{ "id": 8411038, "name": "CATHERINE P. JARRETT, Employee, Plaintiff v. McCREARY MODERN, INC., Self-Insured, Employer, and THE PHOENIX FUND/NATIONAL BENEFITS GROUP, INC., Servicing Agent, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Jarrett v. McCreary Modern, Inc.", "decision_date": "2004-12-07", "docket_number": "No. COA03-1328", "first_page": "234", "last_page": "242", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 234" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" }, { "page": "915-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135777 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "231-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "page": "753-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11200245 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 94, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081042 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521", "parenthetical": "quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 94, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70" }, { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566886, 8566726, 8566795, 8566766, 8566845 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0401-05", "/nc/301/0401-01", "/nc/301/0401-03", "/nc/301/0401-02", "/nc/301/0401-04" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 N.C. App. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552281 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/47/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565283 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "101-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(13)" }, { "page": "(13)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155778, 1155688, 1155729, 1155570, 1155866 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0473-01", "/nc/351/0473-05", "/nc/351/0473-04", "/nc/351/0473-02", "/nc/351/0473-03" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239575 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "354" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0351-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 19605, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.626763357692962e-08, "percentile": 0.4907566039564469 }, "sha256": "675af84ced819e0e0e2babe8c9a318ccbe1af111d2284764dcfbc52bbb155aa9", "simhash": "1:8130de92f0b6c019", "word_count": 3023 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and MCCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "CATHERINE P. JARRETT, Employee, Plaintiff v. McCREARY MODERN, INC., Self-Insured, Employer, and THE PHOENIX FUND/NATIONAL BENEFITS GROUP, INC., Servicing Agent, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nMcCreary Modern, Inc. and National Benefits Group (collectively, defendants) appeal from an opinion and award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission awarding Catherine P. Jarrett (plaintiff) workers\u2019 compensation disability and medical benefits for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\nAn opinion and award was entered on 16 August 2002 by a deputy commissioner denying plaintiffs claim because plaintiff \u201cfailed to establish that her condition was characteristic of and peculiar to her employment, that she was at an increased risk of developing the condition, or that her condition was caused by her employment.\u201d The deputy commissioner specifically concluded that the testimony of one of plaintiffs treating physicians, Dr. Anthony DeFranzo, that plaintiffs job could or might have caused her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was based \u201con speculation and false assumptions such as [sic] that his testimony was not competent to be considered.\u201d\nPlaintiff thereafter appealed to the Full Commission. The Commission found as a fact that plaintiff was 55 years old at the time of the hearing before the deputy commissioner and that she began working for defendant McCreary Modem in April 1995. Plaintiff worked as an attach skirt sewer, operating a sewing machine to sew skirts onto furniture covers. Plaintiff worked between seven and eight hours per shift, five or six days per week, with a ten-minute morning break, a thirty-minute lunch break, and a ten-minute afternoon break. A videotape of plaintiff performing her job duties was stipulated into evidence, which plaintiff agreed accurately depicted her job. The process of sewing a skirt onto a furniture cover involved plaintiff picking up the furniture cover, which typically weighed between two and seven pounds; laying the cover and the skirt on the sewing machine, under the needle arm; guiding the cover and skirt through the machine; stapling a ticket to the cover; and throwing the completed product into a bin. Plaintiff spent approximately eight minutes sewing one sofa skirt, and she sewed between 50 and 60 covers per shift.\nThe Commission further found that on 29 May 2000 plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Mark McGinnis, complaining of a two-year history of pain in her right hand, wrist, and forearm. Plaintiff also complained of numbness in her right hand but did not then report any left-hand symptoms, and plaintiff did not notify defendants at that time that she needed medical care for a work-related condition. Plaintiff returned to Dr. McGinnis on 13 June 2000, at which time Dr. McGinnis found no muscle atrophy, indicating plaintiff was using her hands normally. Dr. McGinnis released plaintiff to return to work, without restrictions.\nThe Commission further found that plaintiff returned to Dr. McGinnis on 23 March 2001, this time complaining of pain, numbness, and tingling in both her right and left hands and arms. Dr. McGinnis diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and thereafter performed a right carpal tunnel release on 29 March 2001, followed by a left carpal tunnel release on 26 April 2001. Post-surgery, plaintiffs right-hand symptoms almost completely resolved, but plaintiff continued to experience pain in her left hand, and nerve conduction tests on her left hand yielded abnormal results. Nevertheless, on 27 July 2001 Dr. McGinnis released plaintiff without restrictions. Plaintiff returned to work with defendant McCreary Modern on 6 August 2001, after her job was specifically modified to eliminate any lifting over 10 pounds.\nThe Commission further found that Dr. McGinnis continued to treat plaintiff through 31 January 2002 for complaints of right arm pain and pain in the fingers of her left hand. After reviewing the videotape of plaintiff performing her job duties, Dr. McGinnis opined that plaintiffs job was not highly repetitive; that it placed plaintiff at a mild risk for developing carpal tunnel syndrome compared with the general public; and that it may have contributed to or exacerbated the development of plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome.\nThe Commission further found that on 13 December 2001 plaintiff sought treatment from a second physician, Dr. DeFranzo, for complaints of pain and numbness in her left arm and hand, for which plaintiff received a cortisone injection. Plaintiff returned to Dr. DeFranzo on 24 January 2002 and reported no significant improvement in her left-hand symptoms. Dr. DeFranzo recommended that plaintiff undergo another nerve conduction study and ultrasound on her left hand, but defendants did not authorize this additional testing. Dr. DeFranzo found plaintiffs right hand to be at maximum medical improvement and assigned an 11% permanent partial impairment rating for her right hand, as well as a 10% permanent partial impairment rating to her right upper extremity, under the American Medical Association (AMA) guidelines. Dr. DeFranzo found plaintiff\u2019s left hand not to be at maximum medical improvement but nevertheless assigned a 17% permanent partial impairment rating to her left hand, as well as a 15% permanent partial impairment rating to her left upper extremity.\nThe Commission further found that Dr. DeFranzo assigned plaintiff permanent work restrictions of light duty, non-repetitive work with a 20-pound lifting restriction when lifting with both hands. By letter dated 28 January 2002, defendant McCreary Modern informed plaintiff it could accommodate these restrictions. However, by a subsequent letter dated 12 February 2002, defendant McCreary Modem informed plaintiff it had received additional information from Dr. DeFranzo which caused it to conclude that plaintiffs work restrictions could not be accommodated. Dr. DeFranzo did not believe that plaintiff could return to her position as an attach skirt sewer, and plaintiff did not work for defendant McCreary Modem in any capacity after 25 January 2002.\nThe Commission further found that after reviewing the videotape of plaintiff performing her job duties, Dr. DeFranzo opined that plaintiffs job was highly repetitive, that it exposed her to a higher risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome than the general public, and that it could have caused her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. At his deposition, Dr. DeFranzo testified that he determined from viewing the videotape that plaintiffs job required more than 2,000 hand motions per hour, and that several of these motions were indicated in the development of carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. DeFranzo testified that in making this determination, he did not actually count the number of hand motions plaintiff made in one full hour.\nThe Commission determined that the greater weight of the credible record evidence supports a finding that plaintiffs employment was a significant contributing factor in the development of her carpal tunnel syndrome, which the Commission concluded was a compensable occupational disease. The Commission further determined that \u201c[a]s the result of plaintiffs repetitive use of her hands in her work with defendant [McCreary Modem], plaintiff contracted carpal tunnel syndrome[,]\u201d and that as a result of plaintiffs bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, she was \u201cdisabled and was unable to earn wages in her regular employment or any employment for the periods March 23, 2001 through July 27, 2001 and January 25, 2002 and continuing.\u201d Accordingly, on 15 May 2003, the Commission entered its opinion and award reversing the deputy commissioner and awarding plaintiff temporary total disability and medical benefits. From the opinion and award of the Commission, defendants appeal.\nBy their sole assignment of error, defendants contend that there is insufficient competent record evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings and conclusion that plaintiffs employment was a significant contributing factor to the development of her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. After a careful review of the record, particularly the deposition transcripts of plaintiffs two treating physicians, Dr. McGinnis and Dr. DeFranzo, we disagree with defendants\u2019 assertion.\nIt is well settled that this Court\u2019s review of an opinion and award of the Industrial Commission is limited to two questions: \u201c(1) whether there is any competent evidence of record to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact; and (2) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law.\u201d Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 351, 353, 524 S.E.2d 368, 371, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 473, 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000). \u201cThe findings of the Commission are conclusive on appeal when such competent evidence exists, even if there is plenary evidence for contrary findings.\u201d Id.\nSection 97-57 of our General Statutes provides that a defendant employer is liable to an employee for onset of an occupational disease if the employee demonstrates that he (1) suffers from a com-pensable occupational disease, and (2) was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease while employed by the defendant employer. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-57 (2003); see also Hardin, 136 N.C. App. at 354, 524 S.E.2d at 371. While carpal tunnel syndrome is not among the compensable occupational diseases listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13), a disease or condition not specifically enumerated in the statute may nonetheless qualify as a compensable occupational disease if the plaintiff shows that:\n(1) [the disease is] characteristic of persons engaged in the particular trade or occupation in which the claimant is engaged; (2) [the disease is] not an ordinary disease of life to which the public generally is equally exposed with those engaged in that particular trade or occupation; and (3) there [is] \u2018a causal connection between the disease and the [claimant\u2019s] employment.\u2019\nRutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 93, 301 S.E.2d 359, 365 (1983) (quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981)); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2003). The burden of proving each element of compensability is upon the employee seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Moore v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 47 N.C. App. 744, 750, 269 S.E.2d 159, 163, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 401, 274 S.E.2d 226 (1980).\nThis Court has previously stated that \u201c[t]he first two elements of the Rutledge test are satisfied where the claimant can show that \u2018the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the public generally.\u2019 \u201d Robbins v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 151 N.C. App. 518, 521, 566 S.E.2d 139, 142 (2002) (quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 94, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70). In the present case, the Commission made the following pertinent findings regarding plaintiff\u2019s employment and her risk, relative to that of the general public, of developing carpal tunnel syndrome:\n14. Dr. McGinnis felt that plaintiffs job placed her at a mild increased risk compared to the general public and that her position may have contributed to or exacerbated the development of carpal tunnel syndrome.\n20. Dr. DeFranzo testified plaintiff was \u201cwithout question\u201d exposed to a greater risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome through her employment than members of the general public.\nOur examination of the record reveals that findings of fact numbers 14 and 20 are supported by competent record evidence, specifically the deposition testimony of plaintiffs two treating physicians. Dr. McGinnis testified at his deposition that \u201c[i]n my estimation, this particular job may place [plaintiff] at a mildly increased risk [of developing carpal tunnel syndrome] compared to the general population.\u201d Moreover, Dr. DeFranzo testified at his deposition that in his opinion, plaintiffs job \u201cwithout question\u201d exposed her to a higher risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome than the general public. Since findings of fact numbers 14 and 20 are supported by competent record evidence, they are conclusive on appeal. Hardin, 136 N.C. App. at 353, 524 S.E.2d at 371. Because we conclude that these findings in turn support the Commission\u2019s conclusion that \u201c[p]laintiff\u2019s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public . . . not so employed is equally exposed[,]\u201d plaintiff has carried her burden of proving the first two elements of the Rutledge test. Robbins, 151 N.C. App. at 521, 566 S.E.2d at 142.\nDefendants therefore correctly assert in their brief that \u201cthis case hinges primarily on the issue of whether there is competent evidence to support the findings and conclusions that Plaintiff\u2019s job as a sewer caused her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome[,]\u201d i.e., the third element of the Rutledge test.\nAn employee seeking workers\u2019 compensation benefits can establish the third element of the Rutledge test by showing that the job was a significant causal factor in, or significantly contributed to, the development of the occupational disease. Locklear v. Stedman Corp., 131 N.C. App. 389, 393, 508 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1998). In the context of determining the relationship between workplace exposure and development of an occupational disease, our Supreme Court has stated as follows:\nSignificant means \u201chaving or likely to have influence or effect: deserving to be considered: important, weighty, notable.\u201d . . . Significant is to be contrasted with negligible, unimportant, present but not worthy of note, miniscule, or of little moment. The factual inquiry, in other words, should be whether the occupational exposure was such a significant factor in the disease\u2019s development that without it the disease would not have developed to such an extent that it caused the physical disability which resulted in claimant\u2019s incapacity for work.\nRutledge, 308 N.C. at 101-02, 301 S.E.2d at 370. \u201cAlthough it is not necessary for doctors to use the exact wording of \u2018significantly con-tributting],\u2019 there must be some indication of the degree of contribution such as \u2018more likely than not\u2019 to meet the Rutledge test.\u201d Hardin, 136 N.C. App. at 355, 524 S.E.2d at 372.\nHere, the Commission made the following finding of fact regarding the degree to which plaintiff\u2019s employment contributed to plaintiff\u2019s development of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome:\n26. The Full Commission finds the greater weight of competent credible evidence in the record supports a finding that plaintiff\u2019s employment was a significant contributing factor the development of plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome.\nOnce again, our examination of the record reveals that finding of fact number 26 is supported by competent evidence, specifically the deposition testimony of Dr. DeFranzo. At his deposition, Dr. DeFranzo testified as follows:\nQ. Dr. Defranzo, I\u2019m going to be asking you some opinion questions. And, in forming your opinions, I understand that you had a chance to review, at some point, all [plaintiff\u2019s] medical records, the job description and videotape?\nA. ... I have reviewed the pertinent records in regard to this problem. And, yes, I reviewed a videotape of her job. And I have kind of a written summary what was in the tape . . .\nQ. ... To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, did [plaintiff\u2019s] job \u2014 could it or might it have caused her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You \u2014 did she work \u2014 you mentioned a high incidence of carpal tunnel syndrome being repetitive workplaces [sic]. In your opinion, was [plaintiff] working in a repetitive work environment?\nA. Yes.\nMs. Neel: Objection.\nA. There\u2019s no question about that.\nQ. And why\u2014\nA. By any criterion, this patient had more than 2,000 separate motions an hour. And all the motions that .are the worst motions for causing carpal tunnel syndrome were clearly demonstrated repetitively on that videotape.\nDr. DeFranzo clearly answered in the affirmative when questioned by plaintiff\u2019s counsel as to whether plaintiff\u2019s job \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d have caused plaintiff\u2019s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Our Supreme Court has stated that \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d expert testimony is probative and competent evidence to prove causation, where there is no additional evidence showing the expert\u2019s opinion to be a guess or mere speculation. Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 233, 581 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2003); Young v. Hickory Bus. Furniture, 353 N.C. 227, 233, 538 S.E.2d 912, 916 (2000).\nWe are not persuaded by defendants\u2019 characterization of Dr. DeFranzo\u2019s opinion testimony as being based on mere guesswork or speculation. When asked whether plaintiff\u2019s employment \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d have caused her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, Dr. DeFranzo unequivocally responded \u201cYes.\u201d Moreover, after reviewing plaintiff\u2019s job duties, Dr. DeFranzo definitively characterized her job as involving repetitive hand motions, including several of the motions most closely associated with the development of carpal tunnel syndrome, and testified that plaintiff\u2019s employment \u201cwithout question\u201d exposed her to a greater risk of developing the disease than members of the general public not so employed. Finally, Dr. DeFranzo considered other potential causes of carpal tunnel syndrome and discounted them as possibilities in the present case. Cf. Young, 353 N.C. at 231-32, 538 S.E.2d at 915-16 (evidence insufficient to support Commission\u2019s findings and conclusions that employee\u2019s work-related back injury significantly contributed to her fibromyalgia where treating physician testified that he was frequently unable to ascribe a cause for fibromylagia in his patients, that he was aware from employee\u2019s medical history of at least three potential causes for her fibromyalgia other than her work-related injury, and that tests to rule out these other potential causes had not been conducted); Holley, 357 N.C. at 233, 581 S.E.2d at 753-54 (same, where employee\u2019s first treating physician testified that he could not say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that employee\u2019s work-related accident led to her development of deep vein thrombosis and that \u201ca galaxy of possibilities\u201d could have led to her DVT, and employee\u2019s second treating physician testified that she \u201cwas unable to say with any degree of certainty\u201d whether employee\u2019s work-related injury led to her development of DVT).\nWe therefore conclude that the Commission\u2019s findings and conclusions that plaintiff\u2019s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by the conditions of her employment were supported by competent evidence.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and MCCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McGuire Woods, by John J. Cacheris, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Thomas W. Page and Terry L. Wallace, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CATHERINE P. JARRETT, Employee, Plaintiff v. McCREARY MODERN, INC., Self-Insured, Employer, and THE PHOENIX FUND/NATIONAL BENEFITS GROUP, INC., Servicing Agent, Defendants\nNo. COA03-1328\n(Filed 7 December 2004)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 carpel tunnel \u2014 causation\u2014evidence sufficient\nThere was competent evidence to support the Industrial Commissions\u2019 findings and conclusions that plaintiffs bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome was caused by her employment. Although defendant characterized the testimony of plaintiffs expert as speculative, the witness responded with an unequivocal \u201cyes\u201d when asked if plaintiffs employment could or might have caused her injury; \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d testimony is probative of causation where there is no other evidence showing the opinion to be mere guess or speculation.\nAppeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 15 May 2003 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 June 2004.\nMcGuire Woods, by John J. Cacheris, for plaintiff-appellee.\nHedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Thomas W. Page and Terry L. Wallace, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0234-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 272 }