{ "id": 9000837, "name": "DIANNE STOCKTON, Plaintiff v. ESTATE OF TERRY DARNELL THOMPSON, RANDY M.L. THOMPSON, Administrator, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Stockton v. Estate of Thompson", "decision_date": "2004-08-17", "docket_number": "No. COA03-749", "first_page": "899", "last_page": "902", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "165 N.C. App. 899" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "745-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12123994 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562923 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "quoting Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155827 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "quoting Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511376 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551140, 551241, 551058, 551257, 551261 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0141-04", "/nc/347/0141-03", "/nc/347/0141-05", "/nc/347/0141-02", "/nc/347/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710933 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198469 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 7693, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.3353754340853354e-08, "percentile": 0.33584776564193514 }, "sha256": "6abcf34d892c3b5e4eebce146a606704d95cf132d8234eeff3f57873764ab76f", "simhash": "1:cb8b6ea6776c5ae4", "word_count": 1265 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:46:04.930387+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "DIANNE STOCKTON, Plaintiff v. ESTATE OF TERRY DARNELL THOMPSON, RANDY M.L. THOMPSON, Administrator, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nThe issue before this Court is whether a party not designated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-16 may intervene in a civil paternity action commenced pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-14.\nTerry Darnell Thompson (decedent) died on 1 September 2001 in a motorcycle accident. At the time of his death, decedent had two minor, legitimated daughters, Tekia C. Jordon and Tend Caroline Jordan (Tekia and Tend).\nJ.T. was born 1 March 2002 to Dianne Stockton (plaintiff), who was living with decedent at the time of decedent\u2019s death. Genetic testing conducted on decedent\u2019s brother and mother revealed a 99.96% probability that decedent was J.T.\u2019s biological father. Prior to decedent\u2019s death, he repeatedly acknowledged that he was the father of J.T. and stated his intention to care for J.T.\nA petition was filed by the administrator of decedent\u2019s estate on 7 August 2002 requesting that the trial court appoint guardians ad litem for the known minor children of decedent, Tekia and Tend, and for decedent\u2019s known illegitimate child, J.T. The petition further requested that the trial court determine the status of the heirs to decedent\u2019s estate. The trial court appointed guardians ad litem on 7 August 2002 for all heirs at law noted in the administrator\u2019s petition. On 14 January 2003, the natural guardian of Tekia and Tend filed a response to the estate\u2019s petition in which the guardian alleged that the statute of limitations for J.T.\u2019s paternity claim barred the action, and thus, Tekia and Tend were the sole heirs to decedent\u2019s estate. The guardian ad litem for J.T. filed an answer to the response. At the 5 February 2003 hearing regarding the estate\u2019s petition, the clerk of court held that Tekia and Tend were heirs to the estate, but the clerk deferred ruling as to J.T\u2019s status pending the resolution of a paternity action regarding J.T.\nPlaintiff filed a paternity action on 5 February 2003 alleging that J.T. was the biological child of decedent. The guardian ad litem for Tekia and Tend filed a motion to intervene in the paternity action on 10 February 2003 in order to protect their pecuniary interest in decedent\u2019s estate. Tekia\u2019s and Tend\u2019s guardian ad litem also filed an answer to plaintiff\u2019s complaint asserting that the statute of limitations had passed for initiating a paternity action. In an order filed 14 March 2003, the trial court denied the motion to intervene and on 27 March 2003, the trial court denied Tekia\u2019s and Tend\u2019s guardian ad litem\u2019s motion for reconsideration of the motion to intervene. The guardian ad litem for Tekia and Tend appeals.\nWe first note that the trial court\u2019s order denying appellant\u2019s motion to intervene is interlocutory. See generally Alford v. Davis, 131 N.C. App. 214, 216, 505 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1998); Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). The order in this case is interlocutory because the trial court had not disposed of the entire controversy among the parties. United Services Automobile Assn. v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 395, 485 S.E.2d 337, 339 disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 141, 492 S.E.2d 37 (1997). Interlocutory orders are generally not subject to immediate appeal; however, \u201cimmediate appellate review is permitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-277 [2003] and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(a) [2003], if the order adversely affects a substantial right which the appellant may lose if not granted an appeal before final judgment.\u201d Id.-, see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-27(2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27 (2003).\nBy failing to address the interlocutory nature of the order in a brief to this Court, appellant violated N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4). However, pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2, this Court elects, in its discretion, to hear the merits of appellant\u2019s argument. We conclude that appellant\u2019s motion to intervene involves a substantial right which would be irreparably impaired if the trial court\u2019s order was not reviewed prior to the trial court\u2019s final judgment in the underlying paternity action.\nThe paternity action regarding J.T. was filed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 49-14 and 49-16 by J.T.\u2019s biological mother. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-16 (2003) explicitly lists those individuals who have standing to participate in a paternity proceeding. Under the statute which is entitled, \u201cParties to proceeding,\u201d a paternity action may be brought by\n(1) The mother, the father, the child, or the personal representative of the mother or the child, [or]\n(2) When the child, or the mother in case of medical expenses, is likely to become a public charge, the director of social services or such person as by law performs the duties of such official[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-16. It is logical to conclude that the General Assembly anticipated that the only defendant in a paternity proceeding would be the putative parent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-14 (2003) provides for the procedure by which a civil action to establish paternity may be initiated by those specifically listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-16. \u201cThe primary goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute.\u201d Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 574, 573 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2002). \u201cWhen confronting an issue involving statutory interpretation, [an appellate court\u2019s] \u2018primary task is to determine legislative intent while giving the language of the statute its natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise.\u2019 \u201d Spruill v. Lake Phelps Vol. Fire Dep\u2019t, Inc., 351 N.C. 318, 320, 523 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2000) (quoting Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1988)).\nIn Smith v. Bumgarner, 115 N.C. App. 149, 151, 443 S.E.2d 744, 745 (1994), this Court recognized that \u201c[t]he legislative purpose of an action under G.S. \u00a7 49-14 is to provide the basis or means of establishing the identity of the biological father so that the child\u2019s right to support may be enforced and the child will not become a public charge.\u201d In Smith, our Court acknowledged that in enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-16, the General Assembly knowingly abrogated the common law and specifically listed those individuals and entities who may bring an action pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-14. Smith, 115 N.C. App. at 151-52, 443 S.E.2d at 745-46 (\u201cIf the legislature had intended to require the child to be joined as a necessary party in an action under G.S. \u00a7 49-14, then it would have specifically stated such[.]\u201d). We conclude that the General Assembly, in explicitly listing who may be a party to a paternity proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-14, did not intend for others not set forth in the statute to intervene in such a paternity proceeding. To hold otherwise, would render ineffective the clear and unambiguous meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-16. Thus, appellant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Woodson, Sayers, Lawther, Short, Parrott & Walker, LLP, by Sean C. Walker, for plaintiff-appellee Diane Stockton.", "James L. \u201cJeremy\u201d Garter, Jr., for defendant-appellee Estate of Terry Darnell Thompson.", "Linwood O. Foust, for intervenor-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANNE STOCKTON, Plaintiff v. ESTATE OF TERRY DARNELL THOMPSON, RANDY M.L. THOMPSON, Administrator, Defendant\nNo. COA03-749\n(Filed 17 August 2004)\nPaternity\u2014 deceased father \u2014 other known children \u2014 intervention not allowed\nThose not listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 49-16 may not intervene in a paternity proceeding, and the trial court correctly denied a motion to intervene by the guardian of the other children of the deceased putative father.\nAppeal by intervenor-appellant from orders entered 14 March and 28 March 2003 by Judge Beth S. Dixon in District Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 2004.\nWoodson, Sayers, Lawther, Short, Parrott & Walker, LLP, by Sean C. Walker, for plaintiff-appellee Diane Stockton.\nJames L. \u201cJeremy\u201d Garter, Jr., for defendant-appellee Estate of Terry Darnell Thompson.\nLinwood O. Foust, for intervenor-appellant." }, "file_name": "0899-01", "first_page_order": 931, "last_page_order": 934 }