{ "id": 8473814, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL DOWNING, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Downing", "decision_date": "2005-04-19", "docket_number": "No. COA04-928", "first_page": "790", "last_page": "797", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "169 N.C. App. 790" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "68 L. Ed. 2d 856", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affidavit containing a statement that a strong odor of marijuana was noticed was evidence from which a magistrate could conclude there was probable cause to issue a search warrant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6355063 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affidavit containing a statement that a strong odor of marijuana was noticed was evidence from which a magistrate could conclude there was probable cause to issue a search warrant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567680, 8567556, 8567594, 8567641, 8567519 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0405-05", "/nc/301/0405-02", "/nc/301/0405-03", "/nc/301/0405-04", "/nc/301/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551318 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 L. Ed. 2d 1453", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1237", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6264512, 6263312, 6263604, 6263838, 6263038 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1237-05", "/us/463/1237-02", "/us/463/1237-03", "/us/463/1237-04", "/us/463/1237-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750239 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984)" }, { "page": "886" }, { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143287 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984)" }, { "page": "133" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6191830 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" }, { "page": "583-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959520 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511176 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S. Ct. 220", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 L. Ed. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11384974, 11385039 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0907-01", "/us/444/0907-02" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570136 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241064 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9364175 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954514 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4742205 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0634-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 728, "char_count": 16240, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6896584411379093e-07, "percentile": 0.6990011772887145 }, "sha256": "e07b96613cbb9a9fb3042cd8544850d85032e05018f75ea9782ac027e7723e8d", "simhash": "1:22297442778d0e54", "word_count": 2621 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:54.593382+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL DOWNING, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nUnder North Carolina law, a search warrant is not required to conduct a lawful search based on probable cause of a motor vehicle in a public roadway or in a public vehicular area. State v. Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 638, 356 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1987). In this case, the record shows that the police lawfully stopped a vehicle fitting a description given by a reliable confidential informant, lawfully entered and moved the vehicle with Defendant\u2019s consent, and smelled cocaine upon entering and moving the vehicle. Because we hold that these facts show that probable cause existed to search the vehicle, we affirm the order of the trial court denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search.\nAt trial, Defendant pled no contest to the charges of trafficking cocaine by possession and trafficking in cocaine by transporation. This appeal arises from his reservation of the right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained by police officers from the search of his vehicle.\nThe evidence at the motion to suppress hearing tended to show the following: On 1 March 2003, Sergeant Norman Johnson, supervisor of the Dare County narcotics unit, received a phone call from a confidential informant concerning Defendant William Downing. The confidential informant had previously provided reliable information in three other narcotics-related cases; Sergeant Johnson had spoken with the informant several times before; Sergeant Johnson had corroborated the informant\u2019s prior information, and each time it proved accurate; and the confidential informant was not receiving any compensation for this information.\nIn December 2002, the confidential informant told Sergeant Johnson that Defendant and another man, Jamie, were picking up cocaine from the Petersburg/Richmond, Virginia area and bringing it to Dare County. Investigator Kevin Duprey, a member of the Dare County narcotics unit, had an open narcotics investigation concerning Jamie and his residence on Loblolly Court. On a previous occasion, the informant told Sergeant Johnson that he had seen Defendant bring cocaine and marijuana to Jamie\u2019s house on Loblolly Court.\nBefore 1 March 2003, Sergeant Johnson had observed a white Ford Aerostar van at Defendant\u2019s residence in Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina. After running the license plate number, Sergeant Johnson learned the van was registered to Defendant. The informant also gave a physical description of Defendant that matched his photograph from the Department of Motor Vehicles.\nOn 1 March 2003 at around 4:30 p.m., the informant called Sergeant Johnson and informed him that he had been in the Loblolly Court residence earlier that day and overheard a conversation between Defendant and Jamie. The informant stated that Defendant was leaving for the Petersburg/Richmond, Virginia area at approximately 3:00 p.m. that day to pick up cocaine and would be returning to Dare County at approximately 8:00 p.m. The informant stated that Defendant would be alone, driving a white Ford Aerostar van.\nInvestigator Duprey drove by Defendant\u2019s residence and observed that the white Ford Aerostar van was not parked at the residence. Sergeant Johnson knew the direct route of travel from Peterburg/Richmond to Dare County would be to cross the Currituck Sound using Highway 158. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Sergeant Johnson and Investigator Duprey sat in a vehicle on the side of Highway 158 just as the highway comes off the Currituck Sound Bridge into Dare County. About two hours later, a white Ford Aerostar van passed the officers\u2019 location heading south into Dare County on Highway 158. The officers pulled behind the van and confirmed that the license plate number on the van matched that of the vehicle registered to Defendant. It appeared to the officers that there was only one person in the van.\nThe officers activated their blue lights, and the van pulled into the main two-lane entrance for a complex of stores. Deputy Ethridge pulled in front of the van, and Investigator Duprey parked behind the van. Defendant, who was alone in the van, produced his driver\u2019s license confirming that he was in fact the person they were looking for.\nThe officers asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle. Defendant said he had just come from Petersburg. Deputy Etheridge patted Defendant down for weapons and found a small amount of marijuana and a pipe in one of his pockets. Investigator Duprey informed Defendant that the officers needed to move the van because it was creating a traffic hazard and for investigative purposes. Defendant told officers that he would move the van. But the officers explained he could not get in the van unless he rode with an officer and told them \u201cwhere the drugs were[.]\u201d At this point, Defendant was not under arrest or \u201cMirandized.\u201d Defendant was handcuffed for officer safety reasons and Sergeant Johnson moved the van after Defendant consented.\nWhile moving the van, Sergeant Johnson \u201csmelled a strong odor of what smelled like cocaine.\u201d Officers then searched the vehicle, although Defendant did not consent, and located a Wendy\u2019s restaurant food bag between the driver\u2019s seat and front passenger seat. Inside the food bag was a plastic bag containing approximately six ounces of cocaine. The officers then placed Defendant under arrest.\nFollowing the trial court\u2019s denial of his Motion to Suppress all evidence seized from the stop of the van, Defendant reserved his right to appeal the ruling and pled no contest to the charges. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of thirty-five to forty-two months imprisonment and a $100,000 fine. Defendant appealed the denial of the motion to suppress.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his constitutional rights were violated by the illegal (1) stopping of his vehicle; (2) movement and search of his vehicle; and (3) pat down of his person. We disagree.\n\u201cThe standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2018are con-elusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App. 107, 114, 584 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2003) (citation omitted). If the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are supported by its factual findings, we will not disturb those conclusions on appeal. State v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135, 138, 557 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (2001).\nWhere an appellant fails to assign error to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, the findings are \u201cpresumed to be correct.\u201d Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998). As Defendant failed to assign error to any findings of fact, our review is limited to the question of whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, which are presumed to be supported by competent evidence, support its conclusions of law and judgment. Okwara v. Dillard Dep\u2019t Stores, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 587 591-92, 525 S.E.2d 481, 484 (2000).\nDefendant argues that the stop of his vehicle violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nThe Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. These constitutional provisions apply to \u201cbrief investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle.\u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citation omitted). An investigatory stop must be based upon a reasonable articulable suspicion the person is, was, or will be involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968); State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E.2d 776, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L. Ed. 2d 143, 100 S. Ct. 220 (1979). In determining the validity of the stop, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, and determine whether a \u201creasonable and cautious\u201d police officer would have had a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 395, 386 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1989).\nHere, officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in illegal activity at the time they made the investigatory vehicle stop. The uncontested findings of fact show: (1) a confidential informant told police that Defendant would be transporting cocaine that day; (2) Defendant was driving a vehicle that matched the description given by the informant; (3) the tag numbers on the vehicle matched that of the vehicle registered to Defendant; (4) Defendant was driving on the suspected route for drug transportation; and (5) Defendant crossed into Dare County at the approximate time indicated by the informant. The totality of the circumstances gave police a reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was transporting drugs. Jones, 96 N.C. App. at 395, 386 S.E.2d at 221. Therefore, the vehicle stop did not violate Defendant\u2019s federal or state constitutional rights.\nDefendant next argues that the subsequent entry and movement of his vehicle violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nAn officer does not need to obtain a warrant or have probable cause to enter a vehicle if the owner of the vehicle gives consent. State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 340-41, 572 S.E.2d 108, 125 (2002); State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 615, 618-19, 589 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2003). The findings of fact explicitly state \u201c. . . [Defendant] gave Sgt. Johnson permission to move the van . ...\u201d As Defendant did not assign error to this finding of fact, it is presumed correct. Inspirational Network, Inc., 131 N.C. App. at 235, 506 S.E.2d at 758. As consent was given, Defendant\u2019s federal and state constitutional rights were not violated when Sergeant Johnson entered and moved the vehicle.\nDefendant next argues that the officers searched Defendant\u2019s vehicle without a search warrant and without probable cause to search the vehicle in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nIt is a well-established rule that a search warrant is not required before a lawful search based on probable cause of a motor vehicle in a public roadway or in a public vehicular area may take place. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 583-84 (1982); Isleib, 319 N.C. at 638, 356 S.E.2d at 576. \u201c \u2018Probable cause exists where \u2018the facts and circumstances within their [the officers\u2019] knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that\u2019 an offense has been or is being committed.\u2019 \u201d State v. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 133, 516 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1999) (quoting State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984)). \u201cIn utilizing an informant\u2019s tip, probable cause is determined using a \u2018totality-of-the-circumstances\u2019 analysis which \u2018permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indi-cia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant\u2019s tip.\u2019 \u201d Earhart, 134 N.C. App. at 133, 516 S.E.2d at 886 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 545, rehearing denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1983)).\nAs stated earlier, the uncontested findings of fact show: (1) a confidential informant told police that Defendant would be transporting cocaine that day; (2) Defendant was driving a vehicle that matched the description given by the informant; (3) the tag numbers on the vehicle matched that of the vehicle registered to Defendant; (4) Defendant was driving on the suspected route for drug transportation; and (5) Defendant crossed into Dare County at the approximate time indicated by the informant. Also, the informant had provided accurate narcotics information to Sergeant Johnson on three prior occasions.\nMoreover, upon lawfully entering and moving the vehicle, Sergeant Johnson \u201csmelled a strong odor of what smelled like cocaine.\u201d Plain smell of drugs by an officer is evidence to conclude there is probable cause for a search. State v. Trapper, 48 N.C. App. 481, 484-85, 269 S.E.2d 680, 682, appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 997, 68 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1981) (affidavit containing a statement that a strong odor of marijuana was noticed was evidence from which a magistrate could conclude there was probable cause to issue a search warrant).\nIn sum, the totality of the circumstances of Defendant\u2019s vehicle and identity match to the informant\u2019s tip along with the odor of cocaine gave the officers probable cause that an offense was being committed. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. at 133, 516 S.E.2d at 886. Therefore, the officers did not violate Defendant\u2019s federal or state constitutional rights when searching the vehicle. Isleib, 319 N.C. at 638, 356 S.E.2d at 576.\nFinally, Defendant argues that the pat down of his person violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. Regardless of whether the pat down was illegal, this argument is irrelevant. Neither the pat down nor the evidence of marijuana found on Defendant\u2019s person factored in our analysis of the legality of the vehicular stop, entry and movement of the vehicle, and search of the vehicle leading to the cocaine charges against Defendant. Indeed, the officers found only marijuana on Defendant\u2019s person during the pat down search. Defendant was never charged with any drug offense for the possession of marijuana. Therefore, even if the marijuana should have been excluded from evidence, it would have been harmless error for the transportation of cocaine charges.\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress was proper and we therefore affirm the order of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Rudy Renfer, for the State.", "McGotter, Ashton & Smith, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III and Terri W. Sharp, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MICHAEL DOWNING, Defendant\nNo. COA04-928\n(Filed 19 April 2005)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 investigatory stop \u2014 drugs\u2014motion to suppress \u2014 pat down\nThe trial court did not err in a trafficking in cocaine by possession and transportation case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his motor vehicle, because: (1) officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was involved in illegal activity at the time they made the investigatory vehicle stop; (2) the police lawfully stopped a vehicle fitting a description given by a reliable confidential informant, lawfully entered and moved the vehicle with defendant\u2019s consent, and smelled cocaine upon entering the vehicle; (3) an officer does not need to obtain a warrant or have probable cause to enter a vehicle if the owner of the vehicle gives consent; (4) a search warrant is not required before a lawful search based on probable cause of a motor vehicle in a public roadway or in a public vehicular area may take place; (5) plain smell of drugs by an officer is evidence to conclude there is probable cause for a search; and (6) although defendant contends the pat down of his person violated his constitutional rights, this argument is irrelevant when neither the pat down nor the evidence of marijuana found on defendant\u2019s person factored into the legality of the vehicular stop, entry and movement of the vehicle, and search of the vehicle leading to the cocaine charges.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 February 2004 by Judge Cy Anthony Grant, Sr. in Superior Court, Dare County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March 2005.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Rudy Renfer, for the State.\nMcGotter, Ashton & Smith, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III and Terri W. Sharp, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0790-01", "first_page_order": 820, "last_page_order": 827 }