{ "id": 8556669, "name": "ALICE JEANNIE HAWLEY CLOUSE v. CHAIRTOWN MOTORS, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Clouse v. Chairtown Motors, Inc.", "decision_date": "1973-03-28", "docket_number": "No. 7322SC140", "first_page": "669", "last_page": "673", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "17 N.C. App. 669" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "150 S.E. 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598366 ], "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625804 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626602 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629004 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 S.E. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606952 ], "year": 1937, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S.E. 2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630960 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 N.C., 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623653 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547102 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547232 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 N.C. App. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555275 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/13/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S.E. 2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631118 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E. 2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574525 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568154 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627599 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0723-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 489, "char_count": 9600, "ocr_confidence": 0.49, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5522964274278852e-07, "percentile": 0.6749928277671787 }, "sha256": "dd3e5e26a5cbd79bdafbe6997d8d9dd24da0c7275cb0cc59c867dbfd8aa3fbef", "simhash": "1:306071b373fd24fb", "word_count": 1612 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:26:57.402584+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Brock and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "ALICE JEANNIE HAWLEY CLOUSE v. CHAIRTOWN MOTORS, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nPlaintiff\u2019s Appeal\nPlaintiff assigns error to the action of the trial judge, allowing the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(a). Plaintiff contends that, under the facts of this case, the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury.\nIn North Carolina, whether a party may recover punitive damages in an action for fraud depends on the character of the acts alleged to constitute fraud in each case. Swinton v. Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E. 2d 785 (1953).\n\u201cIn ordinary cases a recovery of exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages will not be allowed in an action of deceit, but in certain cases such damages may be allowed, as . . . where the fraud is gross or the case presents other extraordinary or exceptional circumstances clearly indicating malice and willfulness, as where it appears that defendant acted with a deliberate intent to injure plaintiff. ...\u201d 37 C.J.S., Fraud, \u00a7 144.\nSee also, Nunn v. Smith, 270 N.C. 374, 154 S.E. 2d 497 (1967); Van Leuven v. Motor Lines, 261 N.C. 539, 135 S.E. 2d 640 (1964); Binder v. Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E. 2d 894 (1943); Mills v. Koscot Interplanetary, 13 N.C. App. 681, 187 S.E. 2d 372 (1972); Poplin v. Ledbetter, 6 N.C. App. 170, 169 S.E. 2d 527 (1969).\n\u201c[W]e think the rule is that the facts in each case must determine whether the fraudulent representations alleged were accompanied by such acts and conduct as to subject the wrongdoer to an assessment of additional damages, for the purpose of punishing him for what has been called his \u2018outrageous conduct\u2019.\u201d Swinton v. Realty Co., supra.\nWe hold that, taking all of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence as true, the record is void of evidence of insult, indignity, malice, oppression, or bad motive, and that the facts upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages are the same facts on which he bases his cause of action for fraud. See Nunn v. Smith, supra. This assignment of error is overruled.\nAlthough not referred to by the plaintiff in her brief, we note that this case has been before us on a previous appeal [Clouse v. Motors, Inc., 14 N.C. App. 117, 187 S.E. 2d 398 (1972)]. On that appeal, Judge Vaughn, writing for the Court, held that the trial court had erred in allowing the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint as to the issue of punitive damages and that the facts alleged in the complaint of the plaintiff stated a claim for punitive damages upon which relief could be granted, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b) (6). At the trial below the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages was allowed, and we have sustained that ruling on this appeal. Plaintiff has not raised or discussed the issue whether the decision on plaintiff\u2019s former appeal is the \u201claw of the case,\u201d binding on the question of the adequacy of the facts to state a claim for relief for the jury to decide. Even had the plaintiff so contended, she could not prevail. In the former appeal the sufficiency of pleadings was before the court. Here we are concerned with sufficiency of the evidence.\n\u201cIt is contended that the \u2018law of the case\u2019 was written when this case was before us at the fall term of 1940, 218 N.C., 680, 12 S.E. (2d), 217. At that term we held that the demurrer to the complaint should not have been sustained. We are now holding that the demurrer to the evidence in this case should be sustained. There is no inconsistency in such holdings. ...\u201d Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N.C. 463, 23 S.E. 2d 844 (1943), reh. denied, 223 N.C. 331, 26 S.E. 2d 567; Smith v. Sink, 211 N.C. 725, 192 S.E. 108 (1937). See also, Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E. 2d 320 (1952).\nPlaintiff further assigns error to the admission in evidence of certain testimony and the exclusion from evidence of other testimony. We have considered the questions raised, but are of the opinion that no prejudicial error was committed therein by the trial judge. These assignments of error are overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s Appeal\nDefendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to grant its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 50(b). However, we are of the opinion that viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury and amply supported the verdict and that defendant\u2019s motions were properly denied. Garland v. Penegar, 235 N.C. 517, 70 S.E. 2d 486 (1952); cf. Bennett v. Whippett-Knight Co., 198 N.C. 98, 150 S.E. 676 (1929). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 51(a). We have examined the challenged portion in connection with the charge as a whole in the light of the evidence offered. We do not perceive any substantial ground upon which to predicate harmful error.\nPlaintiff\u2019s appeal \u2014 Affirmed.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal \u2014 Affirmed.\nJudges Brock and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "John Randolph Ingram for plaintiff appellee and plaintiff appellant.", "Charles F. Lambeth, Jr., for defendant appellant and defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALICE JEANNIE HAWLEY CLOUSE v. CHAIRTOWN MOTORS, INC.\nNo. 7322SC140\n(Filed 28 March 1973)\n1. Damages \u00a7 15; Fraud \u00a7 12\u2014 fraud in sale of automobile \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 punitive damages\nIn this action to recover damages for fraud in the sale of an automobile, plaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient for submission to the jury of an issue of compensatory damages, but was insufficient for submission of an issue of punitive damages, where it tended to show that defendant\u2019s agents represented to plaintiff that the automobile came straight from the factory, that it had never been \u201ctitled\u201d to another person, that it was a \u201cnew factory demonstrator car,\u201d and that it had not been wrecked, that the automobile in fact had previously been owned by a rent-a-car company, and that subsequent to the purchase one of defendant\u2019s agents admitted that the automobile had been wrecked.\n2. Appeal and Error \u00a7 68\u2014 law of the case \u2014 sufficiency of complaint \u2014 insufficiency of evidence\nDecision on former appeal that plaintiff\u2019s complaint stated a claim for relief for punitive damages does not constitute the law of the case on the question of whether plaintiff\u2019s evidence is sufficient to support the submission of an issue of punitive damages to the jury.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendant from Gambill, Judge, 10 July 1972 Session of Superior Court held in Davidson County.\nPlaintiff commenced this civil action against the defendant corporation seeking compensatory and punitive damages for fraud. The defendant filed a counterclaim seeking damages on a cause of action unrelated to the plaintiff\u2019s claim for fraud. The issues raised by the counterclaim were answered by the jury in favor of the plaintiff and the appeal taken as to those issues has lapsed.\nAt trial before a jury plaintiff testified in her own behalf to the following facts: On 18 November 1969, plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant corporation to purchase a 1969 Mercury automobile. At the time the contract was entered into, the defendant corporation\u2019s agents, C. C. Alexander and J. E. Sink, represented to plaintiff that the Mercury automobile \u201ccame straight from the factory\u201d; that it had never been \u201ctitled\u201d to another person; that \u201cit was a new factory demonstrator car\u201d; and that the Mercury automobile had not been \u201cwrecked.\u201d Plaintiff further testified that she relied upon these representations in deciding to purchase the Mercury automobile, but that, subsequent to the purchase, C. C. Alexander \u201cadmitted the car had been wrecked.\u201d On 15 December 1969, plaintiff discovered from a notice mailed to her by the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles that the Mercury automobile she had purchased had previously been owned by a \u201crent-a-car\u201d company. Plaintiff also testified that the purchase price of the Mercury car was $3,295.00, but that in her opinion the fair market value of the car on the date of purchase was only $2,500.00.\nThe defendant offered evidence showing, in substance, that the defendant\u2019s agents and employees had not knowingly made any false representations to the plaintiff; that the title to the Mercury automobile in question was originally held by a \u201crent-a-car\u201d corporation, but that neither C. C. Alexander nor J. E. Sink were aware of that fact when dealing with Mrs. Clouse; that neither Alexander nor Sink made any statement with regard to whether or not the Mercury car had been previously owned by a \u201crent-a-car\u201d company, but that Sink had represented to Mrs. Clouse that the Mercury was a \u201cfactory car.\u201d Defendant also offered in evidence testimony to the effect that the purchase contract between plaintiff and defendant showed the Mercury car as being a \u201cused factory\u201d car and that cars used by \u201crent-a-car\u201d companies were sold as \u201cused factory\u201d cars by the defendant.\nAt the close of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied as to the claim for fraud, but allowed as to the issue of punitive damages. At the close of all the evidence, the motion for a directed verdict was renewed and denied by the trial court. The jury answered the issues tendered in favor of the plaintiff and returned a verdict that the plaintiff shall recover of the defendant the sum of $795.00. Judgment was entered on the verdict and the defendant\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed, assigning error.\nJohn Randolph Ingram for plaintiff appellee and plaintiff appellant.\nCharles F. Lambeth, Jr., for defendant appellant and defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0669-01", "first_page_order": 693, "last_page_order": 697 }