{ "id": 8469249, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES EDWARD THAGGARD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Thaggard", "decision_date": "2005-02-01", "docket_number": "No. COA04-368", "first_page": "263", "last_page": "283", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 N.C. App. 263" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 12169578 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564083 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "3", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535590 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700970 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732149 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303-04", "parenthetical": "slight variances in corroborative testimony go to credibility, not admissibility" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541753 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681-82", "parenthetical": "slight variances in corroborative testimony go to credibility, not admissibility" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "citing Britt, 291 N.C. at 528, 231 S.E.2d at 644" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4762743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "citing Britt, 291 N.C. at 528, 231 S.E.2d at 644" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" }, { "page": "644" }, { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558765 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491873, 491779, 491689, 491626, 491853, 491503, 491442, 491510, 491831 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0579-04", "/nc/357/0579-03", "/nc/357/0579-02", "/nc/357/0579-08", "/nc/357/0579-09", "/nc/357/0579-01", "/nc/357/0579-06", "/nc/357/0579-05", "/nc/357/0579-07" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305404 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 388 S.E.2d 429 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 388 S.E.2d 429 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 9250759 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "\"The use of evidence permitted under Rule 404(b) is guided by two constraints: similarity and temporal proximity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132011, 132268, 131949, 132212, 132255 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0595-03", "/nc/350/0595-04", "/nc/350/0595-05", "/nc/350/0595-01", "/nc/350/0595-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569839 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11215554 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079274 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326-27", "parenthetical": "affirming trial court's admission of evidence showing prior bad acts by defendant who met his victims at skating rinks, invited the victims to his home, and provided them drugs and alcohol" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9127969 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362-64", "parenthetical": "affirming trial court's admission of evidence showing prior bad acts by defendant who met his victims at skating rinks, invited the victims to his home, and provided them drugs and alcohol" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 L. Ed. 2d 885", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 L. Ed. 2d 851", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 967", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1255137, 1254755, 1254692, 1255267, 1254630, 1254665, 1255371, 1254894, 1254992, 1254929, 1255349, 1254684, 1254399 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0967-04", "/us/536/0967-05", "/us/536/0967-02", "/us/536/0967-03", "/us/536/0967-11", "/us/536/0967-06", "/us/536/0967-08", "/us/536/0967-01", "/us/536/0967-12", "/us/536/0967-09", "/us/536/0967-13", "/us/536/0967-07", "/us/536/0967-10" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219912, 220074, 219950, 219891, 220183 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0217-01", "/nc/355/0217-04", "/nc/355/0217-03", "/nc/355/0217-05", "/nc/355/0217-02" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9379729 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613378 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166179 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559866 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 199 S.E.2d 423 (1973); State v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948); State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352 (1944)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573313 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 199 S.E.2d 423 (1973); State v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948); State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352 (1944)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734405 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 775", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684981 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305171 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0542-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1566, "char_count": 46241, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6641847037031013e-07, "percentile": 0.8906619652342666 }, "sha256": "4f353ff421c7e597038976714fb7bed30ffde51da074df7cfad849be364ec88e", "simhash": "1:8b2a546a6e3744f4", "word_count": 7526 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:09.557360+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES EDWARD THAGGARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nJames Edward Thaggard (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments entered after a jury found him to be guilty of: (1) statutory rape; (2) statutory sexual offense; and (3) taking indecent liberties with a child. We find no prejudicial error.\nI. Background\nSisters Jo.P., age fourteen, and Je.P., age twelve (collectively, \u201cthe victims\u201d) lived with their father and brother in a three bedroom mobile home in Cumberland County. Defendant was a friend of the victims\u2019 father and occasionally spent the night with them. In August 2001, defendant was at the home watching television in the living room with the victims and several others. Defendant left and went to their brother\u2019s bedroom. Jo.P. left the living room to take a shower. After her shower, she went to her bedroom and laid face down on her bed.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that after Jo.P. laid on her bed, she felt someone crawl up behind her, put a gun to her head, and say he would shoot her if she made a sound. Jo.P. could not see the person, but recognized defendant\u2019s voice. The assailant removed Jo.P.\u2019s underwear, pulled up her nightgown, and proceeded to engage in anal and vaginal intercourse with her. After the assaults were completed, the assailant got off of the bed and walked out of the bedroom. Jo.P. turned to see who the assailant was and recognized defendant. Jo.P. first told her sister, Je.P., about the assault a week later, and told the Cumberland County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) and the police in April 2002.\nLater that summer, the sisters, brother, and father held a cookout at their mobile home. Je.P. drank liquor at her brother\u2019s request and became dizzy. She went inside, laid down on the couch, and passed out. When she awoke, defendant was on top of her. Je.P.\u2019s and defendant\u2019s pants and underwear were pulled down. She fell back asleep until her brother came into the mobile home and began arguing with defendant. Je.P. felt pain in her vaginal and anal areas. Je.P. told her sister and her guardian ad litem about the assault.\nIn April 2002, DSS conducted a neglect investigation of the sisters. The investigator, Edward Morley (\u201cInvestigator Morley\u201d), met with Jo.P. and Je.P. separately, and each described the above events. A medical exam was performed by Dr. Sharon Cooper (\u201cDr. Cooper\u201d) on the victims. Tears and scarring consistent with sexual trauma were found in Jo.P.\u2019s vagina and anus. A similar injury was found in Je.P.\u2019s vagina. Dr. Cooper diagnosed the victims with injuries consistent with a non-consensual sexual assault.\nOn 9 December 2002, defendant was indicted for one count of statutory rape of a person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old, one count of statutory sexual offense of a person who is 13,14, or 15 years old, and one count of taking indecent liberties with children with respect to Jo.P. Defendant was also indicted for one count of statutory rape and one count of taking indecent liberties with children with respect to Je.P. Defendant was tried before a jury during the 27 October 2003 Criminal Session of the Superior Court of Cumberland County.\nDefendant\u2019s former girlfriend, Brenda Murray (\u201cMurray\u201d), testified she knew the victims and their reputations as \u201cliars\u201d in the community. Defendant testified the victims conspired against him. He also admitted to being previously convicted of two counts of taking indecent liberties with minors.\nThe jury found defendant to be not guilty of: (1) taking indecent liberties with a child for Jo.P.; and (2) first-degree statutory rape of Je.P. Defendant was found to be guilty of: (1) statutory rape of Jo.P.; (2) statutory sexual offense of Jo.P.; and (3) taking indecent liberties with a child for Je.P. The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive active sentences of: (1) not less than 336 nor more than 413 months for statutory rape; (2) not less than 336 nor more than 413 months for statutory sex offense; and (3) not less than twenty-one nor more than twenty-six months for indecent liberties. Defendant appeals.\nII. Issues\nThe issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred in: (1) not allowing admission of evidence concerning the victims\u2019 past sexual conduct; (2) allowing two witnesses to testify that they were sexually abused by defendant when they were minors; (3) allowing Investigator Morley to testify that Jo.P.\u2019s testimony was consistent with prior statements she had made to him; (4) allowing the State\u2019s medical expert to testify that she did not believe the two sisters conspired together to lie against defendant; (5) permitting the State to ask defendant\u2019s character witness about defendant\u2019s prior convictions; (6) sustaining the State\u2019s objection to character testimony about Jo.P.; (7) not providing defendant access to the victims\u2019 juvenile files; and (8) failing to dismiss the charges against defendant for insufficiency of the evidence.\nIII. Abandonment of Assignments of Error\nDefendant voluntarily abandoned assignment of error number 1, not allowing admission of evidence concerning the victims\u2019 past sexual conduct; and number six, sustaining the State\u2019s objection to character testimony about Jo.P, by failing to argue them in his brief. N.C.R. App. P. 10 (2004); N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2004). We decline to review these abandoned assignments of error and dismiss. N.C.R. App. P. 2.\nIV. Other Crimes. Wrongs, or Acts\nDefendant asserts the trial court erred in allowing two witnesses who were not the victims to testify that they had been sexually abused by defendant. We disagree.\nRule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states in part:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2003). The admissibility of 404(b) evidence is \u201csubject to the weighing of probative value versus unfair prejudice mandated by Rule 403.\u201d State v. Agee, 326 N.C. 542, 549, 391 S.E.2d 171, 175 (1990); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2003) (\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of unfair delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d). Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion. Agee, 326 N.C. at 550, 391 S.E.2d at 175.\nThe balancing of these factors lies \u201cwithin the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court\u2019s ruling should not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling was \u2018manifestly unsupported by reason or [was] so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 55, 530 S.E.2d 281, 293 (2000) (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1114, 148 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2001).\nHere, the State offered the testimonies of C.W. and N.W., defendant\u2019s nieces. C.W. testified that when she was fourteen, she spent the night at her grandmother\u2019s house. Defendant stopped by the house while she was asleep. C.W. stated that she awoke to discover that defendant \u201chad put his mouth on my vaginal area . . . and had his tongue down there.\u201d Defendant asked C.W. if she wanted to have sex, then \u201cstuck his finger ... in my vaginal area.\u201d\nN.W. testified that when she was between eleven and twelve years old, she awoke one night as defendant was trying to remove her pants. She tried to push and kick him away, but he succeeded in rubbing her buttocks with his hands before she got up and left the room.\nThe trial court specifically instructed the jury before the witnesses testified that they could consider this evidence only to show\nthe identity of a person who has committed a crime that\u2019s charged in the case, to show that the defendant had the motive for commission of a crime that is charged in this case, to show that a defendant had the intent, which is a necessary element of a crime that might be charged in this case or to show that there existed in the mind of a defendant a plan, a scheme or a system designed to involve the elements involved in the crime charged in this case .... I want you to . . . keep these limitations in mind.\nDefendant participated in crafting this instruction. He received three opportunities to cross-examine C.W. and cross-examined N.W. once.\nNorth Carolina\u2019s appellate courts have been \u201cmarkedly liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex offenses to show one of the purposes enumerated in Rule 404(b).\u201d State v. Scott, 318 N.C. 237, 247, 347 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1986) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court \u201chas been very liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex crimes in construing the exceptions to the general rule.\u201d State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 423, 241 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1978) (citing State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 199 S.E.2d 423 (1973); State v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948); State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352 (1944)).\nThis Court has also applied a liberal interpretation of Rule 404(b). See State v. Carpenter, 147 N.C. App. 386, 392, 556 S.E.2d 316, 321 (2001) (where this court permitted evidence of prior bad sex acts to show the defendant \u201cused ministry and church activities as an excuse for spending time\u201d with his previous victims, \u201cdid similar activities\u201d with the victims, and sexually abused the victims in similar areas and by using a similar manner), cert. denied, 355 N.C. 217, 560 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 536 U.S. 967, 153 L. Ed. 2d 851, reh\u2019g denied, 536 U.S. 983, 153 L. Ed. 2d 885 (2002); State v. Patterson, 149 N.C. App. 354, 362-64, 562 S.E.2d 321, 326-27 (2002) (affirming trial court\u2019s admission of evidence showing prior bad acts by defendant who met his victims at skating rinks, invited the victims to his home, and provided them drugs and alcohol); State v. Brothers, 151 N.C. App. 71, 76-77, 564 S.E.2d 603, 607 (2002) (noting prior bad acts need not be \u201c \u2018unique or bizarre\u2019 \u201d and it was not error to admit evidence showing the defendant\u2019s victims were the same age, the acts occurred under similar circumstances, the defendant used a similar manner to commit the acts, and the defendant was the stepfather to both victims), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 681, 577 S.E.2d 895 (2003).\n\u201c[S]uch evidence is relevant and admissible so long as the incidents are sufficiently similar and not too remote.\u201d State v. Blackwell, 133 N.C. App. 31, 35, 514 S.E.2d 116, 119 (citing State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 207, 362 S.E.2d 244, 247-48 (1987)), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537 S.E.2d 483 (1999); see also State v. Smith, 152 N.C. App. 514, 527, 568 S.E.2d 289 (2002) (\u201cThe use of evidence permitted under Rule 404(b) is guided by two constraints: similarity and temporal proximity.\u201d) (citation omitted).\nThe alleged incidents involving C.W. and N.W. occurred in 1999 and 2000, while the events at bar occurred in early to mid 2001. Je.P. and N.W. were both about twelve years old, and Jo.P. and C.W. were fourteen years old. In both situations, defendant frequently visited or stayed overnight at the homes where the incidents occurred. All four girls were assaulted as they slept or were about to fall asleep while others were present elsewhere in the residence. The two sets of victims are sisters, and the oldest was the abused first in both cases.\nBased on the above similarities and the temporal proximity, we conclude the admission of C.W. and N.W.\u2019s testimony was for proper purposes: to show opportunity, a common scheme or modus operandi, and the assailant\u2019s identity. Although differences exist in the four assaults, defendant failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the testimony. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Corroborative Witness Testimony\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in permitting a witness to testify that the victims\u2019 testimony was consistent with what they told him during an earlier conversation. We disagree.\nOur Supreme Court has held that a witness\u2019s prior consistent statements may be admissible to corroborate the witness\u2019s in-court testimony. State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 204, 524 S.E.2d 332, 340, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 867, 148 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2000). To constitute corroborative evidence, \u201cthe prior statement of the witness need not merely relate to specific facts brought out in the witness\u2019s testimony at trial, so long as the prior statement in fact tends to add weight or credibility to such testimony.\u201d State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573 (1986).\nThe trial court possesses broad discretion in deciding whether a prior consistent statement may be admitted for corroboration. State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 410, 508 S.E.2d 496, 513 (1998) (citing State v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 388 S.E.2d 429 (1990)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046, 151 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2001), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 579, 589 S.E.2d 130 (2003). The statements must be \u201cgenerally consistent\u201d with one another. State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 535, 231 S.E.2d 644, 650 (1977). \u201cSlight variations will not render the statements inadmissible, but such variations only affect the credibility of the statement,\u201d not its admissibility. State v. Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 476, 308 S.E.2d 277, 284 (1983) (citing Britt, 291 N.C. at 528, 231 S.E.2d at 644). The State may not proffer evidence of prior statements of a witness that directly contradict that witness\u2019s trial testimony. Gell, 351 N.C. at 204, 524 S.E.2d at 340.\nHere, defendant assigns error to Investigator Morley\u2019s testimony that the victims\u2019 in-court testimony was consistent With their earlier statements to him. Defendant argues four discrepancies exist between the victims\u2019 statements to Investigator Morley and their testimony in court. First, Investigator Morley testified that Je.P. complained that \u201c[defendant] tried to touch her and that he was a pervert... and that he had also tried to touch her sister.\u201d Je.P. did not mention to Investigator Morley \u201cat that tim\u00e9\u201d that she awoke to find defendant on top of her. Second, Jo.P. initially told Investigator Morley that defendant came up behind her and took her clothes off while she was standing. She then immediately corrected herself to say that she was lying on the bed during the entire incident. Third, Jo.P. did not tell Investigator Morley that she saw defendant leave the room after the assault. Fourth, Investigator Morley testified that Jo.P. stated defendant penetrated her vaginally first, then anally, where Jo.P. testified to the reverse order.\nA careful review of Investigator Morley\u2019s testimony with the victims\u2019 in-court testimony shows them to be corroborative. The differences that defendant cites are not appreciable variances. This was not a situation where multiple, divergent stories were told. Rather, the differences appeared to be either where Investigator Morley did not receive all the details during the initial meetings or the order of details in the victims\u2019 stories varied between their initial statements and their testimony at trial. See State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 681-82, 403 S.E.2d 301, 303-04 (1991) (slight variances in corroborative testimony go to credibility, not admissibility). Considered in totality, Investigator Morley\u2019s testimony of the victims\u2019 statements to him were substantially consistent with that of the victims\u2019 in-court testimony. Any disparities affect the weight, not the admissibility, of the statements and the witnesses\u2019 credibility. Britt, 291 N.C. at 535, 231 S.E.2d at 650. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Medical Expert Opinion Testimony\nDefendant argues the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting opinion testimony from a medical expert that the victims were truthful. We agree, but find the error to be non-prejudicial to defendant.\nA. Expert Opinion on Witness Credibility\nOur Supreme Court has held that under Rules 405(a) and 608(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, \u201can expert witness may not testify that the prosecuting child-witness in a sexual abuse trial is believable, State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350 S.E.2d 76 (1986), or that the child is not lying about the alleged sexual assault, State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986).\u201d State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 752, 446 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405(a) (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(a) (2003).\nHowever, a trial court may permit otherwise inadmissible evidence to be admitted if the opposing party opens the door through cross-examination of the witness. Baymon, 336 N.C. at 752, 446 S.E.2d at 3. \u201cOpening the door\u201d is the principle where one party introduces evidence of a particular fact and the opposing party may introduce evidence to explain or rebut it, even though the rebuttal evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant, if offered initially. Id. at 752-53, 446 S.E.2d at 3 (citations omitted).\nHere, Dr. Cooper, a forensic pediatrician, was tendered by the State as a witness. The Court recognized Dr. Cooper as \u201can expert in the field of child sexual abuse and child sexual evaluations.\u201d She treated both victims after removal from their father\u2019s house. Dr. Cooper explained the histories as told to her by the victims, social workers, and counselors. She further discussed the physical examinations she performed on the victims and existing behavioral disorders caused by the incidents. Based on the histories, physical examinations, and behavioral issues, Dr. Cooper diagnosed Jo.P. and Je.P. as victims of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and post-traumatic stress disorder.\nFollowing Dr. Cooper\u2019s explanation of her diagnosis of the victims, the State asked on direct examination, \u201cNow, Dr. Cooper, based on your training and experience and your examination of the two girls, [Jo.P.] and [Je.P.], do you think that the two girls just got together and told each other what to say to you?\u201d Following an objection by defendant, which the trial court overruled, Dr. Cooper responded, \u201cNo. No, I don\u2019t.\u201d Dr. Cooper then proceeded to discuss the basis of her opinion.\nThe State\u2019s question and Dr. Cooper\u2019s answer speak directly to the credibility of the victims\u2019 testimony. This testimony was an impermissible comment by an expert medical witness on the credibility of the two prosecuting witnesses. This evidence is allowed only if defendant \u201copened the door\u201d by addressing the victims\u2019 credibility on cross-examination. See Baymon, 336 N.C. at 752-53, 446 S.E.2d at 3 (citations omitted). This opinion was expressed on direct examination of Dr. Cooper during the State\u2019s case-in-chief before defendant had the opportunity to \u201copen the door.\u201d Admission of Dr. Cooper\u2019s opinion that she did not believe \u201cthe two girls just got together and told each other what to say\u201d was error.\nB. Prejudicial Error\nHaving found the admission of Dr. Cooper\u2019s opinion bolstering the credibility of the victims was error, we now consider whether this error was prejudicial to defendant.\nA defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2003). A reasonable possibility must exist that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction. State v. Milby, 302 N.C. 137, 142, 273 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1981). The burden is on the defendant to show both the error and its prejudicial effect. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\nDefendant failed to argue how Dr. Cooper\u2019s testimony was prejudicial to his case. After a complete review of the record and transcripts, we do not conclude that Dr. Cooper\u2019s opinion testimony concerning the victims\u2019 credibility caused a different result at trial. The State presented other overwhelming evidence against defendant. The victims\u2019 testimony was consistent with statements made to parents, counselors, social workers, law enforcement officers, and Dr. Cooper, as shown through corroborative testimony. Dr. Cooper\u2019s medical examinations discovered numerous physical and emotional injuries consistent with the victims\u2019 histories and indicative of sexual abuse. Both victims experienced notable behavioral changes following the incidents.\nBased on other overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, we hold the admission of Dr. Cooper\u2019s opinion was not prejudicial error. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVIL Admission of Prior Convictions\nDefendant asserts the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing the State to ask a defense witness whether she knew that defendant had previously been convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child. We disagree.\nA. Impeachment of a Witness\nThe North Carolina Rules of Evidence permit the introduction of opinion and reputation testimony concerning the credibility of a previously heard witness. State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 22-23, 354 S.E.2d 527, 539, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608. This method of impeachment must be preceded by a proper foundation showing the \u201ctestifying witness has sufficient contact with the community\u201d to qualify as having a credible opinion or knowing what kind of reputation the other witness has. State v. Morrison, 84 N.C. App. 41, 47-48, 351 S.E.2d 810, 814 (citing State v. Sidden, 315 N.C. 539, 340 S.E.2d 340 (1986); State v. McEachern, 283 N.C. 57, 194 S.E.2d 787 (1973)), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 408, 354 S.E.2d 724 (1987).\nHere, the State offered the testimony of both victims and additional corroborative evidence from other witnesses. In response, defendant offered the testimony of his former girlfriend, Murray, who lived in the same community as the victims and who was familiar with their reputations.\nDefendant: Ms. Murray, do you \u2014 in the community in which you live, does (sic) [Jo.P.] and [Je.P.] have a reputation as to whether or not they tell the truth?\nMurray: Yes.\nDefendant: What is that reputation?\nMurray: They lie.\nUnder Rules 405(a) and 608(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and North Carolina case law, this line of questioning by defendant is permitted as an impeachment of the credibility of the State\u2019s two prosecuting witnesses. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(a); see State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 421, 426, 390 S.E.2d 142, 145, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 112 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1990).\n\u201cA defendant in a criminal case is entitled to introduce evidence of his own good character as substantive evidence in his favor.\u201d State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 69, 357 S.E.2d 654, 658 (1987) (citations omitted). However, should the defendant proffer such testimony, the State may respond by introducing evidence of his bad character in rebuttal. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1226(a) (2003).\nB. Cross-Examination of Defense Character Witness\nIn North Carolina, \u201c[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(b) (2003); see also State v. Freeman, 319 N.C. 609, 616, 356 S.E.2d 765, 769 (1987). \u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003). However, \u201cevidence admissible during cross-examination remains subject to the limits of other rules governing relevancy, including Rules 402, 403, and 404, as well as to Rule 609.\u201d State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 411, 432 S.E.2d 349, 353 (1993).\nRule 404(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence limits the evidence the State may offer to \u201ca pertinent trait of [the defendant\u2019s] character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1). Rule 405 provides the options available to proving character:\n(a) Reputation or opinion. \u2014 In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. Expert testimony on character or a trait of character is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of behavior.\n(b) Specific instances of conduct. \u2014 In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405. Under Rule 405, the State may question the defense witness\u2019s basis for the favorable testimony by asking, \u201cdid you know,\u201d or \u201chave you heard\u201d about specific instances of the defendant\u2019s conduct. See id.-, see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (2003) (cross examination permitted only for questions probative of truthfulness).\nHere, Murray testified solely to the credibility of Je.P. and Jo.P. Defendant did not proffer opinion or reputation testimony of his good character through Murray as permitted under Rules 404 and 405. See State v. Powell, 340 N.C. 674, 691, 459 S.E.2d 219, 227 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1060, 133 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1996). Rather, Murray\u2019s testimony was offered to impeach the State\u2019s primary witnesses. Murray made no mention of defendant\u2019s character until the State initiated the inquiry on cross-examination.\nMurray: Me and [defendant] were like off and on. We didn\u2019t have a steady relationship. We were off and on.\nState: But you just said you dated him for three and a half years?\nMurray: We did. Everybody have their problems. We break up, go back together, break up, go back together.\nState: So you\u2019re saying Mr. Thaggard wouldn\u2019t do anything like this?\nMurray: No.\nState: Your Honor, may I approach?\nState: Ms. Murray\u2014\nMurray: Yes.\nState: \u2014do you know Mr. Thaggard was convicted\u2014\nDefendant: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nState: \u2014of taking indecent liberties with a child?\nDefendant: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nMurray: Yes.\nState: Do you know he was convicted of two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child?\nMurray: Yes.\nThis was an impermissible admission into evidence of defendant\u2019s prior convictions. The victims\u2019 characters, not defendant\u2019s, were placed in issue by Murray\u2019s testimony. Any inquiries into Murray\u2019s credibility regarding her testimony should have been limited as such. We further note that, in moving the trial court for admission of C.W. and N.W.\u2019s testimony concerning the underlying facts of the prior indecent liberties convictions, the State specifically declared, \u201cThe State\u2019s not going to attempt to bring in the actual convictions through these young ladies.\u201d The trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of defendant\u2019s previous convictions through Murray.\nC. Prejudicial Error\nDefendant contends the error was prejudicial in that it changed trial tactics and forced him to testify. He further asserts that by taking the stand, he was forced to answer additional questions about the prior convictions, which created a reasonable possibility that the jury returned a different verdict after listening to the prior convictions evidence. State v. Brown, 101 N.C. App. 71, 80, 398 S.E.2d 905, 910 (1990). We disagree.\nWe have already determined the admission of C.W. and N.W.\u2019s testimony concerning the previous sexual abuse by defendant was proper under Rule 404(b). The same reasoning also applies here. The State presented a wealth of testimonial and physical evidence implicating defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes against Je.P. and Jo.P. The trial court gave a lengthy limiting instruction prior to C.W. and N. W. testifying that the Rule 404(b) evidence could not be used to show defendant acted in conformity with it to commit the crimes at bar. The court\u2019s jury instructions prior to deliberation ensured that any evidence pertaining to defendant\u2019s prior convictions of taking indecent liberties with children was to be considered solely for the Rule 404(b) factors: identity, motive, intent, or common scheme.\nWe hold the admission of defendant\u2019s prior crimes through Murray and defendant\u2019s subsequent decision to testify in response to the evidence is not prejudicial error in light of the considerable amount of other evidence against defendant. In addition, the trial court twice provided the jury limiting instructions concerning the use of the Rule 404(b) evidence.\nVIII Review of Juvenile Records\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in not providing him complete access to the victims\u2019 juvenile records. We disagree.\nIn Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a defendant may request the trial court to conduct an in camera review of juvenile records created during the investigation of a victim\u2019s complaint. 480 U.S. 39, 58, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40, 58 (1987). The purpose is to protect the defendant\u2019s due process rights by access, through the trial court, of files that may contain information material to his guilt or punishment. Id.; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963). However, in the interest of protecting the minors involved, defense counsel is prohibited from personally combing through the files. Id.\nOur Supreme Court ruled in State v. Hardy,\nsince realistically a defendant cannot know if a statement of a material State\u2019s witness covering the matters testified to at trial would be material and favorable to his defense, Brady [373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215] and Agurs [United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976)] require the judge to, at a minimum, order an in camera inspection and make appropriate findings of fact. As an additional measure, if the judge, after the in camera examination, rules against the defendant on his motion, the judge should order the sealed statement placed in the record for appellate review.\n293 N.C. 105, 128, 235 S.E.2d 828, 842 (1977) (citing State v. Chavis, 24 N.C. App. 148, 176-84, 210 S.E.2d 555, 574-78 (1974)).\nOn appeal, the appellate court is required to examine the sealed records to determine whether they contain information that is favorable and material to an accused\u2019s guilt or punishment. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 57 (citations omitted). \u201c \u2018Favorable\u2019 evidence includes evidence which tends to exculpate the accused, as well as \u2018any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses.\u2019 \u201d State v. McGill, 141 N.C. App. 98, 102, 539 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2000) (quoting U.S. v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1996)). Evidence \u201c \u2018is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A \u2018reasonable probability\u2019 is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 57 (quoting U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985)).\nA defendant \u201cis not entitled to a new trial based on trial errors unless such errors were material and prejudicial.\u201d State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 339, 298 S.E.2d 631, 644 (1983). A constitutional rights violation is prejudicial unless this Court \u201cfinds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2003).\nHere, the trial court reviewed the victims\u2019 juvenile records upon defendant\u2019s motion and determined there was nothing defendant was \u201centitled to see.\u201d Under Ritchie and Hardy, this Court thoroughly reviewed the juvenile files for both victims provided in the record. The record included medical examination reports, DSS progress updates, evaluations by social workers, updates from foster homes, status reports from Falcon Children\u2019s Home, and legal documentation regarding the victims\u2019 removal from their father\u2019s custody.\nWe conclude the trial court properly withheld the files from defendant. They do not contain information material to defendant\u2019s case and no \u201creasonable probability\u201d exists that \u201cthe result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494. The documentation further corroborated the facts of the case. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIX. Motions to Dismiss\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.\nThe standard of review for a motion to dismiss in a criminal trial is, \u201cUpon defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.\u201d State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)).\nEvidence is substantial if it is relevant and adequate to convince a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion. State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995) (citing State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)). If substantial evidence, whether direct, circumstantial, or both, supports a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the motion to dismiss should be denied and the case goes to the jury. State v. Williams, 319 N.C. 73, 79, 352 S.E.2d 428, 432 (1987) (quoting State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 680, 325 S.E.2d 181, 188 (1985)). But, \u201cif the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be allowed.\u201d Powell, 299 N.C. at 98, 261 S.E.2d at 117 (citations omitted).\nIn considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court must analyze the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence. State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 199 (1995). The trial court must also resolve any contradictions in the evidence in the State\u2019s favor. State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581, 548 S.E.2d 712, 721 (2001). The trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witnesses\u2019 credibility. Id. It is concerned \u201conly with the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury.\u201d State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 766, 309 S.E.2d 232, 236 (1983). Ultimately, the court must decide whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117.\nThe jury found defendant to be guilty of three crimes. The first two were the statutory rape and the sexual offense of Jo.P. North Carolina defines these two crimes as \u201cvaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is at least six years older than the person, except when the defendant is lawfully married to the person.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a) (2003). The record indicates that Jo.P. was fourteen years old, defendant was thirty-six years old, and they were not lawfully married at the time of the incident. Further evidence in the case, considered in the light most favorable to the State, tended to show defendant forced Jo.P. to engage in vaginal and anal intercourse. This evidence was based on Jo.P.\u2019s testimony, corroborative testimony by the State\u2019s witnesses, and physical evidence.\nThird, defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor, Je.P. The elements are: (1) the defendant was at least 16 years of age; (2) he was five years older than his victim; (3) he willfully took or attempted to take an indecent liberty with the victim; (4) the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the alleged act or attempted act occurred; and (5) the action by the defendant was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. State v. Rhodes, 321 N.C. 102, 104-05, 361 S.E.2d 578, 579 (1987) (citing State v. Hicks, 79 N.C. App. 599, 339 S.E.2d 806 (1986)); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1(a) (2003).\nAt the time of the alleged incident, Je.P. was twelve and defendant was over the age of sixteen and at least five years older than Je.P. Additional evidence considered in the light most favorable to the State showed Je.P. awoke after passing out to find defendant on top of her. Both Je.P.\u2019s and defendant\u2019s pants and underwear were pulled down. Je.P. later experienced pain in her vaginal and anal areas. Dr. Cooper determined from a medical exam that Je.P. was both physically and mentally injured by nonconsensual sexual abuse.\nDefendant contends the victims\u2019 and the corroborative testimonies are contradictory and lack credibility. Our Supreme Court has held that the credibility of and the weight given to a witness\u2019s testimony is determined by the jury, not the court. State v. Upright, 72 N.C. App. 94, 100, 323 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 610, 332 S.E.2d 82 (1985); see also State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 730-31, 154 S.E.2d 902, 904-05 (1967). Contradictions and inconsistencies are credibility factors the jury considers and are not grounds for dismissal. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992) (quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982)). Defendant was provided the opportunity and attempted to impeach witnesses through cross-examination, his testimony, and the testimony of his witnesses.\nWe hold that the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant committed statutory rape and sexual offense against Jo.P. and took indecent liberties with a minor, Je.P., to withstand defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss. The record and transcripts are replete with substantial evidence to warrant consideration of the charges by the jury. The jury has the ultimate responsibility of determining the credibility of and weight given to the evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nX. Conclusion\nThe trial court did not err in: (1) allowing C.W. and N.W. to testify about past sexual abuse by defendant; (2) permitting Investigator Morley to testify that Jo.P. and Je.P.\u2019s in-court testimony was consistent with their previous statements to him; (3) not allowing defendant to gain complete access to the victims\u2019 juvenile records; and (4) denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the charges for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant did not suffer prejudicial error by the trial court allowing: (1) Dr. Cooper to testify that she did not believe the victims\u2019 conspired to testify against defendant; and (2) the State to ask Murray about defendant\u2019s prior convictions. Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial errors he assigned and argued.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges TIMMONS-GOODSON and GEER concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Christine M. Ryan, for the State.", "Terry W. Alford, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES EDWARD THAGGARD\nNo. COA04-368\n(Filed 1 February 2005)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue in brief\nDefendant voluntarily abandoned two assignments of error in a statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties case related to admission of evidence concerning the vie-tims\u2019 past sexual conduct and that sustained the State\u2019s objection to character testimony about one of the victims, because defendant failed to argue these issues in his brief.\n2. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 similar sex offenses\u2014 temporal proximity \u2014 opportunity\u2014common scheme or mo-dus operandi \u2014 identity\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties case by allowing two witnesses who were not the victims in this case to testify that they had been sexually abused by defendant, because: (1) the alleged incidents involving the witnesses occurred in 1999 and 2000, while the events at bar occurred in early to mid 2001; (2) the witnesses were the same age as the victims; (3) in both situations, defendant frequently visited or stayed overnight at the homes where the incidents occurred; (4) all four girls were assaulted as they slept or were about to fall asleep while others were present elsewhere in the residence; (5) the two sets of victims are sisters, and the oldest was abused first in both cases; and (6) based on the above similarities and the temporal proximity, the testimony was proper to show opportunity, a common scheme or modus operandi, and the assailant\u2019s identity.\n3. Evidence\u2014 officer\u2019s testimony \u2014 prior consistent statements \u2014 corroboration\nThe trial court did not err in a statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties case by permitting an investigator to testify that the two minor victims\u2019 in-court testimony was consistent with their previous statements to the investigator, because: (1) a review of the investigator\u2019s testimony with the victims\u2019 in-court testimony shows his testimony to be corroborative; (2) the differences that defendant cites in the statements are not appreciable variances and instead appeared to be either where the investigator did not receive all the details during the initial meetings or the order of details in the victims\u2019 stories varied between their initial statements and their testimony at trial; and (3) any disparities affect the weight, not the admissibility, of the statements and the witnesses\u2019 credibility.\n4. Evidence\u2014 opinion testimony \u2014 medical expert \u2014 sexual abuse \u2014 no prejudicial error\nAlthough the trial court erred in a statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties case by admitting opinion testimony from a medical expert, a forensic pediatrician, that the victims were truthful and did not just get together to tell each other what to say, the error was not prejudicial to defendant because the State presented other overwhelming evidence against defendant including that: (1) the victims\u2019 testimony was consistent with statements made to parents, counselors, social workers, law enforcement officers, and the pediatrician as shown through corroborative testimony, (2) the pediatrician\u2019s medical examinations discovered numerous physical and emotional injuries consistent with the victims\u2019 histories and indicative of sexual abuse; and (3) both victims experienced noticeable behavioral changes following the incidents.\n5. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 indecent liberties\u2014 no prejudicial error\nAlthough the trial court erred in a statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties case by allowing the State to ask a defense witness, defendant\u2019s former girlfriend, whether she knew that defendant had previously been convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child, this error was not prejudicial'to defendant even though defendant contends it made him change trial tactics and forced him to testify because: (1) the State presented a wealth of testimony and physical evidence implicating defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes against the two victims; (2) the trial court gave a lengthy limiting instruction prior to two witnesses testifying about defendant\u2019s prior sexual abuse of them that the evidence could not be used to show defendant acted in conformity with it to commit the crimes; and (3) the court\u2019s jury instructions prior to deliberation ensured that any evidence pertaining to defendant\u2019s prior convictions of taking indecent liberties with children was to be considered solely for the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) factors of identity, motive, intent, or common scheme.\n6. Evidence\u2014 victims\u2019 juvenile records \u2014 failure to grant complete access\nThe trial court did not err in a statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties case by failing to allow defendant to gain complete access to the victims\u2019 juvenile records, because: (1) the trial court reviewed the victims\u2019 juvenile records upon defendant\u2019s motion and determined that there was nothing defendant was entitled to see; (2) the records do not contain information material to defendant\u2019s case and no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different; and (3) the documentation further corroborated the facts of the case.\n7. Indecent Liberties; Rape; Sexual Offenses\u2014 statutory rape \u2014 statutory sexual offense \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the charges of statutory rape, statutory sexual offense, and taking indecent liberties with a minor based on alleged insufficiency of the evidence, because: (1) in regard to the rape and sexual offense charges, the record indicated that the pertinent victim was fourteen years old, defendant was thirty-six years old, they were not lawfully married at the time of the incident, and defendant forced the victim to engage in vaginal and anal intercourse; (2) in regard to the taking indecent liberties charge, the pertinent victim was twelve and defendant was over the age of sixteen and at least five years older than the victim, the victim awoke after passing out to find defendant on top of her, both the victim\u2019s and defendant\u2019s pants and underwear were pulled down, the victim later experienced pain in her vaginal and anal areas, and a forensic pediatrician determined from a medical exam that the victim was both physically and mentally injured by noncon-sensual sexual abuse; and (3) although defendant contends the victims\u2019 and the corroborative testimonies are contradictory and lack credibility, the credibility and weight given to a witness\u2019s testimony is determined by the jury and not the court.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 3 November 2003 by Judge James Floyd Ammons, Jr., in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November 2004.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Christine M. Ryan, for the State.\nTerry W. Alford, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0263-01", "first_page_order": 293, "last_page_order": 313 }