{ "id": 8470490, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP LEE SNIPES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Snipes", "decision_date": "2005-02-15", "docket_number": "No. COA04-664", "first_page": "525", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "168 N.C. App. 525" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563552 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 S.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568547, 8568648, 8568593, 8568439, 8568505 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0664-03", "/nc/285/0664-05", "/nc/285/0664-04", "/nc/285/0664-01", "/nc/285/0664-02" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" }, { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11305964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" }, { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/22/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710741 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Harris, 308 N.C. 159, 167, 301 S.E.2d 91, 97 (1983)" }, { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Harris, 308 N.C. 159, 167, 301 S.E.2d 91, 97 (1983)" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9531459, 9532036, 9531683, 9531419, 9531977, 9531531, 9531499, 9531631, 9531926, 9531799, 9531384, 9531739, 9531868, 9531582 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0941-03", "/us/528/0941-14", "/us/528/0941-08", "/us/528/0941-02", "/us/528/0941-13", "/us/528/0941-05", "/us/528/0941-04", "/us/528/0941-07", "/us/528/0941-12", "/us/528/0941-10", "/us/528/0941-01", "/us/528/0941-09", "/us/528/0941-11", "/us/528/0941-06" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132015 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918-19", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529175 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498402 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 646", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 1030", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353088, 354880, 354466, 353706, 354636, 352207, 354995, 354391, 352155, 352220 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/1030-09", "/us/535/1030-05", "/us/535/1030-08", "/us/535/1030-06", "/us/535/1030-03", "/us/535/1030-07", "/us/535/1030-04", "/us/535/1030-10", "/us/535/1030-01", "/us/535/1030-02" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 1147", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9256736, 9256996, 9257189, 9256777, 9257356, 9257228, 9257036, 9257136, 9256693, 9256886, 9256920, 9257306, 9256827, 9257276, 9256957, 9256858 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/1147-02", "/us/534/1147-09", "/us/534/1147-12", "/us/534/1147-03", "/us/534/1147-16", "/us/534/1147-13", "/us/534/1147-10", "/us/534/1147-11", "/us/534/1147-01", "/us/534/1147-06", "/us/534/1147-07", "/us/534/1147-15", "/us/534/1147-04", "/us/534/1147-14", "/us/534/1147-08", "/us/534/1147-05" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135653 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761884 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643095 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496800 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 F. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2232009 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "\"bona fide doubt\" as to competency" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/430/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 L. Ed. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 966", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11660704, 11660457, 11660489, 11660558, 11660431, 11660591, 11660529, 11660626, 11660669 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0966-09", "/us/420/0966-02", "/us/420/0966-03", "/us/420/0966-05", "/us/420/0966-01", "/us/420/0966-06", "/us/420/0966-04", "/us/420/0966-07", "/us/420/0966-08" ] }, { "cite": "504 F. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 109533 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/504/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563929 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558792 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-40" }, { "page": "39-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220016 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615-16" }, { "page": "615-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0592-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 991, "char_count": 21484, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.493676521540041e-08, "percentile": 0.4460503295751992 }, "sha256": "cd898ea3ded946a3df6c8b221496a5fd6a45b90e7ff783b483447d1de4ee200a", "simhash": "1:0eaf6066765e4cd0", "word_count": 3535 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:09.557360+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP LEE SNIPES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.\nPhillip Lee Snipes (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals his convictions for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and one count of felony stalking. For the reasons discussed herein, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error, but we remand the case for the correction of clerical errors.\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented at trial tends to show the following: On 13 July 2003, Bridget Roseborp (\u201cRoseboro\u201d) was standing in front of her apartment when defendant approached her with what she believed to be a knife in his hand. Roseboro turned and knocked on the front door of a nearby apartment occupied by Fletcher Quick (\u201cQuick\u201d). As Roseboro knocked on Quick\u2019s front door, defendant attacked Roseboro with the knife. During the altercation, defendant stabbed Roseboro with the knife several times in her head and hand, and he remarked, \u201cBitch, didn\u2019t I tell you I was going to get you?\u201d\nAfter hearing Roseboro knock on his front door, Quick exited his residence and saw defendant \u201cbeating\u201d Roseboro with a \u201csilver weapon.\u201d Quick grabbed defendant, and the two men \u201cwent down to the ground.\u201d Defendant stood up and began beating Quick with \u201ca different weapon\u201d which Quick believed was a \u201cpiece of iron.\u201d Defendant struck Quick several times in the head, side, and arm with the weapon, causing Quick\u2019s head to bleed. Defendant eventually \u201cran off\u2019 when a nearby neighbor informed Quick that the police were on their way.\nAfter law enforcement and medical personnel arrived, Roseboro and Quick were transported to Central Carolina Hospital. As a result of her injuries, Roseboro received seven staples in her head and a cast for a broken finger on her hand. As a result of his injuries, Quick received five staples in his head.\nDefendant was apprehended and arrested the following day. After being advised of his rights, defendant offered the following statement to law enforcement officials:\nOn 7-13-2003, around 12:30 to 1:30 AM I was walking down Washington Avenue when Bridget Roseboro and Fletcher Quick came up to me and started wailing on my head. I started fighting back. After I got them off of me, I left and went home.\nOn 4 August 2003, defendant was indicted for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and one count of felonious stalking. Defendant\u2019s trial began 18 November 2003. On 21 November 2003, the jury returned a verdict of guilty for each charge. The trial court determined that defendant had a prior felony record level II and a prior misdemeanor record level III, and on 21 November 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total of fifty-eight to eighty-eight months incarceration. Defendant appeals.\nWe note initially that defendant\u2019s brief contains arguments supporting only three of his four original assignments of error. Pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2004), the omitted assignment of error is deemed abandoned. Therefore, we limit our present review to those assignments of error properly preserved by defendant for appeal.\nThe issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (I) failing to investigate defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed at trial; (II) denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of felony stalking; and (III) allowing Roseboro\u2019s daughter to sit in the courtroom with a doll and commenting on the doll\u2019s presence.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to investigate defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed. Defendant asserts that the trial court was required to hold a hearing to determine whether defendant had the mental capacity necessary to proceed with trial. We disagree.\nWe note initially that defendant assigns plain error to this issue. Our appellate courts have traditionally applied plain error analysis only to jury instructions and evidentiary matters. State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 615-16, 565 S.E.2d 22, 39-40 (2002). However, recognizing that \u201ca conviction cannot stand where [the] defendant lacks [the] capacity to defend himself],]\u201d State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 568, 231 S.E.2d 577, 580 (1977), in our discretion pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2004), we choose to address the merits of defendant\u2019s argument.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1001(a) (2003) provides as follows:\nNo person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. This condition is hereinafter referred to as \u201cincapacity to proceed.\u201d\nN.C. Gen.- Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002 (2003) governs the determination of a defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed. Subsection (a) of the statute provides as follows:\nThe question of the capacity of the defendant to proceed may be raised at any time on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court. The motion shall detail the specific conduct that leads the moving party to question the defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(a). Pursuant to subsection (b), the trial court is required to hold a hearing to determine the defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed if his or her capacity \u201cis questioned[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b). Our Supreme Court has recognized that \u201c \u2018a defendant may waive the benefit of statutory or constitutional provisions by express consent, failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose ta insist upon it.\u2019 \u201d Young, 291 N.C. at 567, 231 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 239, 176 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1970)). However, the Court has also recognized that \u201c \u2018a trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent.\u2019 \u201d Young, 291 N.C. at 568, 231 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Crenshaw v. Wolff, 504 F. 2d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 966, 43 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1975)); see Wolf v. United States, 430 F. 2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1970) (\u201cbona fide doubt\u201d as to competency).\nIn the instant case, on 30 July 2003, defendant\u2019s trial counsel filed a motion questioning defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed with the trial. Defendant concedes that he waived the statutory right to question his competency by withdrawing the motion in open court on 20 August 2003. Nevertheless, defendant asserts that the trial court was required to conduct a competency hearing in light of Young and other relevant case law. Because we conclude that the evidence of incompetency in the instant case was insufficient to require a sua sponte competency hearing, we hold that the trial court did not err.\n\u201c \u2018Evidence of a defendant\u2019s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant\u2019 to a bona fide doubt inquiry.\u201d State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 390, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118 (1975)). \u201cThere are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.\u201d Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 118. In the instant case, defendant presented no evidence of previous psychological treatment or medical records regarding his capacity to proceed with trial, and his trial demeanor was rational and obedient. Defendant consistently answered the trial court\u2019s pre-trial questions and obeyed the trial court\u2019s request to slow the pace of his speech. Defendant waited for the trial court\u2019s permission to leave the witness stand during his testimony, and he returned to the witness stand when instructed by the trial court to do so. During his testimony, defendant consistently denied carrying a weapon during the altercation with Roseboro and Quick, and he offered a consistent version of the altercation as well as rationale for his actions.\nAlthough some of defendant\u2019s answers during his trial testimony include rambling, irrelevant statements, after reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that defendant was \u201caccurately oriented regarding his present circumstances\u201d and \u201cknew the offenses with which he was charged.\u201d State v. Hepinstall, 309 N.C. 231, 236, 306 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1983). We are unable to conclude that the trial court had \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d before it \u201cindicating that defendant \u2018lack[ed] the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense\u2019 at the time his trial commenced.\u201d State v. King, 353 N.C. 457, 467, 546 S.E.2d 575, 585 (2001) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 113) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1147, 151 L. Ed. 2d 1002, reh\u2019g denied, 535 U.S. 1030, 152 L. Ed. 2d 646 (2002). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court was not required to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte, and, accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s first argument.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the felony stalking charge. Defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence tending to show that he feloniously stalked Roseboro between the dates alleged in the indictment. We disagree.\nWhen ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence of each essential element of the offense charged. State v. Benson, 331 N.C. 537, 544, 417 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1992). The trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the trial court gives the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. Id. \u201cContradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve. The test for sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial or both.\u201d State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918-19 (1993) (citations omitted).\nIn the instant case, defendant was charged with violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3, which provides as follows:\n(a) Offense. \u2014 A person commits the offense of stalking if the person willfully on more than one occasion follows or is in the presence of, or otherwise harasses, another person without legal purpose and with the intent to do any of the following:\n(1) Place that person in reasonable fear either for the person\u2019s safety or the safety of the person\u2019s immediate family or close personal associates.\n(b) Classification. \u2014 A violation of this section is a Class A1 misdemeanor. ... A person who commits the offense of stalking when there is a court order in effect prohibiting similar behavior by that person is guilty of a Class H felony.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3 (2003). The indictment in the instant case charged defendant with stalking Roseboro between the dates of 17 October 2002 and 13 July 2003, for the purpose of putting her \u201cin reasonable fear . . . for her safety[.]\u201d After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State offered sufficient evidence at trial to support this charge.\nAt trial, the State offered evidence tending to show that on 25 September 2002, Roseboro obtained a \u201cno contact\u201d order that required defendant to refrain from contacting Roseboro. The \u201cno contact\u201d order was continued by the trial court on 16 October 2002. At trial, Roseboro testified that as she was walking to her cousin\u2019s residence one morning after the \u201cno contact\u201d order was continued, defendant \u201cc[a]me riding up on on his bicycle .... [and] follow[edj [her] all the way to her [cousin\u2019s] house.\u201d Roseboro testified that defendant followed her for approximately one block and communicated with her. Roseboro testified that\nI asked him why he was bothering me. He couldn\u2019t give me no definite answer. I told him, \u201cI don\u2019t bother you. So why don\u2019t you just leave me alone.\u201d He said, \u201cOkay.\u201d But he continued on.\nRoseboro further testified that she would encounter defendant riding his bicycle \u201c[e]very morning\u201d as she walked to her cousin\u2019s house, but that \u201csometime[s] [she] would beat [defendant] down there to [her] cousin\u2019s house because [she] would leave a little bit earlier.\u201d Roseboro testified that defendant \u201cwould make contact\u201d with her and would travel in the \u201c[s]ame direction\u201d as she was traveling. Roseboro testified that when she would reach her cousin\u2019s house, defendant would \u201cleave.\u201d When asked how many times she saw defendant between 17 October 2002 and 13 July 2003, Roseboro testified that she would see defendant \u201cnear about every day,\u201d and that although defendant did not \u201c[r]eally\u201d communicate with her, he followed her \u201cabout 50\u201d times, as close as \u201c[l]ike from me to this young man right here [indicating the trial court reporter].\u201d Roseboro testified that she would \u201calways get a ride back [from her cousin\u2019s residence] because it would be dark[,]\u201d and she stated that she \u201cfelt like if you\u2019re not trying to be bothering with anybody, why would you follow them all the time?\u201d Roseboro further testified that on the night of the altercation, defendant approached her with a knife, causing her to immediately begin knocking on the front door of a nearby residence. Sanford Police Department Detective Vinnie Frazer (\u201cDetective Frazer\u201d) testified that when he interviewed Roseboro the night of the altercation, \u201c[s]he was very upset, crying, stated she was in fear for her life.\u201d In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence tending to show that defendant stalked Roseboro during the time periods alleged in the indictment. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of felony stalking. Furthermore, while we recognize that defendant also argues in his brief that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the charge, we note that defendant did not object to the relevant portion of the trial court\u2019s instruction or assign plain error to the instruction on appeal. Therefore, defendant has failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b) (2004). Accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s second argument.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Roseboro\u2019s daughter to sit in the courtroom with a doll and by commenting on the doll\u2019s presence. As discussed above, our appellate courts have traditionally applied plain error analysis only to jury instructions and evidentiary matters. Wiley, 355 N.C. at 615-16, 565 S.E.2d at 39-40. Nevertheless, in our discretion pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2, we have chosen to review defendant\u2019s assignment of error, and we conclude that the trial court did not err.\nThe record reflects that Roseboro\u2019s daughter, Kendra West (\u201cWest\u201d), was present at defendant\u2019s trial and holding a doll assigned to her in a school project. Prior to trial, the trial court gave the following instructions to the jury pool:\nAnd I would also like to introduce Ms. Kendra West. Ms. Kendra, would you please stand, please? Turn around so that the jury can see you. Ms. Kendra is the daugther of Ms. Bridget Roseboro. Thank you. And, as you will observe, she\u2019s holding a baby doll, and this is a school project. So, if the baby doll cries we are going to ignore it \u2014 okay\u2014and keep going.\nDuring the course of the trial, West\u2019s doll cried three times, and each time West immediately left the courtroom with the doll. Following the second interruption, the trial court said, \u201cMakes me not want to have any children.\u201d Following the third interruption, the trial court said, \u201cSchool project.\u201d Defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s comments amount to an impermissible expression of opinion which fundamentally prejudiced his trial. We disagree.\n\u201cThe trial judge . . . has the duty to supervise and control a defendant\u2019s trial ... to ensure fair and impartial justice for both parties.\u201d State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 126, 512 S.E.2d 720, 732, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999). In performing its duties, the trial court\u2019s position as the \u201c \u2018standard-bearer of impartiality\u2019 \u201d requires that \u201c \u2018the trial judge must not express any opinion as to the weight to be given to or credibility of any competent evidence presented before the jury.\u2019 \u201d State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 154-55, 456 S.E.2d 789, 808 (1995) (quoting State v. Harris, 308 N.C. 159, 167, 301 S.E.2d 91, 97 (1983)); see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1222 (2003) (stating that the trial court \u201cmay not express during any stage of the trial, any opinion in the presence of the jury on any question of fact to be decided by the jury.\u201d). \u201cIn evaluating whether a judge\u2019s comments cross into the realm of impermissible opinion, a totality of the circumstances test is utilized.\u201d Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 155, 456 S.E.2d at 808.\nIn the instant case, we are not convinced that the trial court\u2019s comments or conduct related to the doll had any influence on the outcome of defendant\u2019s case. The trial court made appropriate arrangements regarding the presence of the doll prior to trial, and its comments regarding the doll\u2019s interruptions were wholly unrelated to any fact at issue in defendant\u2019s case. We note that \u201c[n]ot every disruptive event occurring during the course of the trial requires the court automatically to declare a mistrial.\u201d State v. Dais, 22 N.C. App. 379, 384, 206 S.E.2d 759, 762, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 664, 207 S.E.2d 758 (1974). \u201cOrdinarily, the manner in which a trial is conducted rests in the discretion of the court, \u2018[so] long as defendant\u2019s rights are scrupulously afforded him.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 277 N.C. 174, 177, 176 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1970)). \u201cThis principle applies to control by the court of the conduct of spectators during the course of trial.\u201d Davis, 22 N.C. App. at 384, 206 S.E.2d at 762. In the instant case, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s conduct related to the doll\u2019s presence in the courtroom did not infringe upon defendant\u2019s right to an impartial trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err by allowing Roseboro\u2019s daughter to sit in the courtroom with the doll and by commenting on the doll\u2019s presence.\nWhile we recognize that defendant also asserts in his brief that the trial court\u2019s comments regarding media coverage were impermissible, we note that defendant failed to object to these comments at trial, and he failed to assign error to them on appeal. Therefore, we decline to address the merits of this assertion. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(b). Accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s final argument.\nIn light of the foregoing conclusions, we hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error. However, we note that each of the judgment and commitment forms contains a clerical error. On each form, the trial court has checked the box indicating that it \u201c[ijmposes the prison term pursuant to a plea arrangement as to sentence under Article 58 of G.S. Chapter 15A.\u201d Our review of the record reveals that defendant pled not guilty to each of the offenses for which he was convicted. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of these clerical errors.\nNo error at trial; remand for correction of clerical errors.\nJudges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Richard J. Votta, for the State.", "George E. Kelly, III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PHILLIP LEE SNIPES\nNo. COA04-664\n(Filed 15 February 2005)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 plain error review \u2014 defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed\nRecognizing that a conviction cannot stand where the defendant lacks the capacity to defend himself, the Court of Appeals used its discretion under N.C.R. App. R 2 (2004) to apply plain error analysis to the question of whether defendant had the capacity to proceed.\n2. Criminal Law\u2014 defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed \u2014 plain error review \u2014 evide.nce of incompetency insufficient\nThere was insufficient evidence of incompetency to require a sua sponte competency hearing where defendant presented no evidence of previous psychological treatment or medical records regarding his capacity to proceed with trial, and his trial demeanor was rational and obedient. Although some of defendant\u2019s testimony included rambling and irrelevant statements, the record as a whole indicates that he was oriented to his present circumstances and knew the offenses with which he was charged.\n3. Stalking\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State offered sufficient evidence to support a charge of felony stalking and the trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-277.3.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 victim\u2019s daughter \u2014 sitting in courtroom with doll\nThere was no plain error in a stalking and assault prosecution where the trial court allowed the victim\u2019s daughter to sit in the courtroom with a doll which was part of a school assignment, and which occasionally cried. The court made appropriate arrangements regarding the presence of the doll prior to trial, and its comments about the doll during trial were wholly unrelated to any fact at issue in defendant\u2019s case.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 November 2003 by Judge Ola M. Lewis in Lee County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Richard J. Votta, for the State.\nGeorge E. Kelly, III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0525-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 564 }