{ "id": 8411349, "name": "TONY E. LAMBETH and BONNIE G. LAMBETH, Plaintiffs v. MEDIA GENERAL, INC. d/b/a WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL and JOHN O. BROWN and JASON T. CRAVER and MICHAEL S. BARBER, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Lambeth v. Media General, Inc.", "decision_date": "2004-12-07", "docket_number": "No. COA04-401", "first_page": "350", "last_page": "353", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 350" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "holding there is no liability for the loss where an unforeseeable intervening act was the cause of the harm" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564807 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "holding there is no liability for the loss where an unforeseeable intervening act was the cause of the harm" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564336 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 S.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738404, 4737929, 4740404, 4738486, 4734713 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0694-03", "/nc/318/0694-02", "/nc/318/0694-05", "/nc/318/0694-01", "/nc/318/0694-04" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358214 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 911", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570627, 8570535, 8570503, 8570473, 8570575 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0295-05", "/nc/298/0295-03", "/nc/298/0295-02", "/nc/298/0295-01", "/nc/298/0295-04" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551418 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" }, { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957786 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143772 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170267 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0669-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 473, "char_count": 8280, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.428965615154966e-08, "percentile": 0.3972090650844895 }, "sha256": "57b0c6c37a3f3348a1342bb6aeeab3212f4fcb1dbe610479c0618ad5e1828357", "simhash": "1:05d544e30c879508", "word_count": 1314 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "TONY E. LAMBETH and BONNIE G. LAMBETH, Plaintiffs v. MEDIA GENERAL, INC. d/b/a WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL and JOHN O. BROWN and JASON T. CRAVER and MICHAEL S. BARBER, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiffs, Tony and Bonnie Lambeth, brought this action asserting a claim for conversion against defendants Brown, Craver and Barber and a claim of negligence against defendant Media General, Inc. (Media General). Plaintiffs\u2019 claims arise out of a break-in of their home on 16 September 2002 by the individual defendants, who stole guns, currency, coins, and electronic devices, and converted this property for their own use. With respect to defendant Media General, plaintiffs alleged that they were subscribers to one of its newspapers, The Winston Salem Journal, and contacted the newspaper in September 2002 to request that their home delivery be stopped while they were away from home in order to reduce the appearance that their home was vacant. Plaintiffs alleged that an employee of Media General conveyed the notice to stop delivery to its newspaper carrier by leaving it \u201cwith the newspaper carrier\u2019s daily newspapers at the carrier\u2019s drop off location . . \u201cthat the stop notice . . . was not secured and that a passerby could obtain and read the notice and thereby obtain knowledge of the plaintiffs\u2019 request to stop newspaper delivery and their absence from home;\u201d and that Brown, Craver, and Barber chose plaintiffs\u2019 residence as a target of their criminal activity after learning of plaintiffs\u2019 absence therefrom \u201cby reading the stop notice issued to the newspaper carrier.\u201d\nThe complaint further alleged:\n22. Employees and agents of defendant, Media General, knew or should have known that plaintiffs\u2019 disclosure ... of their imminent absence from their home for a period of time could aid a third-party obtaining such information in committing a crime against plaintiffs\u2019 home by revealing plaintiffs\u2019 absence . . .\nand alleged that defendant Medial General had breached its duty to plaintiffs by failing to protect the dissemination of the stop notice, carelessly disregarding the risks this failure posed to plaintiffs\u2019 property. The complaint alleged: and that defendant\u2019s lack of reasonable care \u201cwas a proximate cause of [plaintiffs\u2019] home\u2019s selection for the break-in carried out by defendants Brown, Craver and Barber and plaintiffs\u2019 losses which derived from that break in.\u201d\n25. The acquisition and use of the sensitive information regarding plaintiffs\u2019 absence by a third party to exploit the disclosed vulnerability of plaintiffs\u2019 home and reduce the risk of entering their home without detection was a foreseeable consequence of defendant Media General\u2019s negligent treatment of that specific information . . . through the acts and omissions of its agents and employees.\nDefendant Media General moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint against it pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). The trial court granted Media General\u2019s motion, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 claim against it with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal.\nPlaintiffs' sole argument on appeal is that the allegations in-the complaint were sufficient to state a claim for negligence. We disagree.\n\u201cA motion to dismiss made pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.\u201d Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). If no law to support the claim exists or if supporting facts are inadequate, a complaint may be dismissed. Shell Island Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 225, 517 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1999). \u201cTo withstand a motion to dismiss, plaintiff\u2019s negligence complaint must allege the existence of a legal duty or standard of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, breach of that duty, and a causal relationship between the breach of duty and certain actual injury or loss sustained by the plaintiff.\u201d Sterner v. Penn, 159 N.C. App. 626, 629, 583 S.E.2d 670, 673 (2003) (internal citation omitted).\nPlaintiffs argue their complaint sufficiently alleges that Media General had a duty of reasonable care regarding information about their absence from home. Plaintiffs maintain that Media General had a legal duty to guard their stop order to prevent the harm of a break-in because Media General rendered a service to them. Plaintiffs contend that when an active course of conduct is undertaken, it is negligent to violate the \u201cpositive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm.\u201d Davidson and Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661, 666, 255 S.E.2d 580, 584, disc. review denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979). We disagree.\nThe duty of ordinary care \u201carises whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position towards another that anyone of ordinary sense\u201d recognizes the need to use ordinary care to prevent \u201cinjury to the person or property of the other.\u201d Davidson, 41 N.C. App. at 666, 255 S.E.2d at 584. Under this standard, we do not believe the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show that Media General breached any duty of ordinary care owed plaintiffs under the circumstances. The course of conduct undertaken by Media General was newspaper delivery and stopping that delivery while plaintiffs were on vacation. The complaint alleges no breach by Media General of its duty to use ordinary care in performing that course of conduct. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that Media General owed a further legal duty to plaintiffs to treat the \u201cstop delivery\u201d request in confidence, and we decline to invent one. Moreover, even if we were to decide that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Media General had a legal duty to maintain the \u201cstop delivery\u201d request as confidential and breached that duty, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is nevertheless insufficient to allege a ca\u00fasal relationship between any such breach and plaintiffs\u2019 loss.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint asserted that the stop order was left in the open for anyone to read and that the individual defendants read it and thereby selected plaintiffs\u2019 house as their target. They contend this adequately alleges a causal connection between Media General\u2019s negligent act and plaintiffs\u2019 loss. We cannot agree. To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff\u2019s complaint in negligence must allege facts demonstrating \u201cthat the defendants\u2019 negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries.\u201d Ford v. Peaches Entertainment Corp., 83 N.C. App. 155, 156, 349 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1986), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 694, 351 S.E.2d 746 (1987). \u201cForeseeability of some injury from an act or omission is a prerequisite to its being a proximate cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.\u201d Ratliff v. Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 614, 151 S.E.2d 641, 648 (1966). The break-in was not a foreseeable consequence of defendant\u2019s system of communicating the stop notices to its carrier. Here, the intervening acts of the other defendants caused the harm from which the plaintiffs seek recovery. See Meyer v. McCarley and Co., 288 N.C. 62, 68, 215 S.E.2d 583, 587 (1975) (holding there is no liability for the loss where an unforeseeable intervening act was the cause of the harm). Because the plaintiffs alleged neither a legal duty owed them by Media General nor a causal connection between any breach of such duty and their injury, the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint.\nAffirmed.\nJudges MCCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Douglas K. Meyers, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Enns & Archer, LLP, by Roderick J. Enns, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TONY E. LAMBETH and BONNIE G. LAMBETH, Plaintiffs v. MEDIA GENERAL, INC. d/b/a WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL and JOHN O. BROWN and JASON T. CRAVER and MICHAEL S. BARBER, Defendants\nNo. COA04-401\n(Filed 7 December 2004)\nNegligence\u2014 newspaper stop-delivery notice not secured\u2014 home broken into \u2014 no duty or causation\nThe trial court properly dismissed a complaint against a newspaper owner for failure to state a claim where plaintiffs alleged that their home was broken into while they were away because defendant left the stop delivery notice with the newspapers at the drop-off, available to any passerby. Plaintiffs did not allege a legal duty owed by defendant or a causal connection between breach of such a duty and their injury.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from order of dismissal entered 10 December 2003 by Judge William Graham in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 October 2004.\nDouglas K. Meyers, for plaintiff-appellant.\nEnns & Archer, LLP, by Roderick J. Enns, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0350-01", "first_page_order": 380, "last_page_order": 383 }