{ "id": 8999613, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DALTON OSBORN BRUNSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brunson", "decision_date": "2004-08-03", "docket_number": "No. COA03-240", "first_page": "667", "last_page": "674", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 N.C. App. 667" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "357 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491813, 491529, 491434, 12631086, 491407, 491891, 491575, 491512, 491770 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0660-02", "/nc/357/0660-05", "/nc/357/0660-07", "/se2d/590/0855-01", "/nc/357/0660-08", "/nc/357/0660-01", "/nc/357/0660-03", "/nc/357/0660-06", "/nc/357/0660-04" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C. \u00a7 963", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986601 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding a habitual felon indictment cannot be predicated upon misdemeanor cocaine possession convictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491864, 491877, 491624, 491595, 491501, 491508, 491766, 491704, 491771 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding a habitual felon indictment cannot be predicated upon misdemeanor cocaine possession convictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0661-08", "/nc/357/0661-07", "/nc/357/0661-01", "/nc/357/0661-02", "/nc/357/0661-04", "/nc/357/0661-05", "/nc/357/0661-06", "/nc/357/0661-03", "/nc/357/0661-09" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding a habitual felon indictment cannot be predicated upon misdemeanor cocaine possession convictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957529 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding a habitual felon indictment cannot be predicated upon misdemeanor cocaine possession convictions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955236 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959035 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9379420 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "rejecting the argument that multiple conspiracies existed \"because the offenses occurred one to two weeks apart\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 838", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198252 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C. \u00a7 846", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715, n.7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519344 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11363090 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912", "parenthetical": "\"where theory argued on appeal not raised in trial court, 'the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount [on appeal]' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145085 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "\"where theory argued on appeal not raised in trial court, 'the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount [on appeal]' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 9, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 750, "char_count": 17098, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.749633382629717e-08, "percentile": 0.29902805144238137 }, "sha256": "ce73937ceced72f80ba04cd3694eed742dc60ac568446686585515c6ec375177", "simhash": "1:79f9f56673aa0473", "word_count": 2693 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:46:04.930387+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DALTON OSBORN BRUNSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nIn March 2001, a detective from the Durham County Sheriff\u2019s Department initiated an undercover drug operation. After numerous purchases of prescription controlled substances from Nancy Ashley (\u201cAshley\u201d), the undercover officer negotiated to purchase one and one-half ounces of cocaine from her. On 5 April 2001, the undercover officer met Ashley and went to her sister\u2019s house to arrange a deal.\nThereafter, Dalton Osborn Brunson (\u201cdefendant\u201d) arrived and greetings were exchanged. Defendant sold the undercover officer a bag of white powder between the size of a golf ball and a tennis ball. Later, the State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) confirmed the bag of white powder contained 41.6 grams of cocaine hydrochloride (\u201ccocaine\u201d). On 17 April and again on 1 May 2001, two additional purchases for approximately one and one-half ounces of cocaine occurred. Immediately following defendant\u2019s 1 May 2001 sale to the undercover officer, law enforcement officials apprehended and arrested defendant after he attempted to flee.\nOn 6 August 2001, defendant was indicted by the Durham County Grand Jury of, inter alia, three counts of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, nine counts of trafficking in cocaine, and four counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. On 27 August 2001, after state prosecutors supplied the pertinent information to federal prosecutors, defendant was also charged, inter alia, with three counts of unlawful distribution of cocaine under federal law for the same three drug transactions. Defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina on one count of unlawful distribution of cocaine and was sentenced to 166 months\u2019 imprisonment for that charge. The State subsequently proceeded on the charges upon which defendant had been indicted by the Durham County Grand Jury. Defendant moved to dismiss the drug-related charges, contending \u201cthat the North Carolina Constitution, the law of the land provision, does not permit the State to [exact] double punishment for the same conduct.\u201d The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The jury found defendant guilty of all drug-related offenses and of being a habitual felon. The trial court arrested judgment on the four counts of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and sentenced defendant on the remaining charges relating to the transactions between the undercover officer and defendant. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, we consider defendant\u2019s assertions that (I) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the State charges relating to the transactions between defendant and the undercover officer and (II) the evidence was insufficient to show three separate conspiracies.\nI. North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 90-97\nMany of defendant\u2019s assignments of error turn on the issue of whether the federal charges and the state charges constitute the same offense. At trial, defendant argued only constitutional double jeopardy grounds as a bar to his prosecution by the State. Defendant, for the first time on appeal, argues N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97 (2001) barred prosecution by the State for the drug-related offenses. Because the transcript reveals defendant failed to raise this argument in the trial court, the question is not properly before us. Nee N.C.R. App. P. 9(a) (appellate \u201creview is solely upon the record on appeal [and] the verbatim transcript of proceedings ...\u201d); State v. Hall, 134 N.C. App. 417, 424, 517 S.E.2d 907, 912 (1999) (\u201cwhere theory argued on appeal not raised in trial court, \u2018the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount [on appeal]\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted). Nonetheless] we- choose to address this argument in our discretion pursuant to Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.\nNorth Carolina General Statutes \u00a7 90-97 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: \u201c[i]f a violation of [the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act] is a violation of a federal law . . . , a conviction or acquittal under federal law . . . for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this State.\u201d (Emphasis added). Defendant was prosecuted for violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841 (2003), which criminalizes the acts of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing controlled substances or possession with intent to engage in one of those acts. He was also prosecuted by the State for, inter alia, trafficking offenses in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3) (2003). This Court has previously remarked upon the effect of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97 in this context. State v. Woods, 146 N.C. App. 686, 544 S.E.2d 383 (2001). In Woods, we examined the relevant language of the two substantive offenses defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95 and 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841 and observed \u201cthe elements of the state violation and the federal violation are nearly identical.\u201d Id. at 691, 544 S.E.2d at 386. Accordingly, we noted that felonious trafficking in drugs, as proscribed by the state statute, also violated 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841 and \u201cbut for N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97, [defendant] could have been prosecuted for both.\u201d Id. at 692, 544 S.E.2d at 387.\nThe State argues State v. Overton, 60 N.C. App. 1, 298 S.E.2d 695 (1982), defines \u201cthe same act\u201d as it is used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97 to require an elemental analysis of the state and federal statutory offenses charged and, based on that reading, urges this Court to uphold the judgment below. This argument fails for two reasons. First, and most directly, Woods makes clear that, even if we did read Overton to require an elemental approach, the elements of the offenses charged in this case were deemed \u201cnearly identical.\u201d Moreover, we do not read Overton, in the first instance, as requiring the elemental approach advocated by the State. Overton merely recognized that the two conspiracy charges in that case (conspiracy to import a controlled substance on the federal level as opposed to conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to sell or deliver, or to sell or deliver a controlled substance on the state level) were different acts. Nothing in Overton suggests the State\u2019s proposed elemental approach was used or adopted by this Court.\nApplied to the case sub judice, we hold that \u201cthe same act\u201d as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97 focuses the relevant analysis on the underlying actions for which defendant is prosecuted at the state and federal levels and operates as a bar to the State\u2019s prosecution of defendant\u2019s trafficking offenses under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95. We need not reach defendant\u2019s constitutional argument.\nDefendant also asserts, on the basis of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97, that the three counts of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by sale were barred. We disagree. Under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841, only the acts of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possession with intent to engage in one of those acts are criminalized. Conspiracy is separately prohibited in 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 846 (2001), with which defendant was not charged. Accordingly, the prohibition against subsequent prosecution by the State found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97 is not applicable under these facts to the offense of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by sale, and defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nII. Number of Conspiracies\nDefendant asserts the evidence at trial showed defendant was guilty of only one conspiracy to traffic in cocaine rather than three separate conspiracies. Specifically, defendant contends that, although there was a series of agreements and acts, they constituted a single conspiracy.\n\u201cA criminal conspiracy is an agreement, express or implied, between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.\u201d State v. Burmeister, 131 N.C. App. 190, 199, 506 S.E.2d 278, 283 (1998). A \u201cconspiracy is complete upon formation of the unlawful agreement [but] continues until the conspiracy comes to fruition or is abandoned.\u201d State v. Griffin, 112 N.C. App. 838, 841, 437 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1993). However, \u201c[a] single conspiracy is not transformed into multiple conspiracies simply because its members vary occasionally and the same acts in furtherance of it occur over a period of time.\u201d Id. In determining the propriety of multiple conspiracy charges, we look to \u201cthe nature of the agreement or agreements\u201d in light of the following factors: \u201ctime intervals, participants, objectives, and number of meetings . . . .\u201d State v. Tabron, 147 N.C. App. 303, 306, 556 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2001).\nIn the instant case, these factors support the existence of a single conspiracy. Initially, the three drug transactions involved the same principal participants engaging in virtually identical conduct for each transaction. In each transaction, the undercover officer contacted Ashley by phone and asked her to arrange a meeting in which he would purchase one and one-half ounces of cocaine. Each time, Ashley then contacted defendant and arranged for herself, the undercover officer, and defendant to meet and make the exchange. After each transaction between defendant and the undercover officer, the undercover officer paid Ashley a \u201ccommission\u201d for arranging the transfer.\nRegarding the objective sought to be accomplished, the undercover officer testified his private motivation was to identify Ashley\u2019s source in the first transaction, confirm the source in the second, and close down the source in the third; however, it could easily be stated that the undercover officer\u2019s objective was, at all times, to identify and apprehend Ashley\u2019s source. Certainly with respect to Ashley and defendant, the objective remained the same. Ashley\u2019s objective was to arrange a drug transaction and receive a \u201ccommission\u201d for doing so, and defendant\u2019s objective was the sale of drugs to a purchaser. Additionally, the indictments all aver the same objective: trafficking by sale in a controlled substance.\nLooking at the time interval, w\u00e9 note that each transaction was temporally separated from the preceding transaction by no more than fourteen days and \u201call transactions transpired over a short period of time, a one month period.\u201d See Griffin, 112 N.C. App. at 841, 437 S.E.2d at 392 (rejecting the argument that multiple conspiracies existed \u201cbecause the offenses occurred one to two weeks apart\u201d).\nAdditionally, we note the undercover officer testified that he continued to contact Ashley throughout the time the transactions were being planned and \u201ctold her . . . that [he] did want to make another purchase of cocaine, buy another one-and-a-half ounces.\u201d This statement indicates the transaction was not a separate or discreet transaction but was to be part of an ongoing agreement for the continued purchase and supply of cocaine. The State\u2019s arguments, that there were some discrepancies in how Ashley was paid her commission or that one of the transactions took place at a different location, are unavailing. Admittedly, each transaction was not a mirror image of the other transactions; however, we have never required, and do not herein adopt, absolute precision in examining the similarities of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine the number of conspiracies. In short, we find the transactions sufficiently similar in consideration of the factors set forth in Tabron and the surrounding circumstances to hold that the transactions were part of a single conspiracy entered into by the same parties for the same purpose.\nIII. Motion for Appropriate Relief\nDefendant has submitted a motion for appropriate relief, seeking to overturn his habitual felon conviction. The motion for appropriate relief is properly before this Court because \u201cappellate courts may rule on such a motion under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1418 ... when the defendant has.... an appeal of right.\u201d State v. Jamerson, 161 N.C. App. 527, 530, 588 S.E.2d 545, 547 (2003). Defendant\u2019s arguments are premised upon this Court\u2019s holdings in State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60, 588 S.E.2d 5, stay granted, 357 N.C. 660, 589 S.E.2d 882 (2003) and State v. Sneed, 161 N.C. App. 331, 588 S.E.2d 74, stay granted, 357 N.C. 661, 589 S.E.2d 883 (2003) (holding a habitual felon indictment cannot be predicated upon misdemeanor cocaine possession convictions). In reviewing Jones and Sneed, our Supreme Court held \u201cthe offense of possession of cocaine is classified as a felony for all purposes.\u201d State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 486,-S.E.2d -,- (2004). We hold accordingly and deny defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.\nIn summary, defendant\u2019s prosecution by the State for cocaine trafficking convictions, but not for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine convictions, were barred by operation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-97. Furthermore, -the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss two counts of conspiracy to traffic cocaine. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and vacated in part.\nJudges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.\n. The State stipulated the federal sentence was based on all three drug sales, even though there was a plea to only one count.\n. See also Overton, 60 N.C. App. at 35, 298 S.E.2d at 715, n.7 (noting \u201cthe [United States] Supreme Court held that convictions and separate consecutive sentences received for conspiracy to import marijuana (21 U.S.C. \u00a7 963) and conspiracy to distribute marijuana reflected Congressional intent. . . and [the two statutes] specify different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy. . .\u201d).\n. Ashley\u2019s roommate, the State argues, was present during one transaction; however, the undercover officer testified \u201cshe just happened to be in the residence\u201d and that she was not \u201cpart of [the] transaction at any point with Mr. Brunson.\u201d Additionally, the State argues Ashley\u2019s sister was present during another transaction; however, the undercover officer testified she \u201ccame ... and bought a bag of cocaine from the defendant\u201d after the transaction between defendant and the undercover officer occurred. Neither individual, from the facts presented on the record, had an impact on the transactions considered in the case sub judice.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey B. Parsons, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DALTON OSBORN BRUNSON\nNo. COA03-240\n(Filed 3 August 2004)\n1. Drugs\u2014 trafficking in cocaine \u2014 federal conviction of unlawful distribution \u2014 state prosecution barred\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-97 barred the prosecution of defendant in state court for trafficking in cocaine after defendant was convicted in federal court of unlawful distribution of cocaine under federal law for the same transactions that formed the basis for the trafficking charges. The \u201csame act\u201d as used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-97 focuses the relevant analysis on the underlying actions for which defendant is prosecuted at the state and federal levels rather than on the elements of the offenses.\n2. Drugs\u2014 conspiracy to traffic in cocaine \u2014 federal conviction of unlawful distribution \u2014 state prosecution not barred\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-97 does not bar the prosecution of defendant in state court for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine by sale after defendant was convicted in federal court of unlawful distribution of cocaine because the federal statute under which defendant was convicted only criminalizes the acts of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possession with the intent to engage in one of those acts; conspiracy is separately prohibited by another federal statute; and defendant was not charged in federal court under the conspiracy statute.\n3. Conspiracy\u2014 number of conspiracies \u2014 trafficking in cocaine \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court erred by concluding that there was sufficient evidence to show three separate conspiracies to traffic in cocaine, because: (1) the undercover officer\u2019s objective was at all times to identify and apprehend a drug dealer\u2019s source; (2) each transaction was temporally separated from the preceding transaction by no more than fourteen days and all transactions transpired over a short period of time within a one month period; (3) the undercover officer\u2019s statement to the drug dealer indicated the transaction was not a separate or discreet transaction but was to be part of an ongoing agreement for the continued purchase and supply of cocaine; and (4) the transactions were sufficiently similar based on the surrounding circumstances to hold that the transactions were part of a single conspiracy entered into by the same parties for the same purpose.\n4. Drugs\u2014 motion for appropriate relief \u2014 habitual felon conviction \u2014 possession of cocaine\nDefendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief seeking to overturn his habitual felon conviction is denied because our Supreme Court has held that the offense of possession of cocaine is classified as a felony for all purposes.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 28 June 2002 by Judge A. Leon Stanback, Jr. in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey B. Parsons, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0667-01", "first_page_order": 699, "last_page_order": 706 }