{ "id": 8411003, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GERRICK LAMONT BETHEA", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bethea", "decision_date": "2004-12-07", "docket_number": "No. COA03-1108", "first_page": "215", "last_page": "224", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 215" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631259, 12631260 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding even \"in the absence of impairment by alcohol\" the \"operation of a vehicle could rise to the level of culpable negligence\" for the purposes of convictions of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0033-02", "/se2d/594/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631237, 12631320, 12631321, 12631259, 12631260, 12631261 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding even \"in the absence of impairment by alcohol\" the \"operation of a vehicle could rise to the level of culpable negligence\" for the purposes of convictions of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0194-02", "/se2d/596/0020-02", "/se2d/596/0020-01", "/se2d/594/0033-02", "/se2d/594/0033-01", "/se2d/594/0034-02" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535590 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684981 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560474 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E.2d 745, 753 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2397685 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E.2d 745, 753 (1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570356 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561130 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627298 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "quoting Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559822 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "quoting Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555714 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520388 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. White, 77 N.C. App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792 (1985)" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916386 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. White, 77 N.C. App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792 (1985)" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523918 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916450 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719603 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 N.C. App. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241787 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502-03" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/135/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521769 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377-78", "parenthetical": "upholding an involuntary manslaughter conviction where no evidence of impaired driving was present" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524640 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311-13", "parenthetical": "upholding an involuntary manslaughter conviction where no evidence of impaired driving was present" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959979 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523321 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155839 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4684892 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561231 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532 (1982)" }, { "page": "733" }, { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67-68", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532 (1982)" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915638 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542671 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1070, "char_count": 23629, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4585767626058124e-07, "percentile": 0.6568687981422855 }, "sha256": "a2c6d60fe1d681d1f2f076db4ecebb9fbdbb325dfb4ce5ad3e072ed6382e94e0", "simhash": "1:8ee10c0b349fccf6", "word_count": 3737 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GERRICK LAMONT BETHEA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nGerrick Lamont Bethea (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from a conviction of second-degree murder for the death of a law enforcement officer during a high speed pursuit of defendant. We find no error.\nAt approximately one o\u2019clock a.m. on 26 September 2001, Officer William Howell (\u201cOfficer Howell\u201d) of the Elizabethtown Police Department was on patrol and observed a man he suspected was defendant getting into a vehicle and driving out of a convenience store parking lot. Officer Howell knew defendant\u2019s license had been revoked. He followed defendant, and after confirming the vehicle\u2019s registration had expired, activated his patrol car\u2019s blue light to stop defendant. Defendant responded by driving through a red light and increasing his speed to seventy-five miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone. Officer Howell pursued defendant out of the Elizabethtown city limits into the surrounding rural area.\nApproximately two minutes after initiating pursuit, Officer Howell made radio contact with Clarkton Police Chief Joey Blackburn (\u201cChief Blackburn\u201d) and Bladen County Deputy Sheriff Jamie Collins (\u201cDeputy Collins\u201d or the \u201cvictim\u201d) (collectively the \u201ctwo officers\u201d), who were patrolling Clarkton in Chief Blackburn\u2019s patrol car. Upon learning the pursuit was heading toward Clarkton, the two officers joined the pursuit. Chief Blackburn passed Officer Howell to lead the pursuit, pulled alongside defendant\u2019s vehicle, and positively identified him.\nAfter defendant braked heavily and turned sharply onto a road with which Chief Blackburn was unfamiliar, the two officers discussed the possibility that defendant would stop his car and try to run. Chief Blackburn handed Deputy Collins a flashlight and noticed the deputy moving his hand toward his seatbelt latch in preparation to exit the patrol car. Chief Blackburn closed to within a car length of defendant in preparation for defendant abandoning his car. As the two officers and defendant approached a curve, of which Chief Blackburn was not aware, defendant slowed very quickly. In response, Chief Blackburn braked heavily, but the brakes had heated during the pursuit and were not working effectively. Chief Blackburn\u2019s driver-side bumper struck the defendant\u2019s passenger-side bumper. Chief Blackburn reacted by quickly steering right in an attempt to avoid further colliding with defendant. While defendant missed the curve and went straight into a ditch, Chief Blackburn\u2019s car slid sideways and impacted a concrete marker and a tree. On impact, Deputy Collins was thrown from the car and subsequently died of his injuries in the emergency room. An accident reconstruction report stated that the speeds of defendant\u2019s car and Chief Blackburn\u2019s car were too great to navigate the curve and that Deputy Collins did not have his seatbelt fastened at the moment of impact.\nOfficer Howell arrested defendant at the scene. During the pursuit, defendant reached speeds of approximately one hundred miles per hour, sped through a traffic light and several stop signs without slowing, crossed into the oncoming traffic lane several times, and turned his car lights off several times while traveling at speeds between ninety and ninety-five miles per hour, making his car difficult to see. Defendant pled guilty to felony speeding to elude arrest, speeding, driving left of center, driving with an expired registration, driving while license revoked, reckless driving to endanger persons or property, and violation of a traffic control device.\nI. Motion to Dismiss\nDefendant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of second-degree murder because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence of malice and of proximate cause. We disagree.\nThe issue in a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, \u201cthere is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. . . . Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (citation omitted). \u201cSecond-degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice, but without premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Brewer, 328 N.C. 515, 522, 402 S.E.2d 380, 385 (1991). The elements of second-degree murder are: \u201c1. defendant killed the victim; 2. defendant acted intentionally and with malice; and 3. defendant\u2019s act was a proximate cause of the victim\u2019s death.\u201d State v. Bostic, 121 N.C. App. 90, 98, 465 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1995).\nDefendant argues that, because he was not driving under the influence, he could not have exhibited the requisite malice for a conviction of second-degree murder. Essentially, defendant argues evidence that a defendant was driving under the influence is the only evidence sufficient to prove malice in a second-degree murder case involving an automobile accident. However, our jurisdiction has long held that malice may be inferred \u201c \u2018when an act which is inherently dangerous to human life is done so recklessly and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief.\u2019 \u201d State v. McBride, 109 N.C. App. 64, 67-68, 425 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1993) (quoting State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532 (1982)). Accord State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 394, 317 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1984). Moreover, to prove malice in second-degree murder prosecutions involving automobile accidents, \u201cit [is] necessary for the State to prove only that defendant had the intent to perform the act of driving in such a reckless manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely result, thus evidencing depravity of mind.\u201d State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 395, 527 S.E.2d 299, 304 (2000). Further, \u201c[w]hat constitutes proof of malice will vary depending on the factual circumstances in each case.\u201d McBride, 109 N.C. App. at 67, 425 S.E.2d at 733.\nDefendant correctly points out that every North Carolina appellate decision involving an automobile accident, where the court found sufficient evidence to prove malice for a second-degree murder conviction, involved a defendant driving under the influence of alcohol or some other impairing substance at the time of the accident. While driving under the influence is certainly evidence sufficient to prove malice, defendant\u2019s actions in the instant case, motivated by an attempt to elude law enforcement by driving in an extremely dangerous manner, is an equally reckless and wanton act, which evidences \u201c \u2018a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 67-68, 425 S.E.2d at 733 (citation omitted). Moreover, our courts have not found driving under the influence to be the only evidence capable of proving malice. See, e.g., Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 527 S.E.2d 299; State v. Byers, 105 N.C. App. 377, 413 S.E.2d 586 (1992). In Byers, this Court analyzed the relevance and admissibility of certain evidence and found that\nthe evidence presented at trial tending to show defendant knew his license was revoked and proceeded to drive regardless of this knowledge indicates defendant acted with \u201ca mind regardless of social duty\u201d and with \u201crecklessness of consequences.\u201d We further find the evidence tending to show defendant took the car without permission and displayed fictitious tags in order, to drive indicates a mind \u201cbent on mischief.\u201d\nByers, 105 N.C. App. at 382, 413 S.E.2d at 589.\nIn the instant case, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, shows that defendant was driving with a revoked license, fled to elude law enforcement officers, sped through a red light and several stop signs, drove at speeds up to one hundred miles per hour, crossed into the oncoming traffic lane several times, and turned his car lights off on dark rural roads, decreasing his own visibility and making his car extremely difficult to see, while traveling at speeds between ninety and ninety-five miles per hour. Defendant\u2019s clear mind unclouded by intoxicating substances that might have hindered his ability to appreciate the danger of his actions, does not negate the presence of malice, but rather, tends to more clearly show an \u201cintent to perform the act of driving in such a reckless manner as reflects knowledge that injury or death would likely result, thus evidencing depravity of mind.\u201d Rich, 351 N.C. at 395, 527 S.E.2d at 304. Accordingly, we hold the evidence here was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer malice from defendant's reckless and wanton attempt to elude law enforcement. Cf. State v. Wade, 161 N.C. App. 686, 690, 589 S.E.2d 379, 383 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 241, 594 S.E.2d 33 (2004) (holding even \u201cin the absence of impairment by alcohol\u201d the \u201coperation of a vehicle could rise to the level of culpable negligence\u201d for the purposes of convictions of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury); State v. Nugent, 66 N.C. App. 310, 311-13, 311 S.E.2d 376, 377-78 (1984) (upholding an involuntary manslaughter conviction where no evidence of impaired driving was present).\nDefendant further argues there was insufficient evidence of proximate cause because he did not actually collide with the other vehicle and kill the victim with his impact. Proximate cause is defined\nas a cause: (1) which, in a natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces an injury; (2) without which the injury would not have occurred; and (3) from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or some similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they existed.\nState v. Hall, 60 N.C. App. 450, 454-55, 299 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1983). Accordingly, \u201c[a] defendant will be held criminally responsible for second-degree murder if his act caused or directly contributed to the victim\u2019s death.\u201d State v. Welch, 135 N.C. App. 499, 502-03, 521 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1999). The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the State shows that the victim died after Chief Blackburn\u2019s patrol car collided with the rear of defendant\u2019s car due to defendant\u2019s sudden slowing and the patrol car careened out of control striking a concrete barrier then a tree at the end of a high-speed pursuit, which would not have occurred had defendant stopped when Officer Howell activated his blue light. A reasonable mind might conclude that defendant\u2019s reckless flight and wanton violation of the State\u2019s traffic laws \u201ccaused or directly contributed to\u201d the collision between defendant\u2019s car and the patrol car, which resulted in the victim\u2019s death. Id Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nBased on his above arguments, defendant also asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury\u2019s verdict. \u201cThe decision whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside the verdict is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court. . . .\u201d State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985). \u201cWhen the evidence at trial is sufficient to support the jury\u2019s verdict, there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict.\u201d State v. Serzan, 119 N.C. App. 557, 562, 459 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1995). As we have already held the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury\u2019s verdict, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict.\nII. Jury Instruction\nDefendant asserts the trial court erred by refusing to give four requested instructions on proximate cause: N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.19 (gen. civ. vol. 2004) (multiple causes); N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.27 (gen. civ. vol. 2004) (concurring acts of negligence); N.C.P.I. \u2014 Div. 102.60 (gen. civ. vol. 2004) (concurring negligence); and N.C.P.I.\u2014Civ. 102.28 (gen. civ. vol. 2004) (insulating acts of negligence). We disagree.\n\u201cIt is well established that when a defendant requests a special instruction which is correct in law and supported by the evidence, the trial court must give the requested instruction, at least in substance.\u201d State v. Tidwell, 112 N.C. App. 770, 773, 436 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1993). \u201cIf a requested instruction is refused, defendant on appeal must show the proposed instruction was \u2018not given in substance, and that substantial evidence supported the omitted instruction.\u2019 \u201d State v. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. 33, 36, 454 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1995) (quoting State v. White, 77 N.C. App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792 (1985)).\nUnder the proximate cause element, the trial court instructed the jury that:\nA proximate cause is a real cause, without which the victim\u2019s death would not have occurred. The defendant\u2019s acts need not have been the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if they concurred with some other cause, acting at the same time, which in combination with it proximately caused the victim\u2019s death.\nThe trial court\u2019s instruction gave in substance N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.19 (multiple causes); N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.27 (concurring acts of negligence); and N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.60 (concurring negligence), which each instruct that a jury may consider a defendant\u2019s actions to be a proximate cause even though there may have been other proximate causes. The trial court did not, however, give in substance N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.28 (insulating acts of negligence). We must therefore review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supported an instruction under N.C.P.I. \u2014 Civ. 102.28. Thompson, 118 N.C. App. at 36, 454 S.E.2d at 273.\nDefendant argues certain actions by the officers constituted one or more intervening or superseding causes that broke the causal chain of defendant\u2019s negligent actions. \u201cTo escape responsibility based on an intervening [or superseding] cause, the defendant must show that the intervening [or superseding] act was \u2018the sole cause of death.\u2019 \u201d Welch, 135 N.C. App. at 503, 521 S.E.2d at 268 (quoting State v. Holsclaw, 42 N.C. App. 696, 699, 257 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1979)). An intervening or superseding cause is a cause that \u201c \u2018so entirely [intervenes in or] supersedes the operation of the defendant\u2019s negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury.\u2019 \u201d Cox v. Gallamore, 267 N.C. 537, 544, 148 S.E.2d 616, 621 (1966) (quoting Henderson v. Powell, 221 N.C. 239, 19 S.E.2d 876 (1942)).\nDefendant contends several actions and decisions by the officers were intervening or superseding causes. First, Officer Howell and the two officers pursued him outside their respective jurisdictions and despite the safer option of arresting him the next day at his residence. Second, they pursued him at unsafe speeds on unfamiliar roads even after the brakes of Chief Blackburn\u2019s patrol car showed signs of wear due to the pursuit. Third, Chief Blackburn steered right in an attempt to avoid further colliding with defendant. Fourth, evidence at trial tended to show that the victim was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident.\nOur Supreme Court has long held that \u201c [contributory negligence as such has no place in the law of crimes.\u201d State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 459, 128 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1963). Therefore, the probability that a reasonable person might conclude that the two officers\u2019 decisions and actions contributed to the victim\u2019s death is of no moment. Moreover, no reasonable person could conclude that the two officers\u2019 decisions and actions, viewed separately or together, so entirely intervened in or superseded the operation of defendant\u2019s reckless flight and wanton traffic violations as to constitute the sole cause of the victim\u2019s death. Accordingly, the evidence was not sufficient to support an instruction on insulating acts of negligence, and the trial court did not err by declining to give the instruction.\nIII. Introduction of Photographs to the Jury\nDefendant asserts the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of two color photographs from different angles of the deceased victim in the emergency room. Specifically, defendant argues that, because the defendant did not dispute that the victim died as a result of the car accident, the pictures were not probative of any issue in dispute. He also argues the pictures were gruesome and were introduced solely to arouse the juror\u2019s passions. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has long \u201cheld that a stipulation as to the cause of death does not preclude the State from proving all essential elements of its case.\u201d State v. Elkerson, 304 N.C. 658, 665, 285 S.E.2d 784, 789 (1982). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 and Rule 402, \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable\u201d is admissible. \u201c \u2018Photographs are usually competent to be used by a witness to explain or illustrate anything that it is competent for him to describe in words.\u2019 \u201d State v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 397, 312 S.E.2d 448, 457 (1984) (quoting State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E.2d 745, 753 (1971)). Moreover, \u201c[photographs of a homicide victim may be introduced even if they are gory, gruesome, horrible or revolting, so long as they are used for illustrative purposes and so long as their excessive or repetitious use is not aimed solely at arousing the passions of the jury.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 284, 372 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1988).\nThe two photographs were introduced during Chief Blackburn\u2019s testimony to provide a chain of causation between the accident and the victim\u2019s death and to illustrate Blackburn\u2019s observations of the state of the victim\u2019s body. Thus, the two photographs, although somewhat graphic, were not introduced in an excessive or repetitious manner in order to arouse the passions of the jury but, rather, were introduced to allow the State to prove chain of causation, an essential element of its case, and to illustrate Blackburn\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the two photographs.\nDefendant also asserts that any probative value of the two photographs was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. \u201c[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403. Whether to exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 is a determination left to \u201c \u2018the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court\u2019s ruling should not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling was \u2018manifestly unsupported by reason or [was] so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 55, 530 S.E.2d 281, 293 (2000) (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)). Having determined above that the two photographs were probative, admissible, and not used excessively or repetitiously to arouse the passions of the jury, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the two photographs\u2019 probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.\nIV. Redirect Examination\nDefendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State on redirect examination to question a witness concerning matters not covered in cross-examination. \u201cThe purpose of redirect examination is to clarify any questions raised on cross-examination concerning the subject matter of direct examination and to confront any new matters which arose during cross-examination.\u201d State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 754, 446 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994). Defendant directs our attention to the redirect examination concerning portions of the recorded law enforcement radio transmissions occurring while Chief Blackburn and the victim were driving to join the pursuit and argues-this line of questioning was outside the scope of the cross-examination. However, defense counsel cross-examined Blackburn extensively on this period of time using a transcript of the radio transmissions, which \u201copened the door\u201d to a redirect on these matters. Accordingly, the redirect examination was not outside the scope of the cross-examination, and the defendant\u2019s assertion is without merit.\nDefendant also asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for appropriate relief after the trial. Having determined defendant received a fair trial free from error, we find this assertion to be without merit. Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403, by admitting certain statements into evidence. Defendant however sets forth no argument in support of this assertion. Therefore, pursuant to N.C. R. App. R 28(b)(6), we decline to address it.\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and LEVINSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Robert M. Curran, for the State.", "The McGougan Law Firm, by Paul J. Ekster and Kevin J. Bullard, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GERRICK LAMONT BETHEA\nNo. COA03-1108\n(Filed 7 December 2004)\n1. Homicide\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 officer\u2019s death during high speed chase \u2014 malice\nThe trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a second-degree murder charge for insufficient evidence of malice in the death of an officer in an automobile accident while he was chasing defendant at high speed. While prior second-degree murders from automobile accidents have involved impaired driving, defendant\u2019s conduct here was equally reckless and wanton.\n2. Homicide\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 officer\u2019s death in high speed chase \u2014 proximate cause\nThere was sufficient evidence of proximate cause in a second-degree murder case arising from the death of an officer in an automobile accident while he was chasing defendant at high speed. A reasonable mind might conclude that defendant\u2019s reckless flight and wanton violation of the traffic laws caused or directly contributed to the victim\u2019s death.\n3. Homicide\u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 death of officer in car chase \u2014 requested instructions \u2014 insulating negligence\nThe court gave in substance all but one of the instructions on proximate cause requested by a second-degree murder defendant prosecuted for the death of an officer who was chasing defendant at high speed. There was no error in not giving an instruction on insulating negligence because contributory negligence has no place in criminal law and no reasonable person could conclude that the officers\u2019 actions intervened to be the cause of death.\n4. Evidence\u2014 emergency room photographs of deceased\u2014 illustrative of testimony \u2014 not excessive or repetitive\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree murder prosecution by admitting emergency room photographs of the deceased, a law enforcement officer who died while chasing defendant at high-speed. The photographs were admitted to illustrate another officer\u2019s testimony and they were not used excessively or repetitiously to arouse the passions of the jury.\n5. Witnesses\u2014 redirect examination \u2014 scope of cross-examination not exceeded\nA redirect examination about recorded law enforcement radio transmissions in a second-degree murder prosecution did not exceed the scope of the cross-examination where defendant had used the transcript in extensively cross-examining an officer.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 24 February 2003 by Judge Robert F. Floyd in Bladen County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 June 2004.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Robert M. Curran, for the State.\nThe McGougan Law Firm, by Paul J. Ekster and Kevin J. Bullard, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0215-01", "first_page_order": 245, "last_page_order": 254 }