{ "id": 8414434, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES MICHAEL CRAIG, SR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Craig", "decision_date": "2005-01-04", "docket_number": "No. COA04-427", "first_page": "793", "last_page": "797", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "167 N.C. App. 793" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68", "parenthetical": "\"no evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was under an imminent threat of death or injury when he made the decision to carry the gun\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8996407 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "\"no evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was under an imminent threat of death or injury when he made the decision to carry the gun\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "quoting Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1297" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9128962 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "quoting Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1297" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(g)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 F.3d 1292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11464325 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1297" }, { "page": "1297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/205/1292-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517321 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139325 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550672 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917804 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-181", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 9569, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0496626274060237e-07, "percentile": 0.5536826664411709 }, "sha256": "1307d3e88b8f813354d8a66dcfc27ce00590e08fdd774cdecc01f2ab5979aa82", "simhash": "1:3e2ae955f45cfef1", "word_count": 1605 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:28.670431+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES MICHAEL CRAIG, SR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-181 and Rule 21 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts, requests for special instructions to the jury must be in writing. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-181(a)(l) (2003). Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his request to give a special instruction on the defense of justification of possession of a firearm by a felon. Where, as here, Defendant failed to submit the special instruction in writing, the trial court did not error by declining to give it.\nThe facts at trial tended to show that on 15 November 2002 Defendant went to Jimmy Higgins\u2019s auto garage in Henderson County, North Carolina to sell him a tire changer. When Defendant arrived Steven Pearson, James Higgins, Paul Higgins, Dane Allen, and Brian Stepp were all present at the garage.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that as Defendant drove into the garage, he almost hit Pearson. Thereafter, Defendant got out of his car with a pistol sticking out of the front of his pants. When Pearson approached Defendant about the incident, Defendant \u201cgot in [his] face and began cussing[.]\u201d Pearson hit Defendant in the face and walked away. Defendant then fired three gunshots hitting Pearson in the left buttock and the right leg.\nRhonda Jones, Defendant\u2019s girlfriend and niece, testified that she drove Defendant and Paul Craig to Higgins\u2019s garage on 15 November 2002 around 5:30 p.m. Defendant got out of the car and Jones observed Defendant \u201chit the floor\u201d a few minutes later. Jones reached to the seat beside her, got her gun, and stuck it in the front of her pants. She walked into the garage and observed several men kicking Defendant. She \u201cgot to [Defendant\u2019s] head\u201d and put the gun in his hand. Defendant fired a shot in the air, then two more shots. Jones got Defendant to the car and they drove to a friend\u2019s house on Dana Road. Defendant testified to essentially the same facts.\nIn rebuttal, the State presented Robert Hamilton, Jones\u2019s first cousin and Defendant\u2019s nephew. Hamilton testified that on 15 November 2002 at about 6:15 p.m. he went to a friend\u2019s house on Dana Road, and when he arrived Jones was the only person present. He asked her \u201c[w]here\u2019s Mike?[,]\u201d and she responded that \u201c[h]e went to Jimmy\u2019s.\u201d Five to ten minutes after Hamilton arrived Defendant drove up in his car. Defendant was alone and told Hamilton that he shot Pearson. Hamilton saw Defendant with a gun.\nAt trial, Defendant requested, \u201can instruction, Your honor, 310.10, the compulsion, duress or coercion with respect to the possession of a firearm by a felon.\u201d The trial court declined to give the instruction after deliberation.\nA jury found Defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-four to fifty months imprisonment for the assault charge and sixteen to twenty months imprisonment for the possession charge but suspended the sentence for sixty months of probation to begin after the other active sentence was completed. Defendant appealed the possession of a firearm by a felon charge.\nOn appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special instruction on justification as a defense to possession of a firearm by a felon. We disagree.\nIn North Carolina, requests for special jury instructions are allowable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-181 and 1A-1, Rule 51(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-181, 1A-1, Rule 51(b) (2003). It is well settled that the trial court must give the instructions requested, at least in substance, if they are proper and supported by the evidence. See Roberts v. Young, 120 N.C. App. 720, 726, 464 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1995). \u201cThe proffered instruction must . . . contain a correct legal request and be pertinent to the evidence and the issues of the case.\u201d State v. Scales, 28 N.C. App. 509, 513, 221 S.E.2d 898, 901 (1976). \u201cHowever, the trial court may exercise discretion to refuse instructions based on erroneous statements of the law.\u201d Roberts, 120 N.C. App. at 726, 464 S.E.2d at 83 (citation omitted).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-181 and Rule 21 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts require that requests for special instructions to the jury must be in writing. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-181(a)(l). This Court has held that a trial court\u2019s ruling denying requested instructions is not error where the defendant fails to submit his request for instructions in writing. State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 240, 485 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1997); State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 237, 367 S.E.2d 618, 623 (1988). Here, Defendant did not submit his proposed special instruction in writing, and therefore it was not error for the trial court to fail to charge as requested. Id.\nAssuming arguendo that Defendant had properly presented the special instruction to the jury, the trial court was still not in error declining to instruct the jury on the justification defense.\nFederal courts have recently recognized justification as an affirmative defense to possession of firearms by a felon. United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2000). Under the test set out in Deleveaux, a defendant must show four elements to establish justification as a defense to a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon:\n(1) that the defendant was under unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the defendant did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) that there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.\nId. at 1297. However, this Court has specifically noted \u201cthat the Deleveaux court limited the application of the justification defense to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(1) cases (federal statute for possession of a firearm by a felon) in \u2018only extraordinary circumstances.\u2019 \u201d State v. Napier, 149 N.C. App. 462, 465, 560 S.E.2d 867, 869 (2002) (quoting Deleveaux, 205 F.3d at 1297).\nIn Napier, the defendant was a convicted felon who was involved in an on-going dispute with his neighbor and the neighbor\u2019s son. In June 1999, the neighbor\u2019s son discharged a shotgun directed over the defendant\u2019s property. The neighbor\u2019s son continued this action for the next several days. On 3 July 1999, the defendant walked over to the neighbor\u2019s property armed with a nine millimeter handgun in a holster on his hip to confront the neighbor and the neighbor\u2019s son. The confrontation escalated into a physical altercation, and the defendant shot the neighbor\u2019s son in the arm.\nWithout ruling on the general availability of the justification defense in possession of a firearm by a felon cases in North Carolina, this Court declined to apply the Deleveaux rationale in Napier because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the defendant was under an imminent threat of death or injury. Napier, 149 N.C. App. at 465, 560 S.E.2d at 869. This Court reached this conclusion despite evidence that the neighbor had been firing bullets over the defendant\u2019s property and that the two parties engaged in prior altercations. Id. See also State v. Boston, 165 N.C. App. 214, 222, 598 S.E.2d 163, 167-68 (2004) (\u201cno evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was under an imminent threat of death or injury when he made the decision to carry the gun\u201d).\nThe uncontroverted evidence in this case shows that after leaving the altercation, Defendant kept the gun and took it with him to a friend\u2019s house on Dana Road. He continued to hold it and carry it while speaking with Hamilton. At that time, Defendant was not under any imminent threat of harm. Napier, 149 N.C. App. at 465, 560 S.E.2d at 869. Thus, the evidence did not support giving a special instruction on justification because there was a time period where Defendant was under no imminent threat while possessing the gun.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignment of error was not argued in the brief and no authority was cited, therefore, it is deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brandon L. Truman, for the State.", "Broker & Hamrick, P.A., by Leah M. Broker for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES MICHAEL CRAIG, SR.\nNo. COA04-427\n(Filed 4 January 2005)\nFirearms and Other Weapons\u2014 possession of firearm by felon \u2014 special instruction \u2014 justification defense \u2014 failure to request in writing\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s request to give a special instruction on the defense of justification of possession of a firearm by a felon, because: (1) defendant failed to request the special instruction in writing as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-181 and Rule 21 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts; and (2) assuming arguendo that defendant had properly presented the special instruction, the trial court still did not err by declining to instruct the jury on the justification defense since the uncontroverted evidence in this case shows that, after leaving the altercation, defendant kept the gun and took it with him to a friend\u2019s house where he was not under an imminent threat while possessing the gun.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 10 July 2003 by Judge Ronald K. Payne in Superior Court, Henderson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 December 2004.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brandon L. Truman, for the State.\nBroker & Hamrick, P.A., by Leah M. Broker for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0793-01", "first_page_order": 823, "last_page_order": 827 }