{ "id": 8999320, "name": "TODD WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BILLY J. HOUSTON and EARL K. BURKHART, Individually and in their official capacity, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. City of Jacksonville Police Department", "decision_date": "2004-08-03", "docket_number": "No. COA03-1450", "first_page": "587", "last_page": "598", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 N.C. App. 587" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11242573 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576097 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550274 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "quoting Myrick, 91 N.C. App. at 215, 371 S.E.2d at 496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440838 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "quoting Myrick, 91 N.C. App. at 215, 371 S.E.2d at 496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 F.2d 236", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 373027 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/763/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793216, 793197, 793171, 793173, 793241 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0419-02", "/nc/341/0419-01", "/nc/341/0419-05", "/nc/341/0419-04", "/nc/341/0419-03" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "citing Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985)" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11920663 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "citing Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985)" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619054 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560744, 2566031, 2560698, 2563643, 2563999 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0477-01", "/nc/323/0477-04", "/nc/323/0477-02", "/nc/323/0477-05", "/nc/323/0477-03" ] }, { "cite": "371 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "quoting Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958)" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525085 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "quoting Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958)" }, { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 159", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6197246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 985", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12035616, 12035130, 12035173, 12035238, 12035081, 12035561, 12035342, 12034992, 12035285, 12035509, 12035449, 12035034, 12035391 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0985-13", "/us/506/0985-04", "/us/506/0985-05", "/us/506/0985-06", "/us/506/0985-03", "/us/506/0985-12", "/us/506/0985-08", "/us/506/0985-01", "/us/506/0985-07", "/us/506/0985-11", "/us/506/0985-10", "/us/506/0985-02", "/us/506/0985-09" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497251, 2498471 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0558-01", "/nc/331/0558-02" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283", "parenthetical": "citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772", "parenthetical": "citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)" }, { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2514118 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511-12", "parenthetical": "quoting Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 582, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552093 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "quoting Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 582, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "addressing only the issue of collateral estoppel and declining to consider arguments that were not presented in motion or argued at the hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511608, 1511289, 1511570, 1511500 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "addressing only the issue of collateral estoppel and declining to consider arguments that were not presented in motion or argued at the hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0437-04", "/nc/356/0437-02", "/nc/356/0437-01", "/nc/356/0437-03" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "addressing only the issue of collateral estoppel and declining to consider arguments that were not presented in motion or argued at the hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249645 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "addressing only the issue of collateral estoppel and declining to consider arguments that were not presented in motion or argued at the hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569908 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736107 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546781 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917406 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh'g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135974, 135980, 135596, 135797, 135800 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh'g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0452-02", "/nc/353/0452-03", "/nc/353/0452-01", "/nc/353/0452-05", "/nc/353/0452-04" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh'g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)" }, { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "232-33" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439459 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh'g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(3)" }, { "page": "(c)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Best v. Duke University, 337 N.C. 742, 752, 448 S.E.2d 506, 511-12 (1994) (quoting Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 582, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220106, 220010, 220045, 219924, 220085 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting Best v. Duke University, 337 N.C. 742, 752, 448 S.E.2d 506, 511-12 (1994) (quoting Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 582, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0493-04", "/nc/355/0493-01", "/nc/355/0493-05", "/nc/355/0493-02", "/nc/355/0493-03" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "173-74" }, { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436581 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" }, { "page": "623" }, { "page": "623" }, { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561845 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53933 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916259 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 826", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131980, 132053, 132155, 131964, 131933 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0826-05", "/nc/350/0826-04", "/nc/350/0826-03", "/nc/350/0826-02", "/nc/350/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239125 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0533-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 980, "char_count": 25977, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4212450041179165e-07, "percentile": 0.8010401378613193 }, "sha256": "092e3a3efd4427b49147847b8b8586924d976f0fb8de4c146375652a6532807e", "simhash": "1:830bfc66070da8d6", "word_count": 4081 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:46:04.930387+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "TODD WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BILLY J. HOUSTON and EARL K. BURKHART, Individually and in their official capacity, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nThe City of Jacksonville Police Department (\u201cJacksonville Police Department\u201d), Officer Billy J. Houston (\u201cOfficer Houston\u201d), and Officer Earl K. Burkhart (\u201cOfficer Burkhart\u201d) (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d) appeal from an order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment. We reverse.\nI. Background \u2022\nPlaintiff originally filed this action on 2 March 2000 in Onslow County Superior Court from incidents that arose during a traffic stop of plaintiff by defendants. Plaintiff asserted claims for: (1) \u201cpersonal injuries, pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of liberty and emotional distress\u201d that he suffered as a result of defendants\u2019 \u201cnegligence, malicious and wanton conduct;\u201d (2) \u201cthe action of Defendants violated the 4th and/or the 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, protecting against unlawful seizures;\u201d (3) \u201cthe acts and conduct of the Defendants . . . constitutes [sic] false arrest and negligence under the laws of the State of North Carolina;\u201d and (4) \u201cThe City of Jacksonville intentionally or negligently failed to properly train its officers . . . .\u201d\nDefendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (\u201cthe U.S. District Court\u201d) pursuant to plaintiff\u2019s assertion of a violation of the Civil Rights Act, Title 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and moved for summary judgment. By Order entered 29 May 2001, the Honorable James C. Fox, Senior U.S. District Court Judge, granted defendants\u2019 motion. Judge Fox found, as a matter of law: (1) defendants had probable cause to stop and detain plaintiff; (2) defendants acted reasonably in conducting a pat-down search and in using \u201cthreat of force;\u201d and (3) defendants did not use excessive force. Judge Fox also concluded, \u201cBecause the officers [Houston and Burkhart] did not commit any constitutional violation, summary judgment is also appropriate as to the plaintiff\u2019s claims against the City of Jacksonville.\u201d Judge Fox\u2019s Order stated, \u201cTo the extent that the plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges state law causes of action, the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such pendent claims, and ORDERS these claims DISMISSED without prejudice.\u201d\nPlaintiff timely filed a new complaint on 16 November 2001 asserting the causes of action stated in his earlier complaint, except for deleting his claim for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Defendants filed an answer and asserted thirty defenses, including governmental immunity, public duty doctrine, and res judicata/collateral estoppel. Defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted, \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s pendant state tort claims are premised on either the lack of probable cause or the unreasonableness of Defendants\u2019 conduct. . . [and] are barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in that the necessary elements of Plaintiff\u2019s claims have been previously adjudicated in favor of Defendants.\u201d The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion. Defendants appeal.\nII. Issues\nThe issues presented are whether: (1) this appeal is interlocutory; and (2) the trial court erred in denying defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar plaintiff\u2019s claims.\nIII. Interlocutory Anneal\n\u201cThe denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment, but rather is interlocutory in nature. We do not review interlocutory orders as a matter of course.\u201d McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C. App. 48, 50, 542 S.E.2d 227, 230, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001) (citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh\u2019g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950)). \u201cIf, however, \u2018the trial court\u2019s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review,\u2019 we may review the appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 l-277(a) and 7A-27(d)(l).\u201d McCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 50, 542 S.E.2d at 230-31 (quoting N.C. Dept. of Transportation v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 734, 460 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1995)).\nAlthough interlocutory, \u201cthe denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata may affect a substantial right, making the order immediately appealable.\u201d Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993) (citations omitted). \u201cUnder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction precludes a second suit involving the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them.\u201d Id. (citing Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986)).\nDenial of a summary judgment motion based on res judicata raises the possibility that a successful defendant will twice have to defend against the same claim by the same plaintiff, in frustration of the underlying principles of claim preclusion. Thus, the denial of summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata can affect a substantial right and may be immediately appealed.\nMcCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 51, 542 S.E.2d at 231 (citing Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161). \u201cThe denial of summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, like res judicata, may expose a sue-cessful defendant to repetitious and unnecessary lawsuits. Accordingly, . . . the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of collateral estoppel may affect a substantial right.... [such that the appeal] is properly before us.\u201d McCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 51, 542 S.E.2d at 231. Defendants\u2019 appeal is properly before this Court.\nIV. Summary Judgment\nDefendants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment based on res judicata and collateral estoppel.\nRule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003).\nAn issue is \u201cgenuine\u201d if it can be proven by substantial evidence and a fact is \u201cmaterial\u201d if it would constitute or irrevocably establish any material element of a claim or a defense. A party moving for summary judgment may prevail if it meets the burden (1) of proving an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or (2) of showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim. Generally this means that on \u201cundisputed aspects of the opposing evidential forecast,\u201d where there is no genuine issue of fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party must in turn either show that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial or must provide an excuse for not doing so.\nLowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982) (internal citations omitted).\nHere, defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted plaintiff\u2019s claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The parties did not brief, move for, or present further arguments or other grounds to the trial court to support or contest the Motion for Summary Judgment. Our review is limited to whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. See McDonald v. Skeen, 152 N.C. App. 228, 567 S.E.2d 209, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 437, 571 S.E.2d 221 (2002) (addressing only the issue of collateral estoppel and declining to consider arguments that were not presented in motion or argued at the hearing); see also N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1).\nV. Res 'Judicata and Collateral Estoppel\nThe trial court concluded neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel precluded plaintiffs claims and denied defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment.\n\u201cThe companion doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) have been developed by the courts for the dual purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.\u201d Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161.\nWhere the second action between two parties is upon the same claim, the prior judgment serves as a bar to the relitigation of all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action. Where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim, the prior judgment serves as a bar only as to issues actually litigated and determined in the original action.\nId. at 492, 428 S.E.2d at 161 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has distinguished between these two doctrines:\nUnder the doctrine of res judicata or \u201cclaim preclusion,\u201d a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies. The doctrine prevents the relitigation of all matters . . . that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action. Under the companion doctrine of collateral estop-pel, also known as \u201cestoppel by judgment\u201d or \u201cissue preclusion,\u201d the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.\nWhitacre P\u2019ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15, 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Res judicata precludes a party from \u201cbringing a subsequent action based on the \u2018same claim\u2019 . . . litigated in an earlier action . ...\u201d Id. Collateral estoppel bars \u201cthe subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different claim.\u201d Id.\nVI. Res Judicata\nIn City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Alamance County, we held the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the plaintiffs claims under the North Carolina Constitution, although the federal court had already ruled on the same issues under the United States Constitution. 132 N.C. App. 533, 536, 513 S.E.2d 335, 338, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 826, 537 S.E.2d 815 (1999).\nAfter careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of both parties, we hold that plaintiffs claims are not barred by res judi-cata or collateral estoppel. The federal court expressly stated that it \u201cdeclined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims,\u201d and dismissed them without prejudice. While the federal court did review federal due process and equal protection claims, this Court has stated that \u201cour courts . . . when construing provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, are not bound by the opinions of the federal courts \u2018construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the United States . . \u201d and that \u201can independent determination of plaintiffs constitutional rights under the state constitution is required.\u201d\nId. at 536, 513 S.E.2d at 338 (quoting Evans v. Cowan, 122 N.C. App. 181, 183-84, 468 S.E.2d 575, 577, aff\u2019d per curiam, 345 N.C. 177, 477 S.E.2d 926 (1996)).\nHere, Judge Fox expressly declined to review plaintiffs state claims, and stated in his Order, \u201cTo the extent that the plaintiffs complaint alleges state law causes of action, the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(c)(3), declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such pendent claims, and ORDERS these claims DISMISSED without prejudice.\u201d Plaintiffs complaint, filed after the U.S. District Court\u2019s ruling, alleged causes of action under state law for negligence, false arrest, and assault. By dismissing these claims without prejudice, plaintiffs \u201csubsequent action\u201d is not \u201cbased on the \u2018same claim\u2019 as that litigated in an earlier action.\u201d Whitacre P\u2019ship, 358 N.C. at 15, 591 S.E.2d at 880.\nWe hold that plaintiff\u2019s claims are not barred by res judicata as Judge Fox\u2019s Order addressed only plaintiff\u2019s claims under federal law and the United States Constitution. Judge Fox expressly declined to rule on plaintiffs causes of action controlled by state law.\nVIL Collateral Estoppel\nDefendants assert that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes plaintiffs suit in state court. \u201cUnder the doctrine of collateral estoppel, when an issue has been fully litigated and decided, it cannot be contested again between the same parties, even if the first adjudication is conducted in federal court and the second in state court.\u201d McCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 52, 542 S.E.2d at 231 (citation omitted). This Court has held:\nAlthough plaintiffs present state court claims are different from those brought in federal court, his state court claims may contain issues previously litigated and determined in the federal court. Thus, plaintiff may be collaterally estopped from re-litigating these issues. To hold otherwise, . . . would mean that state courts are never barred from hearing state constitutional claims or issues pertinent to such claims, even when such issues have been previously litigated in the federal courts. Such a finding would directly violate the underlying principle of judicial economy that precipitated the creation of the collateral estoppel and res judi-cata doctrines .... We reaffirm, therefore, that collateral estop-pel may prevent the re-litigation of issues that are necessary to the decision of a North Carolina constitutional claim and that have been previously decided in federal court.\nId. at 53-54, 542 S.E.2d at 232-33. For collateral estoppel to bar a party\u2019s subsequent claim: \u25a0\n(1) the issues to be concluded must be the same as those involved in the prior action; (2) in the prior action, the issues must have been raised and actually litigated; (3) the issues must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of those issues in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.\nId. at 54, 542 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 358, 200 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1973)).\nHere, the federal court\u2019s Order addressed the issue of whether \u201cDefendant Billy Houston and Defendant Earl K. Burkhart violated [plaintiff\u2019s] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during a traffic stop ....\u201d In granting summary judgment for defendants on the issues of unlawful seizure and excessive force under the United States Constitution, Judge Fox ruled, among other things, Officer Houston and Officer Burkhart: (1) did not \u201cexpandf] the permissible scope of the stop;\u201d (2) did not use excessive force because \u201cthe threat of force displayed by Houston in order to persuade the driver not to leave the scene was not unreasonable;\u201d (3) \u201cdid not violate the plaintiff\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights\u201d by asking the plaintiff to step out of his vehicle; and (4) \u201ca pat-down search was not unreasonable under the circumstances . . . .\u201d The U.S. District Court held, \u201cBecause the officers did not commit any constitutional violation, summary judgment is also appropriate as to the plaintiffs claims against the City of Jacksonville [Police].\u201d\nFollowing entry of the U.S. District Court\u2019s Order, plaintiff filed a new complaint in state court and asserted claims for negligence, false arrest, and assault. Plaintiff also asserted the Jacksonville Police Department negligently trained its officers. While the U.S. District Court\u2019s Order did not rule on defendants\u2019 ultimate liability for these claims, the Order ruled on several underlying issues and identical elements of these claims. To the extent the U.S. District Court ruled on these issues, plaintiff is barred from relitigating the issues in state court. See McCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 53, 542 S.E.2d at 232.\nA. Negligence\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges Officer Houston and Officer Burkhart acted negligently in their official and individual capacity. \u201c \u2018In a negligence action, a law enforcement officer is held to the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.\u2019 \u201d Prior v. Pruett, 143 N.C. App. 612, 620, 550 S.E.2d 166, 172 (2001), disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 493, 563 S.E.2d 572 (2002) (quoting Best v. Duke University, 337 N.C. 742, 752, 448 S.E.2d 506, 511-12 (1994) (quoting Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 582, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988))). A law enforcement officer may be held liable for use of \u201cunreasonable or excessive force\u201d upon another person. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-401(d)(2) (2003).\nIn the U.S. District Court\u2019s Order, Judge Fox held, \u201cViewed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer, the court concludes that the threat of force displayed by Houston . . . was not unreasonable.\u201d Additionally, the officers\u2019 actions did \u201cnot amount to an unreasonable seizure,\u201d and the \u201cpat-down search was not unreasonable under the circumstances . . . The issues regarding the reasonableness of Officer Houston and Officer Burkhart\u2019s actions were litigated in federal court. Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the issue of whether the officers acted reasonably in performing their official duties. The trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment for defendants in their official capacity on the issue of negligence.\n\u201cTo withstand a law enforcement officer\u2019s motion for summary judgment on the issue of individual capacity, plaintiff must allege and forecast evidence demonstrating the officers acted maliciously, corruptly, or beyond the scope of duty.\u201d Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 623, 550 S.E.2d at 173-74. \u201c[S]tate governmental officials can be sued in their individual capacities for damages under section 1983.\u201d Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 772, 413 S.E.2d 276, 283, reh\u2019g denied, 331 N.C. 558, 418 S.E.2d 664, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1992) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)).\n[U]nlike a suit against a state official in his official capacity, which is basically a suit against the official office and therefore against the State itself, a suit against an individual who happens to be a governmental official but is not acting in his official capacity is not imputed to the State. Such individuals are sued as individuals, not as governmental employees.\nCorum, 330 N.C. at 772, 413 S.E.2d at 283.\nIn support of his claim that. defendants acted negligently in their individual capacity, plaintiff asserts that Officer Houston \u201cintentionally,\u201d \u201cnegligently[,] and maliciously pointed a loaded weapon\u201d at plaintiff. Other than this broad assertion, plaintiff presents no other allegation or forecast of evidence to show that defendants acted \u201cmaliciously, corruptly, or beyond the scope of duty.\u201d Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 623, 550 S.E.2d at 174. The U.S. District Court ruled that Officer Houston acted reasonably in pointing his service weapon at plaintiff. Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint also alleges that defendants \u201cintentionally destroyed dispatch tapes\u201d and \u201cconspired to unnecessarily call the plaintiff\u2019s supervisor to the scene . . . .\u201d Judge Fox\u2019s Order recites these allegations and indicates that he considered these actions in ruling on plaintiff\u2019s claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The U.S. District Court\u2019s Order does not rule on the ultimate issue of defendants\u2019 negligence in their individual capacity. However, Judge Fox\u2019s award of summary judgment to defendants essentially ruled both officers\u2019 actions were reasonable; neither officer violated plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights; and their actions did not extend \u201cbeyond the scope of cluty.\u201d Id. Collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff\u2019s suit on the issue of negligence for Officer Houston and Officer Burkhart in their individual capacity. The trial court erred in denying defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of negligence.\nB. False Arrest\n\u201c[U]nder state law, a cause of action in tort will lie for false imprisonment, based upon the \u2018illegal restraint of one\u2019s person against his will.\u2019 A false arrest, i.e., one without proper legal authority, is one means of committing a false imprisonment.\u201d Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 212, 371 S.E.2d 492, 494, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 865 (1988) (quoting Mobley v. Broome, 248 N.C. 54, 56, 102 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1958)). Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim for false arrest. Burton v. City of Durham, 118 N.C. App. 676, 682, 457 S.E.2d 329, 333, disc. rev. denied and cert. denied, 341 N.C. 419, 461 S.E.2d 756 (1995) (citing Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 1985)).\nIn the prior federal court action, Judge Fox ruled that Officer Burkhart had probable cause to detain plaintiff because \u201cplaintiff admittedly drove his vehicle in excess of the speed limit.\u201d Further, Judge Fox ruled that defendants did not unreasonably expand the permissible scope of the stop. As probable cause is an absolute bar to plaintiff\u2019s claim, he is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue. Plaintiff\u2019s claim for false arrest fails. Burton, 118 N.C. App. at 682, 457 S.E.2d at 333. The trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment on plaintiff\u2019s claim of false arrest.\nC. Assault\n\u201c \u2018[A] civil action for damages for assault... is available at common law against one who, for the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, such as justifiable arrest, uses force which is excessive under the given circumstances.\u2019 \u201d Thomas v. Sellers, 142 N.C. App. 310, 315, 542 S.E.2d 283, 287 (2001) (quoting Myrick, 91 N.C. App. at 215, 371 S.E.2d at 496).\nAn officer of the law has the right to use such force as he may reasonably believe necessary in the proper discharge of his duties to effect an arrest. Within reasonable limits, the officer is properly left with the discretion to determine the amount of force required under the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time of the arrest.\nState v. Anderson, 40 N.C. App. 318, 321, 253 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1979) (citations omitted).\nIn the prior federal court action, Judge Fox held that defendants\u2019 display of force and the subsequent pat-down search of plaintiff were reasonable under the circumstances. Collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from relitigating these issues and bars plaintiff\u2019s assault claim in state court. The trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff\u2019s assault claim.\nD. Jacksonville Police Department\n\u201cWithout an underlying negligence charge against the [law enforcement officers], a claim of negligence against the [department] can not [sic] be supported.\u201d Prior, 143 N.C. App. at 622, 550 S.E.2d at 172-73 (citing Johnson v. Lamb, 273 N.C. 701, 707, 161 S.E.2d 131, 137 (1968); Wrenn v. Maria Parham Hosp., Inc., 135 N.C. App. 672, 681, 522 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1999)). To the extent collateral estoppel bars plaintiff\u2019s claims against defendants\u2019 in their official governmental capacity, plaintiff is precluded from asserting a negligence action against the Jacksonville Police Department.\nVII. Conclusion\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims are not barred by res judicata. However, the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants based on collateral estoppel. Essential elements of plaintiff\u2019s claims for false arrest and assault were raised, litigated, and ruled upon in the U.S. District Court\u2019s Order. See McCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 55, 542 S.E.2d at 233.\nJudge Fox also ruled that Officer Houston and Officer Burkhart acted reasonably and within the scope of their duties in stopping and detaining plaintiff and also in their show of force and pat-down search of plaintiff. Collateral estoppel bars plaintiff\u2019s action against defendants for negligence in their official and individual capacities. Without liability shown for defendants\u2019 conduct in their official capacity, plaintiff\u2019s claim against the Jacksonville Police Department for negligent training fails. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for entry of summary judgment for defendants.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ernest J. Wright, for 'plaintiff-appellee.", "Crossley, McIntosh, Prior & Collier, by Brian E. Edes and Clay A. Collier, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TODD WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BILLY J. HOUSTON and EARL K. BURKHART, Individually and in their official capacity, Defendants\nNo. COA03-1450\n(Filed 3 August 2004)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of summary judgment \u2014 res judicata and collateral estoppel\nThe denial of summary judgment based on the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel may affect a substantial right and make the order immediately appealable.\n2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 state claims in federal court \u2014 not ruled upon \u2014 not barred by res judicata\nRes judicata did not bar state claims which a federal judge had expressly declined to review and dismissed without prejudice even though he also ruled on federal claims arising from the same traffic stop.\n3. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 prior ruling on federal issues \u2014 underlying issues and identical elements \u2014 collateral estoppel\nSummary judgment should have been granted for defendants on civil claims against police officers and their department based on collateral estoppel where a federal court had ruled on underlying issues and identical elements when granting summary judgment for defendants on federal claims.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 1 May 2003 by Judge Paul L. Jones in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 June 2004.\nErnest J. Wright, for 'plaintiff-appellee.\nCrossley, McIntosh, Prior & Collier, by Brian E. Edes and Clay A. Collier, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0587-01", "first_page_order": 619, "last_page_order": 630 }