{ "id": 8414274, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRADLEY DEAN CRAWFORD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Crawford", "decision_date": "2005-01-04", "docket_number": "No. COA04-286", "first_page": "777", "last_page": "783", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 777" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561421 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "897" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566502 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658160 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/181/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9252072 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 L. Ed. 905", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining the rule of lenity" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 U.S. 81", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333568 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defining the rule of lenity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/349/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564272 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656579 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558861 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524137 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "128" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986601 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0473-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 658, "char_count": 14123, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5887833747757587e-07, "percentile": 0.8178901549858698 }, "sha256": "5dcf64f6da2f4727e7dcb90f51dbdde3f23e97bcc038bb0c906dc7fdb4cb6b49", "simhash": "1:0fcca153942ff6d3", "word_count": 2281 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRADLEY DEAN CRAWFORD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7, an assault upon a law enforcement officer inflicting serious bodily injury constitutes a felony. Defendant contends that because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-33(c) makes an assault inflicting serious injury a misdemeanor, the indictment in this case charging him with inflicting serious injury (rather than serious bodily injury') on a law enforcement officer was fatally defective. Because our Supreme Court recognizes, a \u201cmanifest purpose\u201d exception to the rule of lenity, we are constrained to hold that even if the language of this statute is ambiguous, the \u201cmanifest purpose\u201d of the legislature was to make an assault upon a law enforcement officer inflicting serious injury a felony under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14.34.7. State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 598 S.E.2d 125 (2004). Accordingly, we uphold Defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe evidence at trial tended to show that on 18 November 2002, New Hanover County Deputy Sheriff Michael Howe received a radio transmission from his supervisor regarding a priority outstanding warrant for Defendant. After receiving this transmission, Deputy Howe proceeded to Defendant\u2019s residence where he arrived at approximately 9:49 a.m. and knocked on the door. Defendant opened the door and stepped outside. When Deputy Howe informed Defendant that he had a warrant for his arrest, Defendant went back into the house and yelled that he needed to get some shoes. Deputy Howe followed Defendant inside the residence and into a room where Defendant said he was getting shoes. Deputy Howe did not see any shoes in the room and asked Defendant to place his hands on the desk; Defendant complied.\nBut before Deputy Howe could place handcuffs on Defendant, a scuffle ensued. Deputy Howe testified that Defendant knocked the handcuffs away and punched him. Deputy Howe then punched Defendant several times with a closed fist and as the two fell to the floor Deputy Howe\u2019s right hand hit a television. Defendant\u2019s girlfriend, Francis Renee Clayton, testified that she witnessed the arrest. She testified that after Defendant placed his hands on the desk, Deputy Howe threw him to the ground and punched his head several times.\nDeputy Howe suffered from a fracture to the fourth metacarpal in his right hand. The injury completely healed, however, Deputy Howe lost twenty percent extension of his right wrist. He underwent physical therapy and returned to his job in full duty.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and a jury found Defendant guilty of assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious bodily injury and resist, delay or obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties. The trial court arrested judgment on the resist, delay, or obstruct charge and sentenced Defendant to a term of fifteen to eighteen months imprisonment. The imprisonment was suspended and Defendant was placed on supervised probation with a thirty-day split active sentence. Defendant appealed.\nOn appeal, Defendant first contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the offense because the indictment was fatally defective. He contends that because the text of the indictment charged him with assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious injury rather than serious bodily injury, the indictment was fatally defective since N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-33 makes an assault inflicting serious injury a misdemeanor. We disagree.\nAn indictment is \u201ca written accusation by a grand jury, filed with a superior court, charging a person with the commission of one or more criminal offenses.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-641(a) (2003). \u201cNorth Carolina law has long provided that \u2018[t]here can be no trial, conviction, or punishment for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation. In the absence of an accusation the court [acquires] no jurisdiction [whatsoever], and if it assumes jurisdiction a trial and conviction are a nullity.\u2019 \u201d State v. Neville, 108 N.C. App. 330, 332, 423 S.E.2d 496, 497 (1992) (quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966)). An indictment is fatally defective \u201cif it \u2018wholly fails to charge some offense ... or fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty.\u2019 \u201d State v. Wilson, 128 N.C. App. 688, 691, 497 S.E.2d 416, 419 (1998) (citation omitted). \u201cWhen the record shows a lack of jurisdiction in the lower court, the appropriate action on the part of the appellate court is to arrest judgment or vacate any order entered without authority.\u201d State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981).\nHere the indictment stated:\nThe jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did assault M. J. Howe, a law enforcement officer of the New Hanover Sheriff\u2019s Department, and did inflict serious injury on the officer. At the time of this offense, the officer was performing the duties of his office by attempting to serve outstanding warrants on the defendant.\n(emphasis added). The indictment listed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 as the relevant statute.\nNorth Carolina statutory law defines \u201cserious bodily injury\u201d as \u201cbodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in prolonged hospitalization.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.4 (2003). While our statutes do not define the term \u201cserious injury\u201d, in State v. Hannah, 149 N.C. App. 713, 563 S.E.2d 1 (2002), this Court stated \u201cthe element of \u2018serious bodily injury\u2019 requires proof of more severe injury than the element of \u2018serious injury.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 719, 563 S.E.2d at 5. Further, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-33(c) makes assault inflicting serious injury a misdemeanor.\nIn general, when a criminal statute is unclear, the long-standing rule of lenity \u201cforbids a court to interpret a statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when the Legislature has not clearly stated such an intention.\u201d State v. Boykin, 78 N.C. App. 572, 577, 337 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1985); see also Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955) (defining the rule of lenity). The rule of lenity applies only when the applicable criminal statute is ambiguous. State v. Cates, 154 N.C. App. 737, 740, 573 S.E.2d 208, 210 (2002).\nIn this case, Defendant was convicted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7, which is entitled, with emphasis added, \u201cAssault inflicting serious injury on a law enforcement, probation, or parole officer or on a person employed at a State or local detention facility.\u201d However, the text of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 makes assault inflicting \u201cserious bodily injury\u201d upon a law enforcement officer a class F felony. This creates an ambiguity within the statute as the title states \u201cserious injury\u201d and the text states \u201cserious bodily injury.\u201d\nUnder North Carolina law, the terms \u201cserious injury\u201d and \u201cserious bodily injury\u201d do not appear to be interchangeable. See Hannah, 149 N.C. App. at 719, 563 S.E.2d at 5; cf. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-32.4 (assault inflicting serious bodily injury is a felony) and 14-33(c) (assault inflicting serious injury is a misdemeanor). Thus, under the traditional rule of lenity, any ambiguity between the use of the term \u201cserious injury\u201d in the title of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 and the text thereafter would be construed against the State to mean that an indictment charging assault on a law enforcement officer creates a misdemeanor, not a felony. Boykin, 78 N.C. App. at 577, 337 S.E.2d at 681.\nBut recently our Supreme Court recognized that even if the statute is ambiguous, \u201c[w]hen interpreting statutes, our principal goal is \u2018to effectuate the purpose of the legislature.\u2019 \u201d Jones, 358 N.C. at 477, 598 S.E.2d at 128 (citation omitted). Thus, while the Court acknowledged that the statute in that case evinced \u201cat best, an ambiguity\u201d, it concluded that \u201c \u2018where a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will . . . contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 477-8, 598 S.E.2d at 128 (quoting State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 625, 107 S.E. 505, 507 (1921)).\nIn Jones, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-90(1) classified cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance. The punishment for a Schedule II controlled substance is found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), which provides that a person found in possession of a Schedule II controlled substance is \u201cguilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor,\u201d but the third sentence creates ambiguity by stating \u201cthe violation shall be punishable as a Class I felony.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) (2003). The Supreme Court held that since the criminal statute was ambiguous, but the \u201cmanifest purpose\u201d of the legislative was to make possession of cocaine a felony, the statute would be interpreted as making possession of cocaine a felony. Jones, 358 N.C. at 486, 598 S.E.2d at 133.\nFollowing Jones, we are constrained to hold that notwithstanding the language of the statute, the \u201cmanifest purpose\u201d of the Legislature in enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 was to make an assault inflicting \u201cserious injury\u201d or \u201cserious bodily injury\u201d against a law enforcement officer, a felony. Accordingly, we reject Defendant\u2019s assignment of error to the contrary.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault inflicting serious injury. We disagree.\nUnder North Carolina law, a defendant may be convicted of the off\u00e9nse charged or of a lesser-included offense when the greater offense in the indictment includes all the essential elements of the lesser offense. State v. Snead, 295 N.C. 615, 622, 247 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1978); State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361, 368, 172 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1970). When there is evidence to support the milder verdict, the court must charge upon it even when there is no specific prayer for the instruction. Id.\nIn this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Deputy Howe was not a law enforcement officer. Inasmuch as we hold that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 aggravates assault inflicting \u201cserious injury\u201d when the offense is against a law enforcement officer, we conclude that the trial court did not err in not presenting the misdemeanor charge to the jury.\nWe have considered Defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error and find them to be without merit.\nNo error.\nJudges HUDSON and ELMORE concur.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 provides:\nUnless covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, a person is guilty of a Class F felony if the person assaults a law enforcement officer, probation officer, or parole officer while the officer is discharging or attempting to discharge his or her official duties and inflicts serious bodily injury on the officer.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.7(a) (2003).\n. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-32.4 provides:\nUnless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, any person who assaults another person and inflicts serious bodily injury is guilty of a Class F felony. \u201cSerious bodily injury\u201d is defined as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in prolonged hospitalization.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.4(a).\n. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-33(c) provides:\nUnless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, any person who commits any assault, assault and battery, or affray is guilty of a Class A1 misdemeanor if, in the course of the assault, assault and battery, or affray, he or she: (1) Inflicts serious injury upon another person or uses a deadly weapon.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33(c) (2003).\n. Additionally, if interpreted the plain language of the statute N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 would simply be a repetition of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-32.4. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 would create no additional punishment for assaulting a law enforcement officer, as was the legislature\u2019s intent by writing a law enforcement specific statute. However, if N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 is interpreted to mean assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious injury, then this statute would aggravate the punishment for assault on a law enforcement officer from a misdemeanor to a class F felony, which was the legislature\u2019s \u201cmanifest purpose.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.", "Richard E. Jester for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRADLEY DEAN CRAWFORD\nNo. COA04-286\n(Filed 4 January 2005)\n1. Assault\u2014 on law enforcement officer \u2014 serious injury or serious bodily injury \u2014 felony\nAn indictment was sufficient to charge the felony of assault on a law enforcement officer under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 even though it alleged the infliction of \u201cserious injury\u201d rather than \u201cserious bodily injury.\u201d The manifest intent of the Legislature in enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 was to punish as a felony assaults against law enforcement officers inflicting serious injury or serious bodily injury.\n2. Assault\u2014 on law enforcement officer \u2014 lesser offense of misdemeanor assault \u2014 instruction refused\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for assault on a law enforcement officer inflicting serious bodily injury by not instructing the jury on the lesser offense of assault inflicting serious injury. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.7 aggravates misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury when the offense is against a law enforcement officer; there is no evidence that the victim here was not a law enforcement officer.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 31 October 2003 by Judge Russell J. Lanier, Jr. in Superior Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 November 2004.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.\nRichard E. Jester for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0777-01", "first_page_order": 807, "last_page_order": 813 }