{ "id": 8411400, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF S.L.L., Juvenile", "name_abbreviation": "In re S.L.L.", "decision_date": "2004-12-07", "docket_number": "No. COA03-1439", "first_page": "362", "last_page": "365", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 362" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566259 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573792 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511523 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 390, "char_count": 6305, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.925142974760291e-08, "percentile": 0.370044546998686 }, "sha256": "c25d7c08e6abe09dae8e7396a544583bf7a145df4d9a267e44e4cbb72c79b7e9", "simhash": "1:9d74df33d6418c20", "word_count": 1043 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUDSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF S.L.L., Juvenile" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nScott Lee Lewis, Sr., (\u201crespondent\u201d) appeals an order of the trial court adjudicating his minor child, Scott Lee Lewis, Jr., (\u201cScott\u201d) a neglected child. For the reason stated herein, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for a new hearing.\nOn 2 January 2003, the Haywood County Department of Social Services (\u201cD.S.S.\u201d) filed a petition with the trial court alleging that Scott was a neglected child. Upon the case being called for trial on 15 May 2003, the following exchange took place between the trial court and respondent regarding respondent\u2019s attorney (\u201cMr. Cook\u201d):\nThe Court: Mr. [Lewis], before we broke for lunch, Mr. Cook informed me that you wanted to address the Court about Mr. Cook.\nMr. [Lewis]: Yes.\nThe Court: Okay. Go ahead. That\u2019s fine.\nMr. [Lewis]: Due to the lack of his ability to (inaudible) withdraw (inaudible).\nThe Court: Okay. You\u2019re asking that Mr. Cook not be your attorney. Is that right?\nMr. [Lewis]: (Inaudible response)\nThe Court: Okay. You don\u2019t want him to represent you?\nMr. [Lewis]: No, sir.\nThe Court: Okay. All right. Mr. Cook, you\u2019re released.\nMs. Holliday: Your Honor, should a waiver be signed or (inaudible)?\nThe Court: I don\u2019t think so. It\u2019s on the record. Okay. ...\nMr. [Lewis]: I want counsel.\nThe Court: I\u2019m sorry.\nMr. [Lewis]: I want counsel. (Inaudible)\nThe Court: Okay. Well, this is the second attorney that you\u2019ve let go, so we\u2019ve appointed two attorneys to represent you. They\u2019ve both been very competent. You\u2019ve elected not to proceed with them. I can\u2019t continue the case ad infinitum until you find an attorney you\u2019re pleased with, so you\u2019re just going to have to represent yourself. Okay? . . .\nMr. [Lewis]: I\u2019d like to object to it.\nThe Court: I\u2019m sorry.\nMr. [Lewis]: I\u2019d like to object to that.\nThe Court: Okay. I\u2019ll note your objection for the record. All right.\nUpon consideration of the evidence, the trial court adjudicated Scott neglected. Respondent appeals.\nThe dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by failing to obtain a written waiver of counsel from respondent.\nThe General Statutes of North Carolina provide that \u201c [i]n cases where the juvenile petition alleges that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent, the parent has the right to counsel and to appointed counsel in cases of indigency unless that person waives the right.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-602(a) (2003). Our courts have yet to address the scope of an indigent parent\u2019s right to counsel in an abuse, neglect or dependency hearing. Because criminal matters are the only other legal matters wherein the accused has a right to counsel, we look to our criminal case law for guidance.\nGenerally, in the absence of some substantial reason for the appointment of replacement counsel, an indigent must accept counsel appointed by the court unless he wishes to waive counsel and represent himself. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 12, 409 S.E.2d 288, 294 (1991) (citing State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981)). Mere dissatisfaction with one\u2019s counsel is not a substantial reason for the appointment of replacement counsel. Nevertheless, \u201c[statements of a desire not to be represented by court-appointed counsel do not amount to expressions of an intention to represent oneself.\u201d Hutchins, 303 N.C. at 339, 279 S.E.2d at 800 (citations omitted). Once a court allows an indigent\u2019s motion to withdraw his or her counsel, \u201c[g]iven the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, we ought not to indulge in the presumption that it has been waived by anything less than an express indication of such an intention.\u201d Id. Our Supreme Court in State v. Thacker further instructed on the issue of waiver of right to counsel as follows:\nServices of counsel cannot be forced upon an unwilling defendant. However, the waiver of counsel, like the waiver of all constitutional rights, must be knowing and voluntary, and the record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.\n301 N.C. 348, 354, 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980) (quotations and citations omitted).\nIn the present case, respondent\u2019s request that Mr. Cook be removed as counsel did not amount to an expression of a waiver of court-appointed counsel, or an intention to represent himself. Our review of the transcript indicates that at no point did respondent expressly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. On the contrary, respondent repeatedly requested new counsel. Although the trial court was not required to grant respondent\u2019s request to release counsel absent a substantial reason, once the court decided to release Mr. Cook it had an obligation to either obtain a knowing waiver of counsel from respondent or appoint substitute counsel. We conclude that the trial court erred by equating respondent\u2019s request for new counsel with a waiver of court-appointed counsel, and requiring respondent to proceed to trial pro se. For these reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court, and remand the case for a new hearing.\nREVERSED and REMANDED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUDSON concur.\n. To protect the identities of the parties in this case, this Court will refer to the respondent father by the pseudonym \u201cScott Lee Lewis, Sr.,\u201d and to his son by the pseudonym \u201cScott Lee Lewis, Jr.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Haywood County Department of Social Services, by Ira L. Dove and Mary G. Holliday.", "Ann H. Davis for Guardian ad Litem.", "Susan P. Hall for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF S.L.L., Juvenile\nNo. COA03-1439\n(Filed 7 December 2004)\nChild Abuse and Neglect\u2014 parent\u2019s right to counsel \u2014 indigent\u2019s request for replacement counsel\nThe trial court erred in a child neglect proceeding by equating an indigent parent\u2019s second request for new counsel with a waiver of appointed counsel and then requiring the parent to proceed pro se. The trial court was not required to grant the parent\u2019s request to release counsel absent a substantial reason, but, having done so, the court was obligated to obtain a knowing waiver or to appoint substitute counsel.\nAppeal by respondent from judgment entered 25 May 2003 by Judge Bradley B. Letts in Haywood County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September 2004.\nHaywood County Department of Social Services, by Ira L. Dove and Mary G. Holliday.\nAnn H. Davis for Guardian ad Litem.\nSusan P. Hall for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0362-01", "first_page_order": 392, "last_page_order": 395 }