{ "id": 8412170, "name": "JAMES J. LEWIS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Administrator), Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Lewis v. North Carolina Department of Correction", "decision_date": "2004-12-21", "docket_number": "No. COA03-1447", "first_page": "560", "last_page": "567", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 560" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9381381 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744", "parenthetical": "quoting Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525626 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)" }, { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)" }, { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561147 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11094153 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" }, { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "528-29" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "529" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11080656 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0526-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 681, "char_count": 17317, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.369130595172464e-08, "percentile": 0.5147220938363588 }, "sha256": "4e8997d897cbcebad318fd24a30348fade7b6e8a6690d309b487057362312b72", "simhash": "1:5323dfa918d7ca46", "word_count": 2545 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and THORNBURG concur." ], "parties": [ "JAMES J. LEWIS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Administrator), Defendants-Appellants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.'\nThe North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission) entered an opinion and award on 13 November 1995 awarding compensation to James J. Lewis (plaintiff) arising from plaintiffs posttraumatic stress disorder acquired during plaintiff\u2019s employment with the North Carolina Department of Correction (defendant Department of Correction). The Commission found as fact and concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder was a compensable injury in that it was \u201cdue to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to plaintiff\u2019s employment with [defendant Department of Correction] and is not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of employment.\u201d Pursuant to an amended opinion and award of 26 March 1996, plaintiff was awarded salary continuation during the first two years of his disability, from 10 September 1992 to 10 September 1994; thereafter plaintiff was awarded temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $293.14 per week from 11 September 1994 until he returned to work or until further order of the Commission. Plaintiff was also awarded payment for all past and future medical expenses he incurred as a result of his compensable occupational disease.\nPlaintiff filed a motion to compel payment and for other relief on 30 September 1996, stating in part that:\n11. Plaintiff has submitted to Defendant medical bills for treatment for exacerbation of his diabetes related to the stress full [sic] conditions of his employment. . . . Plaintiff has obtained a medical opinion letter from Dr. Gianturco ... indicating that these bills are related to the post-traumatic stress disorder. The Commission\u2019s order unequivocally states that Defendant shall pay medical costs incurred as a result of the covered occupational disease. Therefore these bills must be paid by Defendant.\nThe medical bills included treatment for exacerbation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes, periodontal treatment, and bills for prescription medications.\nSubsequently, a deputy commissioner found as fact and concluded as a matter of law on 24 November 1997 that the issue regarding plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was res judicata and would not be addressed. Both plaintiff and defendants appealed to the Commission. The Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner\u2019s finding of res judi-cata on 12 October 1998.\nDefendants appealed to this Court, assigning as error the Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s diabetes claim was res judicata. Lewis v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 138 N.C. App. 526, 528, 531 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2000). Plaintiff filed a cross-assignment of error arguing that the Commission failed to find and conclude that the record established that the compensable posttraumatic stress disorder caused an aggravation of his diabetes. Id. at 528, 531 S.E.2d at 470. This Court held that the Commission incorrectly applied the doctrine of res judi-cata, in that the deputy commissioner\u2019s conclusion of law regarding plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was not a final decision due to the subsequent application for review to the Commission. Id. at 528-29, 531 S.E.2d at 470. This Court also found that defendant Department of Correction was \u201c \u2018entitled to have the full Commission respond to the questions directly raised by [its] appeal.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 529, 531 S.E.2d at 470 (alteration in original) (quoting Vieregge v. N.C. State Univ., 105 N.C. App. 633, 639, 414 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1992)). As a result, this Court remanded the case to the Commission to \u201c \u2018conduct a hearing, make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter an order resolving\u2019 the issue of whether plaintiff\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder aggravated his diabetes.\u201d Id. at 529, 531 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Vieregge, 105 N.C. App. at 641, 414 S.E.2d at 776).\nOn remand, the Commission entered an opinion and award on 10 July 2003, finding as fact and concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder exacerbated his diabetic condition, \u201cwhich in turn caused or aggravated plaintiff\u2019s periodontal condition.\u201d The Commission also made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n13. . . ,[T]he Full Commission finds that the evidence of record shows a causal link between plaintiff\u2019s post-traumatic stress [disorder] and the exacerbation of his diabetic condition.\n15. The Full Commission finds that the record is replete with competent expert medical testimony as to the effect of anxiety and stress upon diabetes. . . .\n16. Defendants have contended that both Dr. Warner Burch and Dr. Dennis [sic] Becker opined that plaintiffs work related post-traumatic stress disorder had no effect on plaintiff\u2019s diabetic condition or symptoms. However, Dr. Burch and Dr. Becker each saw plaintiff merely for an evaluation and were not plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians. Therefore, Drs. Burch and Becker were not in a position to witness firsthand and note the effects of plaintiff\u2019s psychiatric disorder on his diabetes throughout plaintiff\u2019s experience with both illnesses. Thus, the Full Commission affords greater weight to the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians, Drs. Gainturco [sic], Johnson, Handelsman, and Spratt, who were in a better position to witness the effects of plaintiff\u2019s work related post-traumatic stress disorder on his diabetes.\n17. ... Based on Dr. Schroer\u2019s [plaintiff\u2019s periodontist] opinion, the Full Commission finds that plaintiff\u2019s original compensable injury exacerbated or aggravated plaintiff\u2019s diabetic condition, which in turn caused or aggravated plaintiff\u2019s periodontal condition. Therefore, defendants are responsible for plaintiff\u2019s periodontal and diabetic treatment.\nBased upon its findings of fact, the Commission made the following conclusions of law:\n1. Plaintiff\u2019s original compensable injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, exacerbated and aggravated plaintiff\u2019s pre-existing diabetes and, thus, plaintiff is entitled to compensation.\n4. Since plaintiff\u2019s periodontal condition was caused or aggravated by his diabetic condition, which has been found to have been caused or aggravated by plaintiff\u2019s original compensable injury, defendants shall provide medical treatment as may be reasonably required to effect a cure, give relief, or lessen plaintiff\u2019s disability for both plaintiff\u2019s diabetic condition and his periodontal condition. Defendant is responsible for payment for all of plaintiff\u2019s treatment at Duke. Defendant is also responsible for payment for plaintiff\u2019s treatment by plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians, including Dr. Charles Johnson, Dr. Leonard Handelsman, and Dr. Susan E. Spratt.\n(citations omitted). Defendants appeal.\nThis Court\u2019s standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases is \u201cquite narrow.\u201d Calloway v. Mem\u2019l Mission Hosp., 137 N.C. App. 480, 484, 528 S.E.2d 397, 400 (2000). We are limited to the consideration of only two issues: (1) whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence; and (2) whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact. Barham v. Food World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329, 331, 266 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1980). Findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and therefore conclusive on appeal, \u201c \u2018[if] the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u2019 \u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)).\nIt is the role of the Commission, not this Court, to weigh the evidence in a workers\u2019 compensation case. Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 166, 265 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1980). \u201cIn weighing the evidence, the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and may reject entirely the testimony of a witness if warranted by disbelief of the witness.\u201d Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993). Moreover, \u201c \u2018[t]he evidence tending to support plaintiff\u2019s claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Lewis v. Orkand Corp., 147 N.C. App. 742, 744, 556 S.E.2d 685, 687-88 (2001) (quoting Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414).\nDefendants assign as error the Commission\u2019s determination that competent medical evidence established that plaintiff\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder aggravated his diabetes. Specifically, defendants argue that the evidence showed plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was never under control, even prior to the onset of plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder, and such was the real cause of the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes.\nThe record in this case is replete with competent evidence and therefore the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal. Each testifying physician agreed that stress could aggravate or exacerbate diabetes. Dr. Leslie Domalik, expert in endocrinology, explained\n[A]ny time that there are stressors[,] whether they be psychological or physical stressors, that tends to increase hormones such as catacholyamines [sic] and corticols which directly counter the effect of insulin. As a result of that[,] insulin resistance is increased making it more difficult to control blood sugars; so in fact, yes, it\u2019s harder to control blood sugars in very stressful situations particularly if they are long-term. . . . [I]t\u2019s very clear at [times of high stress] that those blood sugars increase despite anything that we do with regard to diet or exercise.... [I]t\u2019s not speculation that blood sugars go up with stress.\n(emphasis added).\nDefendants\u2019 own witnesses similarly agreed that posttraumatic stress disorder could exacerbate a diabetic condition. Dr. Robert Rollins conceded, that \u201c[s]tress can impair control of blood sugar and the behaviors needed to control blood sugar.\u201d Dr. Denis Becker stated \u201c[s]tress invokes hormones that raise blood sugar and make one resistant to the activity of insulin. And in losing one\u2019s sensitivity to insulin, blood sugars rise.... If blood sugars rise, one has a risk or worsening of complications of diabetes.\u201d Finally, Dr. Warner Burch (Dr. Burch) testified that \u201cstress can accentuate diabetes and make control worse.\u201d\nAll of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians agreed that plaintiff\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder exacerbated his diabetes. Dr. Leonard Handelsman, plaintiff\u2019s treating psychiatrist, stated: \u201c[Plaintiff] has posttraumatic stress disorder arising from his employment as a probation officer for North Carolina and... this posttraumatic stress disorder and the anxiety arising from it exacerbate his.diabetes and reduce his ability to manage this diabetic condition optimally.\u201d Dr. Charles Johnson, plaintiff\u2019s original treating endocrinologist, stated: \u201cIn my professional judgment, [plaintiff\u2019s] diabetes was out of control as a consequence [of his posttraumatic stress disorder].\u201d\nAlthough defendants\u2019 witnesses ultimately came to the conclusion that the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was not caused by his posttraumatic stress disorder, the Commission found the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians more persuasive: \u201c[T]he Full Commission affords greater weight to the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians . . . who were in a better position [than defendants\u2019 experts] to witness the effects of plaintiff\u2019s work related post-traumatic stress disorder on his diabetes.\u201d The credibility of the witnesses is \u201cfor the Commission, not the courts, to determine.\u201d Click, 300 N.C. at 167, 265 S.E.2d at 391. Despite the varying testimony as to the cause of the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes, we find that there is competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nDefendants next assign as error the Commission\u2019s reliance on the causation testimony of psychiatrists rather than on the causation testimony of endocrinologists. Defendants argue that endocrinologists were in a better position to render a medical opinion as to the causation of the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes. Defendants further argue that the Commission erred in not giving greater weight to Dr. Burch\u2019s testimony, since Dr. Burch was an endocrinologist who had reviewed all of plaintiff\u2019s medical records.\nWe find that defendants\u2019 argument is without merit. Dr. Burch, the doctor defendants contend was in the best position to determine whether plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder exacerbated his diabetes, testified, \u201cI know nothing about post-traumatic stress [disorder].\u201d\nThe evidence also shows that defendants\u2019 emphasis on the opinions of endocrinologists is misplaced. Dr. Burch, defendants\u2019 witness, testified that both endocrinologists and psychiatrists had a role in determining whether plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was aggravated by posttrau-matic stress disorder. Dr. Susan\u2019Spratt, endocrinologist, testified that, in her opinion, a psychiatrist would be better qualified than an endocrinologist to render a medical opinion on whether plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was aggravated by posttraumatic stress disorder.\nEven if the Commission had relied solely on the testimony of endocrinologists, competent evidence exists to support the Commission\u2019s findings. As previously discussed, all of the testifying endocrinologists, including defendants\u2019 witnesses, averred that post-traumatic stress disorder could have an effect on diabetes. Furthermore, each of plaintiff\u2019s three treating endocrinologists stated that plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder did in fact cause the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes.\nAgain, it is not this Court\u2019s role to weigh the credibility of the various witnesses. Russell, 108 N.C. App. at 765, 425 S.E.2d at 457. The Commission engaged in a thorough analysis and carefully determined the witnesses to whom it would give the most credence. This Court is bound by this determination due to the overwhelming amount of competent evidence in the record. Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414.\nDefendants also assign as error the Commission\u2019s finding that defendants were responsible for the treatment of plaintiffs periodontal disease because there was no evidence that plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder aggravated his diabetes. As we have determined that competent evidence established that plaintiff\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder did in fact aggravate his diabetes, we need not address this assignment of error.\nDefendants have failed to present an argument regarding their remaining assignments of error. Therefore, pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6), these assignments of error are deemed abandoned.\nSince the Commission\u2019s findings of fact were supported by evidence from the record, and its conclusions of law were supported by the findings, we affirm the order of the Commission.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and THORNBURG concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge.'" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and S. Neal Camak, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Brooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Kathlyn C. Hobbs and Bambee N. Booher, for defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES J. LEWIS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Administrator), Defendants-Appellants\nNo. COA03-1447\n(Filed 21 December 2004)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 posttraumatic stress disorder\u2014 aggravation of diabetes \u2014 credibility of witnesses\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that competent medical evidence established that plaintiffs posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising from his employment as a probation officer aggravated his diabetes, because: (1) each testifying physician agreed that stress could aggravate or exacerbate diabetes; (2) all of plaintiffs treating physicians agreed that plaintiffs PTSD aggravated his diabetes; and (3) although defendants\u2019 witnesses ultimately came to the conclusion that the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes was not caused by his PTSD, the Commission found the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians more persuasive and the credibility of witnesses is for the Commission.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 causation testimony \u2014 psychiatrists versus endocrinologists \u2014 posttraumatic stress disorder \u2014 aggravation of diabetes\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by relying on the causation testimony of psychiatrists rather than on the causation testimony of endocrinologists regarding the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes, because: (1) the doctor defendants contend was in the best position to determine whether plaintiff\u2019s posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) exacerbated his diabetes testified that he knew nothing about PTSD; (2) even if the Commission had relied solely on the testimony of endocrinologists, competent evidence existed to support the Commission\u2019s findings when all of the testifying endocrinologists, including defendant\u2019s witnesses, averred that PTSD could have an effect on diabetes; and (3) each of plaintiff\u2019s three treating endocrinologists stated that plaintiff\u2019s PTSD did in fact cause the aggravation of plaintiff\u2019s diabetes.\nAppeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 10 July 2003 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 2004.\nLaw Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and S. Neal Camak, for plaintiff-appellee.\nBrooks, Stevens & Pope, P.A., by Kathlyn C. Hobbs and Bambee N. Booher, for defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0560-01", "first_page_order": 590, "last_page_order": 597 }