{ "id": 8472077, "name": "MANUEL DAVIS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GREAT COASTAL EXPRESS, Employer, Defendant-Appellee, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Great Coastal Express", "decision_date": "2005-04-05", "docket_number": "No. COA04-439", "first_page": "607", "last_page": "613", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 N.C. App. 607" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627293 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571898, 8571940 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0168-01", "/nc/264/0168-02" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903-04", "parenthetical": "citing Lucas v. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Askew v. Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 174, 141 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1965); Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163 S.E. 569, 571 (1932)" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "stating that according to the record, \"no state, standing alone, had the same degree of significant contacts to plaintiff's employment as North Carolina.\"" }, { "page": "905", "parenthetical": "holding invalid Arkansas's policy form that attempted to limit the plaintiff's rights to seek workers' compensation in any state other than Arkansas" }, { "page": "904" }, { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 926 (10th ed. 1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155898 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "citing Lucas v. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Askew v. Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 174, 141 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1965); Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163 S.E. 569, 571 (1932)" }, { "page": "637" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "639" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-36", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 594, "char_count": 14901, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.522937244603836 }, "sha256": "c2a5a18eae6c174ea658aa8ab06c3d79775c68b2bdeeb2b8efdad259bb9b8494", "simhash": "1:db6f0f8248640b57", "word_count": 2305 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:54.593382+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "MANUEL DAVIS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GREAT COASTAL EXPRESS, Employer, Defendant-Appellee, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nManuel Davis (plaintiff), an employee of Great Coastal Express (defendant), was injured in a motor vehicle accident in the course and scope of his employment on 12 July 1999. Defendant hired plaintiff in April 1999 as an over-the-ro\u00e1d truck driver and issued him a company truck. Plaintiff\u2019s duties included making pick-ups and deliveries across the eastern part of the United States. Plaintiff normally had two days off every two weeks, during which he returned to his home in Enka, North Carolina. Defendant\u2019s headquarters was located in Chester, Virginia. Plaintiff received instructions from defendant for pick-ups or deliveries over a QualCom computer system installed in plaintiff\u2019s company truck.\nOn the day of the accident, plaintiff left his home in Enka, made deliveries in Winston-Salem and Charlotte, and then drove into South Carolina to make a delivery. In Gaffney, South Carolina, a vehicle crossed the highway median and collided with plaintiffs truck. Plaintiff suffered injuries and post traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiff filed for worker\u2019s compensation in North Carolina on 28 July 1999. Defendant denied plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim on grounds that the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nA commissioner, acting as the initial hearing officer, issued an interlocutory opinion and award on 26 April 2001, finding that the Commission had jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim. In an opinion and award entered 11 June 2002, a deputy commissioner awarded plaintiff temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and attorney\u2019s fees. Defendant appealed to the Commission, which reversed the deputy commissioner\u2019s opinion, finding that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim because Virginia, not North Carolina, was plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment. Plaintiff appeals.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-36 provides:\nWhere an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State and the accident is one which would entitle him ... to compensation if it had happened in this State, then the employee . . . shall be entitled to compensation (i) if the contract of employment was made in this State, (ii) if the employer\u2019s principal place of business is in this State, or (iii) if the employee\u2019s principal place of employment is within this State[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-36 (2003). Because plaintiff\u2019s accident occurred in South Carolina, North Carolina has jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim only if one of the three provisions in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 applies.\nPlaintiff did not contest that the employment contract was not made in North Carolina, nor that defendant\u2019s principal place of business was not in North Carolina. Therefore, the issue before the Commission was whether North Carolina was plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment. The Commission found as fact and concluded as law that \u201cplaintiff [could not] meet the third circumstance as his principal place of employment was in Virginia, not North Carolina.\u201d\nPlaintiff first argues the Commission erred in this conclusion of law. Generally, our Court\u2019s review of an opinion and award of the Commission is limited to evaluating \u201cwhether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). However, our Supreme Court has held that \u201cthe Commission\u2019s findings of jurisdictional fact are not conclusive on appeal, even if supported by competent evidence.\u201d Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., Inc., 351 N.C. 634, 637, 528 S.E.2d 902, 903-04 (2000) (citing Lucas v. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Askew v. Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 174, 141 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1965); Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163 S.E. 569, 571 (1932)). Rather, the reviewing court has the duty \u201cto make its own independent findings of. . . jurisdictional facts from its consideration of all the evidence in the record.\u201d Perkins, 351 N.C. at 637, 528 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261).\nPlaintiff contends his principal place of employment was in North Carolina, and we must consider the record evidence to determine whether North Carolina was his principal place of employment. Plaintiff first analogizes the present case to that of Perkins, which had similar facts, and in which our Supreme Court determined that North Carolina was the plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment. See Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638, 528 S.E.2d at 904. The plaintiff in Perkins was a truck driver who was assigned to twelve to thirteen states in the southeast, including North Carolina. Id. Approximately eighteen to twenty percent of the plaintiff\u2019s stops were in North Carolina and because the plaintiff\u2019s employer, Arkansas Trucking, did not have a terminal in North Carolina, the plaintiff was dispatched from his home in Dudley, North Carolina. Id. The plaintiff also kept his employer\u2019s truck at his residence in Dudley when the plaintiff was \u201coff the road.\u201d Id. Our Supreme Court stated: \u201cNot surprisingly, as a truck driver, plaintiff did not perform the majority of his job duties in any one state. The record reflects, however, that no state, standing alone, had the same degree of significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment as North Carolina.\u201d Id.\nPlaintiff argues that the present case is similar to Perkins in that plaintiff kept his truck at a truck stop in Candler, North Carolina when plaintiff was off the road; he began and ended his trips in North Carolina; he was dispatched from the Candler truck stop through the QualCom computer in his truck; and he made a significant percentage of his stops in North Carolina. Nevertheless, plaintiff concedes, even by his count, that only fourteen percent of his stops were made in North Carolina, as compared to approximately eighteen to twenty percent made by the plaintiff in Perkins. See Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638, 528 S.E.2d at 904.\nPlaintiff argues that even more than in Perkins, North Carolina was plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment because defendant had a terminal in Charlotte from which plaintiff was sometimes dispatched. We note, however, that the Commission found that \u201c[plaintiff received information and instructions from defendant-employer via a Qualcom satellite link to a computer in the truck. Plaintiff was not dispatched from the Charlotte terminal.\u201d\nContrary to plaintiff\u2019s arguments, the present case raises an issue not present in Perkins, namely that Virginia, standing alone, had more significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment than North Carolina. See Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638, 528 S.E.2d at 904 (stating that according to the record, \u201cno state, standing alone, had the same degree of significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment as North Carolina.\u201d). Defendant argues that Virginia had more significant contacts with plaintiff\u2019s employment because plaintiff accepted employment in Virginia, was supervised by a person in Virginia, and his paychecks were issued in Virginia. Most persuasive to our Court is the fact that plaintiff had more pick-ups and deliveries in Virginia than in any other state. Defendant argues, and the Commission found, that \u201cnineteen percent of plaintiff\u2019s pick-ups and deliveries were in Virginia, only eight percent of his pick-ups- and deliveries were in North Carolina.\u201d In reviewing plaintiff\u2019s travel logs from 25 April 1999 to 11 July 1999, there are similar percentages showing approximately ten percent of plaintiff\u2019s pick-ups and deliveries in North Carolina and approximately eighteen percent in Virginia. Plaintiff also drove considerably more miles in Virginia than in any other state, and since plaintiff was paid by the mile, the majority of his income came from work performed in Virginia.\nPlaintiff argues that this evaluation of his principal place of employment violates our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in that defendant testified that it considered all of its employees to have their principal place of employment in Virginia for workers\u2019 compensation purposes. We agree that having a policy that operates to relieve an employer of any obligation under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act would violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6 (2003). See Perkins, 351 N.C. at 639, 528 S.E.2d at 905 (holding invalid Arkansas\u2019s policy form that attempted to limit the plaintiff\u2019s rights to seek workers\u2019 compensation in any state other than Arkansas). However, in the case before us, defendant\u2019s policy is not relevant to our determination as to whether North Carolina is the proper jurisdiction for plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. Unlike Perkins, the evidence in this case does not demonstrate that no other state \u201chad the same degree of significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment as North Carolina.\u201d See Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638, 528 S.E.2d at 904. To the contrary, the evidence in the present case shows that Virginia had more significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment than North Carolina.\nPlaintiff further asserts, however, that North Carolina was the principal place of his employment because North Carolina is where plaintiff \u201cfocused his duties and trips.\u201d Plaintiff notes that our Supreme Court defined \u201cprincipal\u201d to mean \u201cmost important, consequential, or influential.\u201d Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638, 528 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting Merriam Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 926 (10th ed. 1993)). He contends that North Carolina was the most \u201cconsequential\u201d place for plaintiff\u2019s employment because defendant organized plaintiff\u2019s trips so that plaintiff would be as close as possible to his residence in Enka when plaintiff ended a two-week assignment. Under our standard of review, however, competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s returning to his home in North Carolina every two weeks was \u201ca continuation of his existing trips as his stored truck may have contained a full or partially full load. At no time was plaintiff dispatched from his residence in North Carolina.\u201d\nPlaintiff similarly argues that North Carolina was the \u201cmost important\u201d place for plaintiff\u2019s employment because he was treated like an employee in North Carolina for income tax purposes. However, we find that plaintiff\u2019s having taxes withheld from his paycheck was more a result of plaintiff\u2019s residence in North Carolina, rather than his place of employment being in North Carolina. As the Commission found:\n5. Defendant-Employer allowed employees to choose the state for the purposes of withholding income taxes. Plaintiff chose to have his taxes withheld in North Carolina and, consequently, defendant-employer also paid into the North Carolina unemployment system as required by law. Plaintiff could have chosen any state in the United States for income tax withholding purposes.\nSince N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 does not provide that an employee\u2019s residence establishes jurisdiction for receiving workers\u2019 compensation benefits, we find plaintiff\u2019s arguments unpersuasive.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that North Carolina was not plaintiff\u2019s principal place of business. Thus, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36, North Carolina\u2019s Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim, and we affirm the Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nPlaintiff also assigns as error the Commission\u2019s findings of fact numbers eight and ten. However, plaintiff fails to argue why finding of fact number ten was an error and we deem this assignment of error to be abandoned pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Finding of fact number eight states:\n8. Plaintiff was provided a tractor-trailer for his sole use. When plaintiff would req\u00fcest time off, which was usually two days off every two weeks, defendant-employer would attempt to schedule a route that would take plaintiff close to his residence. During his time off, plaintiff was allowed by defendant-employer to store his truck at a rest area in Buncombe County, North Carolina near his home. These were a continuation of his existing trips as his stored truck may have contained a full or partially full load. At no time was plaintiff dispatched from his residence in North Carolina.\nSpecifically, plaintiff argues that there is no evidence to support the last sentence: \u201cAt no time was plaintiff dispatched from his residence in North Carolina.\u201d We disagree.\nAs stated above, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact will be upheld on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. See Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. Even if there is evidence to the contrary, we will affirm an opinion and award of the Commission when competent evidence supports the opinion and award. McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004). In the present case, plaintiff presents his own testimony as evidence that he began and ended his trips at his home in Enka, North Carolina, and that he received dispatch instructions over the QualCom computer in his truck. However, other evidence presented, including plaintiff\u2019s testimony, showed that plaintiff generally already had his dispatch instructions and the cargo load for his next delivery when plaintiff stopped in Candler, North Carolina to return home. Thus, competent evidence supports the finding that plaintiff was in the middle of existing trips when he returned home, and that he was not dispatched from his residence. We affirm the Commission\u2019s order and award.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WYNN and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ganly & Ramer, by Thomas F. Ramer, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Mullen Holland & Cooper P.A., by James R. Martin, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MANUEL DAVIS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellant v. GREAT COASTAL EXPRESS, Employer, Defendant-Appellee, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA04-439\n(Filed 5 April 2005)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 truck driver \u2014 jurisdiction\nThe Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear the workers\u2019 compensation claim of a truck driver who made pick-ups and deliveries across the eastern part of the United States for a company based in Virginia, who received his instructions over a computer in a company truck, who lived in North Caroling., and who was injured in a traffic accident in South Carolina.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 truck driver \u2014 jurisdiction\u2014 finding\nIn a workers\u2019 compensation case in which the issue was jurisdiction, competent evidence supports the Industrial Commission finding that plaintiff was in the middle of existing trips when he returned home to North Carolina and was not dispatched from his residence.\nAppeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 2 December 2003 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 December 2004.\nGanly & Ramer, by Thomas F. Ramer, for plaintiff-appellant.\nMullen Holland & Cooper P.A., by James R. Martin, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0607-01", "first_page_order": 637, "last_page_order": 643 }