{ "id": 8468420, "name": "DAVID G. JONES, Plaintiff v. EDWARD D. RATLEY and BEST ROOFING COMPANY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Ratley", "decision_date": "2005-01-18", "docket_number": "No. COA03-1496", "first_page": "126", "last_page": "134", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 N.C. App. 126" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564391 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134453 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524-25", "parenthetical": "\"one mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law regarding defendant's adverse possession claim . . . forms an inadequate basis for this Court to conduct a review and assess appellant's contentions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250541 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "\"one mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law regarding defendant's adverse possession claim . . . forms an inadequate basis for this Court to conduct a review and assess appellant's contentions.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568177, 8568082, 8568215, 8568120, 8568153, 8568254 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0393-04", "/nc/279/0393-01", "/nc/279/0393-05", "/nc/279/0393-02", "/nc/279/0393-03", "/nc/279/0393-06" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562301 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "621-22", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" }, { "page": "622", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525806 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-224 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433745 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-224 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228 (1999)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88-89" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134453 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0469-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 796, "char_count": 19747, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.232632874327556e-07, "percentile": 0.9143461645833406 }, "sha256": "2f78e7312832343f50032e59b31f65d11504af451319472b548261e757d35d2b", "simhash": "1:136993a1e40c2cd6", "word_count": 3300 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:09.557360+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge BRYANT concurs.", "Judge TYSON dissents." ], "parties": [ "DAVID G. JONES, Plaintiff v. EDWARD D. RATLEY and BEST ROOFING COMPANY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Judge.\nOn 1 July 2002, plaintiff Jones filed a small claims \u201ccomplaint for money owed\u201d on an Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) form, alleging that he had sent $2,000 to defendant \u201cin error.\u201d On 3 September 2002, the small claims court, using an AOC form Judgment, agreed \u201cthat the plaintiff has proved the case by the greater weight of the evidence,\u201d and ordered defendant Ratley and Best (hereinafter \u201cRatley\u201d) to pay plaintiff $2,000. Ratley appealed to the district court and on 27 November 2002, the district court arbitrator entered an arbitration award and judgment in favor of Jones. Ratley requested a trial de novo in district court, which was held on 3 March 2003. After the court awarded $2,000 to Jones, Ratley appealed. We affirm.\nThe record includes no transcript, but does contain documentary evidence. From these documents, it appears that in 1997 Ratley sued Jones in Randolph County for $2,000, seeking payment for work Ratley alleged he completed for Jones. Ratley contends in his brief that Jones\u2019s mortgage company contacted him at the time and requested that he drop the suit so that Jones\u2019s closing could proceed. In return, Ratley would be paid $2,000 out of the closing. Ratley introduced a letter he wrote to the mortgage company on 5 July 2000 indicating he would drop his suit upon receipt of the $2,000. However, the record indicates that the case was dismissed on 13 June 2000 by entry of an order entitled \u201cOrder of Dismissal (Pursuant to Rule 41 (b)).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (2003) (involuntary dismissal \u201cfor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute\u201d). The date of the order preceded by several weeks the letter to the mortgage company, when \u201cthe plaintiff [\u201cRatley\u201d] informed the court that he did not wish to proceed.\u201d The current case arose when Jones sued Ratley in 2002, claiming that he sent $2,000 to Ratley in error.\nDefendant contends here that the court erred by \u201cmaking no findings as to what theory of law\u201d supported its judgment. In his brief, defendant appears to be arguing actually that the court did not make adequate conclusions of law, as it did not specify its legal theory, but he cites no authority for this proposition. Defendant then speculates that the trial court based its decision on a theory of fraud and argues that fraud was not pled with particularity by plaintiff here. Although defendant cites cases supporting the argument that fraud must be pled with particularity, he does not explain how this claim involved fraud. To the contrary, defendant acknowledges th\u00e1t \u201c[p]laintiff speaks of an error, but never really says that he was defrauded.\u201d Thus we decline to hold that those cases apply. In addition, the complaint in a small claim action \u201cneed be in no particular form, but is sufficient if in a form which enables persons of common understanding to know what is meant.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-216 (2003). Furthermore, in a trial de novo on appeal to the district court, the judge \u201cmay order repleading or further pleading ... or may try [the case] on the pleadings as filed.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 7A-229 (2003) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute leaves it to the discretion of the court to decide whether the pleadings need detail.\nDefendant also fails to cite any legal authority supporting his assertion that the trial court must provide more detailed legal con-elusions in an appeal to the district court from small claims court. While Rule 52 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the trial courts in general state conclusions of law separately, we believe the General Assembly has indicated that these types of formalities do not apply in small claims proceedings, including the de nov\u00f3 appeal in district court. The \u201csimple forms and procedures\u201d of small claims court were devised by the legislature to provide citizens with \u201can expedient, inexpensive, speedy forum in which they can process litigation involving small sums without obtaining a lawyer.\u201d Duke Power Co. v. Daniels, 86 N.C. App. 469, 472, 358 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1987). In order to facilitate simplified litigation, many of the rules of civil procedure do not apply to small claims court. See, e.g., G.S. \u00a7 7A-216 (2003) (no particular form of complaint required); G.S. \u00a7 7A-220 (2003) (no required pleadings other than complaint); G.S. \u00a7 7A-222 (2003) (rules of evidence \u201cgenerally are observed\u201d). Thus, in the absence of any statute or other authority suggesting that legal theories be formally described in these cases, we decline to create such a requirement.\nFurther, reading the statutory provisions governing appeals from small claims, G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-225, et seq., in pari materia, we conclude that unless otherwise specified, the legislature intended that the informal processes of the small claims court continue in the de novo appeal. In this regard, G.S. \u00a7 7A-229 provides: \u201cThe district judge before whom the action is tried may order repleading or further pleading by some or all of the parties; may try the action on stipulation as to the issue; or may try it on the pleadings as filed.\u201d Here, the district court did not require further pleadings and did make findings of fact and conclusions of law, indicating that \u201cplaintiff over paid defendant in an amount not less than $2,000\u201d and that plaintiff was entitled to recover that sum plus interest. The documents support the findings, which in turn support the conclusions and the judgment. We conclude that the court acted within the statutory process and properly exercised its discretion, and we decline to disturb the judgment on this basis.\nDefendant also argues that the court erred in finding that no answer or other responsive pleading was filed by defendant, as no answer is required in a proceeding appealed from the magistrate\u2019s court. As noted above, in a small claims action, no pleadings beyond a complaint are required and no response is considered a general denial. G.S. \u00a7 7A-220 (2003). Defendant does not argue that the finding was erroneous, nor does he explain how the court\u2019s finding harmed him or influenced the case. We overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant also asserts that the court erred by finding that plaintiffs closing attorney gave defendant $2,000 under the belief that there was a valid judgment on the record. Defendant contends that there was no basis to support this finding. \u201cA judge is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only upon a showing by a litigant that the challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980). Here, we conclude that evidence did support the court\u2019s finding and conclusion, specifically the letter from defendant to the plaintiffs mortgage company promising to \u201cdismiss\u201d the suit in return for $2,000 when it had already been dismissed. Defendant\u2019s argument has no merit.\nDefendant further argues that the court erred by not taking judicial notice of the fact that judgments are public records and plaintiff\u2019s closing attorney thus had constructive notice of the status of any judgment. We disagree. Rule 201 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence clearly states that judicial notice is discretionary: \u201cA court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 201 (c) (2003) (emphasis added). Judicial notice is mandatory only where \u201crequested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 201 (d). Here, defendant does not argue that he requested the court take judicial notice or that he supplied the court with the necessary information. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to take judicial notice.\nFinally, defendant asserts that no theory of law exists which would support an award for plaintiff and that the court erred in not reaching this conclusion. We have discussed the essence of this argument above, under defendant\u2019s first assignment of error, and for the same reasons, we find it lacks merit.\nAffirmed.\nJudge BRYANT concurs.\nJudge TYSON dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Judge." }, { "text": "TYSON, Judge\ndissenting.\nThe trial court\u2019s Judgment fails to: (1) set forth proper conclusions of law; (2) make a finding of fact regarding whether plaintiff was obligated to pay $2,000.00 to Ratley; and (3) address whether plaintiff should have had notice of the dismissal taken by in the earlier action. I would reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s judgment. I respectfully dissent.\nI. De Novo Review at the District Court\nThe majority\u2019s opinion holds that \u201cthe legislature intended that the informal processes of the small claims court continue in the de novo appeal\u201d and relies largely upon the case of Duke Power Co. v. Daniels, 86 N.C. App. 469, 358 S.E.2d 87 (1987). I disagree.\nIn Duke Power Co., the plaintiff originally brought an action in small claims court. 86 N.C. App. at 470, 358 S.E.2d at 88. The defendant appealed to the District Court, and again appealed from that order granting summary judgment. Id. This Court recognized the parties conducted discovery and were represented by counsel in the district court, despite the lack of either of these procedures before the small claims court. Id. at 470-71, 358 S.E.2d at 88. In affirming the trial court\u2019s judgment, we reviewed the applicable North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 471, 358 S.E.2d at 88-89. We indicated the triggering of these rules upon appeal to the district court from a decision in small claims court. Id.\nHere, the majority\u2019s opinion avers \u201cthe informal processes of the small claims court continue in the de novo appeal.\u201d Contrary to the holding of the majority\u2019s opinion, Duke Power Co. supports the application of the general rules to all cases in district court, including those that originate in small claims court but are appealed for trial de novo. Id.\n\u201cAny judgment rendered by the magistrate is a judgment of the district court and is appealable to the district court for a trial de novo.\" Chandak v. Electronic Interconnect Corp., 144 N.C. App. 258, 263, 550 S.E.2d 25, 29 (2001) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-224 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228 (1999)). In explaining \u201cthe nature of the district court de novo trial\u201d on appeal from a magistrate\u2019s judgment rendered in small claims court, this Court looked to \u201ccases construing the nature of the de novo trial in superior court following an adjudication in district court.\u201d First Union National Bank v. Richards, 90 N.C. App. 650, 653, 369 S.E.2d 620, 621-22 (1988). Precedent shows, \u201c[W]hen an appeal as of right is taken to the [trial court], in contemplation of law it is as if the case had been brought there originally and there had been no previous trial. The judgment appealed from is completely annulled and is not thereafter available for any purpose.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 653, 369 S.E.2d at 621-22 (emphasis supplied) (quoting State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 507, 173 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1970)). This Court summarized, \u201c[W]hen plaintiff gave notice of appeal for trial de novo in district court, it was as if the case had been brought there originally.\" First Union National Bank, 90 N.C. App. at 653, 369 S.E.2d at 622 (emphasis supplied). Following the reasoning in Duke Power Co., we review the district court\u2019s order anew and apply the standards normally employed in reviewing an order entered by the trial court following a trial without a jury. Id.\nII. Standard of Appellate Review\nThe trial court must enter an order such that the appellate court can readily understand the basis of the order or judgment. In Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 714, 268 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1980), our Supreme Court held:\nEffective appellate review of an order entered by a trial court sitting without a jury is largely dependent upon the specificity by which the order\u2019s rationale is articulated. Evidence must support findings; findings must support conclusions; conclusions must support the judgment. Each step of the progression must be taken by the trial judge, in logical sequence; each link in the chain of reasoning must appear in the order itself. Where there is a gap, it cannot be determined on appeal whether the trial court correctly exercised its function to find the facts and apply the law thereto.\nHere, the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its judgment. \u201cUnder our rules, where a case is tried before a court without a jury, findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to support a judgment are essential parts of the decision making process.\u201d Bank v. Easton, 12 N.C. App. 153, 155, 182 S.E.2d 645, 646, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d 245 (1971); see also Department of Transp. v. Byerly, 154 N.C. App. 454, 458, 573 S.E.2d 522, 524-25 (2002) (\u201cone mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law regarding defendant\u2019s adverse possession claim . . . forms an inadequate basis for this Court to conduct a review and assess appellant\u2019s contentions.\u201d).\nHere, the trial court found that \u201c[Ratley] received a check . . . based upon the representation and belief that a valid judgment was of record . . . .\u201d The trial court further found \u201cthat said Judgment or claim had in fact been dismissed . . . The record on appeal includes only an \u201cOrder of Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41(b).\u201d Although the Order dismisses Ratley\u2019s action \u201cunder Rule 41(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,\u201d the Order states, \u201cUpon the call of the case, the Plaintiff [Ratley, defendant in this action] informed the Court that he/she did not wish to proceed with this action.\u201d Further, plaintiff, who was the defendant in the earlier action, did not move for dismissal as contemplated under Rule 41. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (2003). The dismissal is a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a), not an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b).\nNo portion of Rule 41 permits a trial court to \u201cdismiss\u201d a judgment already entered. Neither a judgment from the prior case, nor an order vacating the judgment, appears in the record on appeal, other than Ratley\u2019s reference in his letter offering to release the judgment \u201crecorded in Deed Book 57, page 36.\u201d The trial court erred by finding that \u201csaid Judgment. . . had been dismissed ...\u201d pursuant to Rule 41(b).\nAdditionally, no evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201cPlaintiff over paid [sic] [Ratley] in an amount not less than $2,000.00.\u201d The evidence showed that plaintiff made only one payment to Ratley in the amount of $2,000.00. The trial court\u2019s Judgment errs by finding an \u201coverpayment.\u201d\nThe trial court also failed to make findings of fact, or state a basis to support its only conclusion of law that stated, \u201cPlaintiff is entitled to recover of [Ratley] the principal sum of $2,000.00 plus interest at the legal rate from July 1, 2002.\u201d\nIII. Notice\nThe trial court also failed to make a finding of fact regarding whether plaintiff was estopped from seeking a return of the monies paid based on notice and his own actions. Plaintiff was a party to the prior action, and the record shows plaintiff received a letter dated 5 July 2000 from Ratley agreeing to release the judgment recorded in \u201cDeed Book 57, page 36\u201d upon receipt of payment. Plaintiff failed to verify Ratley\u2019s dismissal prior to remitting the $2,000.00 payment to him.\nEven if payment was made after Ratley took a voluntary dismissal, plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the debt never existed or that the sum he paid was not in satisfaction of a valid debt or pursuant to a contractual agreement between the parties. As a party to the first action, plaintiff was on notice of Ratley\u2019s claims. Although Ratley took a voluntary dismissal, he was free to file \u201ca new action based on the same claim . . . within one year.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1). The act of a voluntary dismissal did not adjudicate the merits of Ratley\u2019s claim or create a judicial determination that Ratley was not lawfully owed the money that plaintiff had paid to him. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(2) (2003) (\u201cUnless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice.\u201d).\nPublic notice of the dismissal was available to plaintiff prior to payment. The trial court\u2019s Judgment rewards plaintiff for his failure to fulfill his obligations and to know what actions were pending against him without a finding that his actions were proper under the law.\nIV. Conclusion\nThe abbreviated procedures that are permissible in small claims court allow prompt resolution of disputes that do not exceed $4,000.00, while allowing for a full de novo review upon appeal by the party against whom judgment was entered by the magistrate. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-210 (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228 (2003); see also 2004 N.C. Sess. Law c. 128, \u00a7 1 (increasing amount to $5,000.00 effective 1 October 2004). The majority\u2019s opinion abolishes the de novo aspect of the appeal, with all its attendant procedural rights and processes. Magistrates are not required to be attorneys, and some litigants in small claims court do not avail themselves of counsel or procedural processes in reliance on the right to de novo appeal to district court.\nThe trial court\u2019s error in failing to make adequate findings of fact and state the basis for its conclusion of law limits our ability to review this Judgment. The Judgment fails to contain \u201cessential parts of the decision making process.\u201d Bank, 12 N.C. App. at 155, 182 S.E.2d at 646.1 would reverse and remand the Judgment for entry of findings of fact supported by the evidence presented and conclusions of law upon which the trial court relied in ordering Ratley to return $2,000.00 \u201cover paid\u201d to plaintiff. I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "TYSON, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Douglas S. Harris, for defendant-appellant.", "No brief filed for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID G. JONES, Plaintiff v. EDWARD D. RATLEY and BEST ROOFING COMPANY, Defendant\nNo. COA03-1496\n(Filed 18 January 2005)\n1. Small Claims\u2014 de novo appeal to district court \u2014 informal process\nThe district court did not err in a de novo trial from small claims court where defendant apparently contended that the court did not make adequate conclusions and speculated that the court based its decision on a theory of fraud that was not pled with particularity. Defendant does not explain how the claim involved fraud, a complaint in a small claims action need be in no particular form, the legislature intended the informal processes of the small claims court to continue in the de novo appeal, and the district court on a de novo appeal has the discretion to order further pleadings or to try the case as pled.\n2. Small Claims\u2014 appeal to district court \u2014 no answer\nThere was no error in a district court trial de novo from small claims court where the court found that no answer was filed by defendant, as no answer is required in small claims (no response is a general denial). Defendant does not argue that the finding is erroneous or explain how he was harmed.\n3. Courts\u2014 district \u2014 finding\u2014supported by evidence\nThe evidence supported the district court\u2019s finding and conclusion regarding disputed funds paid from a closing under the belief that there was a valid judgment on the record.\n4. Trials\u2014 judicial notice \u2014 not requested \u2014 necessary information not supplied\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by not taking judicial notice that judgments are public records that could have been checked by a closing attorney where defendant did not argue that he requested that the court take judicial notice or that he supplied the court with the necessary information.\nJudge Tyson dissenting.\nDefendant appeals from judgment entered 8 August 2003 by Judge Thomas G. Foster, Jr. in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 September 2004.\nDouglas S. Harris, for defendant-appellant.\nNo brief filed for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0126-01", "first_page_order": 156, "last_page_order": 164 }