6 December 2001, at which time the court declined respondent-father\u2019s request for an expedited hearing to address the enforcement of the California custody order and set a hearing to address the issue of jurisdiction for 31 January 2002. Following an order issued by this Court, however, the district court entered an order on 10 January 2002 in which it denied respondent-father\u2019s motions to dismiss and vacate previous orders.\nOn 15 January 2002, the superior court of Sonoma County, California issued an order asserting exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the custody determination of Q.V. On 20 March 2002, the Orange County District Court relinquished jurisdiction regarding Q.V.\u2019s custody to the State of California. Respondent-father then filed a motion in the Orange County District Court seeking reimbursement, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312, from DSS for expenses in excess of $40,000 allegedly incurred in recovering custody of Q.V. Respondent-father appeals from an order in which the district court determined that both DSS and the court had acted appropriately in the matter and in which the court denied respondent-father\u2019s motion for costs.\nThe Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (\u201cUCCJEA\u201d) provides a uniform set of jurisdictional rules and guidelines for the national enforcement of child custody orders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 50A-101 et seq. (Official Comment) (2003). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312 (2003) is located under Part 3 of the Act, which provides for enforcement.\nUnder the UCCJEA, a party wishing to enforce a child-custody determination of another state with jurisdiction must file a petition for enforcement with a court of the state in which the respondent is located. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-308 (2003). The statute defines \u201cpetitioner\u201d to mean \u201ca person who seeks enforcement ... of a child-custody determination\u201d and \u201crespondent\u201d to mean \u201ca person against whom a proceeding has been commenced for enforcement ... of a child-custody determination.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-301 (2003). The UCCJEA defines \u201cperson\u201d to mean:\nan individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government; governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation; or any other legal or commercial entity.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(12) (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, a state agency, such as a department of social services, may qualify as a petitioner or respondent in such an enforcement proceeding. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102 (Official Comment) (\u201cThe term \u2018person\u2019 has been added to ensure that the provisions of this Act apply when the State is the moving party in a custody proceeding or has legal custody of a child.\u201d).\nRespondent-father\u2019s motion for reimbursement of fees and expenses incurred in enforcing the California custody order was made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312 (2003). That statute provides:\n(a) The court shall award the prevailing party, including a state, necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorneys\u2019 fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award would be clearly inappropriate.\n(b) The court may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against a state unless authorized by law other than this Article.\nId.\nRespondent-father asserts multiple violations of the UCCJEA, as well as his constitutional rights, by DSS and by the district court of Orange County, and argues that such violations were so egregious as to justify an award, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 50A-312, of his costs and expenses incurred in the proceeding. He assigns multiple errors to the trial court\u2019s actions in this case, as well as to its failure to find that he was the prevailing party and that reimbursement is reasonable under the circumstances. While many of his contentions with respect to the apparently tortured course this proceeding followed in this State\u2019s trial court may arguably have merit, we do not consider them because even had they been found by the trial court, they would not afford a basis for relief under G.S. \u00a7 50A-312.\nG.S. \u00a7 50A-312(a) obligates a court to award fees, costs, and expenses to the prevailing party of a petition for enforcement of a child-custody determination pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 50A-308 \u201cunless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award would be clearly inappropriate.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312 (2003); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 50A-308 through 310 (2003). However, G.S. \u00a7 50A-312(b) specifically provides that fees, costs and expenses may not be awarded against a state unless authorized by some law other than the UCCJEA.\nThe UCCJEA defines the term \u201cstate\u201d as follows:\n\u201cState\u201d means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(15) (2003). The State of North Carolina is comprised of one hundred counties and those counties \u201cmake up the state and are, literally, the state itself.\u201d Archer v. Rockingham County, 144 N.C. App. 550, 553, 548 S.E.2d 788, 790 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 210, 559 S.E.2d 796 (2002). While the laws of some other states, as well as federal courts, treat counties \u201cas something other than constituent parts of the state[,]\u201d id. at 554, 548 S.E.2d at 791, North Carolina law has long held otherwise:\nCounties are creatures of the General Assembly and constituent parts of the State government. ... In the exercise of ordinary governmental functions, they are simply agencies of the State, constituted for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the State\u2019s territory .... The powers and functions of a county bear reference to the general policy of the State, and are in fact an integral portion of the general administration of State policy.\nHarris v. Board of Commissioners, 274 N.C. 343, 346-47, 163 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1968) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, when interpreting the General Statutes of North Carolina, it is presumed that any reference to the State implicitly includes all its constituent parts, unless otherwise indicated in the statute or case law. See Archer, 144 N.C. App. at 553, 548 S.E.2d at 790.\nWe find no indication, explicit or implicit, that our General Assembly intended to exclude county departments of social servIces from its meaning of the word \u201cstate\u201d as used generally in the UCCJEA, and specifically in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312(b). Pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s juvenile code, the director of the department of social services in each county of the State is mandated by law to establish protective services for juveniles alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent, investigate such allegations, and if warranted, file petitions with the court seeking adjudication of such juveniles as abused, neglected, or dependent. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-300 et seq. (2003). Where it is found that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent, or there is reasonable grounds to believe such, the department of social services in each county of the State is vested with the authority to assume custody and control over such affected juveniles. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-500 et seq. (2003). Thus, any party seeking to enforce a child custody determination pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 50A-308 against the State of North Carolina will necessarily be dealing with a specific county department of social services within the state. Accordingly, it would be illogical to assume that the legislature did not intend to include such agencies within its meaning of the term \u201cstate.\u201d This intent is further implied in the official comment to G.S. \u00a7 50A-312, which states the following:\nSubsection (b) was added to ensure that this section would not apply to the State unless otherwise authorized. The language is taken from UIFSA [Uniform Interstate Family Support Act] \u00a7 313 (court may assess costs against obligee or support enforcement agency only if allowed by local law).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312 (Official Comment) (2003) (emphasis added). Our conclusion is also consistent with the underlying purpose of the UCCJEA, which is \u201cto prevent parents from forum shopping their child custody disputes and assure that these disputes are litigated in the state with which the child and the child\u2019s family have the closest connection.\u201d In re Van Kooten, 126 N.C. App. 764, 768, 487 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1997) (referring to the UCCJEA\u2019s predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act).\nSince N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-312(b) prohibits an award of expenses against the Orange County DSS, we need not consider respondent-father\u2019s other assignments of error relating to the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion in this case. The order denying respondent-father\u2019s motion for reimbursement of costs and expenses is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER and THORNBURG concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Mark A. Davis, for 'petitioner-appellee.", "Katharine Chester, for respondent-appellant father." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: Q.V., DOB: 07/26/94\nNo. COA03-738\n(Filed 15 June 2004)\nChild Custody, Support, and Visitation\u2014 foreign custody order \u2014 motion for reimbursement of costs\nThe trial court did not err by denying respondent father\u2019s motion for reimbursement of costs incurred to enforce a California custody order pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-312 to recover physical custody of his son from the Orange County Department of Social Services, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-312 specifically provides that fees, costs, and expenses may not be awarded against a state unless authorized by some law other than the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); and (2) there is no indication, explicit or implicit, that our General Assembly intended to exclude county departments of social services from its meaning of the word \u201cstate\u201d as used generally in the UCCJEA, and specifically in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-312(b).\nAppeal by respondent-father from order entered 4 September 2002 by Judge M. Patricia DeVine in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 April 2004.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Mark A. Davis, for 'petitioner-appellee.\nKatharine Chester, for respondent-appellant father." }, "file_name": "0737-01", "first_page_order": 769, "last_page_order": 775 }